{"id":27112,"date":"2021-01-13T12:41:18","date_gmt":"2021-01-13T09:41:18","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/research.sharqforum.org\/?p=27112"},"modified":"2021-01-22T12:44:04","modified_gmt":"2021-01-22T09:44:04","slug":"korfez-krizindeki-donum-noktasi-bolgesel-jeopolitigi-sekillendirecek","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/research.sharqforum.org\/tr\/2021\/01\/13\/korfez-krizindeki-donum-noktasi-bolgesel-jeopolitigi-sekillendirecek\/","title":{"rendered":"K\u00f6rfez Krizindeki D\u00f6n\u00fcm Noktas\u0131 B\u00f6lgesel Jeopoliti\u011fi \u015eekillendirecek"},"content":{"rendered":"

(Bu metin \u0130ngilizce orijinal versiyonundan terc\u00fcme edilmi\u015ftir.)<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n

Katar diplomatik krizi 5 Ocak\u2019ta Riyad\u2019daki K\u00f6rfez \u0130\u015f birli\u011fi Konseyi (K\u0130K) zirvesinde ani bir \u015fekilde son buldu. Suudi Arabistan, Birle\u015fik Arap Emirlikleri, Bahreyn ve M\u0131s\u0131r Haziran 2017\u2019de ba\u015flayan Katar boykotlar\u0131n\u0131 sonland\u0131rarak Doha ile diplomatik ili\u015fkilerini yeniden ba\u015flatt\u0131. K\u0130K zirvesi Katar krizinin \u00e7\u00f6z\u00fcmleni\u015finin sembolik g\u00f6sterileriyle doluydu. Suudi Arabistan Veliaht Prensi Muhammed bin Selman Katar Emiri Temim bin Hamad bin Sani\u2019yi kucaklarken<\/a> Katar Maliye Bakan\u0131 Ali \u015eerif \u0130madi Kahire\u2019deki St. Regis Oteli\u2019nin a\u00e7\u0131l\u0131\u015f\u0131n\u0131<\/a> yapt\u0131. <\/p>\n

Katar ablukas\u0131n\u0131n sona ermesi Basra K\u00f6rfezi\u2019ndeki istikrar\u0131 geli\u015ftirecek olsa da El-Ula Anla\u015fmas\u0131\u2019n\u0131n uzun vadeli sonu\u00e7lar\u0131 hen\u00fcz net de\u011fil. Uzun vadeli boyutta Katar, K\u00f6rfez krizinin kesin kazanan\u0131 oldu. Katar, El-Cezire\u2019nin kapat\u0131lmas\u0131, \u0130ran\u2019la olan ili\u015fkilerinin seviyesinin d\u00fc\u015f\u00fcr\u00fclmesi ve M\u00fcsl\u00fcman Karde\u015fler ile olan ba\u011flar\u0131n\u0131n kopar\u0131lmas\u0131 dahil ambargocu devletlerin on \u00fc\u00e7 talebinin<\/a> hi\u00e7birini kabul etmedi. Katar 2017\u2019den bu yana tar\u0131m ve imalat \u00fcr\u00fcnlerinin tedarik zincirlerini \u00e7e\u015fitlendirdi, hava kuvvetlerinin<\/a> 12 olan sava\u015f jeti say\u0131s\u0131n\u0131 96\u2019ya y\u00fckseltti ve Avrupa, Rusya ve \u00c7in ile ortakl\u0131klar\u0131n\u0131 g\u00fc\u00e7lendirdi.<\/p>\n

Ambargocu devletlerin k\u0131demli yetkilileri ve \u00f6nde gelen yorumcular\u0131 Katar\u2019\u0131n yank\u0131 bulan zafer anlat\u0131s\u0131na meydan okudu. BAE D\u0131\u015fi\u015flerinden Sorumlu Devlet Bakan\u0131 Enver Garga\u015f Katar\u2019\u0131n b\u00fcy\u00fck tavizler vermekten ka\u00e7\u0131nabilmesini \u00f6nemsiz gibi lanse etmek i\u00e7in bu on \u00fc\u00e7 talebin \u201cm\u00fczakere i\u00e7in azami bir pozisyon\u201d oldu\u011funda \u0131srar etti<\/a>. Suudi devlet kanal\u0131 Al-Arabiya\u2019n\u0131n eski Genel M\u00fcd\u00fcr\u00fc Abdurrahman Ra\u015fid, Katar\u2019\u0131n M\u00fcsl\u00fcman Karde\u015fler liderlerini kendi topraklar\u0131ndan \u00e7\u0131karmas\u0131n\u0131n, bankac\u0131l\u0131k sistemini ABD\u2019nin tercihleriyle uyumlu hale getirmesinin ve \u201cmedya faaliyetlerinin \u00e7o\u011funu Doha\u2019dan ba\u015fka \u00fclkelere kayd\u0131rmas\u0131n\u0131n\u201d verilen \u00f6nemli tavizler oldu\u011funu iddia<\/a> etti. Bu g\u00f6r\u00fc\u015fler ise ambargocu d\u00f6rt devletin s\u0131k\u0131 kontrol alt\u0131ndaki medya alanlar\u0131 d\u0131\u015f\u0131nda \u00e7ok az destek buldu.<\/p>\n

