![\"\"](\"https:\/\/research.sharqforum.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2018\/02\/Yury-Barmin1-150x150.jpg\" "\\"\\"")
Yury Barmin<\/a> <\/i> 03 A\u011fustos 2017<\/span><\/h6><\/div><\/div><\/div><\/div><\/div><\/div><\/div><\/div><\/div><\/div><\/div>Uzman G\u00f6r\u00fc\u015f\u00fc<\/a> \/ \/ B\u00f6lgesel Politika<\/a><\/h6><\/div><\/div><\/div><\/div><\/div><\/div><\/div><\/div><\/div><\/div><\/div>\u00d6zet<\/span><\/strong>: Libya\u2019daki \u00e7at\u0131\u015fmalar\u0131n BM\u2019nin arabuluculu\u011fuyla \u00e7\u00f6z\u00fclmesinin zor oldu\u011funun ortaya \u00e7\u0131kmas\u0131yla, Rusya\u2019n\u0131n da i\u00e7inde bulundu\u011fu d\u0131\u015f g\u00fc\u00e7ler krizin \u00e7\u00f6z\u00fcm\u00fcne arac\u0131l\u0131k etme ve bu yolla kendi \u00e7\u0131kar\u0131na hizmet etme f\u0131rsat\u0131 yakalam\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. Libya tarihsel olarak Rusya\u2019n\u0131n Orta Do\u011fu ve Kuzey Afrika (MENA) b\u00f6lgesindeki sad\u0131k m\u00fcttefiklerinden biri olmu\u015f, enerjiden askeri alana kadar pek \u00e7ok alanda g\u00fc\u00e7l\u00fc ba\u011flar\u0131n olu\u015fmas\u0131n\u0131 sa\u011flayan bu ili\u015fki s\u00fcrmekte olan sava\u015fa ra\u011fmen b\u00fcy\u00fck \u00f6l\u00e7\u00fcde korunmu\u015ftur. Moskova, \u00e7at\u0131\u015fman\u0131n \u00e7\u00f6z\u00fcm\u00fcn\u00fc kolayla\u015ft\u0131rma f\u0131rsat\u0131yla, Kuzey Afrika\u2019da silah ticaretini art\u0131rmak, kazan\u00e7l\u0131 enerji ve in\u015faat s\u00f6zle\u015fmeleri ba\u011flamak ve ayn\u0131 zamanda NATO\u2019nun Akdeniz\u2019de artmakta olan etkisini kontrol alt\u0131na almak gibi bir dizi amac\u0131n\u0131 ger\u00e7ekle\u015ftirmeyi umut etmektedir. Ancak Rusya, Orta Do\u011fu\u2019da geleneksel olarak otoriter istikrar nosyonuna a\u011f\u0131rl\u0131k vermesine ra\u011fmen, Libya\u2019da siyasi yelpazede birden fazla se\u00e7ene\u011fe yat\u0131r\u0131m yaparak ba\u015far\u0131s\u0131zl\u0131k riskini en aza indirgemekte ve politikas\u0131ndan kayda de\u011fer bir bi\u00e7imde uzakla\u015fmaktad\u0131r. Rusya, mecburi bir hareket tarz\u0131 i\u00e7inde oldu\u011fu Suriye\u2019den farkl\u0131 olarak, Libya\u2019da daha geni\u015f bir hareket alan\u0131na sahiptir. Bu nedenle, yayg\u0131n bir bi\u00e7imde Vladimir Putin\u2019in Libya\u2019daki kilit adam\u0131 olarak an\u0131lan Halife Hafter Moskova taraf\u0131ndan krizin \u00e7\u00f6z\u00fcm\u00fc i\u00e7in gereken elzem unsurlardan sadece biri olarak de\u011ferlendirilmektedir<\/span>.<\/p>\n<\/div><\/div><\/div><\/div><\/div><\/div>Rusya\u2019n\u0131n Orta Do\u011fu\u2019ya d\u00f6n\u00fc\u015f\u00fc ve Moskova\u2019n\u0131n b\u00f6lgedeki hedeflerine ili\u015fkin tart\u0131\u015fmalar, \u00fclkenin ilgisinin Libya krizinin \u00e7\u00f6z\u00fcm\u00fcnde aktif rol oynamak \u00fczerine kaymaya ba\u015flamas\u0131yla yo\u011funluk kazanm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. Daha \u00f6nce \u00f6nemli \u00f6l\u00e7\u00fcde Suriye\u2019ye odaklanm\u0131\u015f olan Rusya\u2019n\u0131n b\u00f6lgeye y\u00f6nelik d\u0131\u015f politika g\u00fcndemi, askeri ve g\u00fcvenlik \u00e7evrelerinin y\u00f6nlendirici rol\u00fc nedeniyle, d\u0131\u015far\u0131dan bak\u0131ld\u0131\u011f\u0131nda hayli g\u00fcvenlik\u00e7i g\u00f6r\u00fcnmekteydi. Moskova\u2019n\u0131n Suriye\u2019de \u00e7ok say\u0131da hedefe sahip olmas\u0131na ra\u011fmen, g\u00fcvenlik konular\u0131ndaki a\u00e7\u0131k ilgisi, Rusya\u2019n\u0131n Orta Do\u011fu\u2019da askeri bir \u00fcs olu\u015fturma aray\u0131\u015f\u0131 i\u00e7inde oldu\u011fu endi\u015fesine yol a\u00e7maktad\u0131r. Bu ba\u011flamda Rusya\u2019n\u0131n 2016 y\u0131l\u0131nda ba\u015flayan ve General Hafter\u2019e yasad\u0131\u015f\u0131 silah tedariki sa\u011fland\u0131\u011f\u0131na ili\u015fkin dedikodular\u0131n e\u015flik etti\u011fi Libya hamlesi, b\u00f6lgedeki askeri varl\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 sa\u011flama almaya y\u00f6nelik bir ad\u0131m olarak yorumlanmaktad\u0131r. Ancak, Libya\u2019ya bir y\u0131ldan uzun zamand\u0131r s\u00fcrd\u00fcrd\u00fc\u011f\u00fc aktif m\u00fcdahalesinden sonra, Rusya\u2019n\u0131n rol\u00fcn\u00fc bir askeri m\u00fcdahale olarak adland\u0131rmak olduk\u00e7a g\u00fc\u00e7t\u00fcr. Rusya Libya\u2019da daha \u00e7ok g\u00fc\u00e7 g\u00f6sterisi ve diplomasinin dengeli bir kar\u0131\u015f\u0131m\u0131na ba\u015fvurmaktad\u0131r.<\/p>\n
Rusya\u2019n\u0131n MENA b\u00f6lgesine y\u00f6nelik politikas\u0131 \u00f6nemli \u00f6l\u00e7\u00fcde Libya darbesinin etkisi ile tan\u0131mlanm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. \u00dclkenin son d\u00f6nem d\u0131\u015f politika stratejisinde b\u00f6lgenin \u00f6nemi ilk kez yans\u0131t\u0131lm\u0131\u015f ve buradaki istikrars\u0131zl\u0131\u011f\u0131n do\u011frudan Rusya\u2019y\u0131 etkileyece\u011fi a\u00e7\u0131k bir bi\u00e7imde ifade edilmi\u015ftir.[1]<\/a> Muammer Kaddafi\u2019nin iktidardan d\u00fc\u015fmesi, bir dizi ba\u015far\u0131l\u0131 Arap Bahar\u0131 protestosunu d\u0131\u015far\u0131dan kontrol edilen bir kampanya olarak yorumlayan ve bu kampanyan\u0131n nihai hedefinin Rusya olaca\u011f\u0131n\u0131 d\u00fc\u015f\u00fcnen Kremlin\u2019deki siyaset\u00e7ileri derinden etkilemi\u015ftir. Bu ba\u011flamda Libya, Moskova\u2019y\u0131 b\u00f6lgede daha g\u00fc\u00e7l\u00fc bir etki sahibi olma aray\u0131\u015f\u0131na ve b\u00fcy\u00fck \u00f6l\u00e7\u00fcde \u00f6nceden belirlenen Suriye krizine askeri m\u00fcdahale karar\u0131na sevk eden bir k\u0131v\u0131lc\u0131m g\u00f6revi g\u00f6rm\u00fc\u015ft\u00fcr.<\/p>\nRusya Libya\u2019da Ne Kaybediyor?<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\nMuammer Kaddafi\u2019nin Libya\u2019daki d\u00fc\u015f\u00fc\u015f\u00fc Rusya\u2019y\u0131 b\u00f6lgede \u015fimdiye kadar sahip oldu\u011fu en g\u00fc\u00e7l\u00fc m\u00fcttefiklerinden birinden yoksun b\u0131rakm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. Trablus k\u0131rk y\u0131l\u0131 a\u015fk\u0131n bir s\u00fcre, \u00f6nce Sovyetler Birli\u011fi ve daha sonra Rusya\u2019n\u0131n hem Orta Do\u011fu hem de Afrika\u2019da ve ayn\u0131 zamanda daha geni\u015f M\u00fcsl\u00fcman d\u00fcnyas\u0131nda etkili olmas\u0131n\u0131 sa\u011flayan anahtar kanallardan biri olmu\u015ftur. \u0130ki \u00fclke aras\u0131ndaki bu d\u00fczen Muammer Kaddafi\u2019nin 1969\u2019da iktidara gelmesiyle olduk\u00e7a ilgilidir. Sovyetler Birli\u011fi, Kral \u0130dris\u2019i deviren Kaddafi rejimini tan\u0131yan ilk \u00fclke olmu\u015ftur. Siyasi fikirleri bir arada y\u00fcr\u00fctme h\u00fcneri Kaddafi\u2019nin, taraflardan ikisine de yana\u015fmadan, ABD ve SSCB aras\u0131nda bir etki kutbu olmas\u0131n\u0131 sa\u011flam\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. Ancak, M\u0131s\u0131r\u2019da Amerika yanl\u0131s\u0131 Enver Sedat\u2019\u0131n g\u00fc\u00e7lenmesi ve \u0130srail\u2019e yak\u0131nla\u015fmas\u0131 Kaddafi\u2019yi sosyalist \u00e7izgiyi kabul etmeye ve sonu\u00e7 olarak Sovyetler Birli\u011fi ile daha yak\u0131n ili\u015fkiler kurmaya sevk etmi\u015ftir. ABD\u2019nin Orta Do\u011fu\u2019da artmakta olan etkisi, Kaddafi\u2019yi Moskova\u2019ya daha da yakla\u015fmaya ve a\u011f\u0131rl\u0131kl\u0131 olarak Sovyetler askeri deste\u011fine dayanmak yoluyla SSCB\u2019nin korumas\u0131n\u0131 istemeye itmi\u015ftir.<\/p>\n
Sovyet-Libya ili\u015fkileri, SSCB\u2019nin g\u00fc\u00e7l\u00fc ittifaklar kurma ve s\u00fcrd\u00fcrmede en etkin ara\u00e7 oldu\u011funu d\u00fc\u015f\u00fcnmesinden dolay\u0131, askeri i\u015f birli\u011fi boyutuna odaklanm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. \u0130ki \u00fclke aras\u0131nda ilk silah anla\u015fmas\u0131 1974\u2019te imzalanm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r ve g\u00fcn\u00fcm\u00fczde Libya ordusu neredeyse tamamen Sovyet silahlar\u0131na dayanmaktad\u0131r. 1973\u2019den 1992\u2019ye ge\u00e7en 20 y\u0131lda, toplamda yakla\u015f\u0131k 11,000 Sovyet askeri Muammer Kaddafi h\u00fck\u00fcmetinin askeri dan\u0131\u015fman\u0131 olarak Libya\u2019ya konu\u015flanm\u0131\u015f ve baz\u0131 durumlarda do\u011frudan Libya ordusunun yan\u0131nda \u00e7at\u0131\u015fmada yer alm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r.[2]<\/a> Libya kadrosunun y\u00fczde 80 kadar\u0131n\u0131n gerekli deneyimi bulunmad\u0131\u011f\u0131 i\u00e7in, \u00fcst d\u00fczey askeri y\u00f6neticiler de d\u00e2hil olmak \u00fczere pek \u00e7ok askeri personel SSCB\u2019de e\u011fitilmi\u015ftir. Rusya, Libya ordusuna e\u011fitim sa\u011flama ve becerilerini art\u0131rma konusundaki Sovyet deneyimini 2004 y\u0131l\u0131ndan 2011 devrimine kadar pek \u00e7ok defa tekrarlam\u0131\u015ft\u0131r.[3]<\/a><\/p>\nLibya zengin petrol yataklar\u0131 nedeniyle, Rus silah ithalat\u0131 portfolyosunda Rus silahlar\u0131 i\u00e7in pe\u015fin para \u00f6deyebilecek birka\u00e7 \u00fclkeden biri olmu\u015ftur. Moskova 2008 y\u0131l\u0131nda Libya\u2019n\u0131n Sovyetler Birli\u011fi\u2019ne olan 4,5 milyar dolar borcunu silmi\u015f, bunun yerine 2011 itibariyle 5-10 milyar dolar aras\u0131nda tuttu\u011fu tahmin edilen bir dizi silah anla\u015fmas\u0131 yapm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r.[4]<\/a> Bu anla\u015fmalar Muammer Kaddafi iktidardan devrildikten sonra BM silah ambargosu gere\u011fi ask\u0131ya al\u0131nm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r ve Moskova \u00fclkenin bu s\u00f6zle\u015fmeleri yerine getirmesini beklemektedir. Rusya Trablus\u2019ta gelecekte kurulacak h\u00fck\u00fcmetin siyasi y\u00f6neliminden ba\u011f\u0131ms\u0131z olarak, Libya\u2019n\u0131n yeni silahlar almak ve tarihsel olarak Sovyet silahlar\u0131na dayanm\u0131\u015f oldu\u011fu i\u00e7in eski olanlar\u0131 yenilemek \u00fczere Moskova\u2019ya d\u00f6nece\u011fine g\u00fc\u00e7l\u00fc bir \u015fekilde inanmaktad\u0131r. Bu ba\u011flamda Rusya h\u00fck\u00fcmeti i\u00e7in \u00f6nemli olan \u00f6ncelikle Libya\u2019da istikrarl\u0131 bir h\u00fck\u00fcmet oldu\u011fundan emin olmak, ikinci olarak da bu h\u00fck\u00fcmetin savunma masraflar\u0131na di\u011fer konulara nazaran \u00f6ncelik vermesidir.<\/p>\nRusya\u2019n\u0131n Libya\u2019da \u00e7\u0131karlar\u0131n\u0131n tehdit alt\u0131nda oldu\u011funu g\u00f6rd\u00fc\u011f\u00fc alan kazan\u00e7l\u0131 ekonomik sekt\u00f6rd\u00fcr. Hafter\u2019in Libya Ulusal Ordusu kazan\u0131mlar\u0131n\u0131n bir sonucu olarak, \u00fclkede petrol \u00fcretimi 2016 Eyl\u00fcl ay\u0131nda g\u00fcnde 300,000 varilden 2017 Ocak ay\u0131nda g\u00fcnde 700,000 varilin \u00fczerine y\u00fckselmi\u015f ve \u00fcretimin bu y\u0131l\u0131n sonlar\u0131na do\u011fru g\u00fcnde 1 milyon varile \u00e7\u0131kmas\u0131 \u00f6ng\u00f6r\u00fclmektedir.[5]<\/a> Rusya\u2019n\u0131n petrol devi Rosneft 2017 \u015eubat\u2019\u0131nda Libya Ulusal Petrol \u015eirketi (NOC) ile bir yat\u0131r\u0131m ve ham petrol al\u0131m anla\u015fmas\u0131 imzalam\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. Bu anla\u015fma, s\u00fcregelen krize ra\u011fmen Rusya\u2019n\u0131n Libya\u2019da i\u015f yapma ilgisinin yeniden canland\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131n g\u00f6stermektedir. Rosneft \u00fclkeye d\u00f6nmek i\u00e7in giri\u015fimde bulunan pek \u00e7ok \u015firketten sadece biridir ancak bu anla\u015fma ile g\u00f6ze \u00e7arpan bir ba\u015far\u0131 elde etmi\u015ftir. \u015eu aralar Libya\u2019n\u0131n petrol kaynaklar\u0131n\u0131n \u00f6nemli bir k\u0131sm\u0131n\u0131 kontrol\u00fcnde tutmakta olan Halife Hafter, Rosneft\u2019in \u00fclkeye d\u00f6n\u00fc\u015f\u00fcn\u00fc tek ba\u015f\u0131na kolayla\u015ft\u0131rm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. Rusya i\u015f d\u00fcnyas\u0131 Bat\u0131l\u0131 emsallerinin sat\u0131n almada sa\u011flad\u0131\u011f\u0131 yat\u0131r\u0131m ve teknoloji imk\u00e2nlar\u0131n\u0131 kar\u015f\u0131layamayaca\u011f\u0131 i\u00e7in, bunun gibi \u00fcst d\u00fczey bir destek olmasa Libya\u2019da \u00f6ncelikli muamele kazanmak i\u00e7in \u00e7ok m\u00fccadele ederdi. Rusya H\u00fck\u00fcmeti Libyal\u0131 ortaklar\u0131 ile ili\u015fkiler kurarak, Kaddafi h\u00fck\u00fcmeti zaman\u0131nda imzalam\u0131\u015f oldu\u011fu anla\u015fmalarda kaybetmi\u015f oldu\u011fu k\u00e2r\u0131 (in\u015faatta 150 milyon dolar, petrol ve gaz sanayiinde 3,5 milyar dolar kadar)[6]<\/a> telafi etmek ve uzun vadede mali geri kazan\u0131m sa\u011flamak i\u00e7in projelerine kald\u0131\u011f\u0131 yerden devam etmeye \u00f6ncelik vermektedir.<\/p>\nRusya\u2019n\u0131n Libya\u2019daki proaktif rol\u00fc g\u00fcney ve do\u011fu Akdeniz\u2019de daha b\u00fcy\u00fck \u00f6l\u00e7ekli mevcudiyeti ba\u011flam\u0131nda de\u011ferlendirilmelidir. Suriye \u00e7at\u0131\u015fmas\u0131na kat\u0131lmas\u0131 ve Sovyet d\u00f6nemi Tartus \u00fcss\u00fcn\u00fc tam kapasite i\u015fleyen bir deniz \u00fcss\u00fcne \u00e7evirme karar\u0131n\u0131n yan\u0131nda K\u0131r\u0131m\u2019da bulunan Karadeniz donanmas\u0131na yapt\u0131\u011f\u0131 yat\u0131r\u0131m\u0131 artt\u0131rmas\u0131, Rusya\u2019n\u0131n b\u00f6lgede b\u00fcy\u00fcyen h\u0131rslar\u0131 oldu\u011funu g\u00f6stermektedir. SSCB\u2019nin Akdeniz\u2019de kendine yer edinme \u00e7abalar\u0131 5. Akdeniz Sava\u015f Gemisi Filosunun ortaya \u00e7\u0131kmas\u0131n\u0131 sa\u011flam\u0131\u015f ancak bu giri\u015fim 1992 y\u0131l\u0131nda b\u00f6lgede daimi deniz \u00fcss\u00fcn\u00fcn ve etkili ikmal tesislerinin olmamas\u0131 nedeniyle ba\u015far\u0131s\u0131z olmu\u015ftur. 2013 y\u0131l\u0131nda Rus h\u00fck\u00fcmeti, NATO\u2019nun b\u00f6lgedeki yay\u0131lma kapasitesini kar\u015f\u0131lamak \u00fczere filoyu yeniden toplama karar\u0131 vermi\u015ftir.[7]<\/a> Ancak Suriye\u2019nin Tartus \u00fcss\u00fc Rus deniz donanmas\u0131n\u0131 Akdeniz\u2019de etkili bir g\u00fcce d\u00f6n\u00fc\u015ft\u00fcrmek i\u00e7in yeterli de\u011fildir. B\u00f6lgede esnek operasyonlar\u0131 s\u00fcrd\u00fcrmek i\u00e7in Rus Donanmas\u0131\u2019n\u0131n Akdeniz ve Kuzey Afrika boyunca hem Libya hem de M\u0131s\u0131r limanlar\u0131na eri\u015fimine imk\u00e2n sa\u011flayan \u00fcsler kurmas\u0131 gereklidir.