Introduction

The bilateral Turkish–Libyan memorandum was signed on November 27, 2019, in Istanbul, following a meeting between the Prime Minister of Libya’s Government of National Accord (GNA), Fayez al Sarraj, and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. Originally established to delineate maritime boundaries and pave the way for future energy cooperation, the agreement represented a strategic move intended to reshape the balance of power in the Eastern Mediterranean. It enabled Türkiye to expand its energy exploration activities and strengthen its geopolitical influence, culminating in the deployment of Turkish exploration vessels in contested maritime zones.

In recent years, the deal has remained a central issue in regional politics. Following Libya’s political split and the emergence of two rival administrations, the Government of National Unity (GNU) based in Tripoli under Prime Minister Abdul Hamid Dbeibah, and the House of Representatives–backed government in eastern Libya led by Osama Hammad, the maritime agreement continues to generate controversy. The Tripoli-based GNU maintains cooperation with Türkiye and has reaffirmed its commitment to the 2019 memorandum through subsequent energy and exploration deals. However, the eastern-based authorities have rejected the agreement, calling it illegitimate without parliamentary approval.

Regionally, the accord still strains Türkiye’s relations with Greece and Egypt, both of which remain opposed in 2025, arguing it violates their maritime zones and international law. This ongoing tension reflects the broader geopolitical contest over energy and maritime boundaries in the Eastern Mediterranean. At the same time, regional alignments excluding Türkiye have become more visible , particularly through growing cooperation between Israel, Greece, and the Greek Cypriot Administration. This raises the question: How does the Turkish–Libyan maritime agreement function as a strategic and political instrument for Ankara and Tripoli amid competing regional alliances, contested legal legitimacy, and shifting energy dynamics in the Eastern Mediterranean?

Strategic Interests and Regional Reactions

The Mediterranean Sea holds immense strategic importance due to its location between Asia, Africa, and Europe and its vital maritime routes such as the Strait of Gibraltar, the Suez Canal, and the Turkish Straits. It is a major hub of global trade and a region rich in natural resources.

In recent years, growing discoveries of oil and gas, particularly in the Eastern Mediterranean near Cyprus, have fueled intense international and regional competition over control of these resources. According to a U.S. Geological Survey report, the total energy reserves in the Mediterranean amount to around $30 billion, with an estimated market value of $1.5 trillion.

Within this context, the growing cooperation between Israel, Greece, and Greek Cyprus has evolved into what is increasingly perceived in Ankara as a strategic alignment that indirectly targets Turkiye. Tripartie summit, expanding energy cooperation, and increasing military coordination are often framed as part of a broader effort to contain Türkiye’s influence. Cyprus is portrayed as a key strategic hub in this alignment, while Turkish analysts as carrying implicit military view energy security and cyber security initiatives and surveillance.

However, this view mainly reflects a Turkish security-focused perspective. Although cooperation between Israel, Greece, and Greek Cyprus has clearly increased, especially in energy and defense, these countries officially present their cooperation as defensive and aimed at stability, not as being directly against Türkiye. Therefore, this alignment is better understood as part of a regional security dilemma, where overlapping maritime claims, competition over energy resources, and mutual distrust push states to work more closely together.

Turkey’s Strategic Interests

Türkiye’s involvement in Libya remains central to its strategy of expanding influence across the Eastern Mediterranean and Africa. In September 2024, Türkiye’s Energy Minister Alparslan Bayraktar announced Ankara’s readiness to conduct offshore exploration with Libya’s Tripoli-based authorities, emphasizing that Turkey “can be in the Libyan offshore to carry out seismic work”. This signaled Türkiye’s transition from political declarations to operational engagement.

By June 2025, this intent materialized when Libya’s National Oil Corporation (NOC) and Türkiye’s Turkish Petroleum Corporation (TPAO) signed a memorandum of understanding for joint geological and geophysical studies in four maritime zones. This agreement effectively implemented parts of the 2019 maritime memorandum and reinforced the Tripoli government’s commitment to cooperation with Ankara. The move also drew renewed criticism from Greece and Egypt, both of which argued that such actions violated their maritime jurisdictions. In response, the Turkish Foreign Ministry Hakan Fidan reiterated in June 2025 that the maritime deal with Libya is “fully consistent with international law” and “legally binding”.

At the regional level, the maritime dispute remains one of the most divisive issues in Mediterranean geopolitics. In July 2025, Greