Iran-U.S. negotiations are currently underway, with both sides having entered technical talks to examine the details in pursuit of a framework agreement.

Following Donald Trump’s victory in the U.S. presidential election in 2024, Iran’s nuclear issue became a priority on his administration’s agenda. In his first term, Trump withdrew from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2018—a deal reached in 2015 between Iran and the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (the U.S., Russia, China, the UK, and France) plus Germany, a non-permanent member.

The Trump administration, by imposing secondary sanctions on Iran, sought a deal better than what the Obama administration had signed. This led Iran to reduce its commitments under the JCPOA and increase uranium enrichment from the 3.67 percent limit set by the agreement to 60 percent. According to the latest report by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in February 2025, the stock of uranium enriched to 60 percent in the form of uranium hexafluoride grew by 92.5 kilograms in the past quarter, reaching a total of 274.8 kilograms.

It is worth noting that roughly 42 kilograms of 60%-enriched uranium is sufficient to produce a nuclear bomb, though the uranium must be enriched to 90 percent for weapons-grade material.

With Trump’s re-election in 2024, he expressed willingness to reach a new agreement with Iran, although he also raised the possibility of military action in the absence of a deal.

Following his return to power, a period of heightened tensions between Iran and the U.S. began, which ultimately led to talks between the two sides starting on April 12, 2025 in Muscat, Oman.

One major reason for the parties’ preference for diplomacy is the high cost of non-agreement. Accordingly, the need for a deal has been acknowledged.

Several factors forced Iran to come to the negotiating table: the country’s poor economic situation and the need for sanctions relief, regional isolation and the weakening of proxy forces, the potential activation of the snapback mechanism, and military threats from Israel and the U.S. against its nuclear facilities.

From the U.S. perspective, growing concerns over Iran’s nuclear program triggered the negotiations. Although some in the Trump administration may favor military action, another view—represented by Steve Witkoff, Trump’s special envoy in talks with Iran—holds that diplomacy is the best way to contain Iran’s nuclear ambitions.

Washington is also concerned that Iran’s possible withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and changes to its nuclear doctrine could destabilize the region and spark a nuclear arms race, posing an existential threat to both Israel and the U.S. Additionally, this would hinder America’s strategy of containing China and draw Washington deeper into the Middle East.

Ahmad Haghtalab, the Guards commander in charge of nuclear security, became the first Iranian military official to openly suggest, following Israeli threats against Iran’s nuclear facilities, that the Islamic Republic may reconsider its nuclear doctrine and deviate from our previous considerations.

A Positive Negotiation Trend

The two rounds of Iran-U.S. talks—first in Muscat (April 12) and then in Rome, Italy (April 19)—have reportedly yielded positive results, according to both Iranian and American officials. The negotiations have now entered an expert-level phase to examine technical details.

Currently, three major issues are under serious discussion: 1. The scope of the negotiations—whether they will be limited to the nuclear issue or also include Iran’s missile program and regional policies; 2. The acceptable level of Iran’s uranium enrichment for the U.S.; 3. The duration of the understanding and agreement.

So far, the talks appear to be aimed at achieving a limited agreement, and non-nuclear issues, such as Iran’s missile program, have not been formally addressed. Nevertheless, Witkoff told Fox News on April 14 that “The conversation with the Iranians will be much about two critical points.” The first is verification of uranium enrichment, “and ultimately verification on weaponization, that includes missiles, type of missiles that they have stockpiled there, and it includes the trigger for a bomb.”

In contrast, Iran’s foreign minister, Abbas Araghchi, stated after the second round of negotiation with the U.S. that ‘so far’ no non-nuclear issues have been raised in the negotiations.

On the other hand, as seen in the positions previously expressed by Witkoff, he is not advocating for the complete dismantling of Iran’s nuclear program in the manner of the Libya model, and he has deemed Iran’s 3.67 percent uranium enrichment level as acceptable.