<\/p>\nMuammer Kaddafi 2008 y\u0131l\u0131nda, Moskova\u2019ya Sovyetler sonras\u0131 d\u00f6nemde yapt\u0131\u011f\u0131 ilk ziyaretinde, Rusya\u2019ya ilk kez \u00fclkesinde daimi deniz \u00fcss\u00fc kurmay\u0131 teklif etmi\u015ftir.[8]<\/a> Sab\u0131k Libya lideri teklifinin kar\u015f\u0131l\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 hi\u00e7bir zaman ger\u00e7ekle\u015ftirmemi\u015fse de, Rusya\u2019n\u0131n Libya krizindeki aktif diplomatik rol\u00fc hem M\u0131s\u0131r hem de Libya\u2019daki askerleri i\u00e7in, deniz \u00fcss\u00fc de d\u00e2hil olmak \u00fczere tesislere eri\u015fimi hususunda yeni tart\u0131\u015fmalara yol a\u00e7m\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. Rusya\u2019n\u0131n tek u\u00e7ak gemisi Amiral Kuznetsov\u2019un Libya liman\u0131na yana\u015fmak istemesi ve Suriye k\u0131y\u0131lar\u0131nda aylar s\u00fcren g\u00f6revinden sonra Ocak 2017\u2019de General Hafter\u2019i a\u011f\u0131rlamas\u0131 tesad\u00fcf de\u011fildir. Kuznetsov, Akdeniz filosunun ba\u015f\u0131ndaki ki\u015fidir ve \u00fclkenin Akdeniz\u2019de artmakta olan emellerinin bir sembol\u00fcd\u00fcr. Rus h\u00fck\u00fcmetinin Libya s\u0131n\u0131r\u0131 yak\u0131nlar\u0131nda bulunan, M\u0131s\u0131r\u2019\u0131n bat\u0131s\u0131ndaki Sidi Barrani \u00fcss\u00fcne bir \u00f6zel kuvvetler birli\u011fi yollam\u0131\u015f oldu\u011fu da s\u00f6ylenmektedir.[9]<\/a> Sidi Barrani deniz \u00fcss\u00fc 1972\u2019ye kadar Sovyet sava\u015f gemilerine ev sahipli\u011fi yapm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. Bu da Rusya\u2019n\u0131n Kuzey Afrika\u2019da Sovyetlerin kullanm\u0131\u015f oldu\u011fu \u00fcslere geri d\u00f6nme aray\u0131\u015f\u0131nda oldu\u011funa dair spek\u00fclasyonlar\u0131n t\u00fcm\u00fcyle as\u0131ls\u0131z olmad\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 g\u00f6stermektedir.<\/p>\nRusya\u2019n\u0131n b\u00f6lgedeki stratejisine odaklanmas\u0131n\u0131n yan\u0131 s\u0131ra Akdeniz\u2019e d\u00f6nme amac\u0131 tamam\u0131yla a\u00e7\u0131k de\u011fildir. Ancak Rusya\u2019n\u0131n deniz doktrini Moskova\u2019n\u0131n orada tam olarak neye ula\u015fmak istedi\u011fine ili\u015fkin fikir vermektedir. Doktrin,[10]<\/a> di\u011fer \u015feylerin yan\u0131 s\u0131ra, Rusya\u2019n\u0131n Akdeniz\u2019de kal\u0131c\u0131 olarak askeri-donanma varl\u0131\u011f\u0131 g\u00f6sterme aray\u0131\u015f\u0131nda oldu\u011funu ifade etmekte ve Rus donanmas\u0131n\u0131n orada s\u00fcrekli bulunmas\u0131n\u0131n ko\u015fullar\u0131n\u0131 yaratma ihtiyac\u0131n\u0131 vurgulamaktad\u0131r. \u00d6te yandan Akdeniz, \u00f6zellikle NATO\u2019nun orada artmakta olan varl\u0131\u011f\u0131 dikkate al\u0131nd\u0131\u011f\u0131nda, Moskova\u2019da \u00fclkenin g\u00fcvenli\u011fine y\u00f6nelik bir tehdit kayna\u011f\u0131 olarak g\u00f6r\u00fclmektedir.[11]<\/a> Bu ba\u011flamda Suriye\u2019deki \u00fcsler ve Libya ve M\u0131s\u0131r\u2019da gelecekte kurulacak olan tesisler, gelecekte ittifak\u0131n deniz varl\u0131\u011f\u0131ndan kaynaklanan ve Rusya\u2019n\u0131n Karadeniz donanmas\u0131na y\u00f6nelecek olas\u0131 tehditlere kar\u015f\u0131 ilk savunma hatt\u0131 olarak g\u00f6r\u00fclmektedir.[12]<\/a><\/p>\nRusya\u2019n\u0131n Libya\u2019daki Se\u00e7enekleri<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\nRusya, 2015 y\u0131l\u0131 Aral\u0131k ay\u0131nda BM G\u00fcvenlik Konseyi\u2019nde Libya Siyasi Anla\u015fmas\u0131\u2019na destek vermesine ra\u011fmen, 2016 y\u0131l\u0131 Mart ay\u0131nda BM destekli h\u00fck\u00fcmetin Trablus\u2019a varmas\u0131ndan hemen sonra Libya \u00e7at\u0131\u015fmas\u0131nda yeni h\u00fck\u00fcmeti y\u0131kmaya \u00e7al\u0131\u015fan g\u00fc\u00e7leri aktif bir bi\u00e7imde desteklemeye ba\u015flad\u0131. Moskova\u2019n\u0131n Libya\u2019ya kar\u015f\u0131 neden b\u00f6yle tutars\u0131z bir stratejide karar k\u0131ld\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 a\u00e7\u0131klamak g\u00fc\u00e7, ancak yazar\u0131n Rusya politikac\u0131lar\u0131 ile yapt\u0131\u011f\u0131 tart\u0131\u015fmalar Kremlin\u2019in muhtemelen ilk ba\u015flarda, Libya\u2019daki krizin \u00e7\u00f6z\u00fcm\u00fcne \u00f6ncelik vermedi\u011fini ortaya \u00e7\u0131karmaktad\u0131r. Bu durum 2016 yaz\u0131na kadar Rusya H\u00fck\u00fcmeti\u2019nin, Trablus\u2019ta yeni g\u00f6reve gelmi\u015f h\u00fck\u00fcmet, Ulusal Kongre H\u00fck\u00fcmeti ya da Temsilciler Evi olsun, Libya \u00e7at\u0131\u015fmas\u0131ndaki herhangi bir tarafla aktif bir bi\u00e7imde irtibat\u0131n\u0131 s\u00fcrd\u00fcrmemi\u015f olmas\u0131yla kan\u0131tlanmaktad\u0131r.<\/p>\n
Moskova 2016 Haziran ay\u0131na kadar, \u015fimdi pek \u00e7ok ki\u015fi taraf\u0131ndan Rusya\u2019n\u0131n Libya\u2019daki kilit adam\u0131 olarak g\u00f6r\u00fclen General Hafter\u2019i a\u011f\u0131rlamam\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. Rusya\u2019da kar\u015f\u0131lanma bi\u00e7imi Hafter gibi ihtilafl\u0131 ve ayr\u0131l\u0131k\u00e7\u0131 bir fig\u00fcr i\u00e7in al\u0131\u015f\u0131lmad\u0131k bi\u00e7imde y\u00fcksek profilli olmu\u015ftur. Hafter D\u0131\u015f \u0130\u015fleri Bakan\u0131 ve Savunma Bakan\u0131 taraf\u0131ndan ve en \u00f6nemlisi cumhurba\u015fkan\u0131na yak\u0131n, kilit bir karar alma organ\u0131 olan G\u00fcvenlik Konseyi Sekreteri Nikolai Patrushev taraf\u0131ndan kabul edilmi\u015ftir. Moskova\u2019n\u0131n Libya\u2019daki \u00e7abalar\u0131na yo\u011funla\u015fmaya karar verme nedenleri, muhtemelen BM destekli h\u00fck\u00fcmetin siyasal mevcudiyetini sa\u011flamla\u015ft\u0131rmada ba\u015far\u0131s\u0131z olmas\u0131, ter\u00f6rist gruplar\u0131n\u0131n ortaya \u00e7\u0131kmas\u0131; \u00fclkenin OPEC \u00fcyeli\u011fini, s\u00f6z konusu d\u00f6nemde petrol \u00fcretimi kesintisi konusundaki g\u00f6r\u00fc\u015fmelerde grup g\u00f6r\u00fc\u015f\u00fcn\u00fc etkilemek \u00fczere kullanma iste\u011finden kaynaklanmas\u0131 idi.<\/p>\n
Rusya\u2019n\u0131n Libya\u2019ya y\u00f6nelik politikas\u0131nda ba\u015flang\u0131\u00e7taki tutars\u0131zl\u0131k, ilk \u00f6nce Suriye\u2019de test edilen bu politikay\u0131 ve g\u00fcvenlikle\u015ftirilmi\u015f oldu\u011fu anlam\u0131na gelen strateji modelini uygulama giri\u015fimleriyle a\u00e7\u0131\u011fa \u00e7\u0131km\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. Rusya\u2019n\u0131n 2011\u2019den bu yana BM silah ambargosu alt\u0131nda olan \u00fclkeye silah tedarik etme duru\u015fu bunun bir kan\u0131t\u0131d\u0131r. Rusya 2015 gibi erken bir zamanda, Libya resmi h\u00fck\u00fcmetine \u00fclkedeki ter\u00f6rle m\u00fccadeleye yard\u0131m i\u00e7in silah teslimleri yapma konusuna kafa yormu\u015ftur. BM Rusya delegasyonu ba\u015fkan\u0131 Vladimir Churkin, 2015 y\u0131l\u0131 \u015eubat ay\u0131nda gazetecilere, Moskova\u2019n\u0131n Tobruk\u2019taki resmi h\u00fck\u00fcmeti silahla desteklemeyi d\u00fc\u015f\u00fcnd\u00fc\u011f\u00fcn\u00fc[13]<\/a> ve gerekirse silahlar\u0131n deniz yoluyla cihat\u00e7\u0131lara ula\u015fmas\u0131n\u0131 \u00f6nlemek i\u00e7in Libya\u2019da bir deniz ablukas\u0131n\u0131n uygulanmas\u0131 gerekti\u011fini dile getirmi\u015ftir. Hafter\u2019in 2016 Haziran ay\u0131nda Moskova\u2019ya ger\u00e7ekle\u015ftirdi\u011fi ilk ziyarette Libya\u2019daki Rusya El\u00e7isi Ivan Molotkov, taraflar\u0131n Rus silahlar\u0131n\u0131n Tobruk\u2019taki h\u00fck\u00fcmete olas\u0131 teslimat\u0131n\u0131 tart\u0131\u015fm\u0131\u015f olduklar\u0131n\u0131 a\u00e7\u0131klam\u0131\u015ft\u0131r.[14]<\/a> Kremlin\u2019in Hafter\u2019e ve onun has\u0131mlar\u0131na yollam\u0131\u015f oldu\u011fu bu i\u015faretler General\u2019e cesaret vermi\u015f ve t\u00fcm Libya\u2019y\u0131 g\u00fc\u00e7 kullanarak yeniden ele ge\u00e7irme iste\u011fini dile getiremeye te\u015fvik etmi\u015ftir.[15]<\/a> Ancak daha sonra Moskova bu konuda \u00e7ok daha incelikli bir duru\u015f benimseyerek, El\u00e7i Molotov\u2019a g\u00f6re, General Hafter\u2019e \u201cG\u00fcvenlik Konseyi\u2019nin ambargoyu kald\u0131rmad\u0131\u011f\u0131 ya da en az\u0131ndan hafifletmedi\u011fi m\u00fcddet\u00e7e Rus silahlar\u0131n\u0131n Libya\u2019ya teslimi konusunda konu\u015fulamayaca\u011f\u0131n\u0131\u201d a\u00e7\u0131k\u00e7a s\u00f6ylemi\u015ftir.[16]<\/a><\/p>\nRusya\u2019n\u0131n Libya ba\u011flam\u0131ndaki anlay\u0131\u015f\u0131, tart\u0131\u015fmaya a\u00e7\u0131k bir \u015fekilde, Libyal\u0131 payda\u015flarla g\u00f6r\u00fc\u015fmelere ba\u015flad\u0131ktan sonra \u00f6nemli \u00f6l\u00e7\u00fcde daha incelikli olmu\u015ftur. Sonu\u00e7 olarak, \u015fu an Moskova\u2019n\u0131n General Hafter\u2019i bu krizi \u00e7\u00f6zmeye yard\u0131m edebilecek tek olas\u0131 partner olarak g\u00f6rd\u00fc\u011f\u00fcn\u00fc s\u00f6ylemek hatal\u0131 olacakt\u0131r. \u0130ki taraf, kar\u015f\u0131l\u0131kl\u0131 \u00e7\u0131kar sa\u011flanan anla\u015fmal\u0131 bir birliktelikten faydalanmaktad\u0131r. Kaddafi \u00f6zentisi, kendisini Avrupa g\u00fc\u00e7lerinin g\u00f6z\u00fcnde Trablus h\u00fck\u00fcmetine g\u00fc\u00e7l\u00fc bir alternatif olarak konumlamas\u0131na yard\u0131mc\u0131 olan, Moskova\u2019n\u0131n sa\u011flad\u0131\u011f\u0131 uluslararas\u0131 diplomatik k\u0131l\u0131ftan faydalanmaktad\u0131r. Rusya ise Hafter ile ortakl\u0131k yaparak, bat\u0131l\u0131 emsallerine kar\u015f\u0131 ba\u015fka bir koz elde etmek i\u00e7in Akdeniz\u2019deki etkisini art\u0131rmaktan, Libya konusunda i\u015f birli\u011fi \u00fczerinden M\u0131s\u0131r\u2019la yak\u0131n ili\u015fkiler kurmaya kadar bir dizi hedefini yerine getirmektedir.<\/p>\n
Soru, Rusya\u2019n\u0131n Hafter ile g\u00fc\u00e7l\u00fc bir ili\u015fki kurmay\u0131 ama\u00e7larken, Moskova\u2019n\u0131n bu ortakl\u0131\u011fa ne kadar sad\u0131k oldu\u011fu ve General\u2019in yeni bir Kaddafi olarak ortaya \u00e7\u0131kmas\u0131n\u0131 sa\u011flamaya ne \u00f6l\u00e7\u00fcde haz\u0131r oldu\u011fudur. Her ne olursa olsun, Hafter Muammer Kaddafi ile aralar\u0131ndaki anla\u015fmazl\u0131k nedeniyle y\u0131llarca Birle\u015fik Devletler\u2019de ikamet etmi\u015ftir. Bu s\u00fcre zarf\u0131nda Amerika istihbarat\u0131yla birlikte \u00e7al\u0131\u015fm\u0131\u015f oldu\u011fu da iddia edilmektedir[17]<\/a> ve bu da onu Moskova i\u00e7in istenmeyen bir partner yapmaktad\u0131r. Hafter\u2019e net bir deste\u011fe dair yanl\u0131\u015f bir izlenim vererek ba\u015flang\u0131\u00e7ta hata yapan Rusya h\u00fck\u00fcmeti Libya krizine m\u00fcdahalesine ili\u015fkin tart\u0131\u015fmalardan, ulusal mutabakat ihtiyac\u0131 hakk\u0131nda genel a\u00e7\u0131klamalara ba\u015fvurarak dikkate de\u011fer bir bi\u00e7imde ka\u00e7\u0131nmaktad\u0131r. Asl\u0131nda BM\u2019nin dayatt\u0131\u011f\u0131 silah ambargosu silahlar\u0131n Hafter\u2019e teslim edilmemesi iyi bir bahane sunarak, b\u00f6lgede ba\u015fka bir batakl\u0131\u011f\u0131n i\u00e7ine \u00e7ekilme riskinden ka\u00e7\u0131nmay\u0131 sa\u011fl\u0131yor. Kremlin, General\u2019in \u00f6nemli \u00f6l\u00e7\u00fcde Bat\u0131\u2019ya y\u00f6nelik askeri meydan okumas\u0131n\u0131 alenen desteklemesine ra\u011fmen, Hafter\u2019in bir sava\u015f a\u011fas\u0131ndan bir siyaset\u00e7iye d\u00f6n\u00fc\u015f\u00fcm\u00fcn\u00fc g\u00f6zetmektedir. Bu durum Rusya\u2019n\u0131n Libya\u2019ya bak\u0131\u015f\u0131nda ve \u00e7at\u0131\u015fma \u00e7\u00f6z\u00fcm\u00fc y\u00f6nteminde de\u011fi\u015fime i\u015faret etmektedir.<\/p>\nLibya Siyasi Anla\u015fmas\u0131 esasen General Hafter\u2019i marjinalize etmektedir. Temelde planlad\u0131\u011f\u0131 sert g\u00fc\u00e7le, onu Libya\u2019da gelecekteki bir uzla\u015f\u0131n\u0131n d\u0131\u015f\u0131nda b\u0131rakan anla\u015fman\u0131n kapsam\u0131 aras\u0131nda bir kopukluk vard\u0131r. \u015e\u00fcphesiz Rusya h\u00fck\u00fcmeti Hafter i\u00e7in \u00f6nemli bir rol tahayy\u00fcl etmektedir ancak g\u00fc\u00e7l\u00fc bir otoriter liderin dahi toplumu yeniden bir araya getirme becerisi olmad\u0131\u011f\u0131 konusunda Suriye\u2019de dersini alm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. Libya\u2019daki karma\u015f\u0131k ba\u011flamda bu, uzun vadede yeni sosyal s\u00f6zle\u015fmenin kapsay\u0131c\u0131 ve s\u00fcrd\u00fcr\u00fclebilir g\u00f6r\u00fcnmesinin gerekli oldu\u011fu anlam\u0131na gelmektedir. \u00dclkede, muhtemelen en zay\u0131f\u0131 BM destekli Ba\u015fkanl\u0131k Konseyi Ba\u015fkan\u0131 Fayiz es-Serrac olan birka\u00e7 a\u011f\u0131rl\u0131k merkezinin ortaya \u00e7\u0131kmas\u0131yla, Moskova Libya krizinde karar merci gibi davranarak, ister askeri bir g\u00fc\u00e7 taraf\u0131ndan isterse uluslararas\u0131 bir yetki ile desteklensin, t\u00fcm taraflar\u0131 m\u00fczakere masas\u0131nda bir araya getirme hedefi ile birden fazla se\u00e7ene\u011fe yat\u0131r\u0131m yaparak ba\u015far\u0131s\u0131zl\u0131k riskini azaltmay\u0131 tercih etmi\u015ftir.<\/p>\n
Rusya h\u00fck\u00fcmeti, Trablus h\u00fck\u00fcmeti ve Misrata Tugaylar\u0131 ile Genel Ulusal Kongre (GUK) gibi di\u011fer payda\u015flarla ileti\u015fime ge\u00e7me \u00e7abalar\u0131n\u0131 yo\u011funla\u015ft\u0131rm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. 2016 y\u0131l\u0131nda Moskova, Libya\u2019daki eski ba\u011flar\u0131 yeniden kurma ve yeni ba\u011flant\u0131lar i\u00e7in bir ileti\u015fim a\u011f\u0131 geli\u015ftirme g\u00f6revi verilen, aralar\u0131nda \u00c7e\u00e7enlerin dahi bulundu\u011fu diplomatlar\u0131 ve parlamento \u00fcyelerini i\u00e7eren, \u201cLibya\u2019da Uzla\u015f\u0131 i\u00e7in \u0130leti\u015fim Grubu\u201d olarak isimlendirilen bakanl\u0131klar aras\u0131 bir kurum kurmu\u015ftur. Bu olu\u015fum, Rusyal\u0131 yetkililer ile es-Serrac H\u00fck\u00fcmeti ve ayr\u0131ca askeri gruplardan temsilciler aras\u0131nda yap\u0131lan yo\u011fun g\u00f6r\u00fc\u015fmelere neden olmu\u015ftur. Moskova d\u00fcnya g\u00fc\u00e7lerinden birka\u00e7\u0131n\u0131n Fayiz es-Serrac\u2019\u0131 \u00fclkeyi birle\u015ftirecek bir lider olarak g\u00f6rmekte oldu\u011funun fark\u0131ndad\u0131r. Rusya, Libya Siyasi Anla\u015fmas\u0131\u2019n\u0131n daha geni\u015f bir siyasi akt\u00f6rler yelpazesini i\u00e7ine alacak \u015fekilde d\u00fczenlenmedi\u011fi takdirde 2017 y\u0131l\u0131 sonlar\u0131nda son bulaca\u011f\u0131 i\u00e7in, es-Serrac\u2019\u0131 Libya\u2019da kendi siyasi tasar\u0131m\u0131n\u0131n bir par\u00e7as\u0131 yapma f\u0131rsat\u0131n\u0131 yakalamak i\u00e7in imk\u00e2n g\u00f6zetmekte. Bu strateji ayn\u0131 zamanda Rusya\u2019n\u0131n idaresi zor olan Hafter\u2019e daha fazla bask\u0131 yapmas\u0131na ve kendisine verilecek deste\u011fin ge\u00e7i\u015f g\u00f6r\u00fc\u015fmelerine kat\u0131lmas\u0131 ko\u015fuluna ba\u011flanmas\u0131na olanak vermektedir.<\/p>\n
