Ömer ÖzkizilcikHow Turkey’s anti-PKK Operations Moved from Southeast Turkey to Iraq: Context, Outcome, and Role of the KRG
For a brief period from 2013 to 2014, it seemed that Turkey and the Kurdish militant group the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) might finally achieve peace. However, the peace process between the PKK and Turkey collapsed over renewed (PKK) terrorist attacks in the country, most likely as a spillover of the Syrian Civil War. However, the Turkish Armed Forces were confronted with a new reality:
the PKK had exploited the ceasefire to establish networks in the cities of Turkey’s southeast and entrenched itself in these cities to wage urban warfare against the Turkish army. With this, the trench operations began and the Turkish security forces managed to clear the cities from PKK militants with a toll of 793 losses and over 4,000 injuries. This led to the death of at least 314 Turkish citizens and the injury of over 2,000 civilians.
In the wake of these losses, two convictions were formed in Ankara: 1) The unfeasibility of a peace process with the PKK and 2) The need to fight the group at its source and strongholds rather than on Turkish soil. As such, Turkey launched its Euphrates Shield, Olive Branch, and Peace Spring operations against the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and the Syrian branch of the PKK, the People’s Defense Units (YPG) in Syria.
With the conclusion of these operations, terrorist attacks inside Turkey have come close to zero. While the PKK conducted 26 suicide attacks and 51 car bombs attacks in Turkey in the period between 2014 and 2018, the PKK has not been able to conduct a single suicide or car bomb attack inside Turkey since Operation Olive Branch.
The Turkish strategy to combat terrorism at its place of origin was two-pronged. On the one hand, it began to conduct cross-border military operations in Syria, and on the other hand, the Turkish Armed Forces drew the PKK out of Turkish cities to the rural areas of southeastern Turkey. Then, the Turkish army continued to clear rural areas from PKK militants and pushed them to the Turkish-Iraqi border. After the success of military operations inside Turkey, the next phase of operations shifted to the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI).
The first of a series of military operations in northern Iraq began with Operation Claw in 2019. The goal of this first operation was to secure the Turkish-Iraqi border at its easternmost part. The PKK camp in the Hakurk region was the first target. As is well-known, the PKK has maintained a decades-long presence in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI).
While its main bastion is located in the Qandil Mountains on the Iraqi-Iranian border region, the PKK also established several camps along the Turkish-Iraqi border – namely Hakurk, Avasin-Basyan, Zap, Metina, Zaho, and Haftanin. Further to the south, at the start of this operation, the PKK also had a strong presence in the Gara Mountains, the Makhmour camp, and the Sinjar Mountains.
In past decades, Turkish military operations against the PKK in the KRI were conducted usually every spring by a vast contingent of Turkish soldiers. In the 1990s, with these operations, the Turkish army would clear PKK strongholds during the summer and withdraw at the end of fall. The PKK would then return and re-establish its presence in the winter.
This led Turkey to significantly change its strategy. The Turkish army now primarily uses special forces and commando units in the KRI and prefers to secure territory in a more methodical manner. After a specific area is cleared from the PKK, the Turkish army does not withdraw from the region for the winter, but rather establishes military bases to solidify its gains. The following spring, the next step of the military operation commences and new territories are cleaned from the PKK. So far, over the past three years, this new strategy has been immensely successful.
This change in Turkish strategy has become possible for three different reasons. The first is Turkey’s technological advancements. Turkey’s advanced drone technology has enabled permanent aerial surveillance that helps to protect the chain of Turkish military bases from hit-and-run attacks by the PKK.
Secondly, the change within the Turkish Armed Forces towards a more professional army enabled it to have enough special forces and commando units to conduct these military operations. Last but not least, the cleaning of the Turkish Armed Forces from Gulenist
generals and officers restored command control and hierarchy in the Turkish army. The increased cohesion and civilian control over the military has enabled it to carry out more dynamic and continuous cross-border military operations.
A second aspect of the Turkish military operations is the role of the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) and its military forces – the Peshmarga. The succesful series of Claw operations forced the PKK to flee further and further southwards. However, the Iraqi Kurdish authorities fear that the PKK may entrench itself in new territories in the south and thus provoke Turkish military actions. Thus, the Peshmerga forces of the KRG initially deployed alongside the southern lines of the PKK’s zones of operation.
As KRG President Nechirvan Barzani and KRI Prime Minister Masrour Barzani have repeatedly stated, the KRG wants the PKK to leave KRI soil and no longer use its territory to stage attacks against Turkey. For the KRG, Turkey is an essential ally. Economic activities with Turkey, ranging from an oil pipeline connecting to Turkey’s Ceyhan port to Turkish infrastructure investments, are essential for Erbil to provide a certain amount of prosperity for the Iraqi Kurds.
Moreover, Iraqi Kurdish authorities understand their geography. To their west, Syria is a failed state split between rival powers. To their east, Iran is under heavy economic sanctions. To the south, dependence on the Iraqi Central Government would harm Erbil’s autonomy vis-à-vis Baghdad. Furthermore, the long list of problems in Iraq prevents the Iraqi central government from harvesting whatever potential the relationship does hold.
