Turkey-US relations have undergone serious tribulations, which were further exasperated by the July 15th coup attempt and the war in Syria. Khashoggi's murder brought to surface the imperceptive way in which these relations were managed, and how these two countries, who need each other, were left in awkward standing with one another. This case has also shown that often NATO's responses to Turkey's security needs fall short of Turkey's expectations, and as the largest force and the main driver of the organization, the US needs to reassess their perception of Turkey's security problems in the MENA region.

Before Khashoggi's murder, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) under the leadership of the Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman (MbS) was emerging as one of the most intimate partners of the US and the White House in the region. While there was a serious media and political campaign to present MbS as the new reform leader of the region, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan despite being an elected leader was abased to be a problematic “sultan” in the region. The media coverage of President Erdogan would freely make use of words like “sultan,” “dictator” and “problematic” and would even caricature him in traditional sultan image. It is important to understand how the cracks are formed in bilateral relations in moments like these as they are key to discerning the political psychology in Ankara, and reasons for Turkey’s skepticism towards Turkey-US relations and the US's wider MENA policies.
The Khashoggi case showed that support for imbalanced representations of Turkey and efforts to substitute Turkey’s role with other powers in the region are not advantageous policies for Western capitals. In the meantime, it highlighted that for Ankara the issues at play that could help mend ties with the US all relate to its security threats, either internally like FETO or externally like PYD and YPG in Syria. On November 8th, the US announced that it put a price on the heads of the three PKK leaders, and more recently there have been reports in the American media that the White House was considering the removal of Fethullah Gulen, whose extradition to Turkey has long been requested due to his ties to the July 15th coup attempt. Such reports were later denied by officials, stating discussions around Fethullah Gulen’s legal status in the US did not take place. Still, all these developments indicate that the US is also coming to realize that the road ahead for mending ties with Turkey will require responding to the nation’s security threats, where Turkey has already asked for cooperation.

After Khashoggi, the US cannot outsource Turkey’s regional role to the KSA

The murder of Jamaal Khashoggi exposed the outlandish power games in the Middle East that were backed by Western capitals, which includes not only Trump’s chaotic White House, but also Downing Street struggling with Brexit and proponents of the defense industry from Élysée Palace to Bundeskanzleramt. The recent dynamics in KSA under the leadership of the Crown Prince have been troublesome. To give some examples, in the foreign policy realm, we witnessed a prime minister being detained in Riyadh, and we still follow the war in Yemen as it takes heavy toll on civilian lives. In domestic politics, not only were dissidents imprisoned, but also influential members of the royal family were detained in a hotel under “corruption” charges, charges claiming as President Trump also put it, that these individuals had been “milking” their country for too long. However, it was the murder of journalist Jamal Khashoggi, which finally proved to the world that the exercise of power has gone too far in Riyadh.

This was not the first time the Middle East had seen vicious politics, but the situation of the Crown Prince is unique. Despite being the architect of such untamed and unhinged politics, he was hailed as “reformer,” leader and the new “hope” of the region. Soon after his ascension, next in line to the throne, the crown prince MbS was visiting Western capitals, posing not only with Western leaders, but also with billionaires, businessmen and politicians and sharing photos on Instagram and Twitter. It showed that not only for the White House but for business and political communities at large, KSA

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i- FETO stands for Gulenist Terrorist Organization, a network accepted as a terrorist organization by Turkey, GCC, OIC, Asian Parliamentary Assembly and over 25 countries in the Middle East, Africa and Central Asia closed down schools linked to this network.

ii- YPG is an acronym whose translation means People’s Protection Units, and PYD is its civilian arm. Turkey considers them to be offshoots of the PKK, so by extension terrorist organizations.

iii- PKK stands for The Kurdistan Workers’ Party, an organization deemed a terrorist group by both the US and Turkey.
under MbS was their main ally and partner in the MENA region. If not for the murder of Khashoggi, MbS’s conference dubbed as “Davos in the Desert” was going to be even more glamorous and better attended than the Davos Forum itself.  

KSA’s legitimacy in the Muslim world, as a leading power mostly depends on the role of its ruler as the custodian of the two of the holiest mosques in Islam, Kaba and the Prophet’s Masjid in Madina. Throughout the Khashoggi case, in his statements, President Erdogan has deliberately referred to King Salman of Saudi Arabia as the “Hadimü’l Haremeyn-ı Şerifeyn,” meaning “the servant of the two holy sanctuaries,” a noble and honorary reference to the custodian of the two holiest sites in Islam. Erdogan has repeatedly stated that he never believed, King Salman would order such a murder. This position implies the untold moral responsibility ascribed to the ruler of KSA as the custodian of the holiest sites in Islam, and Erdogan has been careful not to damage the legitimacy of the king. However, as a suspect in a brutal murder case, it might be too late for MbS to command respect from Muslim communities and to be hailed as the custodian of the holy sites. With Khashoggi’s murder hanging over his shoulder, it seems MbS will have a very hard time being accepted as a respectable and trustworthy leader in the MENA region let alone the whole Muslim world.

