(This piece was translated from its original Arabic version by Al Sharq Strategic intern Tayseer Mohamedali)

For over a year now, Sudan has been in a tragic situation due to the ongoing war between the Sudanese army, led by General “Burhan,” and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), led by “Hemedti.” What prompted several international and regional parties to propose initiatives and mediation efforts amid continuous tensions and increasing complexities dominating the Sudanese scene since the outbreak of the conflict? The USA’s call for the resumption of talks between the Sudanese parties in Switzerland stands out, marking a new attempt to stop the escalation and achieve a peaceful settlement. This call comes at a sensitive time, as the country faces multiple crises on both humanitarian and political fronts.

The international community and regional mediators are closely watching the outcome of this initiative, wondering whether it can bring about significant change in the course of events, especially given the considerable challenges facing the warring parties on the ground. Meanwhile, responses to this call vary; some forces have expressed willingness to participate, while other parties express reservations and set preconditions for their participation. Questions remain about whether these talks can overcome the current challenges and lay the groundwork for a lasting political solution in Sudan.

Early Attempts in the Negotiation Tracks:

The Role of IGAD:

The first attempts began with the IGAD initiative (a semi-regional organization founded in 1996, known as the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, comprising eight countries: Djibouti, Sudan, South Sudan, Somalia, Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia, and recently Eritrea). Supported by the African Union, it formed a quadripartite committee consisting of Ethiopia, Djibouti, Kenya, and South Sudan, known as the Quadripartite Mechanism. Initially, this initiative gained international momentum with the participation of the United States, the UK, France, Italy, Norway, and Sweden. It was seen as a framework based on previous initiatives, receiving support due to its regional nature of initiation and deeper understanding of the Sudanese crisis. The initiative’s initial resolutions called for an immediate ceasefire and a return to dialogue. (‎1)

Later, during the IGAD meetings, the Ethiopian Prime Minister called for a no-fly zone over Sudan, military intervention, and the withdrawal of heavy weapons from the warring parties. The Sudanese government rejected the outcomes of the IGAD summit, which was attended by army chief General Abdel Fattah Burhan in December 2023, only to accept them later, besides Burhan expressing his readiness to meet the RSF leader. Still, Hemedti declined this initiative for undisclosed reasons. In January, the IGAD held another summit in Uganda, which Burhan boycotted, and his government subsequently suspended Sudan’s membership in the organization, opting instead for a return to the Jeddah platform.

Sudan’s Neighboring Countries Initiative (Egyptian Initiative):

Following the failure of the IGAD initiative and escalating tensions between IGAD leadership and the Sudanese Sovereignty Council, Egyptian President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi launched a new initiative called the “Sudan’s Neighboring Countries Summit.” This summit aimed to achieve a peaceful and effective settlement of the Sudanese crisis through coordination between neighboring countries and other regional and international tracks by formulating a shared vision. Egypt’s approach focused on four points: halting the escalation and starting serious negotiations, facilitating the delivery of humanitarian aid to those affected by the war, initiating an inclusive dialogue involving Sudanese political and civil forces, and forming a communication mechanism to develop an executive action plan for a comprehensive resolution to the crisis. ‎(2)

Many were optimistic about the Egyptian initiative as it involved all neighboring countries affected by the war. Observers believed Egypt had taken over from IGAD, which was seen as biased and interventionist. However, this initiative followed the same path as IGAD’s and ultimately failed. The absence of political will from all parties of the conflict, and the belief by each side that it could defeat the other, played a role in this failure. External parties also exacerbated the conflict by providing political and military support to the warring factions, which prolonged the war. Without this external support, neither side could have continued the conflict, especially given Sudan’s dire economic conditions. Various forms of foreign intervention included material, military, and logistical support, along with allowing the passage of aid through borders from certain countries. Some countries even have allegations of limited direct involvement in the conflict.

The Jeddah Platform and the Civilian Objects Dilemma:

The U.S.-Saudi mediation in May 2023, held in Jeddah, brought together Sudanese parties in a rare opportunity for serious discussions about the crisis. This was the last time the parties had come close to reaching an agreement on a ceasefire plan. Key terms included the RSF’s withdrawal from civilian areas, including citizens’ homes and government institutions, and the gathering of RSF forces at specific locations outside the capital, Khartoum. At the time, the war had not yet spread to other states. However, this agreement was not realized, and the war escalated and spread beyond control. The army remains steadfast in its demand for the RSF to withdraw from civilian sites as a precondition for any dialogue. The failure to establish an effective mechanism to implement this condition contributed to the initiative’s collapse, like those before it. (‎3)

