Mohamad FawazOn 5 August 2025, the Lebanese cabinet convened at the Presidential Palace in Baabda to debate an agenda item unprecedented in recent years: a state monopoly on arms. The session—chaired by President Joseph Aoun—ended by tasking the Lebanese Army to submit by the end of August a plan that would confine all weapons to the state’s official security institutions by year’s end, which targets mainly Hezbollah’s arsenal. This followed Aoun’s Army Day address a few days earlier, in which he explicitly urged that Hezbollah hand over its weapons to the army and called for exclusivity of arms in the hands of the state.
The political weight of the 5 August meeting was exceptional by Lebanese standards—the first time since the Taif Agreement that a sitting government formally brought Hezbollah’s weapons onto the cabinet agenda. Two days later, on 7 August, ministers reconvened in Baabda; Hezbollah and Amal ministers walked out, yet the cabinet approved the objectives of a U.S. proposal that set a clear timeline for the withdrawal of Hezbollah’s weapons. The plan called for Hezbollah to begin handing over its arsenal under a timeline ending by 31 December 2025, while Israel would halt operations and gradually withdraw troops from key positions. The framework also included prisoner exchanges, expanded Lebanese Army control of border areas, and an international conference to fund reconstruction—anchoring the process in the November 2024 ceasefire and UN Security Council Resolution 1701.
These two sessions formally ushered Lebanon into a new phase, one in which Hezbollah’s weapons were placed in confrontation with the state—unlike previous eras when ministerial statements legitimized them. In contrast, this time, the government’s decisions were explicitly announced, and within a set timeframe, the withdrawal of Hezbollah’s arms was announced.
Hezbollah’s Resistance Without Escalation
Nevertheless, Hezbollah refuted the government decision, issuing a string of hard-line statements: on 6 August, the party called the cabinet’s move to seek a state monopoly on arms a “grave sin” imposed by U.S. “diktats,” adding it would “deal with it as if it does not exist.” Deputy chief Naim Qassem later warned that Hezbollah would not abandon the weapons that “protect” it. He conditioned any defense-strategy talks on prior Israeli compliance with the ceasefire, even as street protests were paused but could resume. For his part, Head of Hezbollah’s “Loyalty to the Resistance” parliamentary Bloc, MP Mohammad Raad branded disarmament “suicide”—insisted “we do not intend to commit suicide”—and declared that “to surrender your weapons is to surrender your honor”.
However, unlike Hezbollah’s response to the 5 May 2008 cabinet measures—which were narrower in scope yet triggered an immediate armed escalation—the movement has so far refrained from comparable action after the government’s decisions of 5 and 7 August 2025. Even public mobilization has been limited to small rallies, despite the far greater stakes this time.
Several factors explain the restraint: Hezbollah’s deterrence calculus has been degraded by the recent war; the Syrian supply line has shifted from a conduit to a source of threat; Israeli military pressure remains intense; and domestic sentiment has tilted against the organization—aside from its base, itself under Israeli threat and constrained by displacement. Under these conditions, a military option appears costly and uncertain given the strain on Hezbollah’s capabilities.
At the same time, Hezbollah has not severed ties with the Lebanese state. Given Hezbollah’s internal and external constraints, the 5 August decision—though stringent— grants a period through year’s end. The Lebanese Army, tasked with drafting the plan, is unlikely to court a clash with Hezbollah or its social base. Signaling de-escalation and unwillingness to clash, the army commander—seen as close to President Joseph Aoun—visited Speaker Nabih Berri shortly after government meetings, in a message that any forthcoming plan is not a project of confrontation with the Shi’a community. While the army is bound to execute the government’s mandate, it seeks to do so in a way that avoids sectarian friction and the attendant risks of internal strife or fissures within its ranks.
For their part and in brief, all actors—including the government and the Shi’a duo, Hezbollah and Amal—recognize that a flat rejection of disarmament and a refusal to engage U.S. demands could invite a punitive economic, military, and political response against both the Lebanese state and Hezbollah and consequently its sectarian base. Under this pressure, the government moved first by passing the decisions and deferring operationalization to the army; Hezbollah, in turn, has limited itself to rhetorical escalation and a strategy of buying time, wagering on regional shifts more than domestic ones.
The Wider Regional Context and the Internal Implications
Nevertheless, disarming Hezbollah cannot be understood in isolation. The trajectory to dismantle Hezbollah’s arsenal in Lebanon is part of a broader regional and international strategy. Washington’s approach has focused on confining Iran within its borders and dismantling the weapons of its allies beyond them—from Iraq to Lebanon.
