{"id":25309,"date":"2020-08-18T12:49:56","date_gmt":"2020-08-18T09:49:56","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/research.sharqforum.org\/?p=25309"},"modified":"2020-09-15T17:26:18","modified_gmt":"2020-09-15T14:26:18","slug":"abd-bae-iliskilerinde-degisen-guc-dengesi","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/research.sharqforum.org\/tr\/2020\/08\/18\/abd-bae-iliskilerinde-degisen-guc-dengesi\/","title":{"rendered":"ABD-BAE \u0130li\u015fkilerinde De\u011fi\u015fen G\u00fc\u00e7 Dengesi"},"content":{"rendered":"

(Bu yaz\u0131 \u0130ngilizce orijinal versiyonundan \u00e7evrilmi\u015ftir.)<\/strong><\/em><\/p>\n

Birle\u015fik Arap Emirlikleri\u2019nde (BAE) iktidar, Abu Dabi\u2019nin Veliaht Prensi Muhammed bin Zayed\u2019in (MbZ) elinde toplanmas\u0131ndan itibaren MbZ \u00fclkenin fiili lideri h\u00e2line geldi. New York Times\u2019\u0131n uluslararas\u0131 muhabiri David Kirkpatrick\u2019in s\u00f6zleriyle aktar\u0131lacak olursa, MbZ ayn\u0131 zamanda \u201cen g\u00fc\u00e7l\u00fc Arap lider\u201d durumunda. B\u00f6lgedeki ve d\u00fcnyadaki bir\u00e7ok akt\u00f6r\u00fcn MbZ\u2019nin d\u0131\u015f politika kararlar\u0131na ili\u015fkin farkl\u0131 fikirleri olsa da hi\u00e7 kimse Abu Dabi\u2019nin Veliaht Prensi\u2019nin uluslararas\u0131 alanda son derece stratejik bir akt\u00f6r h\u00e2line geldi\u011fini ink\u00e2r edemiyor.<\/p>\n

BAE, 1971 y\u0131l\u0131nda ba\u011f\u0131ms\u0131zl\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 kazand\u0131ktan sonra, So\u011fuk Sava\u015f\u2019\u0131n da son yirmi y\u0131l\u0131nda ABD ve Birle\u015fik Krall\u0131k ile yak\u0131n bir ili\u015fki kurdu. Di\u011fer K\u00f6rfez devletleri gibi, BAE de Sovyetler Birli\u011fi\u2019nin \u00e7\u00f6k\u00fc\u015f\u00fcnden faydalanmak i\u00e7in d\u0131\u015f politikas\u0131n\u0131n oda\u011f\u0131n\u0131 Moskova yerine Washington olarak belirledi. 1990-1991 K\u00f6rfez Krizi\u2019nde BAE kuvvetlerinin, ABD ordusunun Irak birliklerini Kuveyt\u2019ten \u00e7\u0131karmas\u0131na yard\u0131m etmesi<\/a> Abu Dabi ve Washington aras\u0131ndaki yak\u0131n ili\u015fkiyi daha da kuvvetlendirdi.<\/p>\n

On y\u0131l sonra, 11 Eyl\u00fcl sald\u0131r\u0131lar\u0131n\u0131 ger\u00e7ekle\u015ftiren 17 Arap ter\u00f6rist aras\u0131nda iki BAE\u2019li de yer al\u0131yordu. BAE\u2019nin Afganistan \u0130slami Emirli\u011fi\u2019ni (Taliban rejimi) tan\u0131yan<\/a> sadece \u00fc\u00e7 devletten biri olmas\u0131n\u0131n yan\u0131na b\u00f6yle bir olgunun eklenmesi, BAE\u2019nin Washington nezdindeki imaj\u0131n\u0131 zedeledi. Ayr\u0131ca, Dubai\u2019nin ter\u00f6r \u00f6rg\u00fctleri ile olan finansal ba\u011flant\u0131lar\u0131, ABD\u2019deki baz\u0131 odaklar\u0131n BAE\u2019yi paradoksal olarak hem \u201cd\u00fc\u015fman\u201d hem de stratejik bir askeri ortak olarak g\u00f6rmesine<\/a> yol a\u00e7t\u0131. Nitekim bu ilgin\u00e7 dinamik, 2006 y\u0131l\u0131ndaki Dubai Ports World skandal\u0131n\u0131 ortaya \u00e7\u0131kard\u0131. Washington\u2019dan bir tepki gelmesinden korkan BAE; askeri faaliyetler, lobicilik ve BAE\u2019nin ileri g\u00f6r\u00fc\u015fl\u00fc ve a\u015f\u0131r\u0131l\u0131k yanl\u0131s\u0131 \u015fiddete kar\u015f\u0131 m\u00fccadelenin \u00f6nc\u00fcs\u00fc konumundaki modern bir Arap \u00fclkesi oldu\u011fu s\u00f6ylemini \u00f6ne \u00e7\u0131karmak gibi ad\u0131mlar atarak kendisine dair olumsuz havay\u0131 ABD ile ba\u011flar\u0131n\u0131 kuvvetlendirece\u011fi bir f\u0131rsata d\u00f6n\u00fc\u015ft\u00fcrd\u00fc. Sonu\u00e7 olarak, 11 Eyl\u00fcl sald\u0131r\u0131lar\u0131 ile olan ili\u015fkisine dair tart\u0131\u015fmalara ve Dubai Ports World skandal\u0131na<\/a> ra\u011fmen, Abu Dabi\u2019nin Washington ile olan ili\u015fkisi 2000\u2019li y\u0131llarda, \u00f6zellikle de askeri alanda, daha da g\u00fc\u00e7lendi.<\/p>\n