Moreover, KSA under the de facto leadership of MbS has been a divisive force rather than a power using its influence to unify the region. The blockade on Qatar, and the ambivalent position of the crown prince on the status of Jerusalem, after the US made the controversial move to relocate its embassy there, are just some examples of instances where the Crown Prince stirred up regional conflict and neglected to step up to be a leader voicing regional concerns. On both occasions, the international relations arena witnessed Turkey’s leadership, be it unilaterally as in the case of Qatar, or multilaterally via the Organization of Islamic Cooperation and the European Union as in the Jerusalem controversy.

Now, the collective efforts to create a reform leader out of MbS has failed, and his expensive public image campaign both in the Western world and in Muslim communities has collapsed in the face of harsh realities. As such, although KSA will be a crucial regional power, it will not be able to substitute Turkey’s role and position in the MENA region. So then, where does this leave Turkey-US relations?

**Turkey-US Relations after Khashoggi**

Just prior to the Khashoggi case, Turkey-US relations were strained over the imprisonment of Brunson, an evangelical priest, whose release the Trump administration desired most ardently to appeal to its evangelical voters ahead of the midterm elections. Initially via Vice President Pence’s statements, the administration heightened tensions, and later President Trump threatened Ankara and eventually imposed sanctions and tariffs. Financial threats mixed with political demands antagonized Ankara and more importantly caused the downward spiral of the Turkish Lira. Trump’s security advisor, John Bolton’s comments that Turkey’s currency crisis would go away “instantly” if Brunson was to be released, spread a sense in the wider public that the US was again attacking Turkey, this time economically, and that Turkey was to fend for itself.

The Trump administration’s nearsighted behavior in dealing with the Brunson case, left the US vulnerable after the Khashoggi
case. The administration sanctioned the Turkish Ministers of Interior and Justice over the Brunson case, and later when Jamaal Khashoggi disappeared, the US had to depend on the same two ministers to get more information on the fate of Khashoggi. The very two ministries that the US accused for the mistreatment of Brunson, now had center stage in disseminating information to both the US and the rest of the world and were also responsible for following legal protocols and procedures. As it is the case in much of the Trump administration’s affairs, the White House acted presumptuously for Brunson’s release and eventually left the American state in an awkward and weak standing in the face of circumstances that emerged outside of the administration’s calculations.

Ten days after Khashoggi’s disappearance, Brunson had his pre-scheduled trial, during which he was convicted for espionage and sentenced to 3 years, 1 month and 15 days in prison. Turkish sources stated that it is a common practice in Turkish criminal law to release the convict after serving half or two thirds of his/her sentences, and it is also a routine practice to include time served in prison until the conviction date as a part of the sentence. Therefore, according to Turkey, Brunson who had already spent over two years in prison was released for having served his term. In less than 48 hours, Brunson was in the White House, giving a picture while he was praying with the President, and President Trump was voicing his gratitude to President Erdogan for releasing Brunson. However, for Turkish officials, Brunson was not released, he was convicted and had served his sentence. President Erdogan in a Twitter response to President Trump said that the independent Turkish legal system followed its due course, and that he is now hoping that Turkey and the US will cooperate in a manner befitting for allies, especially against terrorist organizations, such as the PKK, Daesh and FETO.

It was Brunson case not Khashoggi that reopened the channels between Turkey and the US

Therefore, it was Brunson case not Khashoggi that reopened the channels between Turkey and the US. However, Khashoggi case showed to the US that heedless policies towards Turkey might have disadvantageous consequences for the White House, causing the administration to contradict itself.

Older cracks in Turkey-US relations

The problems in Turkey’s relations with the US and Europe gained momentum again after the July 15th coup attempt when Western capitals were believed to be rather slow in responding and supporting the elected government in Turkey. Turkish citizens took to the streets, and guarded government buildings and strategic spots in the cities, such as city centers and airports, to help repel the coup. 251 civilians died and over 2200 injured in the night of July 15th. Afterwards, there was a general sense both in the public and the government that the night of the coup Turkey was left alone to defend for itself. This perception did put a significant strain on relations with the US on Turkey’s end. The “friends,” who in Ankara’s perspective did not show the expected support during what the officials deemed to be the nation’s darkest hour, did not have much credit left in Ankara afterwards. With this socio-political climate, Ankara overwhelmingly regarded the slow responses of the ‘allies’ as a clear lack of support. It did not help the matter when Western capitals were
rather quick in responding to how the Turkish government was dealing with the aftermath of the coup, with an alacrity that was missing the night of the coup. It is not to suggest that transitional justice in the aftermath of the coup has been managed without fault, but following Western media and statements from officials, one would think Turkey had turned into the “wild wild west,” governed by a ‘sultan.’ It is crucial to understand that how the Western media and political spheres chose to depict the coup further traumatized the relations and tilted the political psychology in Ankara against the Western capitals.

