{"id":25345,"date":"2020-09-01T16:47:48","date_gmt":"2020-09-01T13:47:48","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/research.sharqforum.org\/?p=25345"},"modified":"2020-09-15T17:16:13","modified_gmt":"2020-09-15T14:16:13","slug":"turkiyenin-dogalgaz-kesfi-icin-bastirmasi-rus-kamu-sirketleri-icin-ankara-ile-uzun-vadeli-anlasmalari-muzakere-etmeyi-daha-zor-hale-getirebilir","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/research.sharqforum.org\/tr\/2020\/09\/01\/turkiyenin-dogalgaz-kesfi-icin-bastirmasi-rus-kamu-sirketleri-icin-ankara-ile-uzun-vadeli-anlasmalari-muzakere-etmeyi-daha-zor-hale-getirebilir\/","title":{"rendered":"T\u00fcrkiye\u2019nin Do\u011falgaz Ke\u015ffi i\u00e7in Bast\u0131rmas\u0131, Rus Kamu \u015eirketleri i\u00e7in Ankara ile Uzun Vadeli Anla\u015fmalar\u0131 M\u00fczakere Etmeyi Daha Zor H\u00e2le Getirebilir"},"content":{"rendered":"<div class=\"fusion-fullwidth fullwidth-box fusion-builder-row-1 nonhundred-percent-fullwidth non-hundred-percent-height-scrolling\" style=\"--awb-border-radius-top-left:0px;--awb-border-radius-top-right:0px;--awb-border-radius-bottom-right:0px;--awb-border-radius-bottom-left:0px;\" ><div class=\"fusion-builder-row fusion-row\"><div class=\"fusion-layout-column fusion_builder_column fusion-builder-column-0 fusion_builder_column_1_1 1_1 fusion-one-full fusion-column-first fusion-column-last\" style=\"--awb-padding-top:20px;--awb-padding-right:20px;--awb-padding-bottom:20px;--awb-padding-left:20px;--awb-bg-size:cover;--awb-box-shadow:2px 2px 20px 2px #dddddd;;--awb-margin-bottom:0px;\"><div class=\"fusion-column-wrapper fusion-column-has-shadow fusion-flex-column-wrapper-legacy\"><div class=\"fusion-text fusion-text-1\"><p>Rusya\u2019n\u0131n Do\u011fu Akdeniz\u2019deki stratejik ajandas\u0131, Sovyetler Birli\u011fi d\u00f6neminde bu b\u00f6lgeye y\u00f6nelik strateji belirlenirken esas al\u0131nan etmenlerin ayn\u0131s\u0131 etraf\u0131nda \u015fekilleniyor: B\u00f6lgenin Bat\u0131 ve Do\u011fu aras\u0131ndaki politik ve ekonomik faaliyetler ile ticaret rotalar\u0131na n\u00fcfuz etmede dayanak noktas\u0131 niteli\u011finde bir co\u011frafi konuma sahip olmas\u0131. Do\u011fu Akdeniz, Sovyetler d\u00f6neminde Sovyetler Birli\u011fi ve Bat\u0131 aras\u0131ndaki ideolojik ve stratejik rekabetin temel b\u00f6lgelerinden biri olarak d\u00fc\u015f\u00fcn\u00fcl\u00fcrken, So\u011fuk Sava\u015f\u2019\u0131n ard\u0131ndan bir \u015fekilde \u00f6nemini kaybetmi\u015fti. B\u00f6ylece, AB ve ABD\u2019nin k\u00fcresel n\u00fcfuzuna kar\u015f\u0131 denge sa\u011flamak i\u00e7in politik ve ekonomik anlamda manivela g\u00fcc\u00fc sa\u011flayacak potansiyel bir kaynak olarak g\u00f6r\u00fclen Do\u011fu Akdeniz, son d\u00f6nemlere kadar Rus liderler i\u00e7in ikincil \u00f6neme sahip oldu. \u00d6rne\u011fin Rusya, Yunanistan-T\u00fcrkiye gerilimlerini ve NATO i\u00e7erisindeki ayr\u0131l\u0131klar\u0131 S-300 PMU1 sisteminin K\u0131br\u0131s \u00fczerinden Yunanistan\u2019a transferini sa\u011flayacak bir f\u0131rsat olarak kulland\u0131. Benzer bir \u015fekilde Moskova b\u00f6lgedeki politik akt\u00f6rleri son derece ihtiyatl\u0131 bir \u015fekilde destekleme politikas\u0131 izliyor.