Sadece El-Ula Anla\u015fmas\u0131\u2019na bak\u0131l\u0131rsa K\u00f6rfez krizinin bitmesi, m\u00fcdahil t\u00fcm taraflar i\u00e7in bir kazan-kazan sonucu do\u011furdu. Nitekim, COVID-19 pandemisinin ekonomik etkilerini hafifletmek i\u00e7in K\u0130K d\u00fczeyinde daha yak\u0131n i\u015f birli\u011fi de muhtemeldir. Bu sayede Katar, M\u0131s\u0131r\u2019\u0131n en \u00f6nde gelen \u015firketi olan M\u0131s\u0131r Rafine \u015eirketi yat\u0131r\u0131m\u0131 da d\u00e2hil M\u0131s\u0131r\u2019la olan gayr\u0131 resmi ticari i\u015f birli\u011fini geni\u015fletebilecek,<\/a> Dubai\u2019nin sendeleyen emlak piyasas\u0131n\u0131 destekleyebilece<\/a>k ve Muhammed bin Selman\u2019\u0131n 2030 Suudi \u00e7e\u015fitlendirme plan\u0131na yat\u0131r\u0131m yapabilecektir. Katar ekonomisi de Suudi ve BAE yat\u0131r\u0131mlar\u0131n\u0131 \u00e7ekerek ambargocu devletlere kar\u015f\u0131 a\u00e7\u0131lan davalardan kaybedilen tutarlar\u0131 fazlas\u0131yla kar\u015f\u0131layacakt\u0131r.<\/p>\n

Arap Yar\u0131madas\u0131\u2019nda \u00c7\u00f6z\u00fclmemi\u015f Gerilimler <\/strong><\/p>\n

Bu olumlu geli\u015fmelere ra\u011fmen Katar ambargosunun sona ermesi K\u00f6rfez krizinin tamamen \u00e7\u00f6z\u00fclmesiyle sonu\u00e7lanmad\u0131. Katar ile boykot\u00e7u \u00fclkeler aras\u0131ndaki ciddi g\u00fcvensizlik \u015eubat 1996\u2019da Katar Emiri Hamad bin Halife es-Sani\u2019ye kar\u015f\u0131 yap\u0131lan darbe giri\u015fiminden beri devam ediyor. Tabandan gelen \u0130slamc\u0131 hareketlere kar\u015f\u0131 \u00e7\u0131karak Ortado\u011fu\u2019daki kar\u015f\u0131 devrimci g\u00fc\u00e7leri destekleyen BAE ile 2011 Arap Bahar\u0131 protestolar\u0131n\u0131 co\u015fkuyla desteklemi\u015f Katar aras\u0131ndaki ideolojik rekabet de yo\u011funlu\u011funu koruyor. Katar ile BAE Mozambik\u2019te do\u011falgaz kontratlar\u0131<\/a> ile Tunus<\/a> ve Somali<\/a> \u00fczerindeki siyasi n\u00fcfuz i\u00e7in yar\u0131\u015ft\u0131klar\u0131ndan Afrika\u2019da da stratejik rakipler olmaya devam ediyorlar.<\/p>\n