In Iraq, the push to institutionalize the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) through new legislation has become a key flashpoint. Parliament advanced a draft law that would formalize the PMF as a permanent state entity—defining its structure, funding, and chain of command, and even elevating its commander to ministerial rank. Proponents argue it ensures accountability under the prime minister, but critics warn it would legally entrench the PMF’s autonomy and embed Iranian-aligned militias deeper into state structures. Facing Washington’s firm stance toward Iranian-backed militias across the region, the Coordination Framework bloc—the Shi‘a alliance closely aligned with Tehran—paused the law’s progress, withdrawing it temporarily to avoid escalation. Although they hold a parliamentary majority, U.S. pressure alone was sufficient to halt the project.
Meanwhile, Washington coupled these steps with sanctions and explicit warnings that any new laws granting the PMF greater independence would trigger a strong response—further narrowing the space for militias to act outside state authority and reinforcing the broader trajectory toward ending their role.
In Syria, one of the most enduring red lines remains the severing of Iran’s influence, a policy consistently upheld not only by international actors but also by local forces.
Beyond the Levant, Washington has backed connectivity schemes in the South Caucasus that, in practice, bypass Iran—most recently a U.S.-backed peace declaration between Armenia and Azerbaijan that rebrands a contested route through southern Armenia and is widely read in Tehran as a threat to its land and geopolitical link to Armenia.
Tehran has not accepted this U.S. agenda, but it has managed its pushback in a way designed to avoid a costly head-on collision. Iranian Brigadier General Esmail Qaani has repeatedly shuttled to Iraq, working to hold together Shi’a factions that have been shaken by U.S. pressure and internal rivalries, while also discouraging open confrontation with Baghdad’s leadership.
At the same time, senior figures such as Ali Larijani – the head of the Iranian Supreme National Security Council – have been dispatched to Beirut, where he encountered unusually firm public messages from Lebanese leaders insisting that no armed group can remain outside the official framework—an unmistakable signal of how far the debate over Hezbollah’s arms has shifted. Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi has also been active on the diplomatic front, attempting to counter the disarmament plan of Hezbollah in Lebanon, but drawing sharp rebuttals from Lebanese officials whenever his comments were perceived as interference in sovereign affairs.
However, like in Lebanon, Iran’s regional diplomacy reflects a strategy of damage control rather than escalation: it seeks to reassure its allies, project an image of resilience, and keep open channels with governments in Baghdad and Beirut—yet without provoking measures that could trigger confrontation with the United States or invite further escalation. This balancing act underscores Tehran’s current decline — without surrendering or making a fundamental change in strategy. Where it once wielded clear leverage, it now finds itself increasingly on the defensive, relying more on diplomacy, rhetoric, and buying time than on decisive influence, while still maintaining its allies. In both Iraq and Lebanon, the firmness of U.S. pressure and the visible willingness of local governments to translate that pressure into state institutions have exposed the shrinking margin of maneuver for Iranian influence.
This broader regional picture largely aligns with Lebanon and Hezbollah’s strategic calculus. The party remains organically—ideologically, organizationally, and strategically—tied to Iran, which is itself playing for time amid shifting regional and international variables.
Furthermore, from Hezbollah’s perspective, the arsenal serves a dual purpose: it is both a defense instrument against Israel and a protective shield for the party and its constituency—rooted in a minority-security outlook and reinforced by the domestic political capital it carries in Lebanon’s sectarian system. Anxiety about the “new Syria” also looms large, whether due to long-standing ideological and historical frictions with the current Syrian leadership or to border dynamics that, in Hezbollah’s view, could widen amid reports of mobilizations from the Syrian side and U.S. signaling such as Tom Barrack—the U.S. special envoy to Syria and ambassador to Turkey—that warned Lebanon risks facing an “existential threat” unless it addresses Hezbollah’s weapons stockpiles. He added “You have Israel on one side, Iran on the other, and now Syria is reemerging strongly and rapidly. If Lebanon doesn’t act, it will return to being part of ‘Bilad al-Sham’ again,” using the historical name for Greater Syria. He continued: “The Syrians say that Lebanon is their seaside resort. So, we must act. I fully understand the frustration of the Lebanese people — and I share that frustration;” for Hezbollah, such imagery underscores the perceived risks of relinquishing arms.
Moreover, the violence along the Syrian coast and the tragic scenes in Sweida have amplified Hezbollah’s fears of the eastern front—alongside the southern one—especially given the party’s decades-long role in shoring up the Assad regime. That same fear underpins a firmer hold on weapons.