Muammer Kaddafi\u2019nin iktidardan d\u00fc\u015f\u00fc\u015f\u00fc Rusya\u2019n\u0131n Orta Do\u011fu ve Akdeniz\u2019deki \u00e7\u0131karlar\u0131na ink\u00e2r edilemez bir darbe indirmi\u015ftir. Bu durum Libya\u2019n\u0131n en az \u00fc\u00e7 y\u00f6nden Moskova i\u00e7in \u00f6nemli bir m\u00fcttefik oldu\u011funu da g\u00f6stermektedir: k\u00fcresel enerji pazar\u0131n\u0131n d\u00fczenlenmesine ili\u015fkin konularda bir partner, Rusya\u2019n\u0131n savunma sanayisi i\u00e7in bir m\u00fc\u015fteri ve bununla ili\u015fkili olarak, Muammer Kaddafi\u2019nin \u00f6nce Sovyetler ve daha sonra Rusya i\u00e7in MENA b\u00f6lgesinde ve Akdeniz\u2019de Rus \u00e7\u0131karlar\u0131 i\u00e7in gayri resmi bir el\u00e7i oldu\u011fu gibi, bir jeopolitik akt\u00f6r. Bug\u00fcn Kremlin muhtemelen d\u0131\u015f politika denkleminde Libya\u2019n\u0131n rol\u00fcn\u00fc restore etme aray\u0131\u015f\u0131ndad\u0131r, ancak bunu askeri anlamda yapmak Rusya\u2019n\u0131n uzun vadede \u00e7\u0131kar\u0131na hizmet etmemektedir.<\/p>\n
Rusya\u2019n\u0131n Libya krizine yakla\u015f\u0131m\u0131, \u00fclkenin Suriye ve Libya\u2019y\u0131- her ikisi de Arap Bahar\u0131\u2019na ba\u011flansa da- ayn\u0131 tepkileri gerektiren benzer ba\u011flamlarda g\u00f6rm\u00fcyor oldu\u011funu ortaya koymaktad\u0131r. Libya basit\u00e7e co\u011frafi uzakl\u0131\u011f\u0131 nedeniyle, Rusya i\u00e7in \u015f\u00fcphesiz Suriye\u2019den daha az \u00f6neme sahiptir. Bu Moskova\u2019n\u0131n Libya krizine alternatif \u00e7\u00f6z\u00fcmler bulma konusunda daha esnek oldu\u011fu ve \u00fclkeyi askeri bir konu\u015flanman\u0131n m\u00fcmk\u00fcn oldu\u011fu bir ba\u011flamda g\u00f6rmedi\u011fi anlam\u0131na da gelmektedir. Rusya bu a\u015fama itibariyle, Libya krizine y\u00f6nelik bir uzla\u015f\u0131 sa\u011flanmas\u0131n\u0131n Kaddafi tarz\u0131 bir rejimi yeniden olu\u015fturmaktan \u00e7ok, daha uzun \u00f6m\u00fcrl\u00fc bir \u00e7\u00f6z\u00fcm \u00fcretece\u011fi sonucuna ula\u015fm\u0131\u015f g\u00f6r\u00fcnmektedir.<\/p>\n
Referanslar<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n[1]<\/a> Rusya Federasyonu\u2019nun D\u0131\u015f Politika Kavram\u0131, Rusya Federasyonu Ba\u015fkan\u0131 Vladimir Putin taraf\u0131ndan 30 Kas\u0131m 2016\u2019da onaylanm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. http:\/\/www.mid.ru\/foreign_policy\/news\/-\/asset_publisher\/cKNonkJE02Bw\/content\/id\/2542248<\/a><\/p>\n[2]<\/a>Evgeni Zhirnov, I remember distinctly: The war lasted 52 minutes, Kommersant, 1 \u015eubat 2000, https:\/\/www.kommersant.ru\/doc\/16432<\/a><\/p>\n[3]<\/a>Vladimir Voronov, Gaddafi\u2019s Soviet School, Gazeta.Ru, 31 Mart 2011, https:\/\/www.gazeta.ru\/politics\/theme\/2011\/03\/31\/3571009.shtml<\/a><\/p>\n[4]<\/a> Federica Saini Fasanotti, Russia and Libya: A brief history of an on-again-off-again friendship, Brookings, 1 Eyl\u00fcl 2016, https:\/\/www.brookings.edu\/blog\/order-fromchaos\/2016\/09\/01\/russia-and-libya-a-briefhistory-of-an-on-again-off-again-friendship\/<\/a><\/p>\n[5]<\/a> Libyan oil firm aims to raise output to 1 million barrels a day next month, even as Qatar feud spills into Libya, CNBC, 13 Haziran 2017, http:\/\/www.cnbc.com\/2017\/06\/13\/libyan-oil-firm-aims-forbig-output-jump-even-as-qatar-feud-spills-intolibya.html<\/a><\/p>\n[6]<\/a> Igor Chubakha, What has Russia lost in Libya? Rosbalt, 6 Eyl\u00fcl 2011, http:\/\/www.rosbalt.ru\/business\/2011\/09\/06\/886817.html<\/a><\/p>\n[7]<\/a> The operational command of the permanent operational unit of the Russian Navy in the Mediterranean Sea was formed three years ago, Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, 22 Eyl\u00fcl 2016, http:\/\/function.mil.ru\/news_page\/country\/more.htm?id=12096837@egNews#txt<\/a><\/p>\n[8]<\/a> Tom Parfitt, Gaddafi offers Russia a naval base in Libya, The Guardian, 1 Kas\u0131m 2008, https:\/\/www.theguardian.com\/world\/2008\/nov\/01\/libyarussia-gadafy-united-states<\/a><\/p>\n[9]<\/a> Phil Stewart, Exclusive: Russia appears to deploy forces in Egypt, eyes on Libya role \u2013 sources, Reuters, 14 Mart 2017, http:\/\/www.reuters.com\/article\/us-usa-russia-libya-exclusiveidUSKBN16K2RY<\/a><\/p>\n[10]<\/a> Naval Doctrine of the Russian Federation, 26 Temmuz 2015, http:\/\/www.kremlin.ru\/events\/president\/news\/50060<\/a><\/p>\n[11]<\/a> Richard Connolly, Towards a Dual Fleet? The Maritime Doctrine of the Russian Federation and the Modernisation of Russian Naval Capabilities, Center for Security Studies at ETH Zurich, 12 Temmuz 2017, http:\/\/www.css.ethz.ch\/en\/services\/digitallibrary\/articles\/article.html\/e4f8e041-5770-47348f0c-4684781070d2\/pdf<\/a><\/p>\n[12]<\/a> Robert Cobb, Russia\u2019s Naval Policy in the Mediterranean and the War in Syria, EastWest Institute, 3 Nisan 2017, https:\/\/www.eastwest.ngo\/idea\/russia%E2%80%99s-naval-policymediterranean-and-war-syria<\/a><\/p>\n[13]<\/a> Even legal arms supplies to Libya may lead to weapons\u2019 spread around region \u2014 diplomat, TASS, \u015eubat 2015, http:\/\/tass.ru\/en\/world\/778588<\/a><\/p>\n[14]<\/a> Russian Ambassador: Commander-in-Chief of the Libyan army discussed delivery of arms in Moscow, RIA, 28 Haziran 2016, https:\/\/ria.ru\/defense_safety\/20160628\/1453677993.html<\/a><\/p>\n[15]<\/a> https:\/\/www.libyaherald.com\/2016\/12\/24\/west-reaffirms-support-for-presidency-councilas-the-sole-legitimate-government-of-libyasays-military-must-be-under-civilian-control\/<\/a><\/p>\n[16]<\/a> http:\/\/www.interfax.ru\/russia\/515781<\/a><\/p>\n[17]<\/a> Missy Ryan, A former CIA asset has become a U.S. headache in Libya, The Washington Post, 17 A\u011fustos 2016, https:\/\/www.washingtonpost.com\/world\/national-security\/a-former-cia-assethas-become-a-us-headache-in-libya\/2016\/08\/17\/a766e392-54c6-11e6-bbf5-957ad17b4385_story.html?utm_term=.0dbaedf05dda<\/a><\/p>\n <\/p>\n<\/div>
<\/div><\/div><\/div><\/div><\/div><\/div><\/div><\/div><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"Libya\u2019daki \u00e7at\u0131\u015fmalar\u0131n BM\u2019nin arabuluculu\u011fuyla \u00e7\u00f6z\u00fclmesinin zor oldu\u011funun ortaya \u00e7\u0131kmas\u0131yla, Rusya\u2019n\u0131n da i\u00e7inde bulundu\u011fu d\u0131\u015f g\u00fc\u00e7ler krizin \u00e7\u00f6z\u00fcm\u00fcne arac\u0131l\u0131k etme ve bu yolla kendi \u00e7\u0131kar\u0131na hizmet etme f\u0131rsat\u0131 yakalam\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. Libya tarihsel olarak Rusya\u2019n\u0131n Orta<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":50,"featured_media":9688,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_mo_disable_npp":"","ngg_post_thumbnail":0},"categories":[361],"tags":[],"asf_pub_issue":[10319],"asf_pub_region":[10321,10323,10327],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/research.sharqforum.org\/tr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/9686"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/research.sharqforum.org\/tr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/research.sharqforum.org\/tr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/research.sharqforum.org\/tr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/50"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/research.sharqforum.org\/tr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=9686"}],"version-history":[{"count":5,"href":"https:\/\/research.sharqforum.org\/tr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/9686\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":24920,"href":"https:\/\/research.sharqforum.org\/tr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/9686\/revisions\/24920"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/research.sharqforum.org\/tr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/9688"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/research.sharqforum.org\/tr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=9686"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/research.sharqforum.org\/tr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=9686"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/research.sharqforum.org\/tr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=9686"},{"taxonomy":"asf_pub_issue","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/research.sharqforum.org\/tr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/asf_pub_issue?post=9686"},{"taxonomy":"asf_pub_region","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/research.sharqforum.org\/tr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/asf_pub_region?post=9686"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}
Uzman G\u00f6r\u00fc\u015f\u00fc<\/a> \/ \/ B\u00f6lgesel Politika<\/a><\/h6><\/div><\/div><\/div><\/div><\/div><\/div><\/div><\/div><\/div><\/div><\/div>\u00d6zet<\/span><\/strong>: Libya\u2019daki \u00e7at\u0131\u015fmalar\u0131n BM\u2019nin arabuluculu\u011fuyla \u00e7\u00f6z\u00fclmesinin zor oldu\u011funun ortaya \u00e7\u0131kmas\u0131yla, Rusya\u2019n\u0131n da i\u00e7inde bulundu\u011fu d\u0131\u015f g\u00fc\u00e7ler krizin \u00e7\u00f6z\u00fcm\u00fcne arac\u0131l\u0131k etme ve bu yolla kendi \u00e7\u0131kar\u0131na hizmet etme f\u0131rsat\u0131 yakalam\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. Libya tarihsel olarak Rusya\u2019n\u0131n Orta Do\u011fu ve Kuzey Afrika (MENA) b\u00f6lgesindeki sad\u0131k m\u00fcttefiklerinden biri olmu\u015f, enerjiden askeri alana kadar pek \u00e7ok alanda g\u00fc\u00e7l\u00fc ba\u011flar\u0131n olu\u015fmas\u0131n\u0131 sa\u011flayan bu ili\u015fki s\u00fcrmekte olan sava\u015fa ra\u011fmen b\u00fcy\u00fck \u00f6l\u00e7\u00fcde korunmu\u015ftur. Moskova, \u00e7at\u0131\u015fman\u0131n \u00e7\u00f6z\u00fcm\u00fcn\u00fc kolayla\u015ft\u0131rma f\u0131rsat\u0131yla, Kuzey Afrika\u2019da silah ticaretini art\u0131rmak, kazan\u00e7l\u0131 enerji ve in\u015faat s\u00f6zle\u015fmeleri ba\u011flamak ve ayn\u0131 zamanda NATO\u2019nun Akdeniz\u2019de artmakta olan etkisini kontrol alt\u0131na almak gibi bir dizi amac\u0131n\u0131 ger\u00e7ekle\u015ftirmeyi umut etmektedir. Ancak Rusya, Orta Do\u011fu\u2019da geleneksel olarak otoriter istikrar nosyonuna a\u011f\u0131rl\u0131k vermesine ra\u011fmen, Libya\u2019da siyasi yelpazede birden fazla se\u00e7ene\u011fe yat\u0131r\u0131m yaparak ba\u015far\u0131s\u0131zl\u0131k riskini en aza indirgemekte ve politikas\u0131ndan kayda de\u011fer bir bi\u00e7imde uzakla\u015fmaktad\u0131r. Rusya, mecburi bir hareket tarz\u0131 i\u00e7inde oldu\u011fu Suriye\u2019den farkl\u0131 olarak, Libya\u2019da daha geni\u015f bir hareket alan\u0131na sahiptir. Bu nedenle, yayg\u0131n bir bi\u00e7imde Vladimir Putin\u2019in Libya\u2019daki kilit adam\u0131 olarak an\u0131lan Halife Hafter Moskova taraf\u0131ndan krizin \u00e7\u00f6z\u00fcm\u00fc i\u00e7in gereken elzem unsurlardan sadece biri olarak de\u011ferlendirilmektedir<\/span>.<\/p>\n<\/div><\/div><\/div><\/div><\/div><\/div>Rusya\u2019n\u0131n Orta Do\u011fu\u2019ya d\u00f6n\u00fc\u015f\u00fc ve Moskova\u2019n\u0131n b\u00f6lgedeki hedeflerine ili\u015fkin tart\u0131\u015fmalar, \u00fclkenin ilgisinin Libya krizinin \u00e7\u00f6z\u00fcm\u00fcnde aktif rol oynamak \u00fczerine kaymaya ba\u015flamas\u0131yla yo\u011funluk kazanm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. Daha \u00f6nce \u00f6nemli \u00f6l\u00e7\u00fcde Suriye\u2019ye odaklanm\u0131\u015f olan Rusya\u2019n\u0131n b\u00f6lgeye y\u00f6nelik d\u0131\u015f politika g\u00fcndemi, askeri ve g\u00fcvenlik \u00e7evrelerinin y\u00f6nlendirici rol\u00fc nedeniyle, d\u0131\u015far\u0131dan bak\u0131ld\u0131\u011f\u0131nda hayli g\u00fcvenlik\u00e7i g\u00f6r\u00fcnmekteydi. Moskova\u2019n\u0131n Suriye\u2019de \u00e7ok say\u0131da hedefe sahip olmas\u0131na ra\u011fmen, g\u00fcvenlik konular\u0131ndaki a\u00e7\u0131k ilgisi, Rusya\u2019n\u0131n Orta Do\u011fu\u2019da askeri bir \u00fcs olu\u015fturma aray\u0131\u015f\u0131 i\u00e7inde oldu\u011fu endi\u015fesine yol a\u00e7maktad\u0131r. Bu ba\u011flamda Rusya\u2019n\u0131n 2016 y\u0131l\u0131nda ba\u015flayan ve General Hafter\u2019e yasad\u0131\u015f\u0131 silah tedariki sa\u011fland\u0131\u011f\u0131na ili\u015fkin dedikodular\u0131n e\u015flik etti\u011fi Libya hamlesi, b\u00f6lgedeki askeri varl\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 sa\u011flama almaya y\u00f6nelik bir ad\u0131m olarak yorumlanmaktad\u0131r. Ancak, Libya\u2019ya bir y\u0131ldan uzun zamand\u0131r s\u00fcrd\u00fcrd\u00fc\u011f\u00fc aktif m\u00fcdahalesinden sonra, Rusya\u2019n\u0131n rol\u00fcn\u00fc bir askeri m\u00fcdahale olarak adland\u0131rmak olduk\u00e7a g\u00fc\u00e7t\u00fcr. Rusya Libya\u2019da daha \u00e7ok g\u00fc\u00e7 g\u00f6sterisi ve diplomasinin dengeli bir kar\u0131\u015f\u0131m\u0131na ba\u015fvurmaktad\u0131r.<\/p>\n