El-Ula Anla\u015fmas\u0131\u2019n\u0131 izleyen sahici at\u0131l\u0131mlar ile \u00e7\u00f6z\u00fclmemi\u015f \u00e7at\u0131\u015fmalar\u0131n kar\u0131\u015f\u0131m\u0131n\u0131n, K\u0130K\u2019in \u0130ran ve T\u00fcrkiye ile olan ili\u015fkilerine derin etkileri olabilir. \u0130ran D\u0131\u015fi\u015fleri Bakan\u0131 Cevad Zarif her ne kadar Katar\u2019\u0131n bask\u0131 ve zorbal\u0131\u011fa kar\u015f\u0131 cesur direni\u015fini methedip Arap rakiplerini Tahran\u2019\u0131n \u00f6ne s\u00fcrd\u00fc\u011f\u00fc ortak g\u00fcvenlik anla\u015fmas\u0131 olan H\u00fcrm\u00fcz Bar\u0131\u015f \u0130nisiyatifi\u2019ni de\u011ferlendirmeye te\u015fvik etse de El-Ula Anla\u015fmas\u0131 \u0130ran\u2019\u0131n menfaatlerine yaramayabilir. \u0130ran tarihsel olarak K\u0130K i\u00e7indeki \u00e7eki\u015fmeleri s\u0131cak kar\u015f\u0131lay\u0131p onlardan nemalanmaya \u00e7al\u0131\u015ft\u0131. \u0130ran destekli Husi isyanc\u0131lar 2019\u2019da Suudi-BAE gerilimi t\u0131rman\u0131rken g\u00fcney Yemen\u2019deki sald\u0131r\u0131lar\u0131n\u0131n dozunu artt\u0131rm\u0131\u015ft\u0131. \u0130ran, Suudi-BAE anla\u015fmazl\u0131klar\u0131n\u0131n \u00e7\u00f6z\u00fclmesine yard\u0131mc\u0131 olan Riyad Anla\u015fmas\u0131\u2019n\u0131 en y\u00fcksek sesle<\/a> ele\u015ftiren uluslararas\u0131 akt\u00f6r de olmu\u015ftu. K\u0130K zirvesinden hemen sonra \u0130ranl\u0131 medya organ\u0131 \u0130ntihab,<\/em> Bahreyn\u2019in<\/a> Katar ile olan uzla\u015f\u0131s\u0131n\u0131n samimiyetine \u015f\u00fcphe d\u00fc\u015f\u00fcrd\u00fc. Bu durum \u0130ran\u2019\u0131n K\u00f6rfez\u2019deki Suudi liderli\u011finden memnuniyetsizli\u011fini vurgulama \u00e7abalar\u0131n\u0131n i\u00e7 yank\u0131lar\u0131n\u0131 \u00f6ne \u00e7\u0131karmaktad\u0131r.<\/p>\n

\u0130ran\u2019\u0131n Arap Yar\u0131madas\u0131\u2019ndaki gerilimlerin azalmas\u0131ndan duydu\u011fu kayg\u0131lara ra\u011fmen K\u0130K\u2019in \u0130ran kar\u015f\u0131t\u0131 bir blok olu\u015fturma ihtimali d\u00fc\u015f\u00fck. Katar D\u0131\u015fi\u015fleri Bakan\u0131 \u015eeyh Muhammed bin Abdurrahman es-Sani K\u0130K uzla\u015f\u0131s\u0131n\u0131n Katar\u2019\u0131n \u0130ran\u2019la ili\u015fkisini de\u011fi\u015ftirmeyece\u011fini a\u00e7\u0131klad\u0131<\/a>. Ablukadan hemen sonra Katar, \u0130ran\u2019dan acil g\u0131da ve su tedariki istedi<\/a>. \u0130ran\u2019\u0131n bu isteklere cevap vermesi, Katar ile \u0130ran aras\u0131ndaki Doha\u2019n\u0131n Ocak 2016\u2019da \u0130ran\u2019\u0131n Tahran Suudi b\u00fcy\u00fckel\u00e7ili\u011fi ve Me\u015fhed Suudi konsoloslu\u011funa d\u00fczenledi\u011fi sald\u0131r\u0131y\u0131 k\u0131namas\u0131ndan sonra t\u0131rmanan gerilimi yumu\u015fatm\u0131\u015ft\u0131. Suudi Arabistan ve Bahreyn\u2019in \u0130ran\u2019a y\u00f6nelik agresif tavr\u0131na kat\u0131lmak yerine, Katar\u2019\u0131n \u0130ran politikas\u0131 muhtemelen Umman\u2019\u0131n Tahran ile samimi ili\u015fkisi ile BAE\u2019nin temkinli yakla\u015f\u0131m stratejisi aras\u0131nda bir yerde olacakt\u0131r. Gelecek Joe Biden y\u00f6netimi bu duru\u015fu Katar\u2019\u0131n ABD-\u0130ran diyalo\u011funu kolayla\u015ft\u0131rmas\u0131na izin verebilece\u011fi i\u00e7in faydal\u0131 g\u00f6rebilir.<\/p>\n