Ancak son on y\u0131l i\u00e7erisinde Abu Dabi, Bat\u0131\u2019dan daha ba\u011f\u0131ms\u0131z hareket etmeye gayret ediyor. George W. Bush y\u00f6netiminin 2003’te Irak’\u0131 i\u015fgal etme karar\u0131n\u0131n b\u00f6lgeyi istikrars\u0131zla\u015ft\u0131r\u0131c\u0131 etkisinin ve Obama y\u00f6netiminin 2011 Arap Bahar\u0131 ayaklanmalar\u0131n\u0131n ard\u0131ndan Orta Do\u011fu ve Kuzey Afrika’daki olaylara y\u00f6nelik tepkisinin sonucunda BAE, Washington ve Londra’ya kar\u015f\u0131 daha geni\u015f bir \u00f6zerklik elde etti. MbZ; \u00c7in<\/a>, Rusya<\/a> ve Hindistan<\/a> ile olan ili\u015fkilere b\u00fcy\u00fck yat\u0131r\u0131m yaparak BAE\u2019nin ba\u011f\u0131ms\u0131zl\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 g\u00fc\u00e7lendirmeyi ba\u015fard\u0131. <\/p>\n

Fakat bu durum, Washington ve Abu Dabi\u2019nin h\u00e2l\u00e2 g\u00fc\u00e7l\u00fc bir ili\u015fkiye sahip olmad\u0131\u011f\u0131 anlam\u0131na gelmiyor. Tam tersine ABD ve BAE, MbZ\u2019nin \u00f6zel bir ili\u015fkiye sahip oldu\u011fu Ba\u015fkan Donald Trump<\/a> ile bir\u00e7ok meselede yak\u0131n bir i\u015f birli\u011fi y\u00fcr\u00fct\u00fcyor. 13 A\u011fustos\u2019ta ger\u00e7ekle\u015fen ve Trump\u2019\u0131n Twitter\u2019dan duyurdu\u011fu<\/a> BAE-\u0130srail ili\u015fkilerinin resmi d\u00fczeyde tesis edilmesi, Beyaz Saray ve Abu Dabi\u2019nin ne derecede yak\u0131n \u00e7al\u0131\u015ft\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131n g\u00fc\u00e7l\u00fc bir g\u00f6stergesi. Arap kamuoyunun \u00e7ok g\u00fc\u00e7l\u00fc bir bi\u00e7imde Filistin taraftar\u0131 oldu\u011fu g\u00f6z \u00f6n\u00fcne al\u0131nd\u0131\u011f\u0131nda, bu ad\u0131m BAE\u2019nin liderli\u011fini riske de atan c\u00fcretk\u00e2r bir hamle. \u015e\u00fcphe yok ki, devletinin Tel Aviv ile resmi d\u00fczeyde diplomatik ba\u011flar kuran ilk K\u00f6rfez \u0130\u015fbirli\u011fi Te\u015fkilat\u0131 \u00fcyesi devlet olmas\u0131, MbZ\u2019nin Washington\u2019daki imaj\u0131n\u0131 ciddi bir \u015fekilde g\u00fc\u00e7lendirecek. Washington\u2019da hem Cumhuriyet\u00e7i hem de Demokrat Partili \u00e7evrelerce BAE, \u0130srail\u2019i cesaretlendirecek ve Tel Aviv\u2019deki yetkilileri Filistinlilere toprak tavizi vermenin Arap devletleri ile resmi diplomatik ili\u015fkiler kurman\u0131n bir \u00f6n ko\u015fulu olmad\u0131\u011f\u0131na ikna edecek bu hamleyi yapmas\u0131 sebebiyle b\u00fcy\u00fck \u00f6vg\u00fclere mazhar oluyor. \u00d6zellikle, Bahreyn ve Sudan gibi di\u011fer \u00fclkeler de Abu Dabi\u2019nin a\u00e7t\u0131\u011f\u0131 yolu izlerlerse bu durum daha da peki\u015fecek.<\/p>\n

