The PKK’s miscalculation of regional politics from the ceasefire to the present day PKK army

In 2013, Saleh Muslim, the former co-chair of the Democratic Union Party (PYD), visited Ankara and met with Turkish officials. “Kurds will need to have a new status in the new order in Syria,” Muslim told Anadolu News Agency, the Turkish state news agency. Muslim also said that the PYD, the Syrian branch of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), would consider opening an office in Ankara.

In those days, the Syrian Kurds’ political demands were not perceived as a security threat by the Turkish government, because there were ongoing peace negotiations between the PKK and Turkey. The PKK had already declared a ceasefire in March 2013 and had begun to reposition its fighters from Turkey to Northern Iraq as part of the negotiation process.

However, in the following months a different PKK agenda began to unfold. In September 2013, the PKK halted its withdrawal from Turkish soil and began to arm newly-established urban militants and its youth wing, Patriotic Revolutionary Youth Movement (YGD-H) in predominantly Kurdish cities. Although Ocalan, the party’s leader, repeatedly declared that the era of armed struggle had ended for “guerillas” in Turkey, there were two reasons why the PKK decided to keep its troops in Turkey.

First, it believed that the governing Justice and Development Party (AKP) was losing its power in Turkey as a result of the Gezi protests during the summer of 2013. Second, the PKK’s Syrian branch, the PYD, had been increasing its political influence in the context of the Syrian Civil War and had the chance to become a regional actor in Northern Syria.

In declaring an autonomous administration in Northern Syria in 2014, the PKK and PYD had faith that this would allow them to seize control of territories in Northern Syria and establish a democratic, autonomous administration founded on Marxist-Leninist practices. The PYD’s Rojava administrative structure was inspired by Abdullah Ocalan’s belief that self-government without state control offered the best future for Kurdish politics. Therefore, this represented a historical opportunity for the PKK to reach its political and ideological goals, the most promising since its founding in 1978.

On July 11, 2015, the KCK, an umbrella organization that included the PKK, announced that the  ceasefire between the PKK and Turkey had ended. The PKK wanted to halt the construction of all roads and dams that were being built by the Turkish government in Kurdish regions. “The decision to mobilize all sources including the guerilla forces has been taken to halt the construction of all dams,” it stated.

The KCK also emphasized that the Turkish state had been warned many times that the building of roads and dams for military purposes was perceived as an attempt to strengthen control in the event of a conflict.

When the PKK ended its no-conflict policy for this insignificant reason, costing many lives, the PYD/YPG was in control of most of Northern Syria. The PKK was no longer tied to peaceful negotiations in Turkey and had established close relations with the U.S. and Russia in Syria. During this time Western countries came to view the Kurds as secular forces fighting against ISIS.

For the PKK leaders, the use of violence and weaponry bolstered their acceptance as powerful political actors in the region. Western media outlets showcased the YPG as secular heroes in the struggle against ISIS. For the West, YPG fighters represented the modern and secular battle against “radical Islamic terrorism.” Moreover, some Western journalist and experts believed that the female fighters of the PKK and YPG had a significant role in the Rojava revolution. Vice News credited Rojava with “the most Feminist Revolution the World Has Ever Witnessed.”

In October 2015, the SDF (Syrian Democratic Forces), an umbrella group dominated by YPG fighters, were founded in Northern Syria. In military operations against ISIS, the SDF became the most powerful militia group on the ground. Despite increased tensions between the United States and Turkey, the United States had been cooperating with the YPG since 2015 and had been directly sending arms to the SDF since 2017.

In 2017, with the help of the U.S., SDF-led forces captured Raqqa from ISIS. Following the city’s capture from ISIS, SDF fighters unveiled a large portrait of their leader, Abdullah Ocalan. However, there was a historical irony in this event: It was the U.S., cooperating with Kenya, who had provided Turkey with the intelligence necessary for Ocalan’s 1999 capture in Kenya.

The strategic importance of the PKK/YPG relied upon ISIS’s presence in Syria PKK

Since 2014 there has been ongoing tension between Turkey and the Obama and Trump administrations regarding U.S. engagement with the YPG. However, Turkey remains a NATO ally and a strategic partner in the Middle East. The two countries still share military and economic interests.

Early in 2018, Turkey launched a military operation beyond its southern border directed at the Kurdish canton of Afrin in Northern Syria. The goal of Operation Olive Branch was to “create a security belt” in the area and to prevent any assistance from Northern Syria from aiding PKK militants.