Rusya\u2019n\u0131n MENA b\u00f6lgesine y\u00f6nelik politikas\u0131 \u00f6nemli \u00f6l\u00e7\u00fcde Libya darbesinin etkisi ile tan\u0131mlanm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. \u00dclkenin son d\u00f6nem d\u0131\u015f politika stratejisinde b\u00f6lgenin \u00f6nemi ilk kez yans\u0131t\u0131lm\u0131\u015f ve buradaki istikrars\u0131zl\u0131\u011f\u0131n do\u011frudan Rusya\u2019y\u0131 etkileyece\u011fi a\u00e7\u0131k bir bi\u00e7imde ifade edilmi\u015ftir.[1]<\/a> Muammer Kaddafi\u2019nin iktidardan d\u00fc\u015fmesi, bir dizi ba\u015far\u0131l\u0131 Arap Bahar\u0131 protestosunu d\u0131\u015far\u0131dan kontrol edilen bir kampanya olarak yorumlayan ve bu kampanyan\u0131n nihai hedefinin Rusya olaca\u011f\u0131n\u0131 d\u00fc\u015f\u00fcnen Kremlin\u2019deki siyaset\u00e7ileri derinden etkilemi\u015ftir. Bu ba\u011flamda Libya, Moskova\u2019y\u0131 b\u00f6lgede daha g\u00fc\u00e7l\u00fc bir etki sahibi olma aray\u0131\u015f\u0131na ve b\u00fcy\u00fck \u00f6l\u00e7\u00fcde \u00f6nceden belirlenen Suriye krizine askeri m\u00fcdahale karar\u0131na sevk eden bir k\u0131v\u0131lc\u0131m g\u00f6revi g\u00f6rm\u00fc\u015ft\u00fcr.<\/p>\nRusya Libya\u2019da Ne Kaybediyor?<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\nMuammer Kaddafi\u2019nin Libya\u2019daki d\u00fc\u015f\u00fc\u015f\u00fc Rusya\u2019y\u0131 b\u00f6lgede \u015fimdiye kadar sahip oldu\u011fu en g\u00fc\u00e7l\u00fc m\u00fcttefiklerinden birinden yoksun b\u0131rakm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. Trablus k\u0131rk y\u0131l\u0131 a\u015fk\u0131n bir s\u00fcre, \u00f6nce Sovyetler Birli\u011fi ve daha sonra Rusya\u2019n\u0131n hem Orta Do\u011fu hem de Afrika\u2019da ve ayn\u0131 zamanda daha geni\u015f M\u00fcsl\u00fcman d\u00fcnyas\u0131nda etkili olmas\u0131n\u0131 sa\u011flayan anahtar kanallardan biri olmu\u015ftur. \u0130ki \u00fclke aras\u0131ndaki bu d\u00fczen Muammer Kaddafi\u2019nin 1969\u2019da iktidara gelmesiyle olduk\u00e7a ilgilidir. Sovyetler Birli\u011fi, Kral \u0130dris\u2019i deviren Kaddafi rejimini tan\u0131yan ilk \u00fclke olmu\u015ftur. Siyasi fikirleri bir arada y\u00fcr\u00fctme h\u00fcneri Kaddafi\u2019nin, taraflardan ikisine de yana\u015fmadan, ABD ve SSCB aras\u0131nda bir etki kutbu olmas\u0131n\u0131 sa\u011flam\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. Ancak, M\u0131s\u0131r\u2019da Amerika yanl\u0131s\u0131 Enver Sedat\u2019\u0131n g\u00fc\u00e7lenmesi ve \u0130srail\u2019e yak\u0131nla\u015fmas\u0131 Kaddafi\u2019yi sosyalist \u00e7izgiyi kabul etmeye ve sonu\u00e7 olarak Sovyetler Birli\u011fi ile daha yak\u0131n ili\u015fkiler kurmaya sevk etmi\u015ftir. ABD\u2019nin Orta Do\u011fu\u2019da artmakta olan etkisi, Kaddafi\u2019yi Moskova\u2019ya daha da yakla\u015fmaya ve a\u011f\u0131rl\u0131kl\u0131 olarak Sovyetler askeri deste\u011fine dayanmak yoluyla SSCB\u2019nin korumas\u0131n\u0131 istemeye itmi\u015ftir.<\/p>\n
Sovyet-Libya ili\u015fkileri, SSCB\u2019nin g\u00fc\u00e7l\u00fc ittifaklar kurma ve s\u00fcrd\u00fcrmede en etkin ara\u00e7 oldu\u011funu d\u00fc\u015f\u00fcnmesinden dolay\u0131, askeri i\u015f birli\u011fi boyutuna odaklanm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. \u0130ki \u00fclke aras\u0131nda ilk silah anla\u015fmas\u0131 1974\u2019te imzalanm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r ve g\u00fcn\u00fcm\u00fczde Libya ordusu neredeyse tamamen Sovyet silahlar\u0131na dayanmaktad\u0131r. 1973\u2019den 1992\u2019ye ge\u00e7en 20 y\u0131lda, toplamda yakla\u015f\u0131k 11,000 Sovyet askeri Muammer Kaddafi h\u00fck\u00fcmetinin askeri dan\u0131\u015fman\u0131 olarak Libya\u2019ya konu\u015flanm\u0131\u015f ve baz\u0131 durumlarda do\u011frudan Libya ordusunun yan\u0131nda \u00e7at\u0131\u015fmada yer alm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r.[2]<\/a> Libya kadrosunun y\u00fczde 80 kadar\u0131n\u0131n gerekli deneyimi bulunmad\u0131\u011f\u0131 i\u00e7in, \u00fcst d\u00fczey askeri y\u00f6neticiler de d\u00e2hil olmak \u00fczere pek \u00e7ok askeri personel SSCB\u2019de e\u011fitilmi\u015ftir. Rusya, Libya ordusuna e\u011fitim sa\u011flama ve becerilerini art\u0131rma konusundaki Sovyet deneyimini 2004 y\u0131l\u0131ndan 2011 devrimine kadar pek \u00e7ok defa tekrarlam\u0131\u015ft\u0131r.[3]<\/a><\/p>\nLibya zengin petrol yataklar\u0131 nedeniyle, Rus silah ithalat\u0131 portfolyosunda Rus silahlar\u0131 i\u00e7in pe\u015fin para \u00f6deyebilecek birka\u00e7 \u00fclkeden biri olmu\u015ftur. Moskova 2008 y\u0131l\u0131nda Libya\u2019n\u0131n Sovyetler Birli\u011fi\u2019ne olan 4,5 milyar dolar borcunu silmi\u015f, bunun yerine 2011 itibariyle 5-10 milyar dolar aras\u0131nda tuttu\u011fu tahmin edilen bir dizi silah anla\u015fmas\u0131 yapm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r.[4]<\/a> Bu anla\u015fmalar Muammer Kaddafi iktidardan devrildikten sonra BM silah ambargosu gere\u011fi ask\u0131ya al\u0131nm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r ve Moskova \u00fclkenin bu s\u00f6zle\u015fmeleri yerine getirmesini beklemektedir. Rusya Trablus\u2019ta gelecekte kurulacak h\u00fck\u00fcmetin siyasi y\u00f6neliminden ba\u011f\u0131ms\u0131z olarak, Libya\u2019n\u0131n yeni silahlar almak ve tarihsel olarak Sovyet silahlar\u0131na dayanm\u0131\u015f oldu\u011fu i\u00e7in eski olanlar\u0131 yenilemek \u00fczere Moskova\u2019ya d\u00f6nece\u011fine g\u00fc\u00e7l\u00fc bir \u015fekilde inanmaktad\u0131r. Bu ba\u011flamda Rusya h\u00fck\u00fcmeti i\u00e7in \u00f6nemli olan \u00f6ncelikle Libya\u2019da istikrarl\u0131 bir h\u00fck\u00fcmet oldu\u011fundan emin olmak, ikinci olarak da bu h\u00fck\u00fcmetin savunma masraflar\u0131na di\u011fer konulara nazaran \u00f6ncelik vermesidir.<\/p>\nRusya\u2019n\u0131n Libya\u2019da \u00e7\u0131karlar\u0131n\u0131n tehdit alt\u0131nda oldu\u011funu g\u00f6rd\u00fc\u011f\u00fc alan kazan\u00e7l\u0131 ekonomik sekt\u00f6rd\u00fcr. Hafter\u2019in Libya Ulusal Ordusu kazan\u0131mlar\u0131n\u0131n bir sonucu olarak, \u00fclkede petrol \u00fcretimi 2016 Eyl\u00fcl ay\u0131nda g\u00fcnde 300,000 varilden 2017 Ocak ay\u0131nda g\u00fcnde 700,000 varilin \u00fczerine y\u00fckselmi\u015f ve \u00fcretimin bu y\u0131l\u0131n sonlar\u0131na do\u011fru g\u00fcnde 1 milyon varile \u00e7\u0131kmas\u0131 \u00f6ng\u00f6r\u00fclmektedir.[5]<\/a> Rusya\u2019n\u0131n petrol devi Rosneft 2017 \u015eubat\u2019\u0131nda Libya Ulusal Petrol \u015eirketi (NOC) ile bir yat\u0131r\u0131m ve ham petrol al\u0131m anla\u015fmas\u0131 imzalam\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. Bu anla\u015fma, s\u00fcregelen krize ra\u011fmen Rusya\u2019n\u0131n Libya\u2019da i\u015f yapma ilgisinin yeniden canland\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131n g\u00f6stermektedir. Rosneft \u00fclkeye d\u00f6nmek i\u00e7in giri\u015fimde bulunan pek \u00e7ok \u015firketten sadece biridir ancak bu anla\u015fma ile g\u00f6ze \u00e7arpan bir ba\u015far\u0131 elde etmi\u015ftir. \u015eu aralar Libya\u2019n\u0131n petrol kaynaklar\u0131n\u0131n \u00f6nemli bir k\u0131sm\u0131n\u0131 kontrol\u00fcnde tutmakta olan Halife Hafter, Rosneft\u2019in \u00fclkeye d\u00f6n\u00fc\u015f\u00fcn\u00fc tek ba\u015f\u0131na kolayla\u015ft\u0131rm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. Rusya i\u015f d\u00fcnyas\u0131 Bat\u0131l\u0131 emsallerinin sat\u0131n almada sa\u011flad\u0131\u011f\u0131 yat\u0131r\u0131m ve teknoloji imk\u00e2nlar\u0131n\u0131 kar\u015f\u0131layamayaca\u011f\u0131 i\u00e7in, bunun gibi \u00fcst d\u00fczey bir destek olmasa Libya\u2019da \u00f6ncelikli muamele kazanmak i\u00e7in \u00e7ok m\u00fccadele ederdi. Rusya H\u00fck\u00fcmeti Libyal\u0131 ortaklar\u0131 ile ili\u015fkiler kurarak, Kaddafi h\u00fck\u00fcmeti zaman\u0131nda imzalam\u0131\u015f oldu\u011fu anla\u015fmalarda kaybetmi\u015f oldu\u011fu k\u00e2r\u0131 (in\u015faatta 150 milyon dolar, petrol ve gaz sanayiinde 3,5 milyar dolar kadar)[6]<\/a> telafi etmek ve uzun vadede mali geri kazan\u0131m sa\u011flamak i\u00e7in projelerine kald\u0131\u011f\u0131 yerden devam etmeye \u00f6ncelik vermektedir.<\/p>\nRusya\u2019n\u0131n Libya\u2019daki proaktif rol\u00fc g\u00fcney ve do\u011fu Akdeniz\u2019de daha b\u00fcy\u00fck \u00f6l\u00e7ekli mevcudiyeti ba\u011flam\u0131nda de\u011ferlendirilmelidir. Suriye \u00e7at\u0131\u015fmas\u0131na kat\u0131lmas\u0131 ve Sovyet d\u00f6nemi Tartus \u00fcss\u00fcn\u00fc tam kapasite i\u015fleyen bir deniz \u00fcss\u00fcne \u00e7evirme karar\u0131n\u0131n yan\u0131nda K\u0131r\u0131m\u2019da bulunan Karadeniz donanmas\u0131na yapt\u0131\u011f\u0131 yat\u0131r\u0131m\u0131 artt\u0131rmas\u0131, Rusya\u2019n\u0131n b\u00f6lgede b\u00fcy\u00fcyen h\u0131rslar\u0131 oldu\u011funu g\u00f6stermektedir. SSCB\u2019nin Akdeniz\u2019de kendine yer edinme \u00e7abalar\u0131 5. Akdeniz Sava\u015f Gemisi Filosunun ortaya \u00e7\u0131kmas\u0131n\u0131 sa\u011flam\u0131\u015f ancak bu giri\u015fim 1992 y\u0131l\u0131nda b\u00f6lgede daimi deniz \u00fcss\u00fcn\u00fcn ve etkili ikmal tesislerinin olmamas\u0131 nedeniyle ba\u015far\u0131s\u0131z olmu\u015ftur. 2013 y\u0131l\u0131nda Rus h\u00fck\u00fcmeti, NATO\u2019nun b\u00f6lgedeki yay\u0131lma kapasitesini kar\u015f\u0131lamak \u00fczere filoyu yeniden toplama karar\u0131 vermi\u015ftir.[7]<\/a> Ancak Suriye\u2019nin Tartus \u00fcss\u00fc Rus deniz donanmas\u0131n\u0131 Akdeniz\u2019de etkili bir g\u00fcce d\u00f6n\u00fc\u015ft\u00fcrmek i\u00e7in yeterli de\u011fildir. B\u00f6lgede esnek operasyonlar\u0131 s\u00fcrd\u00fcrmek i\u00e7in Rus Donanmas\u0131\u2019n\u0131n Akdeniz ve Kuzey Afrika boyunca hem Libya hem de M\u0131s\u0131r limanlar\u0131na eri\u015fimine imk\u00e2n sa\u011flayan \u00fcsler kurmas\u0131 gereklidir.<\/p>\nMuammer Kaddafi 2008 y\u0131l\u0131nda, Moskova\u2019ya Sovyetler sonras\u0131 d\u00f6nemde yapt\u0131\u011f\u0131 ilk ziyaretinde, Rusya\u2019ya ilk kez \u00fclkesinde daimi deniz \u00fcss\u00fc kurmay\u0131 teklif etmi\u015ftir.[8]<\/a> Sab\u0131k Libya lideri teklifinin kar\u015f\u0131l\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 hi\u00e7bir zaman ger\u00e7ekle\u015ftirmemi\u015fse de, Rusya\u2019n\u0131n Libya krizindeki aktif diplomatik rol\u00fc hem M\u0131s\u0131r hem de Libya\u2019daki askerleri i\u00e7in, deniz \u00fcss\u00fc de d\u00e2hil olmak \u00fczere tesislere eri\u015fimi hususunda yeni tart\u0131\u015fmalara yol a\u00e7m\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. Rusya\u2019n\u0131n tek u\u00e7ak gemisi Amiral Kuznetsov\u2019un Libya liman\u0131na yana\u015fmak istemesi ve Suriye k\u0131y\u0131lar\u0131nda aylar s\u00fcren g\u00f6revinden sonra Ocak 2017\u2019de General Hafter\u2019i a\u011f\u0131rlamas\u0131 tesad\u00fcf de\u011fildir. Kuznetsov, Akdeniz filosunun ba\u015f\u0131ndaki ki\u015fidir ve \u00fclkenin Akdeniz\u2019de artmakta olan emellerinin bir sembol\u00fcd\u00fcr. Rus h\u00fck\u00fcmetinin Libya s\u0131n\u0131r\u0131 yak\u0131nlar\u0131nda bulunan, M\u0131s\u0131r\u2019\u0131n bat\u0131s\u0131ndaki Sidi Barrani \u00fcss\u00fcne bir \u00f6zel kuvvetler birli\u011fi yollam\u0131\u015f oldu\u011fu da s\u00f6ylenmektedir.[9]<\/a> Sidi Barrani deniz \u00fcss\u00fc 1972\u2019ye kadar Sovyet sava\u015f gemilerine ev sahipli\u011fi yapm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. Bu da Rusya\u2019n\u0131n Kuzey Afrika\u2019da Sovyetlerin kullanm\u0131\u015f oldu\u011fu \u00fcslere geri d\u00f6nme aray\u0131\u015f\u0131nda oldu\u011funa dair spek\u00fclasyonlar\u0131n t\u00fcm\u00fcyle as\u0131ls\u0131z olmad\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 g\u00f6stermektedir.<\/p>\nRusya\u2019n\u0131n b\u00f6lgedeki stratejisine odaklanmas\u0131n\u0131n yan\u0131 s\u0131ra Akdeniz\u2019e d\u00f6nme amac\u0131 tamam\u0131yla a\u00e7\u0131k de\u011fildir. Ancak Rusya\u2019n\u0131n deniz doktrini Moskova\u2019n\u0131n orada tam olarak neye ula\u015fmak istedi\u011fine ili\u015fkin fikir vermektedir. Doktrin,[10]<\/a> di\u011fer \u015feylerin yan\u0131 s\u0131ra, Rusya\u2019n\u0131n Akdeniz\u2019de kal\u0131c\u0131 olarak askeri-donanma varl\u0131\u011f\u0131 g\u00f6sterme aray\u0131\u015f\u0131nda oldu\u011funu ifade etmekte ve Rus donanmas\u0131n\u0131n orada s\u00fcrekli bulunmas\u0131n\u0131n ko\u015fullar\u0131n\u0131 yaratma ihtiyac\u0131n\u0131 vurgulamaktad\u0131r. \u00d6te yandan Akdeniz, \u00f6zellikle NATO\u2019nun orada artmakta olan varl\u0131\u011f\u0131 dikkate al\u0131nd\u0131\u011f\u0131nda, Moskova\u2019da \u00fclkenin g\u00fcvenli\u011fine y\u00f6nelik bir tehdit kayna\u011f\u0131 olarak g\u00f6r\u00fclmektedir.[11]<\/a> Bu ba\u011flamda Suriye\u2019deki \u00fcsler ve Libya ve M\u0131s\u0131r\u2019da gelecekte kurulacak olan tesisler, gelecekte ittifak\u0131n deniz varl\u0131\u011f\u0131ndan kaynaklanan ve Rusya\u2019n\u0131n Karadeniz donanmas\u0131na y\u00f6nelecek olas\u0131 tehditlere kar\u015f\u0131 ilk savunma hatt\u0131 olarak g\u00f6r\u00fclmektedir.[12]<\/a><\/p>\nRusya\u2019n\u0131n Libya\u2019daki Se\u00e7enekleri<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\nRusya, 2015 y\u0131l\u0131 Aral\u0131k ay\u0131nda BM G\u00fcvenlik Konseyi\u2019nde Libya Siyasi Anla\u015fmas\u0131\u2019na destek vermesine ra\u011fmen, 2016 y\u0131l\u0131 Mart ay\u0131nda BM destekli h\u00fck\u00fcmetin Trablus\u2019a varmas\u0131ndan hemen sonra Libya \u00e7at\u0131\u015fmas\u0131nda yeni h\u00fck\u00fcmeti y\u0131kmaya \u00e7al\u0131\u015fan g\u00fc\u00e7leri aktif bir bi\u00e7imde desteklemeye ba\u015flad\u0131. Moskova\u2019n\u0131n Libya\u2019ya kar\u015f\u0131 neden b\u00f6yle tutars\u0131z bir stratejide karar k\u0131ld\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 a\u00e7\u0131klamak g\u00fc\u00e7, ancak yazar\u0131n Rusya politikac\u0131lar\u0131 ile yapt\u0131\u011f\u0131 tart\u0131\u015fmalar Kremlin\u2019in muhtemelen ilk ba\u015flarda, Libya\u2019daki krizin \u00e7\u00f6z\u00fcm\u00fcne \u00f6ncelik vermedi\u011fini ortaya \u00e7\u0131karmaktad\u0131r. Bu durum 2016 yaz\u0131na kadar Rusya H\u00fck\u00fcmeti\u2019nin, Trablus\u2019ta yeni g\u00f6reve gelmi\u015f h\u00fck\u00fcmet, Ulusal Kongre H\u00fck\u00fcmeti ya da Temsilciler Evi olsun, Libya \u00e7at\u0131\u015fmas\u0131ndaki herhangi bir tarafla aktif bir bi\u00e7imde irtibat\u0131n\u0131 s\u00fcrd\u00fcrmemi\u015f olmas\u0131yla kan\u0131tlanmaktad\u0131r.<\/p>\n
