{"id":27309,"date":"2021-02-15T12:20:08","date_gmt":"2021-02-15T09:20:08","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/research.sharqforum.org\/?p=27309"},"modified":"2021-03-04T13:53:23","modified_gmt":"2021-03-04T10:53:23","slug":"arap-ayaklanmalari-korfezi-nasil-parcaladi","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/research.sharqforum.org\/tr\/2021\/02\/15\/arap-ayaklanmalari-korfezi-nasil-parcaladi\/","title":{"rendered":"Arap Ayaklanmalar\u0131 K\u00f6rfez\u2019i Nas\u0131l Par\u00e7alad\u0131?"},"content":{"rendered":"

(Bu metin \u0130ngilizce orijinal versiyonundan terc\u00fcme edilmi\u015ftir.)<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n

\u015eubat ve Mart 2011\u2019de Bahreyn\u2019i sarsan kayda de\u011fer karga\u015fa haricinde Arap ayaklanmalar\u0131n\u0131n K\u00f6rfez \u00fczerindeki etkisi o d\u00f6neme k\u0131yasla daha uzun bir \u2018u\u00e7\u2019[1]<\/a> oldu. 2011-12 ayaklanmalar\u0131 ve bunu takip eden y\u0131llar ba\u015fta Katar, Suudi Arabistan ve Birle\u015fik Arap Emirlikleri (BAE) olmak \u00fczere farkl\u0131 K\u00f6rfez devletlerinin Suriye, Yemen ve Kuzey Afrika devletlerindeki siyasal de\u011fi\u015fimin h\u0131z\u0131n\u0131 ve istikametini \u015fekillendirme giri\u015fimlerine tan\u0131k oldu. Bu \u00e7abalar\u0131n ne koordine ne de ortak ama\u00e7lara y\u00f6nelik olmas\u0131 K\u00f6rfez i\u00e7i gerilim ve rekabetleri artt\u0131rd\u0131. Bu durum, Suudi Arabistan, Bahreyn ve BAE\u2019nin sekiz ayl\u0131\u011f\u0131na Katar\u2019dan b\u00fcy\u00fckel\u00e7ilerini \u00e7ekip M\u0131s\u0131r\u2019la beraber Haziran 2017\u2019den Ocak 2021\u2019e dek s\u00fcren uzun bir abluka ba\u015flatt\u0131\u011f\u0131 2014 diplomatik yar\u0131lmas\u0131na katk\u0131da bulundu.<\/p>\n

Arap ayaklanmalar\u0131na y\u00f6nelik politikalar\u0131 hem tekil K\u00f6rfez devletlerinin Ortado\u011fu ve Kuzey Afrika\u2019da b\u00f6lgesel g\u00fc\u00e7ler olarak y\u00fckseli\u015fini hem de 2011\u2019den sonra ge\u00e7i\u015f s\u00fcrecindeki devletlerdeki (alg\u0131lanan) \u00e7\u0131karlar\u0131n\u0131 korumak i\u00e7in \u2018yaln\u0131z ilerleyip\u2019 tek tarafl\u0131 veya en iyi ihtimalle gev\u015fek bir blok olarak hareket etmeye daha istekli olduklar\u0131n\u0131 g\u00f6steriyordu. M\u00fcbarek sonras\u0131 M\u0131s\u0131r politikas\u0131 girdab\u0131nda \u00f6nce Katar\u2019\u0131n sonra da Suudi Arabistan ile BAE\u2019nin farkl\u0131 taraflar\u0131 destekledi\u011fi M\u0131s\u0131r, K\u00f6rfez devletlerinin daha \u00e7ok g\u00fcce dayal\u0131 b\u00f6lgesel yakla\u015f\u0131mlar\u0131n\u0131n k\u00fc\u00e7\u00fck bir evreni h\u00e2line geldi. Katar ve BAE\u2019nin 2011\u2019de Kaddafi kar\u015f\u0131t\u0131 farkl\u0131 yerel gruplar\u0131 destekleyip Libya\u2019n\u0131n par\u00e7alanmas\u0131n\u0131n daha sonra i\u00e7 sava\u015fa d\u00f6n\u00fc\u015fmesinin baz\u0131 tohumlar\u0131n\u0131 att\u0131\u011f\u0131 Libya da K\u00f6rfez devletlerinin ayr\u0131\u015fmas\u0131n\u0131n etkisinin bir ba\u015fka \u00f6rne\u011fi.<\/p>\n

