Introduction

The conflict in Western Sahara has entered a decisive phase following the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 2797 (2025), which renewed the mandate of the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO)[1] and explicitly reaffirmed that Morocco’s Autonomy Plan constitutes a serious and credible basis for negotiations. This represents a notable evolution in the United Nations’ diplomatic discourse.

 

This shift reflects a broader realignment within the Security Council, particularly the convergence of U.S.,[2] French, and Spanish positions in support of Morocco’s approach, highlighting a growing transatlantic consensus favoring solutions that prioritize stability in North Africa. Algeria’s response, articulated by Ambassador Amar Bendjama,[3] emphasized that Algeria’s abstention from voting on the resolution was due to its inconsistency with the principles of decolonization and the right to self-determination. He argued that, despite some improvements, the text lacks balance and adopts a narrow negotiation framework that disregards the Polisario Front’s proposals. He reaffirmed Algeria’s commitment to a peaceful settlement, asserting that respect for the Sahrawi people’s right to self-determination remains the foundation of any just and lasting solution.

 

This divergence has further entrenched Moroccan–Algerian rivalry, transforming the Western Sahara[4] issue from a regional dispute into a central axis of competition for regional influence, raising the prospect of diplomatic paralysis within the Arab Maghreb Union. At the international level, the resolution demonstrates growing strategic coordination between European and American actors, driven by concerns over migration routes, counterterrorism cooperation, and energy security, which links North Africa[5] to Europe and the Atlantic space. These geopolitical calculations have strengthened Morocco’s role as a security and energy partner, particularly as Europe seeks to diversify energy sources and secure stable southern neighbors.

Moreover, the normalization of relations between Morocco and Israel [6]has altered the balance of power surrounding the Western Sahara issue. These dynamics have contributed to the diplomatic marginalization of the Polisario Front[7], leading to renewed rejection of the UN process and warnings against any settlement that excludes “independence”. Looking ahead, three potential scenarios [8]emerge: a gradual diplomatic breakthrough supported by U.S.–European mediation; a continued political stalemate under an enhanced Moroccan status quo; or a limited escalation, characterized by sporadic hostilities and proxy regional tensions. All of these scenarios will shape security dynamics across the Maghreb, the Sahel, and the Mediterranean.

 

The Strategic Importance of Western Sahara

Western Sahara holds significant strategic importance due to its natural resources and geopolitical location. Control over the territory influences regional power dynamics, economic opportunities, and security in North Africa. Phosphate reserves, particularly in the Bou Craa (Bucraa/Bojeador) fields, the territory’s dominant industrial asset under Moroccan operation, have a production capacity of 2.6 million metric tons per year. In 2023 alone, about 1.6 million tons were exported from the territory, slightly up from 1.23 million[9] tons in 2022. They are vital to global fertilizer markets and support Morocco’s export revenues, industrial capacity, and food security strategy.

 

The region’s rich Atlantic fishing grounds represent a major economic asset but remain politically sensitive. The EU agreed to a financial contribution of approximately €208 million over four years in exchange for access to Moroccan-controlled waters, including those off the Western Sahara, with annual payouts of about €48 million. The agreement has faced legal challenges due to its inclusion of Western Saharan waters. Potential offshore hydrocarbon and mineral resources, while not yet commercially proven, continue to influence policymaking by shaping investment decisions, foreign partnerships, and maritime claims.

 

Geopolitically, Western Sahara is a strategic pivot rather than merely a regional dispute. It lies at the heart of Moroccan–Algerian rivalry and affects regional power balances, particularly given its access to the Atlantic, energy corridors, and its role in maritime security. The conflict has also become embedded in great power competition, notably between the United States and China[10], for influence in North Africa and the Atlantic sphere.

