The fate of the renewed peace process that Türkiye launched with the PKK after a decade is taking a dangerous turn in the wake of the dramatic events in Southern Syria. Following recent developments in Syria’s Druze-majority southern province of Suwayda, the process in Türkiye is experiencing a setback. The core issue lies in a familiar dynamic: the collapse of the previous peace process in 2015 was triggered by the YPG&PKK gaining control over a significant portion of Northern Syria. In essence, the PKK sacrificed the peace process in Türkiye-active between 2013 and 2015, in pursuit of a potential state(let) in Northern Syria. Today, the biggest obstacle to the success of the peace process in Türkiye stands as the integration of military and administrative structures into the emerging political order centered around Damascus. 

The recent peace process in Türkiye began unexpectedly and was spearheaded by an unlikely figure, yet it showed promising progress for quite some time. The turning point came with the regime change in Syria on December 8, 2024, influenced by the war in Gaza, the gradual consolidation of power in Damascus, and the international support garnered by the Ahmed al-Sharaa administration. These developments, coupled with an initiative launched in October by Devlet Bahçeli, Chairman of the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), helped accelerate the renewed peace efforts. Bahçeli’s political initiative gradually evolved into a broader process and ultimately transformed into a state project. In alignment with PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan, the PKK held its 12th congress, dissolved itself, and declared its intent to participate in a democratic process within Türkiye. In a symbolic act in July, a group of PKK militants led by KCK co-chair Bese Hozat burned their weapons during a ceremony in Sulaymaniyah, in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq. More recently, one of the PKK’s senior figures, Veysi Aktaş, who had been transferred to İmralı Island at Öcalan’s request, was released after serving over 31 years in prison.

While the peace process moved forward on the Türkiye and Iraq fronts, a different reality unfolded in Syria. Owing to Damascus’s weakened position on the Syrian front, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) were reluctant to commit to integrating into the new Syrian army, despite the agreement signed on March 10 between SDF commander Mazloum Abdi and Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa. Furthermore, Israel’s destabilizing actions in southern Syria, particularly in Suwayda, further emboldened the SDF and the PYD-led Autonomous Administration in Northeast Syria.

Following significant losses in manpower and prestige due to Israeli airstrikes during clashes with Israeli-backed Druze militias in Suwayda, Damascus was forced to retreat, weakening its influence. This shift made the SDF’s resistance to the integration process more visible and assertive. Meanwhile, Israeli-backed Druze leader Hekmat al-Hajari called for the establishment of a corridor linking the SDF-held territories with Suwayda, signaling a similar vision between the two for a secular and decentralized Syria.

What Does the SDF Want?

The PYD/YPG/SDF do not fundamentally oppose integration with Damascus. However, the SDF regards its integration into the Syrian state as a distinct matter, separate from the peace process in Türkiye. In contrast, Turkey draws a direct and inseparable connection between the SDF’s incorporation into the Syrian army and the success of its peace process. This fundamental divergence in perspectives threatens to undermine the peace process initiated by Ankara.

Recognizing the weak state of Damascus, the SDF/PYD are asserting their political leverage and setting forth their conditions. Their goal is to integrate with Damascus as a collective bloc, preserving the gains achieved during the Syrian conflict, while maintaining their administrative and military autonomy. Statements from SDF/YPG leaders frequently echo this stance. One of the principal challenges to integration is the limited capacity of the Damascus government to reassert full sovereignty over every inch of the Syrian territory. Additional obstacles include the significant political and administrative disparities between Damascus and the governing structures in Northeast Syria. For example, one of the PYD leaders, Salih Muslim, during the events in Suwayda, stated that ‘‘they do not want to be part of a Syria governed by a caliphate.

Elham Ahmed, Co-Chair of the Foreign Relations Department of the PYD-led Autonomous Administration, recently reiterated this vision in an interview. She emphasized that their approach to integration fundamentally differs from that of Damascus. According to Ahmed, integration should entail mutual recognition, not unilateral absorption. She criticized the concept of a centralized state, arguing that it has brought Syrians nothing but suffering. Ahmed further asserted that a decentralized system would alleviate pressure on Damascus and made it clear that laying down arms is not on their agenda, given the ongoing instability in Syria. According to Ahmed, laying down arms would amount to death.

Nevertheless, Ahmed acknowledged the necessity of central oversight in specific domains, such as the management of border crossings and airports. However, she strongly advocated for regional autonomy in areas including internal security, provision of public services to locals, education, healthcare, language, and cultural affairs. She expressed a desire to collaborate with the new Damascus administration and revealed the existence of a direct communication channel with Ankara.

In light of these developments, Türkiye, while less openly hostile to the SDF than in the past, continues to oppose its refusal to integrate fully with Damascus. Following a recent high-level meeting in Paris, attended by U.S. Ambassador to Türkiye and Special Envoy for Syria Thomas Barrack, French Foreign Minister Jean-Noël Barrot, and Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaibani, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan and MHP leader Devlet Bahçeli voiced criticism of the SDF’s position. Both emphasized that the agreement between Mazloum Abdi and Ahmad al-Sharaa must be honored.