In May 2024, the U.S. attempted to resume negotiations in Jeddah, with U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken urging General Burhan to return immediately to Jeddah and resume talks while addressing humanitarian aid delivery. The response came the next day from the Deputy Chairman of the Sudanese Sovereignty Council, General Malik Agar, who fiercely rejected the idea, saying, “We will not go to Jeddah, and anyone who wants to take us there can come and carry our corpses … When you deal with them, the world offers you poison on a silver plate. If you don’t deal with them, they put the poison in your path. But we must deal with the world wisely and with great care. The world does not want Sudan to be a strong or sovereign state, nor does it want sovereignty for Sudan. The result of this is the current war”. He further criticized Blinken’s remarks as condescending and disrespectful, which no one would accept. (‎4)

Abiy Ahmed’s Visit, Bin Zayed’s Call, and Easing Tensions

In early July 2024, Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed made a landmark visit to Sudan, becoming the first foreign head of state to visit the country since the war began in April 2023. His plane landed at the temporary capital of Port Sudan, with observers interpreting the visit as part of a coordinated effort between the key players in the Sudanese crisis. Just days after, Saudi Arabia’s Deputy Foreign Minister and the U.S. envoy to Sudan had also visited. Analysts suggested these moves were part of a broader agenda agreed upon by relevant stakeholders in the Sudanese crisis. This was further confirmed when the UAE President, Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed, spoke with General Burhan, though no official statement was issued about the call’s content. Most analyses point toward a shared objective: creating a conducive environment for resuming negotiations and addressing Sudan’s escalating humanitarian and security situation amidst fears that the country could spiral into a full-blown war, creating even more complexity and chaos.

From Jeddah to Switzerland: A Renewed Call for Dialogue

On July 23, 2024, the U.S. renewed its call for the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces to return to the ceasefire talks. The negotiations, co-hosted by Saudi Arabia and Switzerland, were scheduled for August 14, with Egypt, the UAE, the African Union, and the United Nations participating as observers. In a statement, Secretary of State Blinken outlined the aim of the Swiss talks: to reach a nationwide ceasefire, ensure the delivery of humanitarian aid to all those in need, and develop a robust monitoring mechanism to ensure the implementation of any agreement. Blinken’s statement clarified that the talks were not intended to address broader political issues, signaling that the root causes of the crisis—namely, the political disputes between various Sudanese factions and their failure to agree on a unified vision for the transitional period—would not be on the agenda. (‎5)

Parties’ Responses to the U.S. Invitation

The RSF welcomed the U.S. invitation, with its leader announcing that the RSF would participate in the August 14 ceasefire talks in Switzerland. In his statement, the RSF commander said, “The RSF will participate in the U.S.-mediated talks starting on August 14 in Switzerland to achieve a comprehensive ceasefire across the country.” He added, “We are ready to engage in these talks constructively and hope they will represent a significant step toward peace, stability, and the establishment of a new Sudanese state based on justice, equality, and federal governance.” (‎6)

The Sudanese government responded in a statement through Sudan’s Foreign Ministry, which stressed that any talks must be preceded by consultations with the Sudanese government on the agenda and participants. The ministry also called for direct conversations between Sudan and the U.S. to prepare for the talks. Furthermore, the ministry’s statement reiterated that any negotiations prior to the adherence to the terms of the Jeddah Agreement, which stipulates the complete withdrawal of the RSF from cities and towns and an end to attacks on civilians as a prerequisite for any peace discussions, will not be accepted. The government also rejected the UAE’s participation in the negotiations, citing accusations of Emirati support for the RSF. (‎7)

Challenges to the Army’s Participation

The ongoing war has created unprecedented humanitarian suffering, putting immense pressure on the army to seek a way out by any means necessary. However, the military confrontations and RSF actions have set the stage for a different course of action. The Sudanese Armed Forces face several challenges, including:

  1. The Sudanese Sovereignty Council fears that going to Switzerland without implementing the Jeddah agreements will undermine what was agreed upon previously.
  2. The army’s reluctance to engage with certain regional parties that the U.S. named observers in the Swiss talks, particularly those accused of supporting the RSF, charged them with bias and non-neutrality, such as the UAE and the IGAD forum.
  3. The army’s insistence on implementing the Jeddah Agreement of May 2023, particularly the provision requiring the RSF to withdraw from civilian homes and institutions, and regroup in agreed-upon locations.
  4. Strong opposition from a wide range of political and civil forces and youth groups voluntarily fighting alongside the army. These groups, especially those whose homes were occupied and whose properties were looted, vehemently reject any negotiations with those they consider occupiers and criminals.
  5. The army’s military position in certain regions requires progress and victory, such as the complete liberation of the Gezira and Sennar states, or any strategically important state, which would grant the army, and its supporters leverage to impose certain conditions.