K\u00f6rfez devletlerinin g\u00f6r\u00fcn\u00fcr ve giderek daha kararl\u0131 b\u00f6lgesel ve uluslararas\u0131 akt\u00f6rler olarak ortaya \u00e7\u0131k\u0131\u015f\u0131 Arap ayaklanmalar\u0131ndan \u00f6ncesine dayan\u0131yor ama ayaklanman\u0131n ilk \u015foku ge\u00e7ti\u011finde h\u0131zlan\u0131p etkili yeni bir boyut kazand\u0131. 14 \u015eubat 2011\u2019de Bahreyn\u2019de geni\u015f \u00f6l\u00e7ekli ve uzun s\u00fcren siyasi protestolar patlak verip Suudi Arabistan\u2019\u0131n Do\u011fu Eyaleti\u2019ndeki b\u00f6lgelere yay\u0131l\u0131rken Kuveyt 2011\u2019de aylar s\u00fcren ve halk\u0131n siyasi yolsuzluk iddialar\u0131ndan do\u011fan \u00f6fkesinin y\u00f6nlendirdi\u011fi g\u00f6sterilere sahne oldu. Mart 2011\u2019de Umman\u2019da da daha k\u00fc\u00e7\u00fck protestolar ya\u015fan\u0131rken 133 Emirlik vatanda\u015f\u0131n\u0131n \u0131l\u0131ml\u0131 siyasi reformlar\u0131 desteklemek i\u00e7in imzalad\u0131\u011f\u0131 bir dilek\u00e7e ayn\u0131 ay i\u00e7inde \u00fclke y\u00f6neticilerine teslim edildi. Sadece d\u00fcnyada ki\u015fi ba\u015f\u0131na d\u00fc\u015fen en y\u00fcksek gelir seviyesine sahip \u00fclkelerden biri olan (ve BAE\u2019nin be\u015f kuzey emirli\u011fi gibi g\u00f6rece daha e\u015fitsiz ekonomik i\u00e7 b\u00f6lgeleri bulunmayan) Katar hi\u00e7bir karga\u015fa ya\u015famad\u0131.<\/p>\n

Katar\u2019da i\u00e7 huzursuzluk ya\u015fanma ihtimalinin hi\u00e7 olmamas\u0131 Doha y\u00f6netiminin b\u00f6lge devletleri aras\u0131nda tek ba\u015f\u0131na Arap ayaklanmalar\u0131n\u0131 otoriter stat\u00fckoya meydan okuma olarak de\u011fil bir f\u0131rsat olarak g\u00f6rebilmesinin nedenlerinden biriydi. Bunlar\u0131n yan\u0131nda ayaklanmalar Aral\u0131k 2010\u2019da Katar\u2019\u0131n 2022 FIFA D\u00fcnya Kupas\u0131\u2019na ev sahipli\u011fi yapma hakk\u0131 kazanmas\u0131ndan sadece haftalar sonra ba\u015flad\u0131 ki bu da Katarl\u0131lar\u0131n siyasi hedeflerine ula\u015fmak i\u00e7in kaynaklar\u0131n\u0131 stratejik olarak sevk edebileceklerine olan g\u00fcveninin y\u00fcksek oldu\u011fu anlam\u0131na geliyordu. D\u0131\u015far\u0131dan benzer bir y\u00fcksek gelirli \u2018rantiye devleti\u2019 g\u00f6r\u00fcn\u00fcm\u00fcnde olan BAE\u2019de bile siyasi ve ekonomik g\u00fcc\u00fcn Abu Dabi ve Dubai\u2019de yo\u011funla\u015fm\u0131\u015f olmas\u0131 (2009 bor\u00e7 krizinden sonra daha d\u00fc\u015f\u00fck seviyedeydi) siyasalla\u015fma potansiyeli olan yerel e\u015fitsizliklerin 2011\u2019de politika yap\u0131c\u0131lar\u0131 kayg\u0131land\u0131ran konular oldu\u011fu anlam\u0131na geliyordu.<\/p>\n