\u00d6te yandan, her ne kadar medya b\u00fcy\u00fck \u00f6l\u00e7\u00fcde BAE-\u0130srail ili\u015fkilerine dair son geli\u015fmelere odaklanm\u0131\u015f olsa da \u0130srail-Filistin konusu Orta Do\u011fu\u2019daki tek hassas mesele de\u011fil. Arap b\u00f6lgesindeki di\u011fer \u00e7at\u0131\u015fma alanlar\u0131 hususunda, BAE\u2019nin kendi \u00e7\u0131karlar\u0131n\u0131 daha b\u00fcy\u00fck bir \u00f6zg\u00fcvenle savundu\u011fu, hatta baz\u0131 vakalarda Trump y\u00f6netiminin ve ABD diplomatik m\u00fcesses nizam\u0131n\u0131n \u00e7\u0131karlar\u0131na kar\u015f\u0131 durmak pahas\u0131na bunu yapt\u0131\u011f\u0131 reddedilemez bir ger\u00e7ek. Abu Dabi ve Washington aras\u0131nda \u00e7\u0131kar \u00e7at\u0131\u015fmas\u0131 ya\u015fand\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 reddetmenin pek kolay olmad\u0131\u011f\u0131 a\u015fa\u011f\u0131daki d\u00f6rt \u00f6rnek \u00fczerinden g\u00f6sterilebilir:<\/p>\n

Yemen<\/strong><\/p>\n

BAE, Yemen\u2019in g\u00fcneyinde G\u00fcney Yemen\u2019in ba\u011f\u0131ms\u0131z bir ulus devlet olarak yeniden kurulmas\u0131n\u0131 hedefleyen ayr\u0131l\u0131k\u00e7\u0131 bir grup olan G\u00fcney Ge\u00e7i\u015f Konseyi\u2019ni (GGK) desteklemektedir. GGK\u2019nin pop\u00fclaritesi b\u00fcy\u00fck \u00f6l\u00e7\u00fcde, Yemen\u2019in g\u00fcney eyaletlerinde ya\u015fayan ve Yemen\u2019nin 1990 y\u0131l\u0131nda yeniden birle\u015fmesinin kendi topluluklar\u0131n\u0131n ekonomik, toplumsal ve politik \u00e7\u0131karlar\u0131n\u0131 zedeledi\u011fini d\u00fc\u015f\u00fcnen kesimin ya\u015fad\u0131\u011f\u0131 b\u00fcy\u00fck s\u0131k\u0131nt\u0131lar\u0131n bir \u00fcr\u00fcn\u00fc. Elbette, BAE\u2019nin GGK\u2019y\u0131 destekleme tercihinin arkas\u0131nda yatan kendine \u00f6zg\u00fc motivasyonlar\u0131 var. GGK\u2019ya verilen destek, BAE\u2019nin sadece Yemen\u2019in g\u00fcneyinde de\u011fil, ayn\u0131 zamanda Do\u011fu Afrika\u2019da K\u0131z\u0131ldeniz boyunca daha b\u00fcy\u00fck bir jeopolitik g\u00fcce sahip olma ve siyasal \u0130slamc\u0131 kuvvetleri Arap d\u00fcnyas\u0131ndan silme hedefleriyle son derece ba\u011flant\u0131l\u0131.<\/p>\n