Pressures at Play

It is clear to observers that the United States has exerted significant influence in the Sudanese crisis this time, applying pressure through various mechanisms, with assistance from its regional allies.

  • A summit of international mediators was held in Djibouti, led by the personal envoy of the UN Secretary-General, Ambassador Ramtane Lamamra, with the participation of over 20 countries, as well as the African Union, the Arab League, IGAD, and several international observers. The summit discussed coordinating proposed peace initiatives for Sudan and the critical circumstances the country is facing, alongside the catastrophic consequences of the ongoing fighting. This may be seen as part of the arrangements for upcoming talks, whether those called for by the United States or other future dialogues. (‎8)
  • Furthermore, Al-Ahdath News reported that, following its call for peace talks, the U.S. will send two senior officials to Sudan as part of what has been described as an active American effort to address the Sudanese crisis. These officials are Samantha Power, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) Administrator, and the U.S. Special Envoy for Sudan, Tom Perriello. They are scheduled to visit in early August. This could potentially help restore the trust that has reached its lowest point between Sudan and the U.S. since the crisis began. (‎9)

Despite increasing U.S. pressure on the Sudanese Armed Forces, all indications point to the likelihood that the army will refuse to participate in the Swiss talks, primarily due to its objection to the presence of certain parties as observers. Additionally, the army believes the mediators have not pressured the Rapid Support Forces enough. If the army’s conditions are unmet or a major party is absent in the talks, negotiations might focus solely on humanitarian issues and aim to reach an agreement on delivering aid to war-affected areas.

With the war expanding and civilian suffering worsening, there is growing pressure on the mediators to find a solution to alleviate the humanitarian crisis, which remains the initiative’s primary objective. This time, the efforts may be more serious than previous attempts, as evidenced by mobilizing the necessary elements for the initiative’s success. Moreover, according to recent statements, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken has taken personal leadership of the talks.

The Sudanese army is also expected to adopt a different approach toward this initiative. General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan invited three neighboring heads of state—Egypt, Uganda, and Eritrea—to visit Sudan before delivering a response to the U.S. invitation. Burhan may be seeking to impose conditions that would serve the army’s interests. If the initiative progresses, it could pave the way for a comprehensive political settlement, starting with a nationwide ceasefire, and eventually evolving into negotiations among all concerned parties, leading to a political resolution of the crisis.

References:

  1. مبادرات متعددة.. هل تنجح الوساطات الإفريقية في إنهاء أزمة السودان؟ (Multiple Initiatives: Will African Mediation Succeed in Ending the Sudan Crisis?), Al-Araby, 15/7/2023, alaraby.com
  2. دول جوار السودان” الهيئة العامة للاستعلامات المصرية (Sudan Neighboring Countries Summit) Egyptian State Information Service), 13/7/2023, https://www.sis.gov.eg/
  3. ، الجزيرة نت تكشف تفاصيل مفاوضات جدة وشروط الجيش السوداني وطلبات الدعم السريع (Nour Ahmed Nour, Al Jazeera Reveals Details of Jeddah Negotiations, Sudanese Army Conditions, and Rapid Support Forces’ Demands), 9/5/2023, aljazeera.com
  4. وصفها بالاستخفاف، مالك عقار يرفض العودة إلى منبر جدة، (Amer Saleh, Describing it as Disrespect, Malik Agar Rejects Return to Jeddah Platform), 29/05/2024, Sudan Ultra, ultrasudan.ultrasawt.com
  5. The United States Invites the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces to Ceasefire Talks, Press Release, 23/7/2024, state.gov
  6. الدعم السريع ترد على دعوة أمريكية لمحادثات سلام في سويسرا، (Rapid Support Forces Respond to U.S. Invitation for Peace Talks in Switzerland), Alhurra, https://www.alhurra.com/
  7. Sudan Sets Conditions for U.S.-Supported Peace Negotiations, 30/7/2024, https://sudantribune.com
  8. مشاورات بين الوسطاء الدوليين في جيبوتي لوقف الحرب في السودان، صحيفة سودان اندبندنت (Consultations Between International Mediators in Djibouti to Stop the War in Sudan), Sudan Independent Newspaper, 25/7/2024, sudanindependent.com
  9. سامانثا باور ومبعوث واشنطن يزوران السودان مطلع (Al Ahdaath News: Samantha Power and Washington’s Envoy to Visit Sudan in Early August), 25/7/2024, https://alahdaathnews.com/