Therefore, the south is also not a viable option. In contrast to all of the land-locked KRG government’s other neighbors, Turkey presents itself as a bastion of security and prosperity. Economically as well as logistically, Turkey’s access to Europe and the world makes it unquestionably Erbil’s most important neighbor.
Knowing this and having historic grievances of its own against the PKK, the KRG has actively supported the Turkish Armed Forces in their operations against the PKK. What started with attempts to block the PKK from entering more Kurdish towns and villages evolved into the Kurdish Peshmarga deploying into PKK strongholds, cutting PKK supply lines, and directly aiding the Turkish army.
Interestingly, the Iraqi Kurdish authorities prefer to employ Rojava Peshmerga units, the military wing of the Kurdish National Council (KNC). The KNC is a rival Syrian Kurdish party which was expelled from Syria by the Syrian branch of the PKK, the PYD/YPG. PKK-affiliated media sources also emphasize the role of the Rojava Peshmerga. The involvement of the Rojava Peshmerga against the PKK in Sinjar and Duhok has also drawn condemnation from the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan party (PUK), Erbil’s rival Iraqi Kurdish party in the Sulaymaniyah governorate.
Given that the Rojava Peshmerga views the PKK/YPG as an totalitarian and oppressive force that prevents them from returning home, imprisons their family members, and routinely attacks their political offices in Syria, their motivation to fight against the PKK is relatively higher than the other Peshmerga units.
In response to the role of the Peshmerga units in the Turkish military operations, the PKK has reportedly attacked the Peshmarga and even destroyed parts of the oil pipeline to Turkey, the main economic income source of the KRG. The Rojava Peshmerga were also at the center of recent escalations when the YPG attacked the peshmerga in a cross-border attack.
In short, Operation Claw-Lock is based on a strategy that evolved after the collapse of the peace process which requires the active support of Iraqi Kurds. While the Turkish army advances from the north, the Kurdish army pressures the PKK from the south. During his latest visit to London, Prime Minister Barzani was attacked by anti-Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) protestors supposedly for his support of the operation.
However, the KDP hasn’t lost any of its electoral power in Erbil. On the contrary, it has even gained votes in disputed areas with the PUK and also in Sinjar. Moving forward it is important to understand how the Turkish operation affects intra-Kurdish competition and to predict the Turkish Army’s reaction if Baghdad fails to cleanse Sinjar from PKK. Such answers will shed more light on how Turkey’s role in northern Iraq will evolve.
How Turkey’s anti-PKK Operations Moved from Southeast Turkey to Iraq: Context, Outcome, and Role of the KRG
For a brief period from 2013 to 2014, it seemed that Turkey and the Kurdish militant group the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) might finally achieve peace. However, the peace process between the PKK and Turkey collapsed over renewed (PKK) terrorist attacks in the country, most likely as a spillover of the Syrian Civil War. However, the Turkish Armed Forces were confronted with a new reality:
the PKK had exploited the ceasefire to establish networks in the cities of Turkey’s southeast and entrenched itself in these cities to wage urban warfare against the Turkish army. With this, the trench operations began and the Turkish security forces managed to clear the cities from PKK militants with a toll of 793 losses and over 4,000 injuries. This led to the death of at least 314 Turkish citizens and the injury of over 2,000 civilians.
In the wake of these losses, two convictions were formed in Ankara: 1) The unfeasibility of a peace process with the PKK and 2) The need to fight the group at its source and strongholds rather than on Turkish soil. As such, Turkey launched its Euphrates Shield, Olive Branch, and Peace Spring operations against the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and the Syrian branch of the PKK, the People’s Defense Units (YPG) in Syria.
With the conclusion of these operations, terrorist attacks inside Turkey have come close to zero. While the PKK conducted 26 suicide attacks and 51 car bombs attacks in Turkey in the period between 2014 and 2018, the PKK has not been able to conduct a single suicide or car bomb attack inside Turkey since Operation Olive Branch.
The Turkish strategy to combat terrorism at its place of origin was two-pronged. On the one hand, it began to conduct cross-border military operations in Syria, and on the other hand, the Turkish Armed Forces drew the PKK out of Turkish cities to the rural areas of southeastern Turkey. Then, the Turkish army continued to clear rural areas from PKK militants and pushed them to the Turkish-Iraqi border. After the success of military operations inside Turkey, the next phase of operations shifted to the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI).
The first of a series of military operations in northern Iraq began with Operation Claw in 2019. The goal of this first operation was to secure the Turkish-Iraqi border at its easternmost part. The PKK camp in the Hakurk region was the first target. As is well-known, the PKK has maintained a decades-long presence in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI).
While its main bastion is located in the Qandil Mountains on the Iraqi-Iranian border region, the PKK also established several camps along the Turkish-Iraqi border – namely Hakurk, Avasin-Basyan, Zap, Metina, Zaho, and Haftanin. Further to the south, at the start of this operation, the PKK also had a strong presence in the Gara Mountains, the Makhmour camp, and the Sinjar Mountains.