Ancak, ABD\u2019nin birle\u015fik bir Yemen\u2019i desteklemesi ve \u00fclkede Kuzey-G\u00fcney ayr\u0131l\u0131\u011f\u0131 fikrine kar\u015f\u0131 olmas\u0131, Washington ve Abu Dabi\u2019nin Yemen\u2019in g\u00fcneyine dair farkl\u0131 bak\u0131\u015f a\u00e7\u0131lar\u0131 ve \u00f6nceliklerinin oldu\u011funun bir g\u00f6stergesi. Suudi Arabistan \u00f6nc\u00fcl\u00fc\u011f\u00fcndeki Arap koalisyonuna y\u00f6nelik 2015\u2019ten bu yana devam eden deste\u011fiyle beraber, Washington ve Riyad, Devlet Ba\u015fkan\u0131 Abdurabbu Mansur Hadi\u2019nin h\u00fck\u00fcmetinin (BM\u2019nin me\u015fru h\u00fck\u00fcmet olarak tan\u0131d\u0131\u011f\u0131 tek oda\u011f\u0131n) t\u00fcm Yemen\u2019i y\u00f6netmesini istemekte. Yemen\u2019in kuzeyindeki \u0130ran destekli Husi isyanc\u0131lar ve BAE destekli GGK ise bu hedefi her ge\u00e7en g\u00fcn ger\u00e7ek d\u0131\u015f\u0131 hale getirmektedir. 29 Temmuz 2020\u2019de Hadi H\u00fck\u00fcmeti ve GGK, Riyad Anla\u015fmas\u0131\u2019n\u0131n (\u201ci\u00e7 sava\u015f i\u00e7erisindeki i\u00e7 sava\u015f\u201d sorununun \u00e7\u00f6z\u00fcm\u00fc i\u00e7in Kas\u0131m 2019\u2019da imzaland\u0131) uygulanmas\u0131n\u0131 h\u0131zland\u0131racak bir \u00e7\u00f6z\u00fcm \u00fczerinde anla\u015ft\u0131. Bu anla\u015fma GGK\u2019nin Yemen\u2019in g\u00fcneyinde ba\u011f\u0131ms\u0131z bir devleti yeniden kurma hedefini terk etmesini \u015fart ko\u015fuyordu. Ancak, Hadi yanl\u0131s\u0131 kuvvetlerle GGK kuvvetleri aras\u0131nda \u015fiddet olaylar\u0131n\u0131n yeniden patlak vermesi kuvvetle muhtemel g\u00f6r\u00fcn\u00fcyor.<\/p>\n

Libya<\/strong><\/p>\n

General Halife Hafter\u2019in Libya i\u00e7 sava\u015f\u0131 boyunca sahip oldu\u011fu g\u00fc\u00e7 b\u00fcy\u00fck \u00f6l\u00e7\u00fcde Abu Dabi\u2019nin kendisine ve y\u00f6netimindeki s\u00f6zde Libya Ulusal Ordusu\u2019na (LUO) verdi\u011fi deste\u011fe ba\u011flanabilir. Bu sebeple BAE, Yemen\u2019de oldu\u011fu gibi Libya\u2019da da hem ABD\u2019nin hem de BM\u2019nin gayri me\u015fru addetti\u011fi devlet d\u0131\u015f\u0131 bir akt\u00f6r\u00fc desteklemi\u015f oluyor. Dahas\u0131, yine Yemen\u2019de oldu\u011fu gibi Libya\u2019da da Abu Dabi \u00fclkenin iki par\u00e7aya -temel olarak Do\u011fu-Bat\u0131 \u015feklinde- b\u00f6l\u00fcnmesini (resmi veya gayri resmi \u015fekilde) hedefledi\u011fine dair \u015f\u00fcpheler<\/a> var. Ayr\u0131ca, BAE ve Rusya\u2019n\u0131n \u00e7\u0131karlar\u0131n\u0131n da ciddi bir \u015fekilde \u00f6rt\u00fc\u015ft\u00fc\u011f\u00fc g\u00f6r\u00fcl\u00fcyor. Moskova\u2019n\u0131n Hafter\u2019i ve Wagner Grup\u2019un faaliyetlerini destekleyerek Libya\u2019n\u0131n belli k\u0131s\u0131mlar\u0131nda kazan\u0131mlar elde etmeyi ve n\u00fcfuzunu g\u00fc\u00e7lendirmeyi hedeflemesi, Rusya ve BAE\u2019nin Libya ile ilgili bir\u00e7ok meselede ayn\u0131 gemide yer almas\u0131n\u0131 sa\u011flarken, Abu Dabi ve Washington\u2019un pozisyonlar\u0131n\u0131 birbirinden daha da uzakla\u015ft\u0131rd\u0131. <\/p>\n