 

The Western Sahara issue derives much of its importance from its security implications for North Africa and the Sahel. A prolonged unresolved conflict risks creating ungoverned or weakly governed spaces that could be exploited by terrorist groups[11], smuggling networks, and transnational criminal organizations operating in the Sahel. It also fuels Moroccan–Algerian rivalry, undermining regional cooperation in counterterrorism, border control, and migration management. Conversely, stable governance in Western Sahara is viewed as a factor that could reduce regional instability and limit opportunities for extremist and criminal exploitation, giving the issue a strategic and security dimension beyond its political nature.

 

Recent Diplomatic Developments

The Security Council’s[12] 2025 review of MINURSO’s mandate took place amid renewed low-intensity clashes and an ongoing diplomatic deadlock. While Morocco continues to consolidate control and Western actors prioritize stability, Algeria and the Polisario Front remain committed to self-determination, limiting prospects for progress. The conflict is increasingly managed rather than resolved, with growing constraints on MINURSO’s role and its gradual transformation into a largely symbolic mission.

 

The recent Security Council vote marks a diplomatic turning point, reinforcing international alignment around Morocco’s Autonomy Plan, symbolically described as a “diplomatic Green March.[13]” This reflects a pragmatic shift away from long-stalled options such as a referendum, driven by geopolitical interests and changing realities on the ground. While this development strengthens Morocco’s position and reframes negotiations, lasting stability will depend on the genuine implementation of autonomy and the ability to re-engage Algeria and the Polisario Front in a renewed political process.

 

Key Regional Actors and Power Dynamics

Morocco administers most of the territory, promoting its 2007 Autonomy Plan under Moroccan sovereignty, supported by infrastructure investments and backing from the United States and other states, as reflected in recent Security Council resolutions. This enhances Morocco’s influence in the Atlantic and undermines the Polisario Front’s legitimacy. The autonomy proposal is framed as a pragmatic path not only to resolving the conflict but also to reducing tensions with Algeria[14], aligning with recent UN and U.S. diplomatic positions and prioritizing regional stability over broader consensus-building or alternative frameworks.

 

Resistance and retrenchment characterize Algeria’s position. It abstained from the Security Council vote, continues to support the Polisario Front, and rejects the autonomy framework. Analysis by the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR)[15] suggests that Algeria views Western Sahara as part of its broader rivalry with Morocco and that its refusal to adapt to the new diplomatic reality prolongs the conflict rather than facilitating a negotiated settlement. From the Polisario Front’s perspective, peace can only be achieved through a process that guarantees the Sahrawi people their inalienable right to self‑determination and sovereignty, not one that pre‑frames negotiations or legitimizes Moroccan control. The Front has categorically rejected negotiations or political processes based on Morocco’s autonomy plan, arguing that such proposals “legitimize[16] the illegal Moroccan military occupation”.

 

The Polisario Front, founded in the 1970s to pursue Western Sahara’s independence following Spain’s withdrawal, remains a key actor in the conflict. It fought against Morocco and Mauritania until the UN-brokered ceasefire in 1991 and proclaimed the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR), headquartered in Algeria. Although Algeria was crucial to the creation and survival of the Polisario Front, it was not the sole factor behind its founding. The movement emerged primarily from Sahrawi nationalist[17]activism and the historical context of Spanish colonial withdrawal. Nevertheless, once established, the Front became heavily dependent on external support, particularly from Algeria and, to a lesser extent, Libya, during its early years. The 1991 ceasefire was intended to pave the way for a referendum on self-determination[18], but it never materialized. Since 2020, the Polisario Front has declared the ceasefire void and has engaged in limited confrontations. Despite maintaining an organized structure and a consistent independence-based discourse, the movement remains reliant on external support and has failed to secure full international recognition, leaving the conflict unresolved.

Global Competition for Influence in North Africa

Regionally, Morocco and Algeria remain the primary actors. Morocco controls most of the territory, investing in infrastructure like ports and phosphate extraction to assert sovereignty and expand its Atlantic reach. The region is mostly arid desert, so the term “fertile land” doesn’t reflect a large agricultural plain like a river valley. Instead, Morocco holds the Atlantic coastline[19] and the most economically valuable areas: fisheries, ports, population centers, and phosphate deposits. Some agricultural[20] production (fruits and vegetables) is being developed under Moroccan administration and investment, such as in Dakhla.