Ayaklanmalar\u0131n ilk a\u015famas\u0131nda hem Katar hem de BAE Libya\u2019da NATO \u00f6nc\u00fcl\u00fc\u011f\u00fcndeki u\u00e7u\u015fa yasak b\u00f6lge operasyonuna kat\u0131ld\u0131, K\u00f6rfez \u0130\u015fbirli\u011fi Konseyi (K\u0130K) taraf\u0131ndan konu\u015fland\u0131r\u0131lan Yar\u0131mada Kalkan G\u00fcc\u00fc\u2019ne katk\u0131da bulundu ve ikisi de K\u0130K \u00f6nc\u00fcl\u00fc\u011f\u00fcndeki Yemen\u2019de siyasal iktidar\u0131n k\u00f6\u015feye s\u0131k\u0131\u015fm\u0131\u015f Cumhurba\u015fkan\u0131 Ali Abdullah Salih\u2019ten al\u0131nmas\u0131n\u0131 temin etme \u00e7abas\u0131n\u0131n birer par\u00e7as\u0131yd\u0131. Bahreyn ve Yemen \u00f6rneklerindeki politika i\u015f birli\u011fi Katar\u2019\u0131n K\u00f6rfez\u2019den uzaktaki Kuzey Afrika \u00fclkeleri ve Suriye\u2019deki sendeleyen otoriter rejimlere kar\u015f\u0131 ayaklanmalar\u0131n destek\u00e7isi olarak alg\u0131lanmas\u0131na ra\u011fmen Katarl\u0131lar\u0131n K\u00f6rfez b\u00f6lgesinde K\u0130K \u00e7er\u00e7evesi i\u00e7inde hareket etmeye devam etti\u011fini g\u00f6steriyordu. Bu durum Katarl\u0131lar\u0131n d\u00f6rt zengin K\u0130K devletinin (Kuveyt, Katar, Suudi Arabistan ve BAE) 2011\u2019de Bahreyn ve Umman\u2019a sundu\u011fu 10 milyar dolarl\u0131k istikrar paketine kat\u0131lmas\u0131nda da g\u00f6r\u00fcld\u00fc.<\/p>\n

Ancak Katarl\u0131lar\u0131n ba\u015fka yerlerdeki ayaklanmalara destek verdi\u011fi ve \u00f6zellikle de o ayaklanmalar i\u00e7indeki \u0130slamc\u0131 akt\u00f6rlere silah ve fon sa\u011flad\u0131\u011f\u0131 alg\u0131s\u0131 takip eden on y\u0131l\u0131n \u00f6nemli bir k\u0131sm\u0131na damga vuran K\u00f6rfez i\u00e7i keskin yar\u0131lmalar\u0131n temelini olu\u015fturdu. Katar\u2019\u0131n M\u0131s\u0131r\u2019da 2012-13 aras\u0131nda bir y\u0131l s\u00fcren M\u00fcsl\u00fcman Karde\u015fler iktidar\u0131 s\u0131ras\u0131nda Muhammed Mursi\u2019ye siyasi ve mali yard\u0131mda bulunmas\u0131 Katar aleyhtarlar\u0131n\u0131n g\u00f6z\u00fcnde Doha\u2019n\u0131n taraf tutup kazananlar\u0131 se\u00e7ti\u011fi y\u00f6n\u00fcndeki (Katarl\u0131lar\u0131n yaln\u0131zca g\u00fcn\u00fcn se\u00e7ilmi\u015f h\u00fck\u00fcmetleriyle i\u015f yapt\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 belirterek cevap verdi\u011fi) \u015f\u00fcphelerinin v\u00fccut bulmu\u015f h\u00e2liydi. Ancak Abu Dabi\u2019de bu alg\u0131lar siyasal \u0130slam\u2019a sert muhalefet ve \u0130slamc\u0131lar\u0131n Veliaht Prens Muhammed bin Zayid Nahyan\u2019\u0131n ifadeleriyle b\u00f6lgesel istikrara ve ulusal g\u00fcvenli\u011fe b\u00fcy\u00fck bir tehdit olu\u015fturdu\u011fu kanaatiyle \u00e7arp\u0131\u015f\u0131p BAE\u2019nin Katar\u2019la olan husumetine zemin haz\u0131rlad\u0131. <\/p>\n