Yeni bir K\u00f6rfez Krizi Ka\u00e7\u0131n\u0131lmaz m\u0131? <\/strong><\/p>\n

K\u0130K i\u00e7inde \u0130ran hususundaki ayr\u0131\u015fmalar belirgin olmas\u0131na ve bu durumun Biden\u2019\u0131n \u0130ran\u2019la yeniden temas kurmas\u0131 i\u00e7in taktiksel faydalar sunmas\u0131na ra\u011fmen t\u00fcm bunlar yeni bir K\u00f6rfez krizini ba\u015flatmayabilir. Suudi Arabistan ile BAE, Suudi D\u0131\u015fi\u015fleri Bakan\u0131 Faysal bin Farhan\u2019\u0131n 5 Aral\u0131k\u2019ta istedi\u011fi<\/a> gibi Kapsaml\u0131 Ortak Eylem Plan\u0131 m\u00fczakerelerine dahil edilirse bu anla\u015fmazl\u0131klar\u0131n b\u00f6l\u00fcc\u00fc etkisi zamanla hafifleyebilir. Joe Biden ABD\u2019nin Yemen\u2019de Suudi liderli\u011findeki askeri m\u00fcdahaleye maddi deste\u011fini ask\u0131ya alma s\u00f6z\u00fcnde durursa K\u00f6rfez i\u00e7inde \u0130ran hakk\u0131ndaki ayr\u0131l\u0131klar\u0131n kini yumu\u015fayabilir. Umman, Katar ve Kuveyt sava\u015f\u0131 ele\u015ftirmeleri sebebiyle Suudilerin Yemen\u2019den \u00e7ekilmesini s\u0131cak kar\u015f\u0131layacaklard\u0131r. Ayr\u0131ca Katar, Suudilerin ve BAE\u2019nin M\u00fcsl\u00fcman Karde\u015fler ve Husileri Katar\u2019\u0131n destekledi\u011fine y\u00f6nelik iddialar\u0131na<\/a> son vermesini de destekleyecektir.<\/p>\n

\u0130ranl\u0131 yetkililerle medyan\u0131n s\u00f6ylemleri aras\u0131ndaki \u00e7eli\u015fkilerin aksine T\u00fcrkiye El-Ula Anla\u015fmas\u0131\u2019n\u0131 olumlu bir geli\u015fme olarak g\u00f6r\u00fcyor. T\u00fcrkiye Cumhurba\u015fkan\u0131 Recep Tayyip Erdo\u011fan El-Ula Anla\u015fmas\u0131\u2019n\u0131 \u201c\u00f6zellikle K\u00f6rfez b\u00f6lgesi i\u00e7in \u00e7ok faydal\u0131 ve iyi\u201d olarak nitelerken<\/a> T\u00fcrk devlet haber ajans\u0131 Anadolu Ajans\u0131<\/em> ablukan\u0131n bitmesini<\/a> \u201cT\u00fcrkiye ve K\u00f6rfez i\u00e7in b\u00fcy\u00fck bir kazan\u0131m\u201d olarak de\u011ferlendirdi. Katar T\u00fcrk ekonomisinin ikinci en b\u00fcy\u00fck yat\u0131r\u0131mc\u0131s\u0131 oldu\u011fu ve Libya\u2019dan kuzey Suriye\u2019deki K\u00fcrt Halk Savunma Birlikleri (YPG) tehdidine varan konularda T\u00fcrkiye\u2019nin yan\u0131nda<\/a> yer ald\u0131\u011f\u0131 i\u00e7in T\u00fcrkiye-Katar ili\u015fkileri abluka sonras\u0131 d\u00f6nemde de g\u00fc\u00e7lenmeye devam edecektir.<\/p>\n