Algeria, viewing the region as central to its economic and security interests, supports the Polisario Front in its quest for independence to counter Moroccan expansion. This support includes diplomatic, military, and logistical aid, rooted in historical rivalries and Arab solidarity. The Polisario Front, representing Sahrawi nationalists, controls the eastern regions and refugee[21] camps in Algeria but faces declining international recognition. Externally, the issue has shifted from a self-determination framework to one driven by geopolitical stability. The United States recognized Moroccan sovereignty, citing security priorities in the Sahel and efforts to counter rival influence, thereby strengthening military ties with Rabat. France and the United Kingdom have supported Morocco’s autonomy[22] plan at the UN for pragmatic reasons linked to energy and fisheries interests. Russia[23]continues to arm Algeria while abstaining from UN votes, reflecting its effort to balance regional relationships. Syria’s[24] expulsion of Polisario offices represents a symbolic shift in Arab alignments in Morocco’s favor..

 

Normalization with Israel and the Reshaping of Alliances

Morocco’s normalization[25] of relations with Israel in December 2020, under the Abraham Accords, represents a structural shift in North African alliances. Diplomatic normalization was explicitly linked to U.S. recognition of Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara, underscoring a geopolitical quid pro quo in which Morocco traded a sensitive political step for a decisive strategic gain. As a result, military, security, and intelligence cooperation among Morocco, Israel, and the United States deepened, elevating Morocco’s status as a regional security partner and reshaping regional power balances. Conversely, the move sharply escalated tensions with Algeria, which viewed normalization as a betrayal[26]of the Palestinian cause, responded by severing relations with Morocco, and intensified support for the Polisario Front. This alignment reflects a broader regional polarization[27] aimed at counterbalancing Morocco’s growing influence.

 

Domestically, despite public protests in Morocco opposing normalization[28], security and military[29] agreements, including arms deals and joint exercises, continued, demonstrating the state’s prioritization of strategic considerations over popular sentiment. At the Arab level, this trajectory has deepened divisions and weakened the notion of Arab unity, as national and security interests increasingly take precedence over collective causes. Finally, references to statements by the second Trump administration suggest continuity in U.S. support[30] for Morocco, reinforcing its diplomatic gains within the UN framework on Western Sahara. Thus, normalization emerges as a pivotal factor that not only reshaped Moroccan–Israeli relations but also fundamentally redrew the geopolitical map of North Africa.

 

Energy, Migration, and Transatlantic Security

The conflict in Western Sahara has led to the displacement of many Sahrawis to refugee camps[31] in Algeria, a situation that has persisted for decades due to stalled peace negotiations. Migration is a key issue: Morocco prevents irregular crossings into Spain[32], cooperates with the European Union on border control, and criminalizes unauthorized entry, leaving migrants and refugees without legal protection. The conflict and Morocco’s migration policies demonstrate the interconnectedness of displacement, human rights, and regional security in North Africa. The Security Council resolution was supported by the United States and major European countries, reflecting Morocco’s role as a key transatlantic security partner in North Africa. Morocco’s cooperation with NATO on counterterrorism operations and migration management makes it strategically important to the United States and Europe, while Algeria opposes the plan and maintains ties with rival powers. This shift illustrates how Western Sahara diplomacy is increasingly shaped by security, migration, and geopolitical interests, rather than solely by legal or territorial issues.