Mursi 3 Temmuz 2013\u2019te, Katar Emiri \u015eeyh Hamad bin Halife Sani\u2019nin iktidar\u0131 o\u011flu \u015eeyh Temim bin Hamad Sani\u2019ye devretmesinden sadece sekiz g\u00fcn sonra General (\u015fimdiki Cumhurba\u015fkan\u0131) Abd\u00fcl Fettah Sisi liderli\u011findeki M\u0131s\u0131r ordusu taraf\u0131ndan devrildi. \u0130ki olay aras\u0131nda bir ba\u011flant\u0131 oldu\u011funu g\u00f6steren bir kan\u0131t olmasa da bu pratikte \u015eeyh Temim\u2019in Katar Emiri olarak ilk haftas\u0131nda ikisi de Mursi\u2019nin yerine ge\u00e7en ordu liderli\u011findeki M\u0131s\u0131r h\u00fck\u00fcmetine derhal siyasi ve ekonomik yard\u0131m sunarak kar\u015f\u0131l\u0131k veren Abu Dabi ile Riyad\u2019\u0131n \u00f6nc\u00fcl\u00fck etti\u011fi b\u00f6lgesel bir kar\u015f\u0131 \u00e7\u0131k\u0131\u015fa maruz kald\u0131\u011f\u0131 anlam\u0131na geliyordu. Kas\u0131m 2013\u2019te M\u00fcsl\u00fcman Karde\u015fler\u2019in \u00f6rg\u00fct \u00fczerindeki \u015fiddetli bask\u0131lardan ka\u00e7an \u00fcyelerinin Doha\u2019da yeniden toparlanmaya ba\u015flad\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 s\u00f6yleyen medya raporlar\u0131, K\u00f6rfez i\u00e7i diplomatik krizin 2014\u2019\u00fcn sonlar\u0131na kadar devam eden ilk a\u015famas\u0131n\u0131n gerek\u00e7eleri aras\u0131ndayd\u0131.<\/p>\n

2014 yar\u0131lmas\u0131 ve ard\u0131ndan gelen 2017 sonras\u0131 abluka K\u00f6rfez i\u00e7i ve K\u0130K siyasetindeki baz\u0131 gerilim noktalar\u0131na sert darbe vurdu. K\u0130K\u2019in 1981\u2019de kurulmas\u0131ndan itibaren ay\u0131rt edici \u00f6zelliklerinden biri geni\u015f anlamda benzer bir d\u0131\u015f tehdit alg\u0131s\u0131n\u0131 payla\u015fan ve onlar\u0131 ayr\u0131 tutandan daha fazla ortak paydas\u0131 olan Arap Yar\u0131madas\u0131\u2019ndaki alt\u0131 krall\u0131\u011f\u0131n esnek bir ittifak\u0131n\u0131 temsil etmesiydi. K\u0130K\u2019in ilk otuz y\u0131l\u0131nda Arap d\u00fcnyas\u0131ndaki en kal\u0131c\u0131 b\u00f6lgesel kurulu\u015f \u00f6rneklerinden birine evrilmesine olanak sa\u011flayan bu pragmatizmdi. B\u00f6lge ve d\u0131\u015f politika konular\u0131na y\u00f6nelik ortak bir yakla\u015f\u0131m\u0131n olu\u015fmas\u0131n\u0131 engellemi\u015f olsa bile K\u0130K\u2019i bir arada tutan \u00fcye devletlerin ulusal egemenli\u011fi etkileyen konularda ayn\u0131 d\u00fc\u015f\u00fcnmeme haklar\u0131n\u0131n oldu\u011fu bir esneklik duygusu da vard\u0131.<\/p>\n

2014 ve 2017 K\u00f6rfez i\u00e7i ihtilaflar K\u0130K\u2019i hem \u00f6rg\u00fct olarak hem de g\u00f6rece benzer d\u00fc\u015f\u00fcnen devletlerin kolektif bir birli\u011fi olarak birka\u00e7 \u015fekilde zay\u0131flatt\u0131. Katar\u2019la ya\u015fad\u0131\u011f\u0131 2014 ve 2017 ayr\u0131l\u0131klar\u0131nda BAE taraf\u0131ndan desteklenen Suudi Arabistan\u2019\u0131n daha k\u00fc\u00e7\u00fck olan kom\u015fusuna bask\u0131 uygulamaya giri\u015fti\u011fi g\u00f6r\u00fcnt\u00fcs\u00fc K\u00f6rfez\u2019de bir h\u00e2kim devlet ile \u00e7ok daha k\u00fc\u00e7\u00fck be\u015f devlet aras\u0131ndaki b\u00fcy\u00fckl\u00fck ve konvansiyonel g\u00fc\u00e7 farkl\u0131l\u0131klar\u0131ndan duyulan eski kayg\u0131lar\u0131 canland\u0131rmaya yarad\u0131. \u0130ronik bir \u015fekilde 2011 \u00f6ncesinde Abu Dabi de en az Doha kadar bu kayg\u0131y\u0131 ta\u015f\u0131yordu ve 2000\u2019li y\u0131llar\u0131n birka\u00e7 K\u00f6rfez i\u00e7i parlama noktas\u0131 Suudilerin BAE ile Katar\u2019\u0131n bir do\u011falgaz boru hatt\u0131 ve ge\u00e7it yolu yapma \u00e7abalar\u0131na muhalefetiyle ilgiliydi. Her ne kadar 2011 ve sonras\u0131ndaki olaylar silsilesi Abu Dabi\u2019yi Riyad\u2019la ittifak kurmaya y\u00f6neltmi\u015f olsa da Suudi ve BAE\u2019lilerin 2014 ve 2017\u2019de Katar\u2019\u0131 da buna zorlama giri\u015fimi K\u0130K\u2019in pragmatik esnekli\u011fine darbe vurdu.<\/p>\n