Following Israel’s latest wave of attacks on Syria, a high-level meeting took place in Paris between Israeli Minister of Strategic Affairs Ron Dermer and Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaibani, under the mediation of U.S. Special Envoy Thomas Barrack. This meeting marked the highest-level diplomatic engagement between the two sides since 2000. While neither party officially confirmed nor denied the meeting, Barrack later acknowledged that he had held discussions with both delegations in Paris.

Also, after a tripartite meeting between Barrack, French Foreign Minister Barrot, and al-Shaibani a joint official statement was issued in which the following was stated: ‘‘In the spirit of dialogue and de-escalation, the United States, France, and Syria agreed on the need to ensure that Syria’s neighbors do not pose a threat to Syria’s stability and that, in turn, reaffirm Syria’s commitment not to pose a threat to its neighbors, for the sake of stability across the region.’’

The SDF leader, Mazloum Abdi, was also expected to attend the above-mentioned tripartite meeting. It appears Ankara also supported this meeting. However, the meeting was postponed. Instead, in the wake of the trilateral meeting, Mazloum Abdi held a separate meeting with French Foreign Minister Barrot.

Following the trilateral Paris meeting, a joint statement issued by Syria, France, and the U.S. stated that the parties had agreed to hold a round of talks between the SDF and the Syrian government in Paris in the coming period. 

Right after these developments that drew criticism from the new Syrian government, the SDF leader Abdi appeared in an interview with the Saudi media outlet Al Arabiya, adopting a noticeably more reconciliatory tone than that of Elham Ahmed. Abdi invited the new Syrian government institutions to Arab-majority regions of Northeastern Syria, such as Raqqa and Deir ez-Zour, and expressed his commitment to the principles of “one army, one government, and one state” in Syria.

At the same time, he emphasized that decentralization does not mean partition, noting the immense challenge of integrating thousands of SDF members into the Syrian army. Abdi also confirmed his intention to participate in the upcoming planned negotiations with the Syrian government in Paris.

The remarks by Mazloum Abdi and Elham Ahmed reflect the PYD/SDF’s intention to leverage its position to advocate for a decentralized Syria, though the scope and structure of such a system remain uncertain. It is also seen that the PYD/SDF side does not have a unified vision on the shape and limits of the decentralized system in the country.

France and the U.S. Role 

Spearheaded by France and the U.S., the Paris initiative aims to break the longstanding deadlock over the integration of the SDF into the Damascus government, a development that could significantly affect the future of the peace process in Türkiye.

U.S. Representative Barrack has consistently supported Damascus and encouraged the SDF’s integration into the new Syria. However, following the recent events in Suwayda, Barrack has modified his rhetoric toward Damascus and called on it to be more inclusive. He emphasized that otherwise, the new Syrian administration could lose international support, and Syria could be dragged into a new civil war, worse than Libya’s. However, the YPG/SDF continues to receive significant support from CENTCOM, and the USA’s Syria policy is not fully established yet. Notably, the Pentagon is scheduled to provide $130 million in aid to the SDF in 2026, which represents another obstacle to the SDF’s integration into the state apparatus. Stability in Syria is impossible without the SDF becoming part of the Syrian army. Stability in Syria is unlikely without the formal incorporation of the SDF into the national army. The alternative-a military confrontation between the SDF and Damascus-would be catastrophic. Conversely, integrating the SDF would bolster Damascus both militarily and diplomatically, reinforcing its international legitimacy.

In a nutshell, Syria stands at a crossroads. The SDF&PYD now have a genuine opportunity to become part of a newly reconstituted Syria. It is important to recall that Syrian Kurds were long denied fundamental citizenship rights under the deposed regime of Bashar al-Assad. The current moment must not be squandered by clinging to maximalist positions. Doing so would not only undermine the prospects of Syrian Kurds but could also derail the broader peace efforts involving Türkiye.

It is beyond doubt that Damascus is not extremely powerful, unable to assert sovereignty over every inch of the country, and the SDF is aware of this reality. However, the balance of power in Syria has shifted significantly since December 8th. The SDF no longer has Iran, Assad, or Russia to ally with when faced with significant crises. The balance of power has shifted in favor of Damascus. Furthermore, nearly every regional actor-with the exception of Iran and Israel- seeks stability in Syria. Therefore, the most pragmatic and mutually beneficial outcome would be for all sides to soften their red lines and work toward a political formula that incorporates the SDF into the Syrian state.

The PKK’s dissolution decision is rare, recent good news in the Middle East amidst an ongoing genocide in Gaza. Advancing the peace process in Türkiye aligns with the interests of regional actors. While challenging, this mission is far from impossible.