&nbsp; &nbsp;<\/p>\n<p>Her \u015fey Rusya\u2019n\u0131n 2014 y\u0131l\u0131nda K\u0131r\u0131m\u2019\u0131 ilhak etmesiyle de\u011fi\u015fti. Bat\u0131\u2019dan uygulanan yapt\u0131r\u0131mlar\u0131n bask\u0131s\u0131yla kar\u015f\u0131 kar\u015f\u0131ya kalan Kremlin, d\u00fcnyan\u0131n geri kalan\u0131na kar\u015f\u0131 kapal\u0131 \u201cku\u015fat\u0131lm\u0131\u015f bir kale\u201d rol\u00fcne teslim olmad\u0131. Bu \u015fekilde bak\u0131ld\u0131\u011f\u0131nda, Rusya\u2019n\u0131n Suriye\u2019deki -ve daha sonra Libya\u2019daki- operasyonlar\u0131 belli derecede ba\u015far\u0131 yakalayarak Orta Do\u011fu ve Kuzey Afrika\u2019ya d\u00f6nen bir s\u00fcper g\u00fc\u00e7 vizyonunu destekledi. Neredeyse beklenmeyen bi\u00e7imde, Moskova b\u00f6lgedeki ve b\u00f6lgenin \u00f6tesindeki kilit akt\u00f6rlerle ili\u015fkiler geli\u015ftirmeyi ba\u015fard\u0131 ve Bat\u0131 ile ayn\u0131 \u015fartlarda m\u00fccadele edebilece\u011fini g\u00f6sterdi. Bu da Kremlin\u2019in K\u0131r\u0131m krizinden sonra son derece g\u00f6stermek istedi\u011fi bir \u015feydi. Rusya\u2019n\u0131n ba\u015far\u0131s\u0131 yerle\u015fik akt\u00f6rlerin, i\u00e7erisinde bulunduklar\u0131 durumdan \u00e7\u0131kmaya odaklanm\u0131\u015f, duygusal davranmaya ve basit, do\u011frudan \u00e7\u00f6z\u00fcmlere meyilli olduklar\u0131 b\u00fcy\u00fck kriz d\u00f6nemlerinde kararl\u0131 bir \u015fekilde hareket etmesine dayan\u0131yor.<\/p>\n<p>Bununla birlikte, Rusya sadece tesad\u00fcfi f\u0131rsatlardan faydalanmad\u0131. Ayr\u0131ca, kazan\u0131mlar\u0131n\u0131n temel dayanaklar\u0131n\u0131 korumaya ve ad\u0131mlar\u0131n\u0131 bunlar \u00fczerine in\u015fa etmeye gayret ediyor. \u00d6rne\u011fin, kamu destekli petrol \u015firketi Rosneft, L\u00fcbnan\u2019da faaliyet g\u00f6stermesi i\u00e7in Levante Storage S.A.R.L. isimli bir yan \u015firket kurdu. Bu, Rusya\u2019n\u0131n b\u00f6lgedeki varl\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 peki\u015ftirdi, diplomatik a\u00e7\u0131dan da elini g\u00fc\u00e7lendirdi. \u00d6ng\u00f6r\u00fclebilece\u011fi gibi, esas olarak L\u00fcbnan-\u0130srail aras\u0131ndaki gerilimler ba\u011flam\u0131nda.<\/p>\n<p>Bununla birlikte, Do\u011fu Akdeniz\u2019de m\u00fcnhas\u0131r ekonomik b\u00f6lgeler aras\u0131ndaki s\u0131n\u0131rlar\u0131n belirlenmesi konusunda Rusya\u2019n\u0131n rol\u00fcn\u00fc fazla b\u00fcy\u00fctmemek \u00f6nemli. K\u0131br\u0131s Cumhurba\u015fkan\u0131 Nicos Anastasiades\u2019in Rus mevkida\u015f\u0131 Vladimir Putin\u2019den T\u00fcrkiye\u2019yi K\u0131br\u0131s\u2019\u0131n m\u00fcnhas\u0131r ekonomik b\u00f6lgesinde