Suudi Arabistan Kral\u0131 Abdullah\u2019\u0131n 2011 ve 2013 aras\u0131ndaki siyaset ve g\u00fcvenlik s\u00fcre\u00e7lerinin entegrasyonunu derinle\u015ftirip K\u0130K\u2019i bir t\u00fcr K\u00f6rfez birli\u011fine d\u00f6n\u00fc\u015ft\u00fcrme giri\u015fimleri de o d\u00f6nemde BAE ve \u00f6zellikle Kuveyt ve Umman dahil k\u00fc\u00e7\u00fck devletlerin g\u00fc\u00e7l\u00fc direnciyle kar\u015f\u0131la\u015ft\u0131. 2011\u2019den sonra Kuveyt ve Umman y\u00f6netimleri taraf tutmaktan ka\u00e7\u0131nan veya giderek \u0131srarc\u0131la\u015fan kom\u015fular\u0131 aras\u0131nda se\u00e7im yapmaya zorlanan birer dengeleyici g\u00fc\u00e7 olarak ortaya \u00e7\u0131kt\u0131. Haziran 2017\u2019de Suudi-Emirlik-Bahreyn-M\u0131s\u0131r d\u00f6rtl\u00fcs\u00fcn\u00fcn Katar\u2019a kar\u015f\u0131 yay\u0131mlad\u0131\u011f\u0131 13 maddelik \u2018talepler\u2019 listesi Kuveyt ile Umman\u2019\u0131n kendi otonom d\u0131\u015f politikalar\u0131n\u0131 y\u00fcr\u00fctme kabiliyetlerinin kendilerini de hedef h\u00e2line getirebilece\u011fi riskini vurgulad\u0131 \u00e7\u00fcnk\u00fc liste, Kuveyt ile Umman\u2019\u0131n K\u00f6rfez\u2019deki siyasi gerilimleri d\u00fc\u015f\u00fcrmek amac\u0131yla \u0130ran y\u00f6netimiyle temas kurmas\u0131ndan sadece aylar sonra, Katar\u2019\u0131n \u0130ran\u2019la diplomatik ba\u011flar\u0131n\u0131 koparmas\u0131n\u0131 talep ediyordu.<\/p>\n

K\u00f6rfez i\u00e7indeki ayr\u0131l\u0131klar\u0131n 2014\u2019te ve 2017 sonras\u0131ndaki iki a\u015famas\u0131 kilit K\u00f6rfez ba\u015fkentlerindeki karar al\u0131m\u0131n\u0131n kararl\u0131l\u0131klar\u0131 seleflerinin daha mutabakat odakl\u0131 siyasetinden ciddi anlamda farkl\u0131la\u015fan yeni bir liderler ku\u015fa\u011f\u0131n\u0131n elinde nas\u0131l topland\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 da g\u00f6sterdi. Bu de\u011fi\u015fim en \u00e7ok Muhammed bin Zayid\u2019in fiili iktidar\u0131n\u0131 peki\u015ftirmeye devam edip g\u00fcvenlik merkezli ve merkezile\u015fmi\u015f bir politika yap\u0131m \u00e7er\u00e7evesi kurdu\u011fu Abu Dabi\u2019de kendini g\u00f6sterdi. Muhammed bin Zayid\u2019in y\u00fckseli\u015fi 2000\u2019li y\u0131llar\u0131n sonunda BAE Cumhurba\u015fkan\u0131 ve Abu Dabi Emiri \u015eeyh Halife bin Zayid Nahyan\u2019\u0131n hastal\u0131\u011f\u0131 ve Dubai\u2019yi vuran mali zorluklar\u0131n sonucunda ba\u015flayan bir s\u00fcrecin devam\u0131yd\u0131. 2011 sonras\u0131nda yetkileri \u00fczerinde daha az i\u00e7 k\u0131s\u0131tlama kalan Muhammed bin Zayid Arap ayaklanmalar\u0131n\u0131n yaratt\u0131\u011f\u0131 kat\u0131l\u0131mc\u0131 a\u00e7\u0131l\u0131mlardan y\u00fckselen \u0130slamc\u0131 etkisinin b\u00f6lgede yay\u0131lmas\u0131n\u0131 \u00f6nleme \u00e7abalar\u0131n\u0131n ba\u015f\u0131na ge\u00e7ti.<\/p>\n