Two years later, a prominent journalist, Jamal Khashoggi, gets brutally murdered and dismembered inside the Saudi consulate in Istanbul by a death squad of 15 professionals, all Saudi government employees. The world then starts following the event closely, day and night from Istanbul. The “wild wild west” image of Turkey is interrupted and now a premier episode of ‘Law and Order’ is taking place in Istanbul, with Turkey showcasing the performance of its law enforcement agencies to the world and illustrating how its government is sticking to its local legal procedures as well as international law.

The distortions in representation and more importantly the lack of official support in recognizing the coup as a illegitimate event, consolidated the view in Ankara that the western capitals will not live up to expectations when they are under threats that they deem to be existential. Recently, as former ambassador Matthew Bryza has stated, there has been a misalignment of perceptions in Turkey-US bilateral relations when it comes to the coup attempt. He said that "many people in the US still believe maybe it was not a real coup and may be Erdogan engineered the whole affair... to defeat his political opposition. In Turkey, it is clear to everybody I know that it was a real coup attempt and it was close to succeed. There is also unanimous view [in Turkey] that the US must be behind the coup attempt since Gulen resides in the US.”12 It seems that the perceptions of the coup represent the deepest crack that needs to be resolved with care to be able to mend ties and lead long term policies together.

US-Turkey-NATO Triangle
President Erdogan wrote an article for the Washington Post explaining Turkey’s stance in the Khashoggi case and the measures his administration is following.13 In the article, he clearly stated that he is the leader of a NATO country, so by extension this was also an attack on NATO. There are uncanny conceptual similarities between the Khashoggi’s murder by the Saudis in Turkey and Sergei Skripal’s poisoning allegedly carried out by the Russians in the UK. However, neither the NATO itself nor the member countries reacted in a way similar to how they chose to respond to the Sergei Skripal case. From Turkey’s perspective, both were a matter of NATO countries’ sovereignty and security, and there needs to be a serious response to the audacity of the transgressors who carry out crimes on NATO soil.

There are uncanny conceptual similarities between the Khashoggi’s murder by the Saudis in Turkey and Sergei Skripal’s poisoning allegedly carried out by the Russians in the UK. However, neither the NATO itself nor the member countries reacted in a way similar to how they chose to respond to the Sergei Skripal case.
This situation was disappointing but not surprising for Ankara. According to Turkish officials, this was not the first time NATO chose to ignore Turkey’s security concerns. Turkey has been requesting anti-missile system deployment from NATO since the Assad Regime shot down a Turkish jet in 2012. There were some temporary arrangements made with the US, Germany, and the Netherlands under NATO coordination, but by 2015 all Patriots except one Spanish Patriot in Incirlik base, were withdrawn from Turkey. Turkey voiced willingness to buy Patriot systems but could not make progress, and eventually decided to buy Russian S-400 defense systems and also SAMp/t systems from European members. Currently, there is one SAMp/t air defense system in the city of Kahramanmaras, operating under NATO, and Turkey is in the talks with France and Italy to buy the SAMp/t systems.

Turkey expects NATO to act in solidarity in responding to the security threats emerging from the Middle Eastern crisis, and not to treat Turkey as a threat that could potentially get NATO entangled in MENA conflicts.

It was not long ago that President Trump commented that defending an ‘aggressive’ Montenegro as a NATO member “will lead to World War III,” voicing unwillingness to fulfil the obligation to stand up for a NATO ally if the circumstances are not convenient for the US. In 2015, when Iranian proxies and the regime were hostile towards Turkey and Iraq was in crisis, the NATO decision to pull Patriots out of Turkey gave Ankara a similar message: The security threats against Turkey could easily involve NATO in the Syrian war, and NATO was not willing to get involved in Middle Eastern wars because of an ‘aggressive’ Turkey.