At the same time, Hezbollah believes the regional picture remains unsettled: Syria has yet to stabilize, and this fluidity could still shift in directions favorable to both Hezbollah and Iran. Across the region, whether instability unfolds at a distance from Iran—as in the continued turbulence in Syria—or whether it draws Iran in more directly, the calculation is that allied groups should keep their weapons in either case. In addition, the possibility of negotiations—whether over regional security, sanctions, or political settlements—is seen as another reason to maintain the arms of allied movements, as such weapons serve as a form of bargaining leverage. This arsenal, moreover, is reinforced not only politically and strategically, but also along sectarian and ideological lines—gradually becoming more deeply embedded in identity and doctrine than in mere politics or military strategy. Iran has not conceded; it continues to pursue its approach, reinforcing Hezbollah’s determination to hold on to its arsenal, even as the United States has escalated counter-pressure—most recently underscored by the arrival of the U.S. delegation in Beirut.
Washington’s Message and Beirut’s Dilemma
Following the cabinet’s decisions—and as the army worked on a plan intended to establish a state monopoly on arms—Beirut’s leadership expected a reciprocal Israeli move, to be brokered by Washington: at minimum, a partial pullout from the south or a written pledge consistent with the “step-for-step” principle. Instead, on Tuesday, August 26, 2025, a high-profile U.S. delegation arrived in Beirut—including Sens. Lindsey Graham and Jeanne Shaheen, Rep. Joe Wilson, envoy Tom Barrack, deputy special presidential envoy Morgan Ortagus, and U.S. Ambassador Lisa Johnson—meeting President Joseph Aoun at Baabda, then Speaker Nabih Berri and Prime Minister Nawaf Salam, along with other Lebanese figures. The delegation, however, effectively collapsed the “step-for-step” formula, insisting instead that Hezbollah’s full disarmament must precede any Israeli move.
The delegation’s public message, captured in Senator Graham’s comments, aligned closely with an Israeli reading of the file. It came without any Israeli gesture and was accompanied by escalatory signals in Syria and Lebanon. Instead, Graham stated that Lebanon’s political and economic future, as well as its regional and international standing, is tied to the disarmament of Hezbollah without offering any reciprocal or presiding Israeli steps in return. The US delegators also floated the idea of an economic zone in the south, effectively forbidding the return of Lebanese border residents to their villages. This framing mirrors broader regional templates that the United States is promoting or tolerating—from “Rivera” Gaza to barrier/zone concepts on the southern fronts in Lebanon and Syria, and economic-corridor proposals along the Armenia–Iran border.
As a result of the American visit, the tone triggered anger among Lebanese officials. The Speaker of the Lebanese Parliament, Nabih Berri, said the U.S. delegation “brought nothing from Israel, which made things more complicated,” adding that “any step that leads to domestic division is unacceptable.” President Joseph Aoun reaffirmed Lebanon’s commitment to the ceasefire and the joint declaration, stressing that “other parties now need to commit to the roadmap’s contents.”
On the Syrian front, Syrian President Ahmad al-Sharaa told visiting Arab and Lebanese media that although “it was our right to retaliate against Hezbollah for what they did in Syria for 14 years—and this was possible and even internationally blessed,” Damascus chose not to and instead seeks to “open a new page” with Lebanon. He added that some are trying to “use ‘the new Syria’ to settle scores with Hezbollah, but we are not headed in that direction.” Earlier, amid the Sweida crisis, al-Sharaa stressed “we are not among those who fear war,” yet framed Damascus’s priority as avoiding chaos and protecting civilians, however, agreeing to the external pressure towards pushing the Syrian forces towards Hezbollah in Lebanon.
Disarming Hezbollah Future: Scenarios of Deadlock
As Washington awaits the effects of its visit and the Lebanese Army’s plan, the official scene in Beirut has clouded over. The space for a middle solution that Lebanon used to reach is narrowing. Trial balloons have surfaced—from figures close to Hezbollah—suggesting formulas such as placing “command authority” of the weapons under the state while keeping their details, locations, and status opaque, or applying a “Palestinian camps model” of handover that would read as disarmament on paper but fall short of a complete, verifiable transfer.
The gradual collapse of compromise formulas reflects the absence of any Israeli initiative, which in turn has strengthened Hezbollah’s domestic camp that questions both Israel’s intentions and the utility of disarmament, particularly as Israel’s regional project appears to be expanding with no intention of solutions but instead with a desire for further expansion. The most recent Israeli stance toward the Lebanese step also eased domestic pressure on the government, encouraging it to adopt a less rigid approach in implementing Barrack’s paper. Such a shift was exemplified by Minister Tarek Mitri, affiliated with the Prime Minister, who declared that Tom Barrack’s proposal had collapsed since it had not received Israeli approval, and that Lebanon would still discuss the issue of exclusive state control over arms in the cabinet session on Friday, though not on the basis of the U.S. paper. Moreover, the cabinet session initially scheduled for Tuesday, September 2, to review the Lebanese Army’s plan was postponed to Friday—a postponement that was approved for only a few days at the time but was later categorically rejected in the cabinet sessions of October 5 and 7, despite the persistent demands of the Shiite duo. The acceptance of postponement, together with Mitri’s statement, confirms the emergence of a more diplomatic governmental stance toward disarming Hezbollah at a time when the atmosphere following earlier cabinet sessions had been leaning toward confrontation.
