The 12-day war between Iran and Israel served as a geopolitical turning point that transformed the balance of power in the Middle East and signaled the emergence of a new regional order. This war exposed Iran’s weaknesses in maintaining its proxy network and the “Shiite Crescent” project. It also demonstrated that Arab countries, despite efforts to stay out of the conflict, could not completely avoid its repercussions—though de-escalation with Iran prevented the war from spreading to these countries.

Iran’s attack on the U.S. Al-Udeid Air Base in Qatar, in retaliation for the U.S. strike on its nuclear facilities, challenged the security policies of the Gulf states. These countries had sought to balance their security interests with the risks of conflict with Iran by hosting U.S. forces, but this attack revealed the vulnerabilities of such strategies.  

By targeting CENTCOM’s headquarters at Al-Udeid, Tehran conveyed two main messages:  

  1. Controlled exit from the crisis: The attack was a calculated move to demonstrate deterrence while creating a path to reduce tensions.  
  2. Warning to U.S. regional allies: Iran showed that even major U.S. bases in Gulf countries were not immune to its attacks, despite these countries’ security assurances that their territory would not be used for strikes against Iran. In reality, this event also made clear to GCC countries how limited the impact of their security guarantees—particularly their commitment not to allow their soil to be used for unjustified U.S. attacks on Iran—was on Iran’s behavior.

The launch of ballistic missiles that lit up Doha’s sky and sent civilians fleeing to shelters in several Gulf countries had a profound psychological impact on the leaders and people of the GCC states.  

The GCC member states collectively condemned the U.S.-Israeli attacks on Iran’s nuclear facilities and explicitly declared that they would not allow U.S. bases on their soil to be used against Iran.  

This stance reflected a significant shift in these countries’ approach toward Iran, as they had moved toward de-escalation and normalization in recent years. The turning point in this transformation was the 2019 attack on Aramco facilities in Saudi Arabia, which, due to the weak U.S. response, pushed Riyadh to reconsider its policies.  

The outcome of this reassessment was the initiation of a multi-year normalization process that ultimately led to the March 2023 agreement in Beijing, after which most GCC members—except Bahrain—resumed full diplomatic relations with Tehran.  

Despite significant improvements in Iran’s relations with Arab Gulf states, including regular diplomatic dialogues and high-level security and defense contacts, tensions between Iran and the U.S. persisted due to the deadlock in nuclear negotiations, Tehran’s support for Russia in the Ukraine war, and escalating conflicts with Israel after October 2023.  

From Tehran’s perspective, normalized relations with Arab neighbors created a clear rift between U.S. positions and those of GCC countries, as these states not only refused to provide territory or airspace for U.S. military operations against Iran but also did not participate in Washington’s military actions against the Houthis in Yemen and the Red Sea. These developments indicated the emergence of a more independent approach from traditional U.S. policies in the region.  

GCC countries now face a security paradox: The U.S. military presence, once seen as a guarantor of their security, has become a trigger for Iranian retaliatory actions. This paradigm shift became evident when the Trump administration, disregarding the concerns of regional allies, joined Israel in attacking Iran’s nuclear facilities and continued to threaten renewed conflict if Iran resumed uranium enrichment.  

In this context, Gulf states are confronted with a dual challenge—on one hand, their inability to secure strong security guarantees from Iran regarding attacks on U.S. bases on their soil, and on the other, the persistence of U.S. military options against Iran, which itself is a source of regional instability. This situation has fundamentally altered traditional security equations in the region, forcing Arab states to radically rethink their security strategies.  

Under these circumstances, GCC countries may not be able to obtain stronger commitments from Iran to refrain from attacking U.S. bases on their territory as long as the option of U.S. military action against Iran remains on the table.  

On the other hand, despite the weakening of Iran’s nuclear and missile capabilities in the attacks by Israel and the U.S., this war paradoxically increased Arab concerns about Israel’s expanding influence in the region, which could lead to a convergence of security perspectives between Iran and Arab countries—and even Turkey—in certain areas.  

Israel has now emerged as an unrestrained and dominant military power that operates under a preemptive strike doctrine. Recent developments—from Hamas’s October 7 attack to Israel’s assaults on Gaza, clashes with Hezbollah in Lebanon, confrontations with the Houthis in Yemen, and the situation in Syria—all reflect Tel Aviv’s efforts to impose a new security order under the label of the “New Middle East.”