Moskova 2016 Haziran ay\u0131na kadar, \u015fimdi pek \u00e7ok ki\u015fi taraf\u0131ndan Rusya\u2019n\u0131n Libya\u2019daki kilit adam\u0131 olarak g\u00f6r\u00fclen General Hafter\u2019i a\u011f\u0131rlamam\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. Rusya\u2019da kar\u015f\u0131lanma bi\u00e7imi Hafter gibi ihtilafl\u0131 ve ayr\u0131l\u0131k\u00e7\u0131 bir fig\u00fcr i\u00e7in al\u0131\u015f\u0131lmad\u0131k bi\u00e7imde y\u00fcksek profilli olmu\u015ftur. Hafter D\u0131\u015f \u0130\u015fleri Bakan\u0131 ve Savunma Bakan\u0131 taraf\u0131ndan ve en \u00f6nemlisi cumhurba\u015fkan\u0131na yak\u0131n, kilit bir karar alma organ\u0131 olan G\u00fcvenlik Konseyi Sekreteri Nikolai Patrushev taraf\u0131ndan kabul edilmi\u015ftir. Moskova\u2019n\u0131n Libya\u2019daki \u00e7abalar\u0131na yo\u011funla\u015fmaya karar verme nedenleri, muhtemelen BM destekli h\u00fck\u00fcmetin siyasal mevcudiyetini sa\u011flamla\u015ft\u0131rmada ba\u015far\u0131s\u0131z olmas\u0131, ter\u00f6rist gruplar\u0131n\u0131n ortaya \u00e7\u0131kmas\u0131; \u00fclkenin OPEC \u00fcyeli\u011fini, s\u00f6z konusu d\u00f6nemde petrol \u00fcretimi kesintisi konusundaki g\u00f6r\u00fc\u015fmelerde grup g\u00f6r\u00fc\u015f\u00fcn\u00fc etkilemek \u00fczere kullanma iste\u011finden kaynaklanmas\u0131 idi.<\/p>\n
Rusya\u2019n\u0131n Libya\u2019ya y\u00f6nelik politikas\u0131nda ba\u015flang\u0131\u00e7taki tutars\u0131zl\u0131k, ilk \u00f6nce Suriye\u2019de test edilen bu politikay\u0131 ve g\u00fcvenlikle\u015ftirilmi\u015f oldu\u011fu anlam\u0131na gelen strateji modelini uygulama giri\u015fimleriyle a\u00e7\u0131\u011fa \u00e7\u0131km\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. Rusya\u2019n\u0131n 2011\u2019den bu yana BM silah ambargosu alt\u0131nda olan \u00fclkeye silah tedarik etme duru\u015fu bunun bir kan\u0131t\u0131d\u0131r. Rusya 2015 gibi erken bir zamanda, Libya resmi h\u00fck\u00fcmetine \u00fclkedeki ter\u00f6rle m\u00fccadeleye yard\u0131m i\u00e7in silah teslimleri yapma konusuna kafa yormu\u015ftur. BM Rusya delegasyonu ba\u015fkan\u0131 Vladimir Churkin, 2015 y\u0131l\u0131 \u015eubat ay\u0131nda gazetecilere, Moskova\u2019n\u0131n Tobruk\u2019taki resmi h\u00fck\u00fcmeti silahla desteklemeyi d\u00fc\u015f\u00fcnd\u00fc\u011f\u00fcn\u00fc[13]<\/a> ve gerekirse silahlar\u0131n deniz yoluyla cihat\u00e7\u0131lara ula\u015fmas\u0131n\u0131 \u00f6nlemek i\u00e7in Libya\u2019da bir deniz ablukas\u0131n\u0131n uygulanmas\u0131 gerekti\u011fini dile getirmi\u015ftir. Hafter\u2019in 2016 Haziran ay\u0131nda Moskova\u2019ya ger\u00e7ekle\u015ftirdi\u011fi ilk ziyarette Libya\u2019daki Rusya El\u00e7isi Ivan Molotkov, taraflar\u0131n Rus silahlar\u0131n\u0131n Tobruk\u2019taki h\u00fck\u00fcmete olas\u0131 teslimat\u0131n\u0131 tart\u0131\u015fm\u0131\u015f olduklar\u0131n\u0131 a\u00e7\u0131klam\u0131\u015ft\u0131r.[14]<\/a> Kremlin\u2019in Hafter\u2019e ve onun has\u0131mlar\u0131na yollam\u0131\u015f oldu\u011fu bu i\u015faretler General\u2019e cesaret vermi\u015f ve t\u00fcm Libya\u2019y\u0131 g\u00fc\u00e7 kullanarak yeniden ele ge\u00e7irme iste\u011fini dile getiremeye te\u015fvik etmi\u015ftir.[15]<\/a> Ancak daha sonra Moskova bu konuda \u00e7ok daha incelikli bir duru\u015f benimseyerek, El\u00e7i Molotov\u2019a g\u00f6re, General Hafter\u2019e \u201cG\u00fcvenlik Konseyi\u2019nin ambargoyu kald\u0131rmad\u0131\u011f\u0131 ya da en az\u0131ndan hafifletmedi\u011fi m\u00fcddet\u00e7e Rus silahlar\u0131n\u0131n Libya\u2019ya teslimi konusunda konu\u015fulamayaca\u011f\u0131n\u0131\u201d a\u00e7\u0131k\u00e7a s\u00f6ylemi\u015ftir.[16]<\/a><\/p>\nRusya\u2019n\u0131n Libya ba\u011flam\u0131ndaki anlay\u0131\u015f\u0131, tart\u0131\u015fmaya a\u00e7\u0131k bir \u015fekilde, Libyal\u0131 payda\u015flarla g\u00f6r\u00fc\u015fmelere ba\u015flad\u0131ktan sonra \u00f6nemli \u00f6l\u00e7\u00fcde daha incelikli olmu\u015ftur. Sonu\u00e7 olarak, \u015fu an Moskova\u2019n\u0131n General Hafter\u2019i bu krizi \u00e7\u00f6zmeye yard\u0131m edebilecek tek olas\u0131 partner olarak g\u00f6rd\u00fc\u011f\u00fcn\u00fc s\u00f6ylemek hatal\u0131 olacakt\u0131r. \u0130ki taraf, kar\u015f\u0131l\u0131kl\u0131 \u00e7\u0131kar sa\u011flanan anla\u015fmal\u0131 bir birliktelikten faydalanmaktad\u0131r. Kaddafi \u00f6zentisi, kendisini Avrupa g\u00fc\u00e7lerinin g\u00f6z\u00fcnde Trablus h\u00fck\u00fcmetine g\u00fc\u00e7l\u00fc bir alternatif olarak konumlamas\u0131na yard\u0131mc\u0131 olan, Moskova\u2019n\u0131n sa\u011flad\u0131\u011f\u0131 uluslararas\u0131 diplomatik k\u0131l\u0131ftan faydalanmaktad\u0131r. Rusya ise Hafter ile ortakl\u0131k yaparak, bat\u0131l\u0131 emsallerine kar\u015f\u0131 ba\u015fka bir koz elde etmek i\u00e7in Akdeniz\u2019deki etkisini art\u0131rmaktan, Libya konusunda i\u015f birli\u011fi \u00fczerinden M\u0131s\u0131r\u2019la yak\u0131n ili\u015fkiler kurmaya kadar bir dizi hedefini yerine getirmektedir.<\/p>\n
Soru, Rusya\u2019n\u0131n Hafter ile g\u00fc\u00e7l\u00fc bir ili\u015fki kurmay\u0131 ama\u00e7larken, Moskova\u2019n\u0131n bu ortakl\u0131\u011fa ne kadar sad\u0131k oldu\u011fu ve General\u2019in yeni bir Kaddafi olarak ortaya \u00e7\u0131kmas\u0131n\u0131 sa\u011flamaya ne \u00f6l\u00e7\u00fcde haz\u0131r oldu\u011fudur. Her ne olursa olsun, Hafter Muammer Kaddafi ile aralar\u0131ndaki anla\u015fmazl\u0131k nedeniyle y\u0131llarca Birle\u015fik Devletler\u2019de ikamet etmi\u015ftir. Bu s\u00fcre zarf\u0131nda Amerika istihbarat\u0131yla birlikte \u00e7al\u0131\u015fm\u0131\u015f oldu\u011fu da iddia edilmektedir[17]<\/a> ve bu da onu Moskova i\u00e7in istenmeyen bir partner yapmaktad\u0131r. Hafter\u2019e net bir deste\u011fe dair yanl\u0131\u015f bir izlenim vererek ba\u015flang\u0131\u00e7ta hata yapan Rusya h\u00fck\u00fcmeti Libya krizine m\u00fcdahalesine ili\u015fkin tart\u0131\u015fmalardan, ulusal mutabakat ihtiyac\u0131 hakk\u0131nda genel a\u00e7\u0131klamalara ba\u015fvurarak dikkate de\u011fer bir bi\u00e7imde ka\u00e7\u0131nmaktad\u0131r. Asl\u0131nda BM\u2019nin dayatt\u0131\u011f\u0131 silah ambargosu silahlar\u0131n Hafter\u2019e teslim edilmemesi iyi bir bahane sunarak, b\u00f6lgede ba\u015fka bir batakl\u0131\u011f\u0131n i\u00e7ine \u00e7ekilme riskinden ka\u00e7\u0131nmay\u0131 sa\u011fl\u0131yor. Kremlin, General\u2019in \u00f6nemli \u00f6l\u00e7\u00fcde Bat\u0131\u2019ya y\u00f6nelik askeri meydan okumas\u0131n\u0131 alenen desteklemesine ra\u011fmen, Hafter\u2019in bir sava\u015f a\u011fas\u0131ndan bir siyaset\u00e7iye d\u00f6n\u00fc\u015f\u00fcm\u00fcn\u00fc g\u00f6zetmektedir. Bu durum Rusya\u2019n\u0131n Libya\u2019ya bak\u0131\u015f\u0131nda ve \u00e7at\u0131\u015fma \u00e7\u00f6z\u00fcm\u00fc y\u00f6nteminde de\u011fi\u015fime i\u015faret etmektedir.<\/p>\nLibya Siyasi Anla\u015fmas\u0131 esasen General Hafter\u2019i marjinalize etmektedir. Temelde planlad\u0131\u011f\u0131 sert g\u00fc\u00e7le, onu Libya\u2019da gelecekteki bir uzla\u015f\u0131n\u0131n d\u0131\u015f\u0131nda b\u0131rakan anla\u015fman\u0131n kapsam\u0131 aras\u0131nda bir kopukluk vard\u0131r. \u015e\u00fcphesiz Rusya h\u00fck\u00fcmeti Hafter i\u00e7in \u00f6nemli bir rol tahayy\u00fcl etmektedir ancak g\u00fc\u00e7l\u00fc bir otoriter liderin dahi toplumu yeniden bir araya getirme becerisi olmad\u0131\u011f\u0131 konusunda Suriye\u2019de dersini alm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. Libya\u2019daki karma\u015f\u0131k ba\u011flamda bu, uzun vadede yeni sosyal s\u00f6zle\u015fmenin kapsay\u0131c\u0131 ve s\u00fcrd\u00fcr\u00fclebilir g\u00f6r\u00fcnmesinin gerekli oldu\u011fu anlam\u0131na gelmektedir. \u00dclkede, muhtemelen en zay\u0131f\u0131 BM destekli Ba\u015fkanl\u0131k Konseyi Ba\u015fkan\u0131 Fayiz es-Serrac olan birka\u00e7 a\u011f\u0131rl\u0131k merkezinin ortaya \u00e7\u0131kmas\u0131yla, Moskova Libya krizinde karar merci gibi davranarak, ister askeri bir g\u00fc\u00e7 taraf\u0131ndan isterse uluslararas\u0131 bir yetki ile desteklensin, t\u00fcm taraflar\u0131 m\u00fczakere masas\u0131nda bir araya getirme hedefi ile birden fazla se\u00e7ene\u011fe yat\u0131r\u0131m yaparak ba\u015far\u0131s\u0131zl\u0131k riskini azaltmay\u0131 tercih etmi\u015ftir.<\/p>\n
Rusya h\u00fck\u00fcmeti, Trablus h\u00fck\u00fcmeti ve Misrata Tugaylar\u0131 ile Genel Ulusal Kongre (GUK) gibi di\u011fer payda\u015flarla ileti\u015fime ge\u00e7me \u00e7abalar\u0131n\u0131 yo\u011funla\u015ft\u0131rm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. 2016 y\u0131l\u0131nda Moskova, Libya\u2019daki eski ba\u011flar\u0131 yeniden kurma ve yeni ba\u011flant\u0131lar i\u00e7in bir ileti\u015fim a\u011f\u0131 geli\u015ftirme g\u00f6revi verilen, aralar\u0131nda \u00c7e\u00e7enlerin dahi bulundu\u011fu diplomatlar\u0131 ve parlamento \u00fcyelerini i\u00e7eren, \u201cLibya\u2019da Uzla\u015f\u0131 i\u00e7in \u0130leti\u015fim Grubu\u201d olarak isimlendirilen bakanl\u0131klar aras\u0131 bir kurum kurmu\u015ftur. Bu olu\u015fum, Rusyal\u0131 yetkililer ile es-Serrac H\u00fck\u00fcmeti ve ayr\u0131ca askeri gruplardan temsilciler aras\u0131nda yap\u0131lan yo\u011fun g\u00f6r\u00fc\u015fmelere neden olmu\u015ftur. Moskova d\u00fcnya g\u00fc\u00e7lerinden birka\u00e7\u0131n\u0131n Fayiz es-Serrac\u2019\u0131 \u00fclkeyi birle\u015ftirecek bir lider olarak g\u00f6rmekte oldu\u011funun fark\u0131ndad\u0131r. Rusya, Libya Siyasi Anla\u015fmas\u0131\u2019n\u0131n daha geni\u015f bir siyasi akt\u00f6rler yelpazesini i\u00e7ine alacak \u015fekilde d\u00fczenlenmedi\u011fi takdirde 2017 y\u0131l\u0131 sonlar\u0131nda son bulaca\u011f\u0131 i\u00e7in, es-Serrac\u2019\u0131 Libya\u2019da kendi siyasi tasar\u0131m\u0131n\u0131n bir par\u00e7as\u0131 yapma f\u0131rsat\u0131n\u0131 yakalamak i\u00e7in imk\u00e2n g\u00f6zetmekte. Bu strateji ayn\u0131 zamanda Rusya\u2019n\u0131n idaresi zor olan Hafter\u2019e daha fazla bask\u0131 yapmas\u0131na ve kendisine verilecek deste\u011fin ge\u00e7i\u015f g\u00f6r\u00fc\u015fmelerine kat\u0131lmas\u0131 ko\u015fuluna ba\u011flanmas\u0131na olanak vermektedir.<\/p>\n
Muammer Kaddafi\u2019nin iktidardan d\u00fc\u015f\u00fc\u015f\u00fc Rusya\u2019n\u0131n Orta Do\u011fu ve Akdeniz\u2019deki \u00e7\u0131karlar\u0131na ink\u00e2r edilemez bir darbe indirmi\u015ftir. Bu durum Libya\u2019n\u0131n en az \u00fc\u00e7 y\u00f6nden Moskova i\u00e7in \u00f6nemli bir m\u00fcttefik oldu\u011funu da g\u00f6stermektedir: k\u00fcresel enerji pazar\u0131n\u0131n d\u00fczenlenmesine ili\u015fkin konularda bir partner, Rusya\u2019n\u0131n savunma sanayisi i\u00e7in bir m\u00fc\u015fteri ve bununla ili\u015fkili olarak, Muammer Kaddafi\u2019nin \u00f6nce Sovyetler ve daha sonra Rusya i\u00e7in MENA b\u00f6lgesinde ve Akdeniz\u2019de Rus \u00e7\u0131karlar\u0131 i\u00e7in gayri resmi bir el\u00e7i oldu\u011fu gibi, bir jeopolitik akt\u00f6r. Bug\u00fcn Kremlin muhtemelen d\u0131\u015f politika denkleminde Libya\u2019n\u0131n rol\u00fcn\u00fc restore etme aray\u0131\u015f\u0131ndad\u0131r, ancak bunu askeri anlamda yapmak Rusya\u2019n\u0131n uzun vadede \u00e7\u0131kar\u0131na hizmet etmemektedir.<\/p>\n
Rusya\u2019n\u0131n Libya krizine yakla\u015f\u0131m\u0131, \u00fclkenin Suriye ve Libya\u2019y\u0131- her ikisi de Arap Bahar\u0131\u2019na ba\u011flansa da- ayn\u0131 tepkileri gerektiren benzer ba\u011flamlarda g\u00f6rm\u00fcyor oldu\u011funu ortaya koymaktad\u0131r. Libya basit\u00e7e co\u011frafi uzakl\u0131\u011f\u0131 nedeniyle, Rusya i\u00e7in \u015f\u00fcphesiz Suriye\u2019den daha az \u00f6neme sahiptir. Bu Moskova\u2019n\u0131n Libya krizine alternatif \u00e7\u00f6z\u00fcmler bulma konusunda daha esnek oldu\u011fu ve \u00fclkeyi askeri bir konu\u015flanman\u0131n m\u00fcmk\u00fcn oldu\u011fu bir ba\u011flamda g\u00f6rmedi\u011fi anlam\u0131na da gelmektedir. Rusya bu a\u015fama itibariyle, Libya krizine y\u00f6nelik bir uzla\u015f\u0131 sa\u011flanmas\u0131n\u0131n Kaddafi tarz\u0131 bir rejimi yeniden olu\u015fturmaktan \u00e7ok, daha uzun \u00f6m\u00fcrl\u00fc bir \u00e7\u00f6z\u00fcm \u00fcretece\u011fi sonucuna ula\u015fm\u0131\u015f g\u00f6r\u00fcnmektedir.<\/p>\n