In past decades, Turkish military operations against the PKK in the KRI were conducted usually every spring by a vast contingent of Turkish soldiers. In the 1990s, with these operations, the Turkish army would clear PKK strongholds during the summer and withdraw at the end of fall. The PKK would then return and re-establish its presence in the winter.
This led Turkey to significantly change its strategy. The Turkish army now primarily uses special forces and commando units in the KRI and prefers to secure territory in a more methodical manner. After a specific area is cleared from the PKK, the Turkish army does not withdraw from the region for the winter, but rather establishes military bases to solidify its gains. The following spring, the next step of the military operation commences and new territories are cleaned from the PKK. So far, over the past three years, this new strategy has been immensely successful.
This change in Turkish strategy has become possible for three different reasons. The first is Turkey’s technological advancements. Turkey’s advanced drone technology has enabled permanent aerial surveillance that helps to protect the chain of Turkish military bases from hit-and-run attacks by the PKK.
Secondly, the change within the Turkish Armed Forces towards a more professional army enabled it to have enough special forces and commando units to conduct these military operations. Last but not least, the cleaning of the Turkish Armed Forces from Gulenist
generals and officers restored command control and hierarchy in the Turkish army. The increased cohesion and civilian control over the military has enabled it to carry out more dynamic and continuous cross-border military operations.
A second aspect of the Turkish military operations is the role of the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) and its military forces – the Peshmarga. The succesful series of Claw operations forced the PKK to flee further and further southwards. However, the Iraqi Kurdish authorities fear that the PKK may entrench itself in new territories in the south and thus provoke Turkish military actions. Thus, the Peshmerga forces of the KRG initially deployed alongside the southern lines of the PKK’s zones of operation.
As KRG President Nechirvan Barzani and KRI Prime Minister Masrour Barzani have repeatedly stated, the KRG wants the PKK to leave KRI soil and no longer use its territory to stage attacks against Turkey. For the KRG, Turkey is an essential ally. Economic activities with Turkey, ranging from an oil pipeline connecting to Turkey’s Ceyhan port to Turkish infrastructure investments, are essential for Erbil to provide a certain amount of prosperity for the Iraqi Kurds.
Moreover, Iraqi Kurdish authorities understand their geography. To their west, Syria is a failed state split between rival powers. To their east, Iran is under heavy economic sanctions. To the south, dependence on the Iraqi Central Government would harm Erbil’s autonomy vis-à-vis Baghdad. Furthermore, the long list of problems in Iraq prevents the Iraqi central government from harvesting whatever potential the relationship does hold.
Therefore, the south is also not a viable option. In contrast to all of the land-locked KRG government’s other neighbors, Turkey presents itself as a bastion of security and prosperity. Economically as well as logistically, Turkey’s access to Europe and the world makes it unquestionably Erbil’s most important neighbor.
Knowing this and having historic grievances of its own against the PKK, the KRG has actively supported the Turkish Armed Forces in their operations against the PKK. What started with attempts to block the PKK from entering more Kurdish towns and villages evolved into the Kurdish Peshmarga deploying into PKK strongholds, cutting PKK supply lines, and directly aiding the Turkish army.
Interestingly, the Iraqi Kurdish authorities prefer to employ Rojava Peshmerga units, the military wing of the Kurdish National Council (KNC). The KNC is a rival Syrian Kurdish party which was expelled from Syria by the Syrian branch of the PKK, the PYD/YPG. PKK-affiliated media sources also emphasize the role of the Rojava Peshmerga. The involvement of the Rojava Peshmerga against the PKK in Sinjar and Duhok has also drawn condemnation from the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan party (PUK), Erbil’s rival Iraqi Kurdish party in the Sulaymaniyah governorate.
Given that the Rojava Peshmerga views the PKK/YPG as an totalitarian and oppressive force that prevents them from returning home, imprisons their family members, and routinely attacks their political offices in Syria, their motivation to fight against the PKK is relatively higher than the other Peshmerga units.
In response to the role of the Peshmerga units in the Turkish military operations, the PKK has reportedly attacked the Peshmarga and even destroyed parts of the oil pipeline to Turkey, the main economic income source of the KRG. The Rojava Peshmerga were also at the center of recent escalations when the YPG attacked the peshmerga in a cross-border attack.
In short, Operation Claw-Lock is based on a strategy that evolved after the collapse of the peace process which requires the active support of Iraqi Kurds. While the Turkish army advances from the north, the Kurdish army pressures the PKK from the south. During his latest visit to London, Prime Minister Barzani was attacked by anti-Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) protestors supposedly for his support of the operation.
However, the KDP hasn’t lost any of its electoral power in Erbil. On the contrary, it has even gained votes in disputed areas with the PUK and also in Sinjar. Moving forward it is important to understand how the Turkish operation affects intra-Kurdish competition and to predict the Turkish Army’s reaction if Baghdad fails to cleanse Sinjar from PKK. Such answers will shed more light on how Turkey’s role in northern Iraq will evolve.