Huzayl MohdThe decline of the PJD had been a major concern for the Islamist in Morocco and it has now led us to the very question, why, and what is the main drive of this fallback, and would it be possible for political Islam movement to be revived back with the comeback of the party leader, Benkirane. Even though the party fallback had a lot of major factors which some said was the victim of “wrong time, right person” situation where covid 19 hit during the 2020-2022 years back then and the party failed miserably to control government[1] and party image with some other blunders with Israel normalization had caused this downfall for the PJD. Compared to other MENA countries, Morocco is considered one of the most progressive countries for Islamism to revive since the Arab uprising, where some of the other neighboring countries, such as Egypt and Tunisia, failed to maintain power play and were thrown out by the military coup d’etat and outplayed by the autocratic president. This loss of PJD in Morocco remarks not just the downfall of Islamism in Morocco alone, but also the MENA region as a whole, as there are no standing political islamist movements moreover, after the banning of the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan, which was the latest. This left a big question mark on what the future of Islamism in MENA is.
From Triumph to political Turmoil
Before the Arab Uprising, the PJD was not in favour with the people as much as they were post the Arab Spring. Since its entrance and debut in Moroccan politics, the PJD has experienced significant fluctuations in its electoral performance over the years, reflecting shifts in political dynamics, public sentiments, and government policies. Back in 2002, the PJD surprised many people when they won 42 seats in the Moroccan parliament[2]. It was a big step for them; not many saw them as a strong political player. This win sort of changed how people looked at the party. It wasn’t in power, of course, but it became one of the voices in parliament that people started paying more attention to, especially those who were getting tired of the same old faces in Moroccan politics. Later in 2007, they managed to increase their seats slightly to 46[3]. In 2011, the PJD achieved a major breakthrough, winning 107 seats and becoming the largest party in the House of Representatives[4]. This victory followed the Arab Spring protests, which led to constitutional reforms and greater public demand for change. The PJD capitalized on its image as a clean, reformist alternative to traditional parties. 2016 marks the peak influence for PJD as it manages to expand its dominance, increasing its seats to 125[5], further consolidating its position as Morocco’s leading party. It led a coalition government and positioned itself as a pragmatic Islamist party balancing religious values and governance.
The 2021 election was a turning point for the PJD. From leading with more than 100 seats, it dropped to 13. It is argued that there were a few reasons behind it. First being the state started putting pressure on them with less media time and more quiet restrictions here and there. Secondly, people aren’t seeing progress in the manifesto and promises they made after a decade in ruling with the Israel normalization of Othmani worsened the situation. Thirdly, the new electoral law had been changed and it didn’t really work in their favour[6]. Lastly, while they were struggling, parties like the National Rally of Independents (RNI) and the Authenticity and Modernity Party (PAM) were already gaining ground, looking cleaner, more modern, and closer to the palace. So, people started shifting their support. In the end, it wasn’t just one thing; it was pressure from above, frustration from below, and competitors waiting to take their place[7].
The Return of the Prodigal Leader
On April 28, the former president and the main Justice and Development Party (PJD) charismatic leader, Abdelilah Benkirane, was re-elected as PJD leader with a strong mandate, which secured 947 out of 1,402 votes, representing 69.4% of the total[8]. The comeback of Benkirane is awaited by the people of PJD as the party had fallen back very badly during the 2021 elections which witnessed the party lose almost 80% of the votes they used to receive and failed to form a government that they used to lead for the past 10 years. The return of Benkirane is considered a light at the end of the tunnel for the PJD, as he was the leader who strategizes and pragmatically brings the party to the front, gains the trust of the people, and climbs the Moroccan political ladder. The main question is, can his comeback help the survival of the party?
The question of whether Benkirane can revive the PJD is first to ask if the main question of PJD downfall is the leadership issue. It arguably makes sense as the decreasing influence and popularity happened to be in the Othmani era. To compare, Abdelilah Benkirane and Saadeddine Othmani, showed two very different ways of leading the party. Benkirane had a bold and emotional style as he was charismatic, sometimes loud, and didn’t mind using strong, populist language to connect with the people even if sometimes it goes overboard, such as the “Taza Before Gaza” Advocates he called as ‘“Microbes” and “Donkeys”[9]. He tried to show that he stood for reform and wasn’t afraid to challenge some of the elites in Moroccan politics, even if that meant creating tension. You could feel that he wanted change, but still tried to stay loyal to the monarchy, though the balance wasn’t always easy. Othmani, on the other hand, was much quieter and more careful. He came across as more technical, focusing on keeping the party united and avoiding open conflict with the Palace. Because of that, many felt he was too soft or even too close to the Palace, making him seem less independent as a leader[10].