Even though France called for an emergency meeting of the UN following Turkey’s Operation Olive Branch, and some members of the European Parliament condemned the operation, the U.S. did not totally oppose Turkey’s advances. Former Defense Secretary James Mattis stated that Turkey had “legitimate security concerns.” Former Secretary of State Rex Tillerson announced that the United States “recognizes and fully appreciates Turkey’s legitimate right to protect its own citizens from terrorist elements.”

Even though the U.S. decision to withdraw from Syria appeared unexpected (even to SDF officials, who according to NPR learned about the decision while watching television), Donald Trump had already called for the U.S. to leave the Middle East before he took power in the White House. Also, The U.S. move only reveals that Turkey is still a more reliable and valuable ally than the YPG fighters in terms of U.S. interests. Over the long term, correct policy recommends a continued partnership between the United States and Turkey.

The PYD/YPG has organic links with the PKK, which has been waging an armed struggle against Turkey since 1984. Even though the PKK has at times gained political power and received temporary support from various countries, the PKK is essentially a military organization. The U.S. and EU nations all recognize the PKK as a terrorist organization. It is highly unlikely that the PKK will become recognized as a legitimate actor unless it ends its armed struggle against Turkey.

Beginning in 2013, the AKP government took risks in attempting to solve the Kurdish issue peacefully. However, the PKK ended the ceasefire, brought heavy artillery into cities, built barricades and dug trenches to hinder Turkish security patrols, and in so doing effectively terrorized Turkey’s Southeast. According to the KCK’s statement, the ditches were dug in case of any attacks by the Turkish state, and the barricades were established as protection from the security forces in the towns.

Thousands of people have fled the Southeast to avoid heavy clashes between Turkish Security Forces and PKK militants. Instead of resuming the confrontation, the PKK should have ended its armed struggle against Turkey and become a more reliable and rational political actor in the Middle East. Following disarmament, the PKK could have become a legitimate political actor inside Turkey.

It is reasonable to say that there could be a possibility that Kurdish autonomy could have been recognized in Syria if the PKK had renounced violence and removed its fighters from Turkey. However, the PKK has chosen to continue its armed struggle and grossly underestimated the other players in the politics of the region.

The defeat of ISIS will impact PYD/PKK roles in Syria orton 2ed

ISIS has lost almost 90 percent of the territory which it controlled since 2014. Even though the organization has been carrying out attacks in Syria against its enemies both in Kurdish areas and in Arab-populated areas such as Idlib, U.S. President Trump has claimed that ISIS has been defeated and insists on withdrawing troops. When we look at the post-ISIS era in Syria, the importance of the PKK/PYD has declined compared to any other time during the past three years. The strategic importance of YPG fighters was due from their value as combatants against ISIS fighters.

The PKK has also lost a significant number of militants in Turkey, and Turkey’s Kurds have not supported the PKK’s decision to dig ditches to combat Turkish Security Forces. According to a poll by YORSAM in Sur, a central district of Diyarbakir, 83.3 percent of respondents stated that they believed that it was wrong for the PKK to have dug ditches inside of towns in 2015.

In addition, residents of Sur said that they had been threatened by the PKK, and their houses had been attacked because they had refused to help YDG-H militants in their struggle against security forces. Sur is one of the districts that was heavily affected by clashes between the Turkish Security Forces and the PKK.

Unsurprisingly, SDF officials have stated that they are ready to begin dialogue with the Assad regime to discuss the future of the region. Moreover, the SDF, which was seen as a crucial ally against ISIS, has discussed the release of 3,200 ISIS prisoners following Trump’s decision to withdraw troops. This will cause the reliability of SDF/YPG/PKK forces to come under scrutiny.

On January 15, U.S. President Donald Trump tweeted that during a phone conversation he had advised President Erdogan to establish a 20-mile safe zone in Syria. Following Trump’s statement, Turkey announced that it was willing to create a safe zone in Northeastern Syria for the benefit of the 4 million Syrians who had fled Syria to safety in his country.

The YPG/YPY has rejected the security zone proposal, but Aldar Khalil, co-chair of the Syrian Democratic Council (SDC), said he would accept the presence of UN forces for the purpose of creating a security line between Turkish forces and SDC fighters. Negotiations are ongoing between Turkey, the U.S., and the YPG/PYD.

Ultimately, the PKK has sacrificed the peace process in Turkey for the sake of control over territories in Northern Syria. However, these territories are currently at risk of a Turkish military operation, and Turkey has already shown that it has the capacity to suppress SDF/YPG forces, as was seen during Operation Olive Branch in Afrin last year.