It appears that regarding Iran’s regional policies, the Trump administration intends to address the issue by exerting pressure on regional countries such as Iraq and Lebanon. Moreover, countering Iran’s regional threats may involve forming regional alliances and enhancing conventional military capabilities. Of course, this does not mean that the U.S. will not have demands regarding Iran’s regional policy. It seems this issue will also be raised, and Iran will be asked to cease its support for groups such as Lebanon’s Hezbollah and the Popular Mobilization Forces, which could be achieved by supporting the disarmament process or integrating these groups into the armies of Lebanon and Iraq.

Moreover, supporting proxy forces in the region has become increasingly difficult for Iran. After the October 7, 2023, Hamas attack on Israel and Israel’s retaliatory actions, Iran’s proxy forces in the region, such as Hezbollah, Hamas (Although they are not direct representatives of Iran( and Bashar al-Assad regime have been weakened or overthrown. According to the ceasefire deal with Hezbollah based on UN Security Council Resolution 1701, the group is to be disarmed.

Joseph Aoun, the President of Lebanon, has pledged to enforce the state’s monopoly on weapons. However, he emphasized that this is a “sensitive” issue and must be pursued through dialogue at an appropriate time.

Mojtaba Amani, Iran’s ambassador to Lebanon, reacted to the issue of disarming Hezbollah in a post on the social media platform X (formerly Twitter). Without explicitly naming Hezbollah, he wrote that “the disarmament plan is a clear conspiracy against governments.” He stated that this conspiracy could endanger the security of the region’s people and warned, “We must not fall into the enemy’s trap.”

These remarks led to his summoning by the Lebanese Foreign Ministry. Following this, Amani, in an interview with the Lebanese network Al-Jadeed, reiterated that the disarmament of Hezbollah is an “internal matter” for Lebanon and that Iran “will not interfere in it.” He said, “We abide by the decisions of Lebanese institutions,” adding, “There is occupation in Lebanon, there are attacks, there is the threat of Israel, and there is a group that wants to defend itself.”

Hamas has also been significantly weakened in the Gaza war and, according to ceasefire proposals—such as Egypt’s plan—will not have a role in governing Gaza in the future.

Furthermore, Syria, which was the only state (other than Iran) in the ‘Axis of Resistance,’ has fallen into the hands of opponents of Iran following the collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s regime. This has effectively cut Iran’s land and logistical routes to its proxy forces in the region, including Hezbollah. In addition, Lebanon’s new government has imposed severe restrictions on Iran’s logistical access to Hezbollah, including the suspension of Iranian flights to Lebanon.

Overall, the Iran-U.S. talks so far have resulted in a mutual understanding regarding the framework of a deal, a timeline, and entry into a technical review phase.

Among the technical details under discussion are issues such as the status of Iran’s highly enriched uranium stockpile; the mechanism for monitoring nuclear facilities; the estimated time for Iran to reach ‘nuclear threshold’; the process of lifting sanctions; guarantees to prevent Iran from deviating from the agreement; and mechanisms to prevent U.S. withdrawal from the deal.

According to some reports, Iran has agreed to transfer its highly enriched uranium stockpile to a third country such as Russia and has raised the possibility of a joint venture to run its nuclear enrichment facilities.

Arab Gulf states’ Approach

Arab states of the Persian Gulf, in contrast to their stance during Trump’s first term—when they opposed the JCPOA—now support a nuclear agreement with Iran. For example, Saudi Arabia took a cautious position a decade ago and supported Trump’s withdrawal from the JCPOA in 2018. However, it currently favors reaching a JCPOA-like agreement with Iran.

A possible direct war between Iran and Israel/U.S. could pose serious threats to these countries, undermining their economic Visions. Prior to the October 7, 2023, Hamas attack on Israel, Iran-Israel confrontations occurred within the “gray zone,” with limited scope and without huge impact on regional states.