 

Conclusion

Western Sahara stands at a critical juncture where diplomatic engagement is increasingly shaped by transatlantic security priorities rather than earlier UN commitments to a self-determination referendum. The 2025 UN resolution reaffirming Morocco’s autonomy proposal as a “serious and credible” option illustrates a growing alignment among the United States, France, and Spain in favor of stability-focused solutions. Morocco’s close cooperation with NATO partners, its role in managing regional conflicts, counterterrorism efforts in the Sahel, and collaboration with Europe on migration control have strengthened its position as a strategic security partner, influencing international backing for its claims. Meanwhile, Algeria and the Polisario Front continue to advocate for independence, while unresolved humanitarian concerns such as restrictive migration measures and the prolonged displacement of Sahrawi refugees persist. A sustainable resolution will ultimately depend on whether the autonomy framework can be applied inclusively and achieve broader regional acceptance.

The Western Sahara conflict is now framed less as a decolonization issue and more as a matter of regional stability and security cooperation. The recent UN resolution strengthened Morocco’s diplomatic leverage and marginalized the Polisario Front internationally. However, Algeria’s continued support for independence and the unresolved status of Sahrawi refugees mean the dispute remains a managed but frozen conflict, with progress limited unless negotiations address both political rights and regional rivalries.

 

 

 

Endnotes:

[i] United Nations Security Council. (2025). Resolution 2797 (2025): Adopted by the Security Council at its 10030th meeting, on 31 October 2025. https://digitallibrary.un.org/nanna/record/4093660/files/S_RES_2797_%282025%29-EN.pdf

[ii]Euronews. (2025, October 31). UN Security Council approves resolution backing Morocco’s plan for Western Sahara. https://www.euronews.com/2025/10/31/un-security-council-approves-resolution-backing-moroccos-plan-for-western-sahara .

[iii]Modern Diplomacy. (2025, November 20). What the UN resolution 2797 means for Western Sahara. https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2025/11/20/what-the-un-resolution-2797-means-for-western-sahara/ .

[iv]The Guardian. (2025, October 31). UN approves resolution supporting Morocco’s claim to Western Sahara. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/oct/31/un-approves-resolution-supporting-moroccos-claim-to-western-sahara .

[v]Reuters. (2020, December 10). Israel, Morocco agree to normalize relations in latest U.S.-brokered deal. https://www.reuters.com/article/markets/commodities/israel-morocco-agree-to-normalize-relations-in-latest-us-brokered-deal-idUSL1N2IN12U/ .

[vi]Sahrawi Press Service (SPS). (2025, December 9). (Article on Western Sahara and Resolution 2797). https://www.spsrasd.info/en/2025/12/09/13399.html .

[vii]Euronews. (2025, October 29). Will Washington succeed in mending the Western Sahara rift? https://www.euronews.com/2025/10/29/will-washington-succeed-in-mending-the-western-sahara-rift

[viii] Economy of Western Sahara.. Grokipedia. https://grokipedia.com/page/Economy_of_Western_Sahara .

 

[ix]Sahara Press Service. (2024). SPSRASD Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic news. https://spsrasd.info/fr/2024/05/22/3620.html .

 

[x]European Parliament. (2019, February 12). MEPs adopt new Fisheries Partnership with Morocco includingWesternSahara.https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20190207IPR25218/meps-adopt-new-fisheries-partnership-with-morocco-including-western-sahara .

 

[xi]Ghoulidi, A. (2024, December 13). Breaking the Stalemate: A Strategic Framework To Resolve Western Sahara. The Heritage Foundation. https://www.heritage.org/africa/commentary/breaking-the-stalemate-strategic-framework-resolve-western-sahara .

[xii]Why the Western Sahara matters. American Enterprise Institute. https://www.aei.org/research-products/journal-publication/why-the-western-sahara-matters/ .

 

[xiii]African Security Analysis. (2025). Western Sahara 2025: Security Council reviews MINURSO mandateamid renewed hostilities and diplomatic stalemate. https://www.africansecurityanalysis.com/reports/western-sahara-2025-security-council-reviews-minurso-mandate-amid-renewed-hostilities-and-diplomatic-stalemate .

[xiv] Atlantic Council. (2025). The UN’s Western Sahara vote marks a diplomatic Green March. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/the-uns-western-sahara-vote-marks-a-diplomatic-green-march/ .