Bu iyile\u015fmeler yak\u0131n zamanda T\u00fcrkiye ile ili\u015fkilerini g\u00fc\u00e7lendiren Kuveyt ve Umman taraf\u0131ndan da s\u0131cak kar\u015f\u0131lanacakt\u0131r. Riyad T\u00fcrkiye ile ili\u015fkilerini yeniden ba\u015flatman\u0131n ilk a\u015famalar\u0131nda oldu\u011fu i\u00e7in T\u00fcrkiye muhtemelen Suudi Arabistan\u2019dan sessiz bir yan\u0131t alacakt\u0131r. K\u00f6rfez uzla\u015fma s\u00fcreci BAE-T\u00fcrkiye gerilimlerinin k\u0131smen hafiflemesine bile katk\u0131da bulunabilir. T\u00fcrkiye\u2019ye y\u00f6nelik hasmane retori\u011fine ara veren BAE D\u0131\u015fi\u015flerinden Sorumlu Devlet Bakan\u0131 Enver Garga\u015f BAE i\u00e7in kazara<\/a> \u201cT\u00fcrkiye\u2019nin b\u00f6lgedeki bir numaral\u0131 ticaret orta\u011f\u0131\u201d oldu\u011funu s\u00f6yledi ve BAE\u2019nin T\u00fcrkiye ile ihtilaf ya\u015famaktan yana olmad\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 belirtti. BAE K\u00f6rfez krizini yeniden k\u0131z\u0131\u015ft\u0131rmaktan ka\u00e7\u0131nmak amac\u0131yla T\u00fcrkiye\u2019yi Do\u011fu Akdeniz\u2019de durdurmaya odaklan\u0131p<\/a> Ortado\u011fu\u2019daki T\u00fcrk kar\u015f\u0131t\u0131 \u00e7abalar\u0131nda daha temkinli hareket edebilir.<\/p>\n

El-Ula Anla\u015fmas\u0131 yak\u0131n tarihte K\u00f6rfez i\u00e7inde ya\u015fanan en s\u00fcr\u00fcncemeli anla\u015fmazl\u0131\u011f\u0131n sonuna i\u015faret ediyor ama Basra K\u00f6rfezi b\u00f6lgesinin jeopolitik gelece\u011fine ili\u015fkin ak\u0131llarda cevaplardan \u00e7ok soru b\u0131rak\u0131yor. Suudi Arabistan ve BAE Katar\u2019a kar\u015f\u0131 ekonomik zorlaman\u0131n beyhudeli\u011fini fark eder ve K\u0130K yetkilileri kar\u015f\u0131l\u0131kl\u0131 g\u00fcvensizli\u011fi kontrol alt\u0131na al\u0131rsa El-Ula Anla\u015fmas\u0131 rakip K\u0130K \u00fclkeleri i\u00e7in sembol bir diplomatik ba\u015far\u0131 olarak ortaya \u00e7\u0131kabilir. <\/p>\n<\/div>

<\/div><\/div><\/div><\/div><\/div>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Katar diplomatik krizi 5 Ocak\u2019ta Riyad\u2019daki K\u00f6rfez \u0130\u015f birli\u011fi Konseyi (K\u0130K) zirvesinde ani bir \u015fekilde son buldu. Suudi Arabistan, Birle\u015fik Arap Emirlikleri, Bahreyn ve M\u0131s\u0131r Haziran 2017\u2019de ba\u015flayan Katar boykotlar\u0131n\u0131 sonland\u0131rarak Doha ile diplomatik ili\u015fkilerini yeniden ba\u015flatt\u0131. K\u0130K zirvesi Katar krizinin \u00e7\u00f6z\u00fcmleni\u015finin sembolik g\u00f6sterileriyle doluydu<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":218,"featured_media":27068,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_mo_disable_npp":"","ngg_post_thumbnail":0},"categories":[376],"tags":[],"asf_pub_issue":[],"asf_pub_region":[10321,17582,17585,17586],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/research.sharqforum.org\/tr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/27112"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/research.sharqforum.org\/tr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/research.sharqforum.org\/tr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/research.sharqforum.org\/tr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/218"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/research.sharqforum.org\/tr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=27112"}],"version-history":[{"count":3,"href":"https:\/\/research.sharqforum.org\/tr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/27112\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":27115,"href":"https:\/\/research.sharqforum.org\/tr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/27112\/revisions\/27115"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/research.sharqforum.org\/tr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/27068"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/research.sharqforum.org\/tr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=27112"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/research.sharqforum.org\/tr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=27112"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/research.sharqforum.org\/tr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=27112"},{"taxonomy":"asf_pub_issue","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/research.sharqforum.org\/tr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/asf_pub_issue?post=27112"},{"taxonomy":"asf_pub_region","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/research.sharqforum.org\/tr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/asf_pub_region?post=27112"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}