When it comes to their approach to policy making, Benkirane took some tough steps, like cutting subsidies, even if they weren’t popular. Othmani’s time in office, by comparison, felt more passive as there weren’t many bold changes that stood out, except the controversial move on Israel normalization. Ideologically, Benkirane still held on to the party’s more traditional Islamic identity[11]. Othmani, though, leaned towards a more pragmatic or “post-Islamist” style where less focus on religious slogans, more on managing things quietly[12]. These two approaches really show how the PJD has struggled between sticking to its original values and adapting to survive in Morocco’s political system. It is hard to argue one is better than the other and it is not fair to say that Othomani is the reason for the fall of the PJD even though the fall of PJD happened in his year of premiership.
Benkirane’s return seems to signal a new phase where he’s no longer holding back. He wants to bring the PJD back to its roots as a moderate Islamist party where it openly supporting causes like Gaza, pushing for policies that might not be flashy or populist, but truly matter to the party’s base. And this time, he’s not trying to hide the PJD’s shared ground with Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated parties in nearby countries. The recent congress of PJD witnessed that the party invited representatives from Türkiye and Senegal and should be attending the meeting Hamas and Muslim Brotherhood of Jordan but canceled at the last minute because of the unstated reason[13]. It is also important to note that Rached Ghannouchi was mentioned and given homage during the party congress. The PJD’s invitation highlights more than just diplomatic courtesy, but it symbolizes the enduring ideological bond between Islamist movements across national boundaries. Despite the political challenges faced by Ennahda in Tunisia, this invitation underlines a shared commitment to political Islam and democratic reform, even in the face of adversity[14].
Conclusion
At this point, it’s hard to say if the PJD can bounce back anytime soon. Their fall in 2021 wasn’t just about losing an election, but it was a sign that their connection with the people had weakened, and their space within the system had been narrowed. The political landscape has also shifted, with new parties stepping in and voters looking elsewhere. But revival is not impossible. The PJD still has a solid grassroots base, and if they manage to reconnect with the public, reflect honestly on their past mistakes, and rebuild their identity with clarity, there’s still room for them. The connection with the palace is also restored as the King noticed the leadership changes in PJD during its recent party election, as the king congratulated on the Benkirane’s comeback[15]. It may not happen overnight, but in Moroccan politics where shifts often come quietly and over time comebacks are always possible.
The real question is whether the party has the courage to reform from within without losing what made it different in the first place. This return of Benkirane is nothing to guarantee the revival of the PJD, however it could be a big bet PJD put in restoring back the dignity of the party. This period of time is very challenging for Islamist in Morocco, and also the Islamist across the region. The thesis of Oliver Roy, the failure of Political Islam is not really the reality now, it is the future to determine. As Islamism exists as experiment in the beginning, it should and always be experimental and be ready to reform in order to maintain relevant to the voters and people of Morocco without losing party core and identity.
Endnotes:
[1] https://pomeps.org/implications-of-the-covid-19-pandemic-for-politics-in-morocco
[2] http://archive.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/arc/2221_02.htm
[3] http://archive.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/arc/2221_07.htm
[4] http://archive.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/arc/2221_11.htm
[5] https://data.ipu.org/parliament/MA/MA-LC01/election/MA-LC01-E20161007/
[7] https://www.chathamhouse.org/2021/09/how-moroccos-islamist-party-fell-grace
[8] https://www.moroccoworldnews.com/2025/04/194428/benkirane-re-elected-leader-of-moroccos-pjd-party/
[10] https://www.aa.com.tr/en/africa/moroccos-king-approves-new-government/790088
[12] https://www.jadaliyya.com/Details/34320?
[13] https://en.yabiladi.com/articles/details/164839/hamas-jordanian-muslim-brotherhood-will.html
[14] https://x.com/R_Ghannouchi/status/1916191552231088285
[15] https://fesnews.media/304812/2025/04/28/