Referanslar<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n[1]<\/a> Rusya Federasyonu\u2019nun D\u0131\u015f Politika Kavram\u0131, Rusya Federasyonu Ba\u015fkan\u0131 Vladimir Putin taraf\u0131ndan 30 Kas\u0131m 2016\u2019da onaylanm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. http:\/\/www.mid.ru\/foreign_policy\/news\/-\/asset_publisher\/cKNonkJE02Bw\/content\/id\/2542248<\/a><\/p>\n[2]<\/a>Evgeni Zhirnov, I remember distinctly: The war lasted 52 minutes, Kommersant, 1 \u015eubat 2000, https:\/\/www.kommersant.ru\/doc\/16432<\/a><\/p>\n[3]<\/a>Vladimir Voronov, Gaddafi\u2019s Soviet School, Gazeta.Ru, 31 Mart 2011, https:\/\/www.gazeta.ru\/politics\/theme\/2011\/03\/31\/3571009.shtml<\/a><\/p>\n[4]<\/a> Federica Saini Fasanotti, Russia and Libya: A brief history of an on-again-off-again friendship, Brookings, 1 Eyl\u00fcl 2016, https:\/\/www.brookings.edu\/blog\/order-fromchaos\/2016\/09\/01\/russia-and-libya-a-briefhistory-of-an-on-again-off-again-friendship\/<\/a><\/p>\n[5]<\/a> Libyan oil firm aims to raise output to 1 million barrels a day next month, even as Qatar feud spills into Libya, CNBC, 13 Haziran 2017, http:\/\/www.cnbc.com\/2017\/06\/13\/libyan-oil-firm-aims-forbig-output-jump-even-as-qatar-feud-spills-intolibya.html<\/a><\/p>\n[6]<\/a> Igor Chubakha, What has Russia lost in Libya? Rosbalt, 6 Eyl\u00fcl 2011, http:\/\/www.rosbalt.ru\/business\/2011\/09\/06\/886817.html<\/a><\/p>\n[7]<\/a> The operational command of the permanent operational unit of the Russian Navy in the Mediterranean Sea was formed three years ago, Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, 22 Eyl\u00fcl 2016, http:\/\/function.mil.ru\/news_page\/country\/more.htm?id=12096837@egNews#txt<\/a><\/p>\n[8]<\/a> Tom Parfitt, Gaddafi offers Russia a naval base in Libya, The Guardian, 1 Kas\u0131m 2008, https:\/\/www.theguardian.com\/world\/2008\/nov\/01\/libyarussia-gadafy-united-states<\/a><\/p>\n[9]<\/a> Phil Stewart, Exclusive: Russia appears to deploy forces in Egypt, eyes on Libya role \u2013 sources, Reuters, 14 Mart 2017, http:\/\/www.reuters.com\/article\/us-usa-russia-libya-exclusiveidUSKBN16K2RY<\/a><\/p>\n[10]<\/a> Naval Doctrine of the Russian Federation, 26 Temmuz 2015, http:\/\/www.kremlin.ru\/events\/president\/news\/50060<\/a><\/p>\n[11]<\/a> Richard Connolly, Towards a Dual Fleet? The Maritime Doctrine of the Russian Federation and the Modernisation of Russian Naval Capabilities, Center for Security Studies at ETH Zurich, 12 Temmuz 2017, http:\/\/www.css.ethz.ch\/en\/services\/digitallibrary\/articles\/article.html\/e4f8e041-5770-47348f0c-4684781070d2\/pdf<\/a><\/p>\n[12]<\/a> Robert Cobb, Russia\u2019s Naval Policy in the Mediterranean and the War in Syria, EastWest Institute, 3 Nisan 2017, https:\/\/www.eastwest.ngo\/idea\/russia%E2%80%99s-naval-policymediterranean-and-war-syria<\/a><\/p>\n[13]<\/a> Even legal arms supplies to Libya may lead to weapons\u2019 spread around region \u2014 diplomat, TASS, \u015eubat 2015, http:\/\/tass.ru\/en\/world\/778588<\/a><\/p>\n[14]<\/a> Russian Ambassador: Commander-in-Chief of the Libyan army discussed delivery of arms in Moscow, RIA, 28 Haziran 2016, https:\/\/ria.ru\/defense_safety\/20160628\/1453677993.html<\/a><\/p>\n[15]<\/a> https:\/\/www.libyaherald.com\/2016\/12\/24\/west-reaffirms-support-for-presidency-councilas-the-sole-legitimate-government-of-libyasays-military-must-be-under-civilian-control\/<\/a><\/p>\n[16]<\/a> http:\/\/www.interfax.ru\/russia\/515781<\/a><\/p>\n[17]<\/a> Missy Ryan, A former CIA asset has become a U.S. headache in Libya, The Washington Post, 17 A\u011fustos 2016, https:\/\/www.washingtonpost.com\/world\/national-security\/a-former-cia-assethas-become-a-us-headache-in-libya\/2016\/08\/17\/a766e392-54c6-11e6-bbf5-957ad17b4385_story.html?utm_term=.0dbaedf05dda<\/a><\/p>\n <\/p>\n<\/div>
<\/div><\/div><\/div><\/div><\/div><\/div><\/div><\/div><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"Libya\u2019daki \u00e7at\u0131\u015fmalar\u0131n BM\u2019nin arabuluculu\u011fuyla \u00e7\u00f6z\u00fclmesinin zor oldu\u011funun ortaya \u00e7\u0131kmas\u0131yla, Rusya\u2019n\u0131n da i\u00e7inde bulundu\u011fu d\u0131\u015f g\u00fc\u00e7ler krizin \u00e7\u00f6z\u00fcm\u00fcne arac\u0131l\u0131k etme ve bu yolla kendi \u00e7\u0131kar\u0131na hizmet etme f\u0131rsat\u0131 yakalam\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. Libya tarihsel olarak Rusya\u2019n\u0131n Orta<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":50,"featured_media":9688,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_mo_disable_npp":"","ngg_post_thumbnail":0},"categories":[361],"tags":[],"asf_pub_issue":[10319],"asf_pub_region":[10321,10323,10327],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/research.sharqforum.org\/tr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/9686"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/research.sharqforum.org\/tr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/research.sharqforum.org\/tr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/research.sharqforum.org\/tr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/50"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/research.sharqforum.org\/tr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=9686"}],"version-history":[{"count":5,"href":"https:\/\/research.sharqforum.org\/tr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/9686\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":24920,"href":"https:\/\/research.sharqforum.org\/tr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/9686\/revisions\/24920"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/research.sharqforum.org\/tr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/9688"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/research.sharqforum.org\/tr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=9686"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/research.sharqforum.org\/tr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=9686"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/research.sharqforum.org\/tr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=9686"},{"taxonomy":"asf_pub_issue","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/research.sharqforum.org\/tr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/asf_pub_issue?post=9686"},{"taxonomy":"asf_pub_region","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/research.sharqforum.org\/tr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/asf_pub_region?post=9686"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}
\u00d6zet<\/span><\/strong>: Libya\u2019daki \u00e7at\u0131\u015fmalar\u0131n BM\u2019nin arabuluculu\u011fuyla \u00e7\u00f6z\u00fclmesinin zor oldu\u011funun ortaya \u00e7\u0131kmas\u0131yla, Rusya\u2019n\u0131n da i\u00e7inde bulundu\u011fu d\u0131\u015f g\u00fc\u00e7ler krizin \u00e7\u00f6z\u00fcm\u00fcne arac\u0131l\u0131k etme ve bu yolla kendi \u00e7\u0131kar\u0131na hizmet etme f\u0131rsat\u0131 yakalam\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. Libya tarihsel olarak Rusya\u2019n\u0131n Orta Do\u011fu ve Kuzey Afrika (MENA) b\u00f6lgesindeki sad\u0131k m\u00fcttefiklerinden biri olmu\u015f, enerjiden askeri alana kadar pek \u00e7ok alanda g\u00fc\u00e7l\u00fc ba\u011flar\u0131n olu\u015fmas\u0131n\u0131 sa\u011flayan bu ili\u015fki s\u00fcrmekte olan sava\u015fa ra\u011fmen b\u00fcy\u00fck \u00f6l\u00e7\u00fcde korunmu\u015ftur. Moskova, \u00e7at\u0131\u015fman\u0131n \u00e7\u00f6z\u00fcm\u00fcn\u00fc kolayla\u015ft\u0131rma f\u0131rsat\u0131yla, Kuzey Afrika\u2019da silah ticaretini art\u0131rmak, kazan\u00e7l\u0131 enerji ve in\u015faat s\u00f6zle\u015fmeleri ba\u011flamak ve ayn\u0131 zamanda NATO\u2019nun Akdeniz\u2019de artmakta olan etkisini kontrol alt\u0131na almak gibi bir dizi amac\u0131n\u0131 ger\u00e7ekle\u015ftirmeyi umut etmektedir. Ancak Rusya, Orta Do\u011fu\u2019da geleneksel olarak otoriter istikrar nosyonuna a\u011f\u0131rl\u0131k vermesine ra\u011fmen, Libya\u2019da siyasi yelpazede birden fazla se\u00e7ene\u011fe yat\u0131r\u0131m yaparak ba\u015far\u0131s\u0131zl\u0131k riskini en aza indirgemekte ve politikas\u0131ndan kayda de\u011fer bir bi\u00e7imde uzakla\u015fmaktad\u0131r. Rusya, mecburi bir hareket tarz\u0131 i\u00e7inde oldu\u011fu Suriye\u2019den farkl\u0131 olarak, Libya\u2019da daha geni\u015f bir hareket alan\u0131na sahiptir. Bu nedenle, yayg\u0131n bir bi\u00e7imde Vladimir Putin\u2019in Libya\u2019daki kilit adam\u0131 olarak an\u0131lan Halife Hafter Moskova taraf\u0131ndan krizin \u00e7\u00f6z\u00fcm\u00fc i\u00e7in gereken elzem unsurlardan sadece biri olarak de\u011ferlendirilmektedir<\/span>.<\/p>\n<\/div> Rusya\u2019n\u0131n Orta Do\u011fu\u2019ya d\u00f6n\u00fc\u015f\u00fc ve Moskova\u2019n\u0131n b\u00f6lgedeki hedeflerine ili\u015fkin tart\u0131\u015fmalar, \u00fclkenin ilgisinin Libya krizinin \u00e7\u00f6z\u00fcm\u00fcnde aktif rol oynamak \u00fczerine kaymaya ba\u015flamas\u0131yla yo\u011funluk kazanm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. Daha \u00f6nce \u00f6nemli \u00f6l\u00e7\u00fcde Suriye\u2019ye odaklanm\u0131\u015f olan Rusya\u2019n\u0131n b\u00f6lgeye y\u00f6nelik d\u0131\u015f politika g\u00fcndemi, askeri ve g\u00fcvenlik \u00e7evrelerinin y\u00f6nlendirici rol\u00fc nedeniyle, d\u0131\u015far\u0131dan bak\u0131ld\u0131\u011f\u0131nda hayli g\u00fcvenlik\u00e7i g\u00f6r\u00fcnmekteydi. Moskova\u2019n\u0131n Suriye\u2019de \u00e7ok say\u0131da hedefe sahip olmas\u0131na ra\u011fmen, g\u00fcvenlik konular\u0131ndaki a\u00e7\u0131k ilgisi, Rusya\u2019n\u0131n Orta Do\u011fu\u2019da askeri bir \u00fcs olu\u015fturma aray\u0131\u015f\u0131 i\u00e7inde oldu\u011fu endi\u015fesine yol a\u00e7maktad\u0131r. Bu ba\u011flamda Rusya\u2019n\u0131n 2016 y\u0131l\u0131nda ba\u015flayan ve General Hafter\u2019e yasad\u0131\u015f\u0131 silah tedariki sa\u011fland\u0131\u011f\u0131na ili\u015fkin dedikodular\u0131n e\u015flik etti\u011fi Libya hamlesi, b\u00f6lgedeki askeri varl\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 sa\u011flama almaya y\u00f6nelik bir ad\u0131m olarak yorumlanmaktad\u0131r. Ancak, Libya\u2019ya bir y\u0131ldan uzun zamand\u0131r s\u00fcrd\u00fcrd\u00fc\u011f\u00fc aktif m\u00fcdahalesinden sonra, Rusya\u2019n\u0131n rol\u00fcn\u00fc bir askeri m\u00fcdahale olarak adland\u0131rmak olduk\u00e7a g\u00fc\u00e7t\u00fcr. Rusya Libya\u2019da daha \u00e7ok g\u00fc\u00e7 g\u00f6sterisi ve diplomasinin dengeli bir kar\u0131\u015f\u0131m\u0131na ba\u015fvurmaktad\u0131r.<\/p>\n Rusya\u2019n\u0131n MENA b\u00f6lgesine y\u00f6nelik politikas\u0131 \u00f6nemli \u00f6l\u00e7\u00fcde Libya darbesinin etkisi ile tan\u0131mlanm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. \u00dclkenin son d\u00f6nem d\u0131\u015f politika stratejisinde b\u00f6lgenin \u00f6nemi ilk kez yans\u0131t\u0131lm\u0131\u015f ve buradaki istikrars\u0131zl\u0131\u011f\u0131n do\u011frudan Rusya\u2019y\u0131 etkileyece\u011fi a\u00e7\u0131k bir bi\u00e7imde ifade edilmi\u015ftir.[1]<\/a> Muammer Kaddafi\u2019nin iktidardan d\u00fc\u015fmesi, bir dizi ba\u015far\u0131l\u0131 Arap Bahar\u0131 protestosunu d\u0131\u015far\u0131dan kontrol edilen bir kampanya olarak yorumlayan ve bu kampanyan\u0131n nihai hedefinin Rusya olaca\u011f\u0131n\u0131 d\u00fc\u015f\u00fcnen Kremlin\u2019deki siyaset\u00e7ileri derinden etkilemi\u015ftir. Bu ba\u011flamda Libya, Moskova\u2019y\u0131 b\u00f6lgede daha g\u00fc\u00e7l\u00fc bir etki sahibi olma aray\u0131\u015f\u0131na ve b\u00fcy\u00fck \u00f6l\u00e7\u00fcde \u00f6nceden belirlenen Suriye krizine askeri m\u00fcdahale karar\u0131na sevk eden bir k\u0131v\u0131lc\u0131m g\u00f6revi g\u00f6rm\u00fc\u015ft\u00fcr.<\/p>\n Rusya Libya\u2019da Ne Kaybediyor?<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n Muammer Kaddafi\u2019nin Libya\u2019daki d\u00fc\u015f\u00fc\u015f\u00fc Rusya\u2019y\u0131 b\u00f6lgede \u015fimdiye kadar sahip oldu\u011fu en g\u00fc\u00e7l\u00fc m\u00fcttefiklerinden birinden yoksun b\u0131rakm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. Trablus k\u0131rk y\u0131l\u0131 a\u015fk\u0131n bir s\u00fcre, \u00f6nce Sovyetler Birli\u011fi ve daha sonra Rusya\u2019n\u0131n hem Orta Do\u011fu hem de Afrika\u2019da ve ayn\u0131 zamanda daha geni\u015f M\u00fcsl\u00fcman d\u00fcnyas\u0131nda etkili olmas\u0131n\u0131 sa\u011flayan anahtar kanallardan biri olmu\u015ftur. \u0130ki \u00fclke aras\u0131ndaki bu d\u00fczen Muammer Kaddafi\u2019nin 1969\u2019da iktidara gelmesiyle olduk\u00e7a ilgilidir. Sovyetler Birli\u011fi, Kral \u0130dris\u2019i deviren Kaddafi rejimini tan\u0131yan ilk \u00fclke olmu\u015ftur. Siyasi fikirleri bir arada y\u00fcr\u00fctme h\u00fcneri Kaddafi\u2019nin, taraflardan ikisine de yana\u015fmadan, ABD ve SSCB aras\u0131nda bir etki kutbu olmas\u0131n\u0131 sa\u011flam\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. Ancak, M\u0131s\u0131r\u2019da Amerika yanl\u0131s\u0131 Enver Sedat\u2019\u0131n g\u00fc\u00e7lenmesi ve \u0130srail\u2019e yak\u0131nla\u015fmas\u0131 Kaddafi\u2019yi sosyalist \u00e7izgiyi kabul etmeye ve sonu\u00e7 olarak Sovyetler Birli\u011fi ile daha yak\u0131n ili\u015fkiler kurmaya sevk etmi\u015ftir. ABD\u2019nin Orta Do\u011fu\u2019da artmakta olan etkisi, Kaddafi\u2019yi Moskova\u2019ya daha da yakla\u015fmaya ve a\u011f\u0131rl\u0131kl\u0131 olarak Sovyetler askeri deste\u011fine dayanmak yoluyla SSCB\u2019nin korumas\u0131n\u0131 istemeye itmi\u015ftir.<\/p>\n Sovyet-Libya ili\u015fkileri, SSCB\u2019nin g\u00fc\u00e7l\u00fc ittifaklar kurma ve s\u00fcrd\u00fcrmede en etkin ara\u00e7 oldu\u011funu d\u00fc\u015f\u00fcnmesinden dolay\u0131, askeri i\u015f birli\u011fi boyutuna odaklanm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. \u0130ki \u00fclke aras\u0131nda ilk silah anla\u015fmas\u0131 1974\u2019te imzalanm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r ve g\u00fcn\u00fcm\u00fczde Libya ordusu neredeyse tamamen Sovyet silahlar\u0131na dayanmaktad\u0131r. 1973\u2019den 1992\u2019ye ge\u00e7en 20 y\u0131lda, toplamda yakla\u015f\u0131k 11,000 Sovyet askeri Muammer Kaddafi h\u00fck\u00fcmetinin askeri dan\u0131\u015fman\u0131 olarak Libya\u2019ya konu\u015flanm\u0131\u015f ve baz\u0131 durumlarda do\u011frudan Libya ordusunun yan\u0131nda \u00e7at\u0131\u015fmada yer alm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r.[2]<\/a> Libya kadrosunun y\u00fczde 80 kadar\u0131n\u0131n gerekli deneyimi bulunmad\u0131\u011f\u0131 i\u00e7in, \u00fcst d\u00fczey askeri y\u00f6neticiler de d\u00e2hil olmak \u00fczere pek \u00e7ok askeri personel SSCB\u2019de e\u011fitilmi\u015ftir. Rusya, Libya ordusuna e\u011fitim sa\u011flama ve becerilerini art\u0131rma konusundaki Sovyet deneyimini 2004 y\u0131l\u0131ndan 2011 devrimine kadar pek \u00e7ok defa tekrarlam\u0131\u015ft\u0131r.[3]<\/a><\/p>\n Libya zengin petrol yataklar\u0131 nedeniyle, Rus silah ithalat\u0131 portfolyosunda Rus silahlar\u0131 i\u00e7in pe\u015fin para \u00f6deyebilecek birka\u00e7 \u00fclkeden biri olmu\u015ftur. Moskova 2008 y\u0131l\u0131nda Libya\u2019n\u0131n Sovyetler Birli\u011fi\u2019ne olan 4,5 milyar dolar borcunu silmi\u015f, bunun yerine 2011 itibariyle 5-10 milyar dolar aras\u0131nda tuttu\u011fu tahmin edilen bir dizi silah anla\u015fmas\u0131 yapm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r.