ABD diplomatik m\u00fcesses nizam\u0131n\u0131n Trablus merkezli Ulusal Mutabakat H\u00fck\u00fcmeti\u2019ni (UMH) desteklemesiyle birlikte, uluslararas\u0131 \u00e7apta tan\u0131nan bu h\u00fck\u00fcmete ba\u011fl\u0131 birlikler LUO\u2019ya kar\u015f\u0131 sald\u0131r\u0131lar\u0131n\u0131 s\u00fcrd\u00fcrerek M\u0131s\u0131r s\u0131n\u0131r\u0131na do\u011fru ilerliyorlar. M\u0131s\u0131r Cumhurba\u015fkan\u0131 Abd\u00fclfettah es-Sisi\u2019nin UMH yanl\u0131s\u0131 kuvvetlerin operasyonlar\u0131n\u0131 durdurmas\u0131 i\u00e7in M\u0131s\u0131r\u2019\u0131n silahl\u0131 kuvvetlerini Libya\u2019ya g\u00f6nderme tehdidinde bulunmas\u0131, Washington\u2019u Libya\u2019da M\u0131s\u0131r ile T\u00fcrkiye aras\u0131nda bir sava\u015f patlak vermesi hususunda endi\u015felendiriyor. B\u00f6ylece, Washington\u2019daki yetkililer Libya i\u00e7 sava\u015f\u0131n\u0131n iki taraf\u0131nda yer alan gruplar\u0131n tavizler vermesini ve uzla\u015fmas\u0131n\u0131 isterken, ABD diplomatik m\u00fcesses nizam\u0131 i\u00e7erisinde Abu Dabi ve Riyad\u2019\u0131n, M\u0131s\u0131r\u2019\u0131 T\u00fcrkiye ve UMH yanl\u0131s\u0131 kuvvetlere kar\u015f\u0131 tehditlerinde c\u00fcretk\u00e2r olmas\u0131 i\u00e7in cesaretlendirdi\u011finde dair kanaat g\u00fcn ge\u00e7tik\u00e7e art\u0131yor.<\/p>\n

Suriye<\/strong><\/p>\n

Suriye h\u00fck\u00fcmeti askeri alanda zafer il\u00e2n etmi\u015f olsa da \u015eam h\u00e2l\u00e2 Arap Ligi\u2019nden d\u0131\u015flanm\u0131\u015f durumda ve Bat\u0131l\u0131 devletlerin \u00e7o\u011fu Suriye ile resmi ili\u015fkileri yeniden kurmay\u0131 reddediyor. Ancak Arap devletleri aras\u0131nda, hatta daha \u00f6nce Baas rejimi kar\u015f\u0131t\u0131 isyanlar\u0131 destekleyen y\u00f6netimlerce dahi \u015eam ile ili\u015fkileri yeniden normalle\u015ftirmeye y\u00f6nelik genel bir e\u011filim mevcut. Bu gayretlerin ba\u015f\u0131n\u0131 \u00e7eken Arap devleti olarak BAE, Suriye\u2019nin b\u00f6lgenin diplomatik denklemine yeniden dahil olmas\u0131n\u0131 Abu Dabi\u2019nin jeopolitik ve ideolojik ajandalar\u0131 i\u00e7in faydal\u0131 g\u00f6r\u00fcyor ve BAE, Suriye\u2019yi T\u00fcrkiye, Katar ve M\u00fcsl\u00fcman Karde\u015fler kar\u015f\u0131t\u0131 Arap devletleri blo\u011funa dahil etmeye \u00e7al\u0131\u015f\u0131yor.<\/p>\n

Ancak BAE, Esed\u2019in \u201cme\u015fruiyetini\u201d yeniden kabul etmek istese de Trump y\u00f6netimi ve Washington\u2019daki d\u0131\u015f politikay\u0131 y\u00fcr\u00fcten m\u00fcesses nizam ayn\u0131 hisleri payla\u015fm\u0131yor. ABD, Arap h\u00fck\u00fcmetleri \u00fczerinde Suriye ile ili\u015fkilerin yeniden normalle\u015fmesine kar\u015f\u0131 bask\u0131 uygularken, Caesar Yasas\u0131<\/a>\u2019n\u0131n uygulamaya konmas\u0131yla alt\u0131 \u00e7izildi\u011fi \u00fczere, Esed h\u00fck\u00fcmetine ve Esed\u2019in Arap\/\u0130slam d\u00fcnyas\u0131nda oynamas\u0131 gereken role dair birbirinden ayr\u0131lan g\u00f6r\u00fc\u015fler, Washington ile Abu Dabi aras\u0131ndaki gerilimin bir di\u011fer kayna\u011f\u0131 h\u00e2line geliyor.<\/p>\n