The Khashoggi case highlighted once again the challenging geography that Turkey is trying to navigate as a NATO ally. Turkey expects NATO to realize that KSA, a country deemed “friendly” by many of the NATO countries, ended up assaulting Turkey in one of the most abominable manners by sending over a death squad, committing murder inside their consulate, and brutally mutilating the body of the victim. While KSA confesses to all of this, the kingdom’s leadership still refuses to handover the victim’s remains, citing preposterous alibis. Turkey expects NATO to act in solidarity in responding to the security threats emerging from the Middle Eastern crisis, and not to treat Turkey as a threat that could potentially get NATO entangled in MENA conflicts.

Turkey, Germany, France, Russia Summit in Istanbul & Uninvited USA
On 28th of October, President Erdogan hosted Presidents Merkel, Macron and Putin to discuss Syria. The achievement of a ceasefire in Idlib prepared the groundwork for this summit. Turkey is aware that the conflict in Syria cannot be resolved in the Astana triangle, and it is time to include other powers in the mix, especially the European allies. It seems that political transformation and reforms are not at the top of the list when Russians talk of reconstruction of Syria. European powers are mainly concerned with the refugee influx, but also, they are the more likely supporters of political transition in Syria. Therefore, Ankara is trying to bring the European allies to the table. All seems orderly until now except the fact that the US was not even invited.

The positioning of the PYD and the YPG in Northern Syria is considered a direct threat to Turkey, while “U.S. Central Command believes that the YPG has
proven itself and thus earned the ability to have a say in the post-war discussions.”

This situation is the main reason why the US was not invited to this summit. Turkey is still expecting the US to make a choice between its ally and its surrogate, but there seems to be willingness at both the Pentagon and in Washington to keep these surrogates (funded by the Saudis for the US) in Syria as the American arm there.

PYD and YPG issues in Syria constitute the second largest crack in contemporary US-Turkey relations. Ankara expects the US to also acknowledge the challenging geography Turkey operates in and respond to the security threats that it considers to be existential.

The way forward
Brunson was a case that was invented by the uniquely chaotic and populist White House and took precedence over deeper issues. Although the case is resolved now, it has left scars in Ankara and created permanent damage in terms of relations with the Trump administration. Now with the Khashoggi case, Turkey is testing western powers and trying to hold them accountable for international laws and order which they themselves imposed. Lack of action in the face of brutal murder would push the MENA region into a chaos that none would have the power to resolve afterwards. If there is any intention of seeing nations and states of law appear and flourish in the MENA region, Khashoggi’s death needs to result in serious consequences for all those responsible. Deterrence for cooperation with Turkey or reluctance to accept the findings of the investigation would create another crack between Turkey and the US.

If anything, the Khashoggi case should show that widening the cracks to irreparable levels will not be in the interest of the US, as clearly Turkey is not an ally whose role and leadership in the region can be replaced by the KSA anymore. There is a need for balance and a need for the White House to manage this reality. It is important to note that there are a lot of issues to patch between Turkey and the US and enlarging the disagreements would only make the final patchwork incongruous.

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There have been some improvements lately: the US lifted sanctions and removed tariff against Turkey also recognizing Turkey’s energy concerns and gave exemptions to Turkey over the Iranian sanctions. However, the harder yet more central issues around PYD, YPG and FETO are still awaiting action. Since the Brunson case is resolved, the joint working groups should resume their work for bilateral policies in Syria. Additionally, the working group on legal affairs could help with making improvements on concerns raised by US officials on Turkish legal practices.

There are upcoming contentious topics that require serious dialogue, such as the Russian S-400 anti-missile system deployment in Turkey and delivery of F-35 fighter jets to Turkey. Turkey is also still awaiting a final decision from the Treasury on the Halkbank case, requesting that Halkbank not be fined.
There are layers of challenges that will emerge in Turkey-US relations in the near future, and the ability to deal with these challenges and to improve relations will depend upon addressing the core cracks in this relationship. It can be said that relations between Turkey and the US have aged but not matured; therefore, acknowledging and responding to each other’s key concerns need to be centralized in the future of these relations. One of the ways to achieve this would be to move Turkey-US relations from rhetorical bilateralism to the paradigm of real bilateralism.
Endnotes
2- “Democrat or Sultan?” The Economist, June 8, 2013, <https://www.economist.com/leaders/2013/06/08/democrat-or-sultan>
10- Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, “Sayın Başkan @realDonaldTrump, her zaman vurguladığım gibi Türk yargısı kararını bağımsız bir şekilde verdi. Umuyorum ki ABD ve Türkiye iki müttefike yakışır biçimde iş birliğine devam eder. PKK, DEAŞ ve FETÖ başta olmak üzere terör örgütlerine karşı ortak bir mücadele yürütür..” Twitter, @rt_erdogan, October 13, 2018, <https://twitter.com/rt_erdogan/status/1051130307905241088?lang=en>


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