Muhammed bin Zayid, 2015 ba\u015flar\u0131nda o d\u00f6nemde g\u00f6rece az bilinen Muhammed bin Selman\u2019\u0131 Suudi hanedan\u0131n\u0131n y\u00fckselen y\u0131ld\u0131z\u0131 olarak g\u00f6r\u00fcp 29 ya\u015f\u0131ndaki Savunma Bakan\u0131\u2019n\u0131n Suudi Arabistan i\u00e7inde, b\u00f6lgede ve uluslararas\u0131 sahnede tan\u0131nmas\u0131nda \u00f6nemli bir rol oynad\u0131. Muhammed bin Selman ile Muhammed bin Zayid Mart 2015\u2019te Yemen\u2019de Suudi-Emirlik \u00f6nc\u00fcl\u00fc\u011f\u00fcndeki askeri m\u00fcdahaleyi ba\u015flatt\u0131 ve Abu Dabi-Riyad \u2018ekseni\u2019 K\u00f6rfez i\u00e7i siyasetin belirleyici bir \u00f6zelli\u011fi h\u00e2line geldi. Aral\u0131k 2017\u2019de mevcut Suudi-Emirlik Koordinasyon Konseyi\u2019nin g\u00fcvenlik, siyaset ve ekonomi bile\u015fenleri olan daha kapsaml\u0131 bir ortakl\u0131k olarak yeniden ba\u015flat\u0131laca\u011f\u0131n\u0131n ilan edilmesi, K\u00f6rfez siyasetinde daha d\u0131\u015flay\u0131c\u0131 bir iki tarafl\u0131 d\u00fczenlemeler bi\u00e7imine evrilen i\u00e7e kapanman\u0131n bir sembol\u00fcyd\u00fc.<\/p>\n

Muhammed bin Selman ile Muhammed bin Zayid aras\u0131nda a\u00e7\u0131lan mesafe BAE\u2019nin birliklerinin \u00e7o\u011funu Yemen\u2019den kayd\u0131r\u0131rken Cumhurba\u015fkan\u0131 Hadi\u2019nin Suudi destekli Yemen h\u00fck\u00fcmetine kar\u015f\u0131 G\u00fcney Ge\u00e7ici Konseyi\u2019ni desteklemeye devam etmesi nedeniyle 2019\u2019dan bu yana g\u00f6zlemlenebiliyordu. OPEC ve OPEC+ i\u00e7inde BAE ile Suudi pozisyonlar\u0131 aras\u0131ndaki gerilimin ba\u015fka i\u015faretleri de oldu ve pandemi sonras\u0131nda ba\u015flamas\u0131 kesin olan ekonomik b\u00fcy\u00fcmeye d\u00f6n\u00fc\u015f, Riyad ile Dubai aras\u0131ndaki \u00e7eki\u015fmeli rekabeti keskinle\u015ftirebilir. Joe Biden\u2019\u0131n 46. Amerikan Ba\u015fkan\u0131 olarak se\u00e7ilmesi Donald Trump y\u00f6netimi s\u0131ras\u0131nda gerek K\u0130K i\u00e7inde gerekse K\u00f6rfez devletleri ile \u0130ran dahil b\u00f6lgedeki kom\u015fular\u0131 aras\u0131nda kar\u015f\u0131la\u015fmay\u0131 koordinasyona \u00f6nceliyor g\u00f6r\u00fcnen b\u00f6lgesel politika yap\u0131m\u0131nda \u0131l\u0131ml\u0131la\u015fma i\u00e7in en az\u0131ndan bir alan a\u00e7abilir.<\/p>\n