do\u011falgaz ke\u015ffi faaliyetlerini durdurmas\u0131 i\u00e7in ikna etmesi talebi bunun bir \u00f6rne\u011fi. Putin\u2019den bu talebe anlaml\u0131 bir destek gelmedi. Tam tersine, Moskova tutarl\u0131 bir \u015fekilde b\u00f6lgedeki \u00e7at\u0131\u015fmada herhangi bir rol \u00fcstlenmekten de ka\u00e7\u0131n\u0131yor. Rusya\u2019n\u0131n en fazla yapabilece\u011fi, meselenin \u00e7\u00f6z\u00fcm\u00fc i\u00e7in baz\u0131 uluslararas\u0131 giri\u015fimlerde yer almak olacakt\u0131r.<\/p>\n<p>Ayr\u0131ca, Rusya\u2019n\u0131n Suriye ve Libya\u2019daki sava\u015flara m\u00fcdahil olmas\u0131, b\u00fcrokrasi akt\u00f6rlerinin sorumluluk alma ve d\u0131\u015f politika hedeflerini ger\u00e7ekle\u015ftirme konusundaki yetersizli\u011fini g\u00f6zler \u00f6n\u00fcne serdi. Bu durum, diplomatlar\u0131n ve di\u011fer resmi akt\u00f6rlerin faaliyetlerinin gayriresmi ba\u015fkaca akt\u00f6rlerin \u00e7abalar\u0131yla tamamland\u0131\u011f\u0131 s\u00f6zde \u201cparalel diplomasiye\u201d olan ihtiyac\u0131 ortaya \u00e7\u0131kard\u0131. B\u00f6ylece, \u00c7e\u00e7en lider Ramazan Kadirov\u2019un a\u011f\u0131, Orta Do\u011fu diplomasisinde aktif bir t\u00fcr \u201cd\u00fc\u015f\u00fcnce kurulu\u015fu\u201d gibi <a href=\"https:\/\/www.ridl.io\/en\/the-fragmentation-of-russia-s-middle-east-policies\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">i\u015flev g\u00f6stermeye ba\u015flad\u0131<\/a>. Evgeny Prigozhin\u2019e ba\u011fl\u0131 \u00f6zel askeri \u015firketler b\u00f6lgesel \u00e7at\u0131\u015fmalara paral\u0131 askerler olarak kat\u0131l\u0131m g\u00f6steriyorlar. Bu faaliyetlerin Rus \u00f6zel servislerinin g\u00f6zetimi alt\u0131nda oldu\u011funa pek \u015f\u00fcphe yok. Jeopolitik \u00e7\u0131kmazlara \u00e7\u00f6z\u00fcm\u00fcn haz\u0131rlanmas\u0131nda komuta rol\u00fcn\u00fc bu servisler \u00fcstleniyor.&nbsp;&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p>Bir di\u011fer mesele, Rusya\u2019n\u0131n d\u0131\u015f \u00e7at\u0131\u015fmalara d\u00e2hil olmas\u0131na dair kamuoyu onay\u0131n\u0131 sa\u011flamak (en az\u0131ndan sert ele\u015ftirilerin \u00f6n\u00fcne ge\u00e7mek). Suriye\u2019deki \u00e7at\u0131\u015fma hususunda Kremlin, m\u00fcdahalesini makul bir \u015fekilde izah edebildi. Ancak, Rusya\u2019n\u0131n Libya\u2019ya olan m\u00fcdahalesini a\u00e7\u0131klamak daha karma\u015f\u0131k bir mesele. Libya\u2019daki \u00e7at\u0131\u015fmaya dahil olan akt\u00f6rler -BAE gibi devlet akt\u00f6rlerinin yan\u0131 s\u0131ra \u00f6zel \u00e7\u0131kar gruplar\u0131 da dahil olmak \u00fczere- son derece motive olmu\u015f ve h\u0131rsl\u0131 durumda. Rusya\u2019n\u0131n m\u00fcdahalesinin ulusal \u00e7\u0131karlar\u0131na nas\u0131l hizmet etti\u011fi konusu ise \u00e7ok a\u00e7\u0131k de\u011fil. Bunun sonucunda, Rusya\u2019n\u0131n Libya\u2019daki faaliyetleri jeopolitik macerac\u0131l\u0131k ile petrol sekt\u00f6r\u00fcnde kontrol sa\u011flayarak ve di\u011fer k\u00e2rl\u0131 kaynaklardan faydalanma aray\u0131\u015f\u0131na girerek \u00e7at\u0131\u015fmadan belli kazan\u00e7lar elde etme arzusunun bir kar\u0131\u015f\u0131m\u0131 olarak g\u00f6r\u00fcn\u00fcyor.