[4]<\/a> Bu anla\u015fmalar Muammer Kaddafi iktidardan devrildikten sonra BM silah ambargosu gere\u011fi ask\u0131ya al\u0131nm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r ve Moskova \u00fclkenin bu s\u00f6zle\u015fmeleri yerine getirmesini beklemektedir. Rusya Trablus\u2019ta gelecekte kurulacak h\u00fck\u00fcmetin siyasi y\u00f6neliminden ba\u011f\u0131ms\u0131z olarak, Libya\u2019n\u0131n yeni silahlar almak ve tarihsel olarak Sovyet silahlar\u0131na dayanm\u0131\u015f oldu\u011fu i\u00e7in eski olanlar\u0131 yenilemek \u00fczere Moskova\u2019ya d\u00f6nece\u011fine g\u00fc\u00e7l\u00fc bir \u015fekilde inanmaktad\u0131r. Bu ba\u011flamda Rusya h\u00fck\u00fcmeti i\u00e7in \u00f6nemli olan \u00f6ncelikle Libya\u2019da istikrarl\u0131 bir h\u00fck\u00fcmet oldu\u011fundan emin olmak, ikinci olarak da bu h\u00fck\u00fcmetin savunma masraflar\u0131na di\u011fer konulara nazaran \u00f6ncelik vermesidir.<\/p>\n Rusya\u2019n\u0131n Libya\u2019da \u00e7\u0131karlar\u0131n\u0131n tehdit alt\u0131nda oldu\u011funu g\u00f6rd\u00fc\u011f\u00fc alan kazan\u00e7l\u0131 ekonomik sekt\u00f6rd\u00fcr. Hafter\u2019in Libya Ulusal Ordusu kazan\u0131mlar\u0131n\u0131n bir sonucu olarak, \u00fclkede petrol \u00fcretimi 2016 Eyl\u00fcl ay\u0131nda g\u00fcnde 300,000 varilden 2017 Ocak ay\u0131nda g\u00fcnde 700,000 varilin \u00fczerine y\u00fckselmi\u015f ve \u00fcretimin bu y\u0131l\u0131n sonlar\u0131na do\u011fru g\u00fcnde 1 milyon varile \u00e7\u0131kmas\u0131 \u00f6ng\u00f6r\u00fclmektedir.[5]<\/a> Rusya\u2019n\u0131n petrol devi Rosneft 2017 \u015eubat\u2019\u0131nda Libya Ulusal Petrol \u015eirketi (NOC) ile bir yat\u0131r\u0131m ve ham petrol al\u0131m anla\u015fmas\u0131 imzalam\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. Bu anla\u015fma, s\u00fcregelen krize ra\u011fmen Rusya\u2019n\u0131n Libya\u2019da i\u015f yapma ilgisinin yeniden canland\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131n g\u00f6stermektedir. Rosneft \u00fclkeye d\u00f6nmek i\u00e7in giri\u015fimde bulunan pek \u00e7ok \u015firketten sadece biridir ancak bu anla\u015fma ile g\u00f6ze \u00e7arpan bir ba\u015far\u0131 elde etmi\u015ftir. \u015eu aralar Libya\u2019n\u0131n petrol kaynaklar\u0131n\u0131n \u00f6nemli bir k\u0131sm\u0131n\u0131 kontrol\u00fcnde tutmakta olan Halife Hafter, Rosneft\u2019in \u00fclkeye d\u00f6n\u00fc\u015f\u00fcn\u00fc tek ba\u015f\u0131na kolayla\u015ft\u0131rm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. Rusya i\u015f d\u00fcnyas\u0131 Bat\u0131l\u0131 emsallerinin sat\u0131n almada sa\u011flad\u0131\u011f\u0131 yat\u0131r\u0131m ve teknoloji imk\u00e2nlar\u0131n\u0131 kar\u015f\u0131layamayaca\u011f\u0131 i\u00e7in, bunun gibi \u00fcst d\u00fczey bir destek olmasa Libya\u2019da \u00f6ncelikli muamele kazanmak i\u00e7in \u00e7ok m\u00fccadele ederdi. Rusya H\u00fck\u00fcmeti Libyal\u0131 ortaklar\u0131 ile ili\u015fkiler kurarak, Kaddafi h\u00fck\u00fcmeti zaman\u0131nda imzalam\u0131\u015f oldu\u011fu anla\u015fmalarda kaybetmi\u015f oldu\u011fu k\u00e2r\u0131 (in\u015faatta 150 milyon dolar, petrol ve gaz sanayiinde 3,5 milyar dolar kadar)[6]<\/a> telafi etmek ve uzun vadede mali geri kazan\u0131m sa\u011flamak i\u00e7in projelerine kald\u0131\u011f\u0131 yerden devam etmeye \u00f6ncelik vermektedir.<\/p>\n Rusya\u2019n\u0131n Libya\u2019daki proaktif rol\u00fc g\u00fcney ve do\u011fu Akdeniz\u2019de daha b\u00fcy\u00fck \u00f6l\u00e7ekli mevcudiyeti ba\u011flam\u0131nda de\u011ferlendirilmelidir. Suriye \u00e7at\u0131\u015fmas\u0131na kat\u0131lmas\u0131 ve Sovyet d\u00f6nemi Tartus \u00fcss\u00fcn\u00fc tam kapasite i\u015fleyen bir deniz \u00fcss\u00fcne \u00e7evirme karar\u0131n\u0131n yan\u0131nda K\u0131r\u0131m\u2019da bulunan Karadeniz donanmas\u0131na yapt\u0131\u011f\u0131 yat\u0131r\u0131m\u0131 artt\u0131rmas\u0131, Rusya\u2019n\u0131n b\u00f6lgede b\u00fcy\u00fcyen h\u0131rslar\u0131 oldu\u011funu g\u00f6stermektedir. SSCB\u2019nin Akdeniz\u2019de kendine yer edinme \u00e7abalar\u0131 5. Akdeniz Sava\u015f Gemisi Filosunun ortaya \u00e7\u0131kmas\u0131n\u0131 sa\u011flam\u0131\u015f ancak bu giri\u015fim 1992 y\u0131l\u0131nda b\u00f6lgede daimi deniz \u00fcss\u00fcn\u00fcn ve etkili ikmal tesislerinin olmamas\u0131 nedeniyle ba\u015far\u0131s\u0131z olmu\u015ftur. 2013 y\u0131l\u0131nda Rus h\u00fck\u00fcmeti, NATO\u2019nun b\u00f6lgedeki yay\u0131lma kapasitesini kar\u015f\u0131lamak \u00fczere filoyu yeniden toplama karar\u0131 vermi\u015ftir.[7]<\/a> Ancak Suriye\u2019nin Tartus \u00fcss\u00fc Rus deniz donanmas\u0131n\u0131 Akdeniz\u2019de etkili bir g\u00fcce d\u00f6n\u00fc\u015ft\u00fcrmek i\u00e7in yeterli de\u011fildir. B\u00f6lgede esnek operasyonlar\u0131 s\u00fcrd\u00fcrmek i\u00e7in Rus Donanmas\u0131\u2019n\u0131n Akdeniz ve Kuzey Afrika boyunca hem Libya hem de M\u0131s\u0131r limanlar\u0131na eri\u015fimine imk\u00e2n sa\u011flayan \u00fcsler kurmas\u0131 gereklidir.<\/p>\n Muammer Kaddafi 2008 y\u0131l\u0131nda, Moskova\u2019ya Sovyetler sonras\u0131 d\u00f6nemde yapt\u0131\u011f\u0131 ilk ziyaretinde, Rusya\u2019ya ilk kez \u00fclkesinde daimi deniz \u00fcss\u00fc kurmay\u0131 teklif etmi\u015ftir.[8]<\/a> Sab\u0131k Libya lideri teklifinin kar\u015f\u0131l\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 hi\u00e7bir zaman ger\u00e7ekle\u015ftirmemi\u015fse de, Rusya\u2019n\u0131n Libya krizindeki aktif diplomatik rol\u00fc hem M\u0131s\u0131r hem de Libya\u2019daki askerleri i\u00e7in, deniz \u00fcss\u00fc de d\u00e2hil olmak \u00fczere tesislere eri\u015fimi hususunda yeni tart\u0131\u015fmalara yol a\u00e7m\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. Rusya\u2019n\u0131n tek u\u00e7ak gemisi Amiral Kuznetsov\u2019un Libya liman\u0131na yana\u015fmak istemesi ve Suriye k\u0131y\u0131lar\u0131nda aylar s\u00fcren g\u00f6revinden sonra Ocak 2017\u2019de General Hafter\u2019i a\u011f\u0131rlamas\u0131 tesad\u00fcf de\u011fildir. Kuznetsov, Akdeniz filosunun ba\u015f\u0131ndaki ki\u015fidir ve \u00fclkenin Akdeniz\u2019de artmakta olan emellerinin bir sembol\u00fcd\u00fcr. Rus h\u00fck\u00fcmetinin Libya s\u0131n\u0131r\u0131 yak\u0131nlar\u0131nda bulunan, M\u0131s\u0131r\u2019\u0131n bat\u0131s\u0131ndaki Sidi Barrani \u00fcss\u00fcne bir \u00f6zel kuvvetler birli\u011fi yollam\u0131\u015f oldu\u011fu da s\u00f6ylenmektedir.[9]<\/a> Sidi Barrani deniz \u00fcss\u00fc 1972\u2019ye kadar Sovyet sava\u015f gemilerine ev sahipli\u011fi yapm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. Bu da Rusya\u2019n\u0131n Kuzey Afrika\u2019da Sovyetlerin kullanm\u0131\u015f oldu\u011fu \u00fcslere geri d\u00f6nme aray\u0131\u015f\u0131nda oldu\u011funa dair spek\u00fclasyonlar\u0131n t\u00fcm\u00fcyle as\u0131ls\u0131z olmad\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 g\u00f6stermektedir.<\/p>\n Rusya\u2019n\u0131n b\u00f6lgedeki stratejisine odaklanmas\u0131n\u0131n yan\u0131 s\u0131ra Akdeniz\u2019e d\u00f6nme amac\u0131 tamam\u0131yla a\u00e7\u0131k de\u011fildir. Ancak Rusya\u2019n\u0131n deniz doktrini Moskova\u2019n\u0131n orada tam olarak neye ula\u015fmak istedi\u011fine ili\u015fkin fikir vermektedir. Doktrin,[10]<\/a> di\u011fer \u015feylerin yan\u0131 s\u0131ra, Rusya\u2019n\u0131n Akdeniz\u2019de kal\u0131c\u0131 olarak askeri-donanma varl\u0131\u011f\u0131 g\u00f6sterme aray\u0131\u015f\u0131nda oldu\u011funu ifade etmekte ve Rus donanmas\u0131n\u0131n orada s\u00fcrekli bulunmas\u0131n\u0131n ko\u015fullar\u0131n\u0131 yaratma ihtiyac\u0131n\u0131 vurgulamaktad\u0131r. \u00d6te yandan Akdeniz, \u00f6zellikle NATO\u2019nun orada artmakta olan varl\u0131\u011f\u0131 dikkate al\u0131nd\u0131\u011f\u0131nda, Moskova\u2019da \u00fclkenin g\u00fcvenli\u011fine y\u00f6nelik bir tehdit kayna\u011f\u0131 olarak g\u00f6r\u00fclmektedir.[11]<\/a> Bu ba\u011flamda Suriye\u2019deki \u00fcsler ve Libya ve M\u0131s\u0131r\u2019da gelecekte kurulacak olan tesisler, gelecekte ittifak\u0131n deniz varl\u0131\u011f\u0131ndan kaynaklanan ve Rusya\u2019n\u0131n Karadeniz donanmas\u0131na y\u00f6nelecek olas\u0131 tehditlere kar\u015f\u0131 ilk savunma hatt\u0131 olarak g\u00f6r\u00fclmektedir.[12]<\/a><\/p>\n Rusya\u2019n\u0131n Libya\u2019daki Se\u00e7enekleri<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n Rusya, 2015 y\u0131l\u0131 Aral\u0131k ay\u0131nda BM G\u00fcvenlik Konseyi\u2019nde Libya Siyasi Anla\u015fmas\u0131\u2019na destek vermesine ra\u011fmen, 2016 y\u0131l\u0131 Mart ay\u0131nda BM destekli h\u00fck\u00fcmetin Trablus\u2019a varmas\u0131ndan hemen sonra Libya \u00e7at\u0131\u015fmas\u0131nda yeni h\u00fck\u00fcmeti y\u0131kmaya \u00e7al\u0131\u015fan g\u00fc\u00e7leri aktif bir bi\u00e7imde desteklemeye ba\u015flad\u0131. Moskova\u2019n\u0131n Libya\u2019ya kar\u015f\u0131 neden b\u00f6yle tutars\u0131z bir stratejide karar k\u0131ld\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 a\u00e7\u0131klamak g\u00fc\u00e7, ancak yazar\u0131n Rusya politikac\u0131lar\u0131 ile yapt\u0131\u011f\u0131 tart\u0131\u015fmalar Kremlin\u2019in muhtemelen ilk ba\u015flarda, Libya\u2019daki krizin \u00e7\u00f6z\u00fcm\u00fcne \u00f6ncelik vermedi\u011fini ortaya \u00e7\u0131karmaktad\u0131r. Bu durum 2016 yaz\u0131na kadar Rusya H\u00fck\u00fcmeti\u2019nin, Trablus\u2019ta yeni g\u00f6reve gelmi\u015f h\u00fck\u00fcmet, Ulusal Kongre H\u00fck\u00fcmeti ya da Temsilciler Evi olsun, Libya \u00e7at\u0131\u015fmas\u0131ndaki herhangi bir tarafla aktif bir bi\u00e7imde irtibat\u0131n\u0131 s\u00fcrd\u00fcrmemi\u015f olmas\u0131yla kan\u0131tlanmaktad\u0131r.<\/p>\n Moskova 2016 Haziran ay\u0131na kadar, \u015fimdi pek \u00e7ok ki\u015fi taraf\u0131ndan Rusya\u2019n\u0131n Libya\u2019daki kilit adam\u0131 olarak g\u00f6r\u00fclen General Hafter\u2019i a\u011f\u0131rlamam\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. Rusya\u2019da kar\u015f\u0131lanma bi\u00e7imi Hafter gibi ihtilafl\u0131 ve ayr\u0131l\u0131k\u00e7\u0131 bir fig\u00fcr i\u00e7in al\u0131\u015f\u0131lmad\u0131k bi\u00e7imde y\u00fcksek profilli olmu\u015ftur. Hafter D\u0131\u015f \u0130\u015fleri Bakan\u0131 ve Savunma Bakan\u0131 taraf\u0131ndan ve en \u00f6nemlisi cumhurba\u015fkan\u0131na yak\u0131n, kilit bir karar alma organ\u0131 olan G\u00fcvenlik Konseyi Sekreteri Nikolai Patrushev taraf\u0131ndan kabul edilmi\u015ftir. Moskova\u2019n\u0131n Libya\u2019daki \u00e7abalar\u0131na yo\u011funla\u015fmaya karar verme nedenleri, muhtemelen BM destekli h\u00fck\u00fcmetin siyasal mevcudiyetini sa\u011flamla\u015ft\u0131rmada ba\u015far\u0131s\u0131z olmas\u0131, ter\u00f6rist gruplar\u0131n\u0131n ortaya \u00e7\u0131kmas\u0131; \u00fclkenin OPEC \u00fcyeli\u011fini, s\u00f6z konusu d\u00f6nemde petrol \u00fcretimi kesintisi konusundaki g\u00f6r\u00fc\u015fmelerde grup g\u00f6r\u00fc\u015f\u00fcn\u00fc etkilemek \u00fczere kullanma iste\u011finden kaynaklanmas\u0131 idi.<\/p>\n Rusya\u2019n\u0131n Libya\u2019ya y\u00f6nelik politikas\u0131nda ba\u015flang\u0131\u00e7taki tutars\u0131zl\u0131k, ilk \u00f6nce Suriye\u2019de test edilen bu politikay\u0131 ve g\u00fcvenlikle\u015ftirilmi\u015f oldu\u011fu anlam\u0131na gelen strateji modelini uygulama giri\u015fimleriyle a\u00e7\u0131\u011fa \u00e7\u0131km\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. Rusya\u2019n\u0131n 2011\u2019den bu yana BM silah ambargosu alt\u0131nda olan \u00fclkeye silah tedarik etme duru\u015fu bunun bir kan\u0131t\u0131d\u0131r. Rusya 2015 gibi erken bir zamanda, Libya resmi h\u00fck\u00fcmetine \u00fclkedeki ter\u00f6rle m\u00fccadeleye yard\u0131m i\u00e7in silah teslimleri yapma konusuna kafa yormu\u015ftur. BM Rusya delegasyonu ba\u015fkan\u0131 Vladimir Churkin, 2015 y\u0131l\u0131 \u015eubat ay\u0131nda gazetecilere, Moskova\u2019n\u0131n Tobruk\u2019taki resmi h\u00fck\u00fcmeti silahla desteklemeyi d\u00fc\u015f\u00fcnd\u00fc\u011f\u00fcn\u00fc[13]<\/a> ve gerekirse silahlar\u0131n deniz yoluyla cihat\u00e7\u0131lara ula\u015fmas\u0131n\u0131 \u00f6nlemek i\u00e7in Libya\u2019da bir deniz ablukas\u0131n\u0131n uygulanmas\u0131 gerekti\u011fini dile getirmi\u015ftir. Hafter\u2019in 2016 Haziran ay\u0131nda Moskova\u2019ya ger\u00e7ekle\u015ftirdi\u011fi ilk ziyarette Libya\u2019daki Rusya El\u00e7isi Ivan Molotkov, taraflar\u0131n Rus silahlar\u0131n\u0131n Tobruk\u2019taki h\u00fck\u00fcmete olas\u0131 teslimat\u0131n\u0131 tart\u0131\u015fm\u0131\u015f olduklar\u0131n\u0131 a\u00e7\u0131klam\u0131\u015ft\u0131r.[14]<\/a> Kremlin\u2019in Hafter\u2019e ve onun has\u0131mlar\u0131na yollam\u0131\u015f oldu\u011fu bu i\u015faretler General\u2019e cesaret vermi\u015f ve t\u00fcm Libya\u2019y\u0131 g\u00fc\u00e7 kullanarak yeniden ele ge\u00e7irme iste\u011fini dile getiremeye te\u015fvik etmi\u015ftir.[15]<\/a> Ancak daha sonra Moskova bu konuda \u00e7ok daha incelikli bir duru\u015f benimseyerek, El\u00e7i Molotov\u2019a g\u00f6re, General Hafter\u2019e \u201cG\u00fcvenlik Konseyi\u2019nin ambargoyu kald\u0131rmad\u0131\u011f\u0131 ya da en az\u0131ndan hafifletmedi\u011fi m\u00fcddet\u00e7e Rus silahlar\u0131n\u0131n Libya\u2019ya teslimi konusunda konu\u015fulamayaca\u011f\u0131n\u0131\u201d a\u00e7\u0131k\u00e7a s\u00f6ylemi\u015ftir.[16]<\/a><\/p>\n Rusya\u2019n\u0131n Libya ba\u011flam\u0131ndaki anlay\u0131\u015f\u0131, tart\u0131\u015fmaya a\u00e7\u0131k bir \u015fekilde, Libyal\u0131 payda\u015flarla g\u00f6r\u00fc\u015fmelere ba\u015flad\u0131ktan sonra \u00f6nemli \u00f6l\u00e7\u00fcde daha incelikli olmu\u015ftur. Sonu\u00e7 olarak, \u015fu an Moskova\u2019n\u0131n General Hafter\u2019i bu krizi \u00e7\u00f6zmeye yard\u0131m edebilecek tek olas\u0131 partner olarak g\u00f6rd\u00fc\u011f\u00fcn\u00fc s\u00f6ylemek hatal\u0131 olacakt\u0131r. \u0130ki taraf, kar\u015f\u0131l\u0131kl\u0131 \u00e7\u0131kar sa\u011flanan anla\u015fmal\u0131 bir birliktelikten faydalanmaktad\u0131r. Kaddafi \u00f6zentisi, kendisini Avrupa g\u00fc\u00e7lerinin g\u00f6z\u00fcnde Trablus h\u00fck\u00fcmetine g\u00fc\u00e7l\u00fc bir alternatif olarak konumlamas\u0131na yard\u0131mc\u0131 olan, Moskova\u2019n\u0131n sa\u011flad\u0131\u011f\u0131 uluslararas\u0131 diplomatik k\u0131l\u0131ftan faydalanmaktad\u0131r. Rusya ise Hafter ile ortakl\u0131k yaparak, bat\u0131l\u0131 emsallerine kar\u015f\u0131 ba\u015fka bir koz elde etmek i\u00e7in Akdeniz\u2019deki etkisini art\u0131rmaktan, Libya konusunda i\u015f birli\u011fi \u00fczerinden M\u0131s\u0131r\u2019la yak\u0131n ili\u015fkiler kurmaya kadar bir dizi hedefini yerine getirmektedir.