Vali Nasr, a prominent analyst and advisor to the Obama administration, believes that the recent 12-day war was designed to cement Israel’s hegemony as the region’s unrivaled power with full U.S. support. This strategy was crafted to leave no room for regional rivals and to establish a unilateral security order.

The recent war clearly showed that the U.S., in prioritizing its interests, consistently favors Israel over its Arab allies—though this may not visibly affect the continuation of the “Abraham Accords.” 

However, it has slowed the normalization process and made the formation of Israel’s desired regional coalition against Iran more difficult.  

This U.S. behavior has deepened Gulf Arab countries’ understanding of Washington’s unconditional support for Israel and reinforced their long-standing criticisms of the West’s double standards in international policymaking. Clear examples of these double standards include the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 while turning a blind eye to Israel’s ongoing occupation of Palestine, as well as Washington’s hostile reactions to international court rulings against Israel.  

Meanwhile, Gulf states are strengthening their defensive capabilities against regional threats through security cooperation with the U.S., including arms sales and programs such as the “Red Sands” center in Saudi Arabia and the security agreement with Bahrain. The U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) is also expanding the “Integrated Red Sands Testing Center” in Saudi Arabia to enhance regional cooperation against Iranian missile and drone threats and those of its allies.  

U.S.-Gulf security relations, despite some disagreements over issues such as the UAE’s ties with Russia, responses to Houthi attacks, and ongoing Saudi-Iran relations, have continued in a more flexible and transactional form.  

The recent 12-day war, on one hand, revealed the weaknesses of the U.S. security umbrella but, on the other, proved that this very U.S. presence prevents the escalation of regional conflicts. The decline of Iran’s influence in the region, particularly its exit from Syria, marks an unprecedented shift in the Middle East over the past two decades—one that could reduce sectarian tensions stemming from the U.S. invasion of Iraq and the rise of Shiite power there.  

In the short term, the new regional order will rely on the weakening of Iran and the expansion of Israel’s influence, but Tel Aviv cannot consolidate this order without sustained U.S. support.  

Although the fall of Assad in Syria weakened Iran’s axis and created opportunities for Gulf states to increase their influence while elevating Turkey’s regional role, Israel’s attacks on Syria and its attempts to fragment the country—including creating a buffer zone in the south under the pretext of protecting the Druze—pose a threat to the interests of both Turkey and Iran.  

Regional countries want to maintain the U.S. security order but avoid being drawn into Iran-Israel tensions, as their priority is economic development and regional stability. Any large-scale conflict could harm their economies, as seen during the 12-day war with the closure of airspace and stock market crashes.

Following Trump’s successful visit to the region in May 2024, Gulf leaders believed their trillion-dollar investments in the U.S. provided sufficient incentive for Trump to maintain regional stability. This visit bolstered hopes for new U.S. approaches to resolving regional disputes, especially after Washington’s agreement with the Houthis, which signaled a preference for transactional diplomacy.  

Gulf Arabs, who are pursuing major economic projects like the IMEC corridor, see regional stability as essential. This is why they turned to de-escalation with Iran in 2023 and disbanded sectarian-inciting institutions.  

However, the Gaza war exposed underlying differences in security priorities, as Arab states—particularly Saudi Arabia—adopted noticeably tougher stances toward Israel. The shift in Mohammed bin Salman’s position from expressing hope for normalization in 2023 to condemning Israel’s genocide in 2024 highlighted these growing tensions.  

Sunni-majority countries led by Saudi Arabia and Turkey are working to steer post-Assad Syria away from Iran’s orbit.  

Although Iran’s proxy network has weakened, its revival in the future cannot be ruled out. Meanwhile, uncertainties about the future regional order and Israel’s role persist.  

In sum, The Middle East is transitioning to a non-ideological order where economics and technology outweigh revolutionary rhetoric. While Israel has emerged as the region’s dominant military power, this position depends on sustained U.S. backing. Though Iran has been militarily weakened, its cultural influence in Iraq and Lebanon endures. Gulf states, while wary of Iran’s missile capabilities, view nuclear conflict as the greater threat to their economic projects. To avoid being caught in Iran-Israel/U.S. wars, they will continue pursuing delicate balancing acts and hedging strategies. The future of Iran’s nuclear negotiations and developments in Syria will largely determine the contours of the regional order.