&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p>Yunanistan ve T\u00fcrkiye aras\u0131nda Do\u011fu Akdeniz\u2019de ya\u015fanan son uyu\u015fmazl\u0131k \u00e7er\u00e7evesinde de hem iki \u00fclke aras\u0131ndaki \u00e7at\u0131\u015fma hem de b\u00f6lgedeki kaynaklara dair m\u00fccadele konusunda Rusya kesin bir \u015fekilde tarafs\u0131z bir pozisyon ald\u0131. Bu tutumun arkas\u0131nda yatan baz\u0131 sebepler yukar\u0131da vurguland\u0131. Rusya\u2019n\u0131n suskun kal\u0131\u015f\u0131n\u0131n bir di\u011fer sebebi ise Moskova\u2019n\u0131n T\u00fcrkiye\u2019ye dair projeleri ve iki \u00fclkenin enerji alan\u0131ndaki geni\u015f i\u015f birli\u011fi ile alakal\u0131. Bu ili\u015fkilerin dinamikleri de\u011fi\u015fiyor. \u00d6ncelikli olarak, T\u00fcrkiye son y\u0131llarda petrol ve enerjiye dair yakla\u015f\u0131m\u0131n\u0131 de\u011fi\u015ftirerek d\u0131\u015f sermayeye y\u00f6nelik \u00f6zelle\u015ftirme ve kaynaklar\u0131 \u00e7e\u015fitlendirme yoluna girdi. Bunun aksine, Rusya\u2019n\u0131n stratejisi h\u00e2l\u00e2 at\u0131l durumda ve an\u0131nda teslim piyasas\u0131 yerine boru hatlar\u0131na \u00f6ncelik veriyor. Bunun sonucunda, T\u00fcrkiye\u2019ye enerji tedarik edenlerin say\u0131s\u0131 artarken, Rusya\u2019dan al\u0131nan do\u011falgaz miktar\u0131 da her ge\u00e7en g\u00fcn d\u00fc\u015f\u00fcyor.<\/p>\n<p>G\u00f6z \u00f6n\u00fcnde tutulmas\u0131 gereken bir ba\u015fka husus ise T\u00fcrkiye\u2019nin Karadeniz ve Akdeniz havzalar\u0131nda do\u011falgaz ke\u015fif faaliyetlerine h\u0131z vermesidir. Bu durum, Rus kamu \u015firketlerinin Ankara ile uzun vadeli anla\u015fmalar yapmas\u0131n\u0131 muhtemelen daha zor h\u00e2le getirecektir. Elbette, bundan T\u00fcrkAk\u0131m veya Mavi Ak\u0131m gibi boru hatt\u0131 projelerinin iptal edilece\u011fi veya ask\u0131ya al\u0131naca\u011f\u0131 anlam\u0131 \u00e7\u0131kmaz. Ancak, Rusya\u2019n\u0131n enerji tedarik\u00e7isi olarak rol\u00fcn\u00fcn daha \u00f6nemsiz h\u00e2le gelece\u011fi anlam\u0131 \u00e7\u0131kabilir. \u00c7e\u015fitli s\u00fcbjektif ve politik etmenlerin etkili olabilece\u011fi g\u00f6z \u00f6n\u00fcne al\u0131nd\u0131\u011f\u0131nda, do\u011falgaz ta\u015f\u0131nmas\u0131 alan\u0131ndaki giri\u015fimlerle ilgili herhangi bir \u015fekilde tahmin y\u00fcr\u00fctmek son derece g\u00fc\u00e7. Buna kar\u015f\u0131n hem Rusya hem de Avrupa cephesinden EastMed boru hatt\u0131na ili\u015fkin baz\u0131 \u015f\u00fcpheler dile getirildi. Proje olduk\u00e7a maliyetli bir giri\u015fim ancak buna ra\u011fmen, Avrupal\u0131 t\u00fcketicilerin tanker ile yap\u0131lacak ta\u015f\u0131malarla a\u00e7\u0131\u011f\u0131 kapatabilece\u011fi