Katar<\/strong><\/p>\n

9 Temmuz\u2019da Fox News \u201cBAE\u2019nin Katar ablukas\u0131n\u0131 sona erdirecek ve ABD\u2019nin Orta Do\u011fu\u2019daki \u00e7\u0131karlar\u0131na hizmet edecek K\u00f6rfez i\u00e7i uzla\u015f\u0131y\u0131 engelledi\u011fi s\u00f6yleniyor\u201d ba\u015fl\u0131kl\u0131 bir yaz\u0131<\/a> yay\u0131mlad\u0131. Yaz\u0131da BAE\u2019nin ABD taraf\u0131ndan haz\u0131rlanan ve Qatar Airways\u2019in Suudi Arabistan ve BAE hava sahalar\u0131na yeniden girmesine m\u00fcsaade ederek Katar\u2019a uygulanan ablukay\u0131 hafifletmesi beklenen anla\u015fmay\u0131 engelledi\u011fi s\u00f6yleniyordu. E\u011fer bu haber do\u011fruysa, BAE\u2019nin Washington\u2019\u0131n K\u00f6rfez \u0130\u015fbirli\u011fi Te\u015fkil\u00e2t\u0131\u2019n\u0131 (K\u0130K) \u00e7\u00f6z\u00fcme y\u00f6neltme anlam\u0131nda etkili bir rol oynamas\u0131n\u0131 engellemek i\u00e7in n\u00fcfuzunu kullanmas\u0131 anlaml\u0131 olacakt\u0131r.  <\/p>\n

\u00d6te yandan, Trump y\u00f6netiminin de kani oldu\u011fu \u00fczere, ABD\u2019nin \u00e7\u0131karlar\u0131 d\u00f6rd\u00fcnc\u00fc y\u0131l\u0131na giren bu Arap husumetinden olumsuz etkilenmekte. Beyaz Saray\u2019\u0131n bak\u0131\u015f a\u00e7\u0131s\u0131na g\u00f6re Washington, \u0130ran\u2019\u0131n d\u0131\u015f politikas\u0131 ile m\u00fccadele edebilmek i\u00e7in t\u00fcm alt\u0131 K\u0130K devletiyle beraber hareket etmeli. Dolay\u0131s\u0131yla, ABD\u2019nin K\u00f6rfez\u2019deki Arap m\u00fcttefikleri aras\u0131ndaki bu uyu\u015fmazl\u0131k, Trump y\u00f6netiminin \u0130ran\u2019\u0131 olabildi\u011fince izole etme ve s\u0131k\u0131\u015ft\u0131rma \u00e7abalar\u0131na zarar vermekte. 26 Temmuz\u2019da, ABD\u2019nin \u0130ran \u00d6zel Temsilcisi, Doha\u2019n\u0131n \u00fcst d\u00fczey diplomat\u0131yla yapt\u0131\u011f\u0131 toplant\u0131dan sonra K\u00f6rfez krizi hakk\u0131nda konu\u015farak<\/a> \u015funlar\u0131 s\u00f6yledi: \u201cUyu\u015fmazl\u0131k \u00e7ok uzun s\u00fcredir devam etmekte ve bu durum istikrara, refaha ve g\u00fcvenli\u011fe dair hepimizin ortak b\u00f6lgesel \u00e7\u0131karlar\u0131na zarar veriyor.\u201d A\u00e7\u0131kt\u0131r ki, Abu Dabi kaynakl\u0131 bir fikir olan Katar\u2019a ambargo uygulamas\u0131, Orta Do\u011fu\u2019da Washington ve Abu Dabi\u2019deki karar al\u0131c\u0131lar\u0131n birbiriyle ayn\u0131 fikirde olmad\u0131\u011f\u0131 birka\u00e7 m\u00fchim meseleden biri.<\/p>\n