But since October 7, 2023 Iran and Israel have twice engaged in direct military war. One of the main reasons the two sides entered into direct war was that prior to this, the conflict had been in a ‘gray zone,’ with Iran primarily responding to Israel’s intelligence and security sabotage operations through proxy forces or its own covert actions. However, after Israel’s attack on the consular annex building adjacent to the Iranian embassy—which killed 16 people, including Mohammad Reza Zahedi, a senior commander of the IRGC Quds Force, and Mohammad Hadi Haji Rahimi, another high-ranking Quds Force commander—Iran declared it a violation of its own territory and launched an attack against Israel.

In effect, Iran responded to an Israeli intelligence and security operation with a military strike—a response that highlights Iran’s weakness in intelligence and security operations. Moreover, the escalation into direct military conflict raises the level of tension and the risk of its spread across the region. In response, regional countries have declared neutrality to avoid being drawn into the war. Although after October 7, 2023, groups such as Lebanon’s Hezbollah, Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), and Yemen’s Houthis also entered the conflict, further destabilizing the region.

Despite the reciprocal attacks between Iran and Israel, no strikes have been carried out against Iran’s nuclear sites, and no major escalation has occurred. However, there are concerns that any further escalation between Iran and Israel/U.S. could spill over into the region.

This is particularly alarming as the foreign policy of regional states is increasingly focused on development and economic cooperation, which depend on regional stability and, more importantly, the integration of economic and transit chains across the region.

For instance, Saudi Arabia, in pursuit of its Vision 2030, is striving to diversify its economy, reduce dependency on oil, and transform itself into a regional hub for trade, technology, and tourism. As such, the prospect of renewed conflict in the region poses a serious threat to these ambitions.

Previously, Saudi Arabia, in response to the ambiguous U.S. policy toward the kingdom—such as Washington’s lack of reaction to the military attack on Aramco in 2019—turned to political and security balancing (Hedging strategy) in both its regional and extra-regional relations. This included closer ties with Russia and China, and one of the outcomes of this shift has been enhanced cooperation with Iran and Turkey. At the same time, Riyadh has also pursued normalization of relations with Israel and participation in initiatives such as the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC). Although this project has not yet made any significant physical progress due to geopolitical hurdles.

Accordingly, with the start of negotiations between Iran and U.S. in Muscat, the Arab Gulf states have welcomed and supported the talks, viewing them as contributing to regional stability.

In sum, the ongoing negotiations between Iran and U.S. appear to be aimed at reaching a limited rather than comprehensive agreement. Iran is likely to offer a few temporary restrictions on uranium enrichment in order to prompt Trump to ease parts of the ‘maximum pressure’ campaign, avoid military threats and the activation of the snapback mechanism, and buy time—potentially paving the way for a ‘comprehensive agreement’ in the future.

The three main points of contention between Iran and the U.S.—nuclear, missile, and regional issues—remain unresolved, though currently only the nuclear issue is officially on the negotiation table.

However, the issue of Iran’s missile program was raised by Steve Witkoff in an interview with Fox News, on 14 April, 2025. It’s important to note that each of these issues carries its own complexities. For instance, verification mechanisms in the nuclear issues differ significantly from those in missile technology, where there is no binding international treaty like the NPT (Non-Proliferation Treaty) to restrict missile activities—unless voluntarily agreed upon.

Regarding Iran’s support for proxy forces, it’s worth noting that groups such as Lebanon’s Hezbollah are currently weakened. While Hezbollah and Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) retain roles in their respective countries’ political and security structures, their ability to act as decisive regional players in the future appears limited. Logistically, rebuilding and reinforcing these groups would also pose challenges for Iran. That said, Iran may not obstruct efforts to disarm or integrate them into their national armies.

Consequently, given the complexity of reaching a ‘comprehensive agreement,’ a ‘temporary deal’ between Iran and the U.S. may emerge as a first step—though Washington remains reluctant, insisting on a comprehensive agreement. Failure to reach a negotiated solution could heighten the risk of military action by Israel, backed by the U.S. However, such an attack risks exacerbating regional tensions and instability, complicating the Trump administration’s Middle East agenda and its strategy to contain China. Moreover, a strike could prompt Iran to revise its nuclear doctrine—a move that would likely trigger severe repercussions from the international community, particularly Israel and the U.S.