d\u00fc\u015f\u00fcn\u00fcld\u00fc\u011f\u00fcne g\u00f6re, projenin kapasitesi pek de b\u00fcy\u00fck de\u011fil. Ekonomik ve politik etmenler g\u00f6z \u00f6n\u00fcne al\u0131nd\u0131\u011f\u0131nda Rusya, EastMed\u2019in uygulanabilirli\u011fi konusunda \u015f\u00fcpheci. \u00d6zellikle de Gazprom\u2019un projelerinin (T\u00fcrk Ak\u0131m\u0131 ve Mavi Ak\u0131m) yan\u0131na eklendi\u011finde\u2026<\/p>\n<\/div><div class=\"fusion-clearfix\"><\/div><\/div><\/div><\/div><\/div>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Rusya\u2019n\u0131n Do\u011fu Akdeniz\u2019deki stratejik ajandas\u0131, Sovyetler Birli\u011fi d\u00f6neminde bu b\u00f6lgeye y\u00f6nelik strateji belirlenirken esas al\u0131nan etmenlerin <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":190,"featured_media":25359,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_mo_disable_npp":"","ngg_post_thumbnail":0},"categories":[364],"tags":[],"asf_pub_issue":[10305],"asf_pub_region":[10321],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/research.sharqforum.org\/tr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/25345"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/research.sharqforum.org\/tr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/research.sharqforum.org\/tr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/research.sharqforum.org\/tr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/190"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/research.sharqforum.org\/tr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=25345"}],"version-history":[{"count":2,"href":"https:\/\/research.sharqforum.org\/tr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/25345\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":25349,"href":"https:\/\/research.sharqforum.org\/tr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/25345\/revisions\/25349"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/research.sharqforum.org\/tr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/25359"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/research.sharqforum.org\/tr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=25345"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/research.sharqforum.org\/tr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=25345"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/research.sharqforum.org\/tr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=25345"},{"taxonomy":"asf_pub_issue","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/research.sharqforum.org\/tr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/asf_pub_issue?post=25345"},{"taxonomy":"asf_pub_region","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/research.sharqforum.org\/tr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/asf_pub_region?post=25345"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}