\u00c7ok Kutuplu Bir D\u00fcnyada Abu Dabi  <\/strong>
\nABD ve BAE\u2019nin k\u00f6kleri on y\u0131llar \u00f6nceye dayanan ve ter\u00f6rle m\u00fccadele, yat\u0131r\u0131m, diplomasi, teknoloji, e\u011fitim, k\u00fclt\u00fcr vb. bir\u00e7ok alan\u0131 kapsayan i\u015f birli\u011finden do\u011fan \u00f6zel bir ili\u015fkiye sahip olduklar\u0131 muhakkak. 1990\u2019lar\u0131n ba\u015f\u0131ndan bu yana, di\u011fer be\u015f K\u0130K \u00fcyesi gibi BAE de ABD\u2019nin g\u00fcvenlik \u015femsiyesinin alt\u0131nda yer ald\u0131 ve bunun yak\u0131nda de\u011fi\u015fece\u011fini d\u00fc\u015f\u00fcnmek neredeyse imk\u00e2ns\u0131z. \u00d6te yandan, s\u00f6z konusu ikili ili\u015fkinin on, yirmi veya otuz y\u0131l \u00f6nceye g\u00f6re daha e\u015fit ve dengeli bir h\u00e2le gelece\u011fi de tart\u0131\u015fmas\u0131z bir ger\u00e7ek.<\/p>\n

Her ge\u00e7en g\u00fcn \u00e7ok kutuplu h\u00e2le gelen bir d\u00fcnyada, BAE d\u0131\u015f politikada \u201c\u00f6nlemini alarak\u201d Abu Dabi\u2019nin m\u00fcttefikler, ortaklar ve dostlar a\u011f\u0131n\u0131 \u00e7e\u015fitlendiren bir politika izliyor. Bu da devletin tek bir g\u00fc\u00e7 merkezine son derece ba\u011f\u0131ml\u0131 olmas\u0131n\u0131n \u00f6n\u00fcn\u00fc al\u0131yor. BAE, \u00c7in ve Rusya ile g\u00fc\u00e7l\u00fc ortakl\u0131klara ciddi yat\u0131r\u0131mlar yaparak Washington ile olan ili\u015fkisinde de daha geni\u015f bir n\u00fcfuz g\u00fcc\u00fc elde ediyor.<\/p>\n

Daha az \u00f6l\u00e7ekte olsa da Hindistan da BAE\u2019nin Bat\u0131\u2019dan daha fazla \u00f6zerklik kazanmas\u0131nda \u00f6nemli bir rol oynad\u0131. Orta Do\u011fu d\u00fcnyadaki g\u00fc\u00e7 da\u011f\u0131l\u0131m\u0131n\u0131n daha dengeli oldu\u011fu yeni bir jeopolitik d\u00fczene g\u00f6re \u015fekil al\u0131rken, BAE ve di\u011fer K\u0130K \u00fcyeleri ge\u00e7ti\u011fimiz on y\u0131l\u0131 Hindistan ile daha g\u00fc\u00e7l\u00fc ili\u015fkiler geli\u015ftirmeye yat\u0131r\u0131m yaparak harcad\u0131. Abu Dabi-Yeni Delhi ortakl\u0131\u011f\u0131, Washington\u2019daki bir\u00e7ok oda\u011f\u0131n ABD\u2019nin Orta Do\u011fu\u2019dan \u00e7ekilmesi yahut en az\u0131ndan b\u00f6lgedeki varl\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 kayda de\u011fer \u00f6l\u00e7\u00fcde azaltmas\u0131 gerekti\u011fini seslendirmesi kar\u015f\u0131s\u0131nda b\u00fcy\u00fck \u00f6l\u00e7\u00fcde ticarete, enerji g\u00fcvenli\u011fine ve savunmaya odakland\u0131.<\/p>\n