Nevertheless, on the ground, Lebanon does not appear to be in a strong position to maneuver under firm Israeli and U.S. pressure. This situation leaves only a few difficult possibilities. One is for things to remain as they are, with Hezbollah holding on to its weapons—an outcome that would trigger growing U.S. and Israeli pressure on Lebanon in various forms. This could stem either from Hezbollah’s refusal to hand over its arsenal or from Washington’s skepticism about the credibility of upcoming Lebanese steps.
Another scenario is an attempt to force Hezbollah to disarm without any explicit Israeli guarantees in return. This option raises serious questions about how Hezbollah would react and the potential risk of internal tensions, which neither Hezbollah nor Lebanese officials are willing to face. This reluctance becomes clearer when compared to the Palestinian case: even in the context of Palestinian disarmament in Lebanon, the use of force has not been put on the table. While some weapons have recently been surrendered from the camps, these did not include those of Hamas or Islamic Jihad, nor did the Lebanese Army move to seize them by force. This reflects the army’s cautious approach toward the Palestinians in Lebanon—an approach that would be even more unlikely toward Hezbollah, which is deeply embedded within Lebanon’s military, political, social, and geographic fabric.
On the other hand, the path Hezbollah seems to prefer is to keep delaying, in the hope that an unexpected regional development—whether political or military—might create room for a solution. In their calculation, such a solution could emerge either through escalation and chaos that reshuffles the cards or through negotiations that Iran has sought to reopen with Washington. Alternatively, Hezbollah could benefit from gaining broader domestic legitimacy, both official and popular, particularly after the hardening of U.S. and Israeli positions. This would reframe the issue from being a dispute between Hezbollah and the Lebanese state to one between Lebanon and Israel—a shift that would strategically ease pressure on Hezbollah. Yet this trajectory appears to be firmly rejected by a broad spectrum of Lebanese political forces, foremost among them the Christian parties.
On the other hand, Hezbollah has thus far refrained from escalation, maintaining its commitment to participation within the government. Moreover, the Shiite duo recognizes the gravity of the moment to the extent that it hesitates even to escalate popular mobilization—a step that Hezbollah appears more eager to pursue than Berri, who fears its potential repercussions in Lebanon’s fragile sectarian arena. Notably, large-scale Shiite civil disobedience or mass demonstrations remain among the duo’s most significant remaining tools. Yet, they appear increasingly uncertain and divided over how—or whether—to deploy them.
Amid these scenarios and their intricate details, the second wing of the Shiite duo, Nabih Berri—who has reemerged more forcefully than ever following Hezbollah’s relative setback—appears to be softening Hezbollah’s rigid stance on refusing disarmament. In his speech on the anniversary of Imam Musa al-Sadr’s disappearance, Berri suggested that the issue could at least be placed on the table for discussion, thereby opening the door to a proposal: the prospect of internal dialogue. Yet, as past experiences suggest, such dialogue remains unlikely to be accepted by the other side. As also reiterated in previous leaks, Berri reiterated a complete rejection of any confrontation between the army and Hezbollah—in other words, an outright refusal of a Lebanese Army-Shiite conflict involving the community Berri has represented for decades.
In addition, various leaks confirm that the recent American visit created room for a new Lebanese maneuver—or at least this is how Lebanon perceives it. Reports suggest that this will take shape through the Lebanese Army leadership presenting its awaited plan, but without linking it to a binding timeline. This indicates that the prospect of internal confrontation is receding, while communication and dialogue are emerging as the preferred path for most domestic actors, from the state to the Shiite duo—even if such proposals are unlikely to gain approval from Washington or from a significant share of Lebanese factions and officials. Accordingly, the latest round has produced a limited internal breakthrough that may not necessarily translate into an external one. Nevertheless, any broad domestic solidarity and unified stance could strengthen Lebanon’s negotiating position and mitigate external reactions. In other words, crafting a medium-term internal Lebanese solution could help the country avoid internal strife while presenting itself to external actors with an initiative—one that is not necessarily destined for acceptance but is valuable as a demonstration of internal coherence.
All of this underscores the current deadlock in Lebanon: on one side, compromise formulas that are rejected by part of the political authority, a broad spectrum of Lebanese parties, and external actors—thereby opening the door to potential external escalation; and on the other, radical internal solutions that risk plunging the country into civil strife. Caught between these two paths, Lebanon appears to lack any genuine leverage or real instruments of power, leaving it vulnerable to Israeli opportunism.