<\/p>\n Soru, Rusya\u2019n\u0131n Hafter ile g\u00fc\u00e7l\u00fc bir ili\u015fki kurmay\u0131 ama\u00e7larken, Moskova\u2019n\u0131n bu ortakl\u0131\u011fa ne kadar sad\u0131k oldu\u011fu ve General\u2019in yeni bir Kaddafi olarak ortaya \u00e7\u0131kmas\u0131n\u0131 sa\u011flamaya ne \u00f6l\u00e7\u00fcde haz\u0131r oldu\u011fudur. Her ne olursa olsun, Hafter Muammer Kaddafi ile aralar\u0131ndaki anla\u015fmazl\u0131k nedeniyle y\u0131llarca Birle\u015fik Devletler\u2019de ikamet etmi\u015ftir. Bu s\u00fcre zarf\u0131nda Amerika istihbarat\u0131yla birlikte \u00e7al\u0131\u015fm\u0131\u015f oldu\u011fu da iddia edilmektedir[17]<\/a> ve bu da onu Moskova i\u00e7in istenmeyen bir partner yapmaktad\u0131r. Hafter\u2019e net bir deste\u011fe dair yanl\u0131\u015f bir izlenim vererek ba\u015flang\u0131\u00e7ta hata yapan Rusya h\u00fck\u00fcmeti Libya krizine m\u00fcdahalesine ili\u015fkin tart\u0131\u015fmalardan, ulusal mutabakat ihtiyac\u0131 hakk\u0131nda genel a\u00e7\u0131klamalara ba\u015fvurarak dikkate de\u011fer bir bi\u00e7imde ka\u00e7\u0131nmaktad\u0131r. Asl\u0131nda BM\u2019nin dayatt\u0131\u011f\u0131 silah ambargosu silahlar\u0131n Hafter\u2019e teslim edilmemesi iyi bir bahane sunarak, b\u00f6lgede ba\u015fka bir batakl\u0131\u011f\u0131n i\u00e7ine \u00e7ekilme riskinden ka\u00e7\u0131nmay\u0131 sa\u011fl\u0131yor. Kremlin, General\u2019in \u00f6nemli \u00f6l\u00e7\u00fcde Bat\u0131\u2019ya y\u00f6nelik askeri meydan okumas\u0131n\u0131 alenen desteklemesine ra\u011fmen, Hafter\u2019in bir sava\u015f a\u011fas\u0131ndan bir siyaset\u00e7iye d\u00f6n\u00fc\u015f\u00fcm\u00fcn\u00fc g\u00f6zetmektedir. Bu durum Rusya\u2019n\u0131n Libya\u2019ya bak\u0131\u015f\u0131nda ve \u00e7at\u0131\u015fma \u00e7\u00f6z\u00fcm\u00fc y\u00f6nteminde de\u011fi\u015fime i\u015faret etmektedir.<\/p>\n Libya Siyasi Anla\u015fmas\u0131 esasen General Hafter\u2019i marjinalize etmektedir. Temelde planlad\u0131\u011f\u0131 sert g\u00fc\u00e7le, onu Libya\u2019da gelecekteki bir uzla\u015f\u0131n\u0131n d\u0131\u015f\u0131nda b\u0131rakan anla\u015fman\u0131n kapsam\u0131 aras\u0131nda bir kopukluk vard\u0131r. \u015e\u00fcphesiz Rusya h\u00fck\u00fcmeti Hafter i\u00e7in \u00f6nemli bir rol tahayy\u00fcl etmektedir ancak g\u00fc\u00e7l\u00fc bir otoriter liderin dahi toplumu yeniden bir araya getirme becerisi olmad\u0131\u011f\u0131 konusunda Suriye\u2019de dersini alm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. Libya\u2019daki karma\u015f\u0131k ba\u011flamda bu, uzun vadede yeni sosyal s\u00f6zle\u015fmenin kapsay\u0131c\u0131 ve s\u00fcrd\u00fcr\u00fclebilir g\u00f6r\u00fcnmesinin gerekli oldu\u011fu anlam\u0131na gelmektedir. \u00dclkede, muhtemelen en zay\u0131f\u0131 BM destekli Ba\u015fkanl\u0131k Konseyi Ba\u015fkan\u0131 Fayiz es-Serrac olan birka\u00e7 a\u011f\u0131rl\u0131k merkezinin ortaya \u00e7\u0131kmas\u0131yla, Moskova Libya krizinde karar merci gibi davranarak, ister askeri bir g\u00fc\u00e7 taraf\u0131ndan isterse uluslararas\u0131 bir yetki ile desteklensin, t\u00fcm taraflar\u0131 m\u00fczakere masas\u0131nda bir araya getirme hedefi ile birden fazla se\u00e7ene\u011fe yat\u0131r\u0131m yaparak ba\u015far\u0131s\u0131zl\u0131k riskini azaltmay\u0131 tercih etmi\u015ftir.<\/p>\n Rusya h\u00fck\u00fcmeti, Trablus h\u00fck\u00fcmeti ve Misrata Tugaylar\u0131 ile Genel Ulusal Kongre (GUK) gibi di\u011fer payda\u015flarla ileti\u015fime ge\u00e7me \u00e7abalar\u0131n\u0131 yo\u011funla\u015ft\u0131rm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. 2016 y\u0131l\u0131nda Moskova, Libya\u2019daki eski ba\u011flar\u0131 yeniden kurma ve yeni ba\u011flant\u0131lar i\u00e7in bir ileti\u015fim a\u011f\u0131 geli\u015ftirme g\u00f6revi verilen, aralar\u0131nda \u00c7e\u00e7enlerin dahi bulundu\u011fu diplomatlar\u0131 ve parlamento \u00fcyelerini i\u00e7eren, \u201cLibya\u2019da Uzla\u015f\u0131 i\u00e7in \u0130leti\u015fim Grubu\u201d olarak isimlendirilen bakanl\u0131klar aras\u0131 bir kurum kurmu\u015ftur. Bu olu\u015fum, Rusyal\u0131 yetkililer ile es-Serrac H\u00fck\u00fcmeti ve ayr\u0131ca askeri gruplardan temsilciler aras\u0131nda yap\u0131lan yo\u011fun g\u00f6r\u00fc\u015fmelere neden olmu\u015ftur. Moskova d\u00fcnya g\u00fc\u00e7lerinden birka\u00e7\u0131n\u0131n Fayiz es-Serrac\u2019\u0131 \u00fclkeyi birle\u015ftirecek bir lider olarak g\u00f6rmekte oldu\u011funun fark\u0131ndad\u0131r. Rusya, Libya Siyasi Anla\u015fmas\u0131\u2019n\u0131n daha geni\u015f bir siyasi akt\u00f6rler yelpazesini i\u00e7ine alacak \u015fekilde d\u00fczenlenmedi\u011fi takdirde 2017 y\u0131l\u0131 sonlar\u0131nda son bulaca\u011f\u0131 i\u00e7in, es-Serrac\u2019\u0131 Libya\u2019da kendi siyasi tasar\u0131m\u0131n\u0131n bir par\u00e7as\u0131 yapma f\u0131rsat\u0131n\u0131 yakalamak i\u00e7in imk\u00e2n g\u00f6zetmekte. Bu strateji ayn\u0131 zamanda Rusya\u2019n\u0131n idaresi zor olan Hafter\u2019e daha fazla bask\u0131 yapmas\u0131na ve kendisine verilecek deste\u011fin ge\u00e7i\u015f g\u00f6r\u00fc\u015fmelerine kat\u0131lmas\u0131 ko\u015fuluna ba\u011flanmas\u0131na olanak vermektedir.<\/p>\n Muammer Kaddafi\u2019nin iktidardan d\u00fc\u015f\u00fc\u015f\u00fc Rusya\u2019n\u0131n Orta Do\u011fu ve Akdeniz\u2019deki \u00e7\u0131karlar\u0131na ink\u00e2r edilemez bir darbe indirmi\u015ftir. Bu durum Libya\u2019n\u0131n en az \u00fc\u00e7 y\u00f6nden Moskova i\u00e7in \u00f6nemli bir m\u00fcttefik oldu\u011funu da g\u00f6stermektedir: k\u00fcresel enerji pazar\u0131n\u0131n d\u00fczenlenmesine ili\u015fkin konularda bir partner, Rusya\u2019n\u0131n savunma sanayisi i\u00e7in bir m\u00fc\u015fteri ve bununla ili\u015fkili olarak, Muammer Kaddafi\u2019nin \u00f6nce Sovyetler ve daha sonra Rusya i\u00e7in MENA b\u00f6lgesinde ve Akdeniz\u2019de Rus \u00e7\u0131karlar\u0131 i\u00e7in gayri resmi bir el\u00e7i oldu\u011fu gibi, bir jeopolitik akt\u00f6r. Bug\u00fcn Kremlin muhtemelen d\u0131\u015f politika denkleminde Libya\u2019n\u0131n rol\u00fcn\u00fc restore etme aray\u0131\u015f\u0131ndad\u0131r, ancak bunu askeri anlamda yapmak Rusya\u2019n\u0131n uzun vadede \u00e7\u0131kar\u0131na hizmet etmemektedir.<\/p>\n Rusya\u2019n\u0131n Libya krizine yakla\u015f\u0131m\u0131, \u00fclkenin Suriye ve Libya\u2019y\u0131- her ikisi de Arap Bahar\u0131\u2019na ba\u011flansa da- ayn\u0131 tepkileri gerektiren benzer ba\u011flamlarda g\u00f6rm\u00fcyor oldu\u011funu ortaya koymaktad\u0131r. Libya basit\u00e7e co\u011frafi uzakl\u0131\u011f\u0131 nedeniyle, Rusya i\u00e7in \u015f\u00fcphesiz Suriye\u2019den daha az \u00f6neme sahiptir. Bu Moskova\u2019n\u0131n Libya krizine alternatif \u00e7\u00f6z\u00fcmler bulma konusunda daha esnek oldu\u011fu ve \u00fclkeyi askeri bir konu\u015flanman\u0131n m\u00fcmk\u00fcn oldu\u011fu bir ba\u011flamda g\u00f6rmedi\u011fi anlam\u0131na da gelmektedir. Rusya bu a\u015fama itibariyle, Libya krizine y\u00f6nelik bir uzla\u015f\u0131 sa\u011flanmas\u0131n\u0131n Kaddafi tarz\u0131 bir rejimi yeniden olu\u015fturmaktan \u00e7ok, daha uzun \u00f6m\u00fcrl\u00fc bir \u00e7\u00f6z\u00fcm \u00fcretece\u011fi sonucuna ula\u015fm\u0131\u015f g\u00f6r\u00fcnmektedir.<\/p>\n Referanslar<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n [1]<\/a> Rusya Federasyonu\u2019nun D\u0131\u015f Politika Kavram\u0131, Rusya Federasyonu Ba\u015fkan\u0131 Vladimir Putin taraf\u0131ndan 30 Kas\u0131m 2016\u2019da onaylanm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. http:\/\/www.mid.ru\/foreign_policy\/news\/-\/asset_publisher\/cKNonkJE02Bw\/content\/id\/2542248<\/a><\/p>\n [2]<\/a>Evgeni Zhirnov, I remember distinctly: The war lasted 52 minutes, Kommersant, 1 \u015eubat 2000, https:\/\/www.kommersant.ru\/doc\/16432<\/a><\/p>\n [3]<\/a>Vladimir Voronov, Gaddafi\u2019s Soviet School, Gazeta.Ru, 31 Mart 2011, https:\/\/www.gazeta.ru\/politics\/theme\/2011\/03\/31\/3571009.shtml<\/a><\/p>\n [4]<\/a> Federica Saini Fasanotti, Russia and Libya: A brief history of an on-again-off-again friendship, Brookings, 1 Eyl\u00fcl 2016, https:\/\/www.brookings.edu\/blog\/order-fromchaos\/2016\/09\/01\/russia-and-libya-a-briefhistory-of-an-on-again-off-again-friendship\/<\/a><\/p>\n [5]<\/a> Libyan oil firm aims to raise output to 1 million barrels a day next month, even as Qatar feud spills into Libya, CNBC, 13 Haziran 2017, http:\/\/www.cnbc.com\/2017\/06\/13\/libyan-oil-firm-aims-forbig-output-jump-even-as-qatar-feud-spills-intolibya.html<\/a><\/p>\n [6]<\/a> Igor Chubakha, What has Russia lost in Libya? Rosbalt, 6 Eyl\u00fcl 2011, http:\/\/www.rosbalt.ru\/business\/2011\/09\/06\/886817.html<\/a><\/p>\n [7]<\/a> The operational command of the permanent operational unit of the Russian Navy in the Mediterranean Sea was formed three years ago, Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, 22 Eyl\u00fcl 2016, http:\/\/function.mil.ru\/news_page\/country\/more.htm?id=12096837@egNews#txt<\/a><\/p>\n [8]<\/a> Tom Parfitt, Gaddafi offers Russia a naval base in Libya, The Guardian, 1 Kas\u0131m 2008, https:\/\/www.theguardian.com\/world\/2008\/nov\/01\/libyarussia-gadafy-united-states<\/a><\/p>\n [9]<\/a> Phil Stewart, Exclusive: Russia appears to deploy forces in Egypt, eyes on Libya role \u2013 sources, Reuters, 14 Mart 2017, http:\/\/www.reuters.com\/article\/us-usa-russia-libya-exclusiveidUSKBN16K2RY<\/a><\/p>\n [10]<\/a> Naval Doctrine of the Russian Federation, 26 Temmuz 2015, http:\/\/www.kremlin.ru\/events\/president\/news\/50060<\/a><\/p>\n [11]<\/a> Richard Connolly, Towards a Dual Fleet? The Maritime Doctrine of the Russian Federation and the Modernisation of Russian Naval Capabilities, Center for Security Studies at ETH Zurich, 12 Temmuz 2017, http:\/\/www.css.ethz.ch\/en\/services\/digitallibrary\/articles\/article.html\/e4f8e041-5770-47348f0c-4684781070d2\/pdf<\/a><\/p>\n [12]<\/a> Robert Cobb, Russia\u2019s Naval Policy in the Mediterranean and the War in Syria, EastWest Institute, 3 Nisan 2017, https:\/\/www.eastwest.ngo\/idea\/russia%E2%80%99s-naval-policymediterranean-and-war-syria<\/a><\/p>\n [13]<\/a> Even legal arms supplies to Libya may lead to weapons\u2019 spread around region \u2014 diplomat, TASS, \u015eubat 2015, http:\/\/tass.ru\/en\/world\/778588<\/a><\/p>\n [14]<\/a> Russian Ambassador: Commander-in-Chief of the Libyan army discussed delivery of arms in Moscow, RIA, 28 Haziran 2016, https:\/\/ria.ru\/defense_safety\/20160628\/1453677993.html<\/a><\/p>\n [15]<\/a> https:\/\/www.libyaherald.com\/2016\/12\/24\/west-reaffirms-support-for-presidency-councilas-the-sole-legitimate-government-of-libyasays-military-must-be-under-civilian-control\/<\/a><\/p>\n [16]<\/a> http:\/\/www.interfax.ru\/russia\/515781<\/a><\/p>\n [17]<\/a> Missy Ryan, A former CIA asset has become a U.S. headache in Libya, The Washington Post, 17 A\u011fustos 2016, https:\/\/www.washingtonpost.com\/world\/national-security\/a-former-cia-assethas-become-a-us-headache-in-libya\/2016\/08\/17\/a766e392-54c6-11e6-bbf5-957ad17b4385_story.html?utm_term=.0dbaedf05dda<\/a><\/p>\n <\/p>\n<\/div> Libya\u2019daki \u00e7at\u0131\u015fmalar\u0131n BM\u2019nin arabuluculu\u011fuyla \u00e7\u00f6z\u00fclmesinin zor oldu\u011funun ortaya \u00e7\u0131kmas\u0131yla, Rusya\u2019n\u0131n da i\u00e7inde bulundu\u011fu d\u0131\u015f g\u00fc\u00e7ler krizin \u00e7\u00f6z\u00fcm\u00fcne arac\u0131l\u0131k etme ve bu yolla kendi \u00e7\u0131kar\u0131na hizmet etme f\u0131rsat\u0131 yakalam\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. Libya tarihsel olarak Rusya\u2019n\u0131n Orta<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":50,"featured_media":9688,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_mo_disable_npp":"","ngg_post_thumbnail":0},"categories":[361],"tags":[],"asf_pub_issue":[10319],"asf_pub_region":[10321,10323,10327],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/research.sharqforum.org\/tr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/9686"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/research.sharqforum.org\/tr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/research.sharqforum.org\/tr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/research.sharqforum.org\/tr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/50"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/research.sharqforum.org\/tr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=9686"}],"version-history":[{"count":5,"href":"https:\/\/research.sharqforum.org\/tr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/9686\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":24920,"href":"https:\/\/research.sharqforum.org\/tr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/9686\/revisions\/24920"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/research.sharqforum.org\/tr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/9688"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/research.sharqforum.org\/tr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=9686"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/research.sharqforum.org\/tr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=9686"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/research.sharqforum.org\/tr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=9686"},{"taxonomy":"asf_pub_issue","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/research.sharqforum.org\/tr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/asf_pub_issue?post=9686"},{"taxonomy":"asf_pub_region","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/research.sharqforum.org\/tr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/asf_pub_region?post=9686"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}