Orta Do\u011fu devletleri i\u00e7erisinde g\u00fcn ge\u00e7tik\u00e7e daha s\u0131n\u0131rl\u0131 bir Amerikan n\u00fcfuzunun g\u00f6zlendi\u011fi ve b\u00f6lgede \u00c7in\u2019in, Rusya\u2019n\u0131n ve Hindistan\u2019\u0131n g\u00fcc\u00fcn\u00fc artt\u0131rd\u0131\u011f\u0131 bir d\u00f6nemde Washington\u2019daki yetkililer, K\u0130K devletlerini ABD \u00e7\u0131karlar\u0131 ile uyumlu hareket etmeye y\u00f6nlendirme hususunda daha s\u0131n\u0131rl\u0131 imk\u00e2nlara sahip olmay\u0131 kabullendiler. Yemen\u2019in g\u00fcneyindeki, Libya\u2019n\u0131n do\u011fusundaki ve Suriye\u2019deki durumun g\u00f6zler \u00f6n\u00fcne serdi\u011fi \u00fczere Abu Dabi, Orta Do\u011fu\u2019daki d\u0131\u015f politikas\u0131nda Rusya\u2019n\u0131n hedeflerine (ABD\u2019nin de\u011fil) \u00e7ok daha yak\u0131n bir konumda duruyor. Katar ablukas\u0131 konusunda ise BAE, hi\u00e7bir b\u00fcy\u00fck g\u00fc\u00e7 ile yan yana durmay\u0131p, bir\u00e7ok ideolojik boyutu da olan K\u0130K krizinde kendi \u00e7\u0131karlar\u0131n\u0131 g\u00f6zetiyor.<\/p>\n

Trump\u2019\u0131n 2017\u2019de Ba\u015fkan olmas\u0131ndan bu yana, Orta Do\u011fu\u2018nun \u00e7o\u011fu b\u00f6lgesinde ABD liderlik rol\u00fcnden geri \u00e7ekildi. \u0130lk zamanlardan itibaren Trump\u2019\u0131n d\u0131\u015f politikas\u0131n\u0131 etkilemeyi ama\u00e7layan Washington\u2019un en yak\u0131n Arap ortaklar\u0131ndan biri BAE oldu. MbZ\u2019nin \u0130ran ve ba\u015fka meselelerdeki g\u00f6r\u00fc\u015fleri Trump y\u00f6netimiyle son derece uyu\u015ftu\u011fu i\u00e7in Beyaz Saray, Washington\u2019\u0131n d\u0131\u015f politikas\u0131n\u0131n \u00f6nemli bir b\u00f6l\u00fcm\u00fcn\u00fc ve \u00f6zellikle de Libya\u2019ya dair k\u0131sm\u0131n\u0131 g\u00f6rece istekli bir \u015fekilde BAE\u2019ye devretti. Her ne kadar ABD\u2019nin Orta Do\u011fu b\u00f6lgesindeki sorumluluklar\u0131n\u0131 yerel akt\u00f6rlere aktarmak istemesi anla\u015f\u0131l\u0131r olsa da, BAE ve K\u00f6rfez\u2019deki di\u011fer g\u00fc\u00e7 odaklar\u0131n\u0131n Trump y\u00f6netiminin veya Washington\u2019daki diplomatik m\u00fcesses nizam\u0131n \u00e7\u0131karlar\u0131yla ters d\u00fc\u015fse dahi kendi \u00e7\u0131karlar\u0131n\u0131 \u00f6ne \u00e7\u0131karmak istemesi \u015fa\u015f\u0131rt\u0131c\u0131 olmamal\u0131.<\/p>\n<\/div>

<\/div><\/div><\/div><\/div><\/div>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Birle\u015fik Arap Emirlikleri\u2019nde (BAE) iktidar, Abu Dabi\u2019nin Veliaht Prensi Muhammed bin Zayed\u2019in (MbZ) elinde toplanmas\u0131ndan itibaren MbZ \u00fclkenin fiili lideri h\u00e2line geldi<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":59,"featured_media":24251,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_mo_disable_npp":"","ngg_post_thumbnail":0},"categories":[364],"tags":[],"asf_pub_issue":[10319],"asf_pub_region":[10321,10323],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/research.sharqforum.org\/tr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/25309"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/research.sharqforum.org\/tr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/research.sharqforum.org\/tr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/research.sharqforum.org\/tr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/59"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/research.sharqforum.org\/tr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=25309"}],"version-history":[{"count":4,"href":"https:\/\/research.sharqforum.org\/tr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/25309\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":25376,"href":"https:\/\/research.sharqforum.org\/tr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/25309\/revisions\/25376"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/research.sharqforum.org\/tr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/24251"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/research.sharqforum.org\/tr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=25309"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/research.sharqforum.org\/tr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=25309"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/research.sharqforum.org\/tr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=25309"},{"taxonomy":"asf_pub_issue","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/research.sharqforum.org\/tr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/asf_pub_issue?post=25309"},{"taxonomy":"asf_pub_region","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/research.sharqforum.org\/tr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/asf_pub_region?post=25309"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}