K\u00f6rfez i\u00e7i ili\u015fkilerdeki ayr\u0131l\u0131\u011f\u0131n 2017 versiyonu Muhammed bin Selman ile Emir Temim\u2019in 5 Ocak 2021\u2019de Suudi d\u00fcnya miras\u0131 El-Ula\u2019da ger\u00e7ekle\u015fen 41. K\u0130K Zirvesi\u2019nde kucakla\u015fmas\u0131yla sona ermi\u015f olabilir ama Arap ayaklanmalar\u0131ndan on y\u0131l sonra K\u00f6rfez siyasetinin gelece\u011fine ili\u015fkin sorular cevaps\u0131z kal\u0131yor. Alt\u0131 devletin K\u0130K\u2019i 1981\u2019de bir araya getiren ve 2011 sonras\u0131nda yerini Abu Dabi ile Doha\u2019da hem d\u00fc\u015f\u00fcnsel hem de maddi anlamda iki taraf\u0131n birbirine tehdit olu\u015fturdu\u011fu duygusuna b\u0131rakan ortak tehdit alg\u0131s\u0131 anahatt\u0131n\u0131 yeniden kurmas\u0131 gerekecek. El-Ula Bildirgesi\u2019nden sonra kar\u015f\u0131l\u0131kl\u0131 g\u00fcveni yeniden in\u015fa etmek K\u00f6rfez devletlerinin Arap ayaklanmalar\u0131na y\u00f6nelik ayr\u0131\u015fan politikalar\u0131n\u0131n b\u00fcy\u00fck \u00f6l\u00e7\u00fcde tetikledi\u011fi K\u00f6rfez i\u00e7i krizlerin ard\u0131ndan K\u0130K\u2019in b\u00f6lgesel bir \u00f6rg\u00fct olarak yeniden bir araya toplan\u0131p toplanamayaca\u011f\u0131 sorusu i\u00e7in ciddi \u00f6nem ta\u015f\u0131yor.<\/p>\n

[1]<\/a> \u00c7evirmen Notu: Metnin \u0130ngilizce orijinalinde \u201ctail\u201d olarak ge\u00e7en bu kelime \u00e7an e\u011frisinin d\u00fc\u015f\u00fck seviye g\u00f6steren u\u00e7lar\u0131na i\u015faret ediyor.<\/p>\n<\/div>

<\/div><\/div><\/div><\/div><\/div>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

\u015eubat ve Mart 2011\u2019de Bahreyn\u2019i sarsan kayda de\u011fer karga\u015fa haricinde Arap ayaklanmalar\u0131n\u0131n K\u00f6rfez \u00fczerindeki etkisi o d\u00f6neme k\u0131yasla daha uzun bir \u2018u\u00e7\u2019 oldu. 2011-12 ayaklanmalar\u0131 ve bunu takip eden y\u0131llar ba\u015fta Katar, Suudi Arabistan ve Birle\u015fik Arap Emirlikleri (BAE) olmak \u00fczere farkl\u0131 K\u00f6rfez devletlerinin Suriye<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":59,"featured_media":27276,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_mo_disable_npp":"","ngg_post_thumbnail":0},"categories":[364],"tags":[],"asf_pub_issue":[],"asf_pub_region":[10321],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/research.sharqforum.org\/tr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/27309"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/research.sharqforum.org\/tr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/research.sharqforum.org\/tr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/research.sharqforum.org\/tr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/59"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/research.sharqforum.org\/tr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=27309"}],"version-history":[{"count":4,"href":"https:\/\/research.sharqforum.org\/tr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/27309\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":27407,"href":"https:\/\/research.sharqforum.org\/tr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/27309\/revisions\/27407"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/research.sharqforum.org\/tr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/27276"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/research.sharqforum.org\/tr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=27309"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/research.sharqforum.org\/tr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=27309"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/research.sharqforum.org\/tr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=27309"},{"taxonomy":"asf_pub_issue","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/research.sharqforum.org\/tr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/asf_pub_issue?post=27309"},{"taxonomy":"asf_pub_region","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/research.sharqforum.org\/tr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/asf_pub_region?post=27309"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}