 

[xv]Foundation for Defense of Democracies. (2025, November 10). The Moroccan plan is a path to peace with Algeria. https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2025/11/10/the-moroccan-plan-is-a-path-to-peace-with-algeria/.

 

[xvi]Council on Foreign Relations. Morocco’s victory in Western Sahara. https://www.cfr.org/blog/moroccos-victory-western-sahara .

 

[xvii]Morocco Mail. (2025, October 27). Western Sahara: Polisario renews its refusal of all negotiations on autonomy. https://www.moroccomail.fr/2025/10/27/western-sahara-polisario-renew-its-refusal-to-all-negotiations-on-autonomy/ .

 

[xviii]U.S. Department of State. (1977–1980). Foreign Relations of the United States, Volume XVII, Middle East and North Africa, Document 221. Office of the Historian. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v17p3/d221 .

 

[xix]Grey Dynamics. (n.d.). The Polisario Front: An organisational overview. https://greydynamics.com/the-polisario-front-an-organisational-overview/ .

 

[xx]International Institute for Justice and Development. (2021, June 1). Legal rights owed to the Sahrawi: Self-determination and use of natural resources. https://www.iijd.org/2021/06/01/legal-rights-owed-to-the-sahrawi-self-determination-and-use-of-natural-resources/ .

 

[xxi]Middle East Monitor. (2022, September 10). Morocco to launch $213m agricultural project in Western Sahara. https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20220910-morocco-to-launch-213m-agricultural-project-in-western-sahara/.

 

[xxii]Foundation for Defense of Democracies. (2025, June 9). Why the Polisario Front threatens Morocco and the region. https://www.fdd.org/analysis/op_eds/2025/06/09/why-the-polisario-front-threatens-morocco-and-the-region/ .

 

[xxiii]Sahara Press Service. (2025, November 1). Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic news article. https://www.spsrasd.info/en/2025/11/01/12638.html .

 

 

[xxiv]Atlantic Council. Morocco and Israel are friendlier than ever thanks to the Abraham Accords but what does this mean for the rest of North Africa? https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/morocco-and-israel-are-friendlier-than-ever-thanks-to-the-abraham-accords-but-what-does-this-mean-for-the-rest-of-north-africa/ .

 

[xxv]Al-Resalah. Algerian party: We support the Palestinian resistance and reject normalization. https://alresalah.ps/post/250075/ .

 

[xxvi]Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. (2023, September). North Africa demurs on normalization with Israel. https://carnegieendowment.org/middle-east/diwan/2023/09/north-africa-demurs-on-normalization-with-israel?lang=en .

[xxvii] Manifestations in Morocco in support of normalization with Israel. https://www.syria.tv/%D9%85%D8%B8%D8%A7%D9%87%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%BA%D8%B1%D8%A8-

 

[xxviii]Al Sifr Foundation. . Normalization between Morocco & Israel. https://alsifr.org/normalization-between-morocco-israel .

 

[xxix]Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. (2023, September). North Africa demurs on normalization with Israel. https://carnegieendowment.org/middle-east/diwan/2023/09/north-africa-demurs-on-normalization-with-israel?lang=en .

 

[xxx]Institute for Security Studies. (2025). Western Sahara’s quest for independence seems to be flagging. https://issafrica.org/iss-today/western-sahara-s-quest-for-independence-seems-to-be-flagging .

 

[xxxi]Specialeurasia. (2025, November 4). UN, Western Sahara & Morocco. https://www.specialeurasia.com/2025/11/04/un-western-sahara-morocco/ .

 

[xxxii]International Crisis Group. Window for diplomacy in Western Sahara (Report B96). https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/western-sahara/b96-window-diplomacy-western-sahara .

 

[xxxiii]Human Rights Watch. (2025). World Report 2025: Morocco and Western Sahara. https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2025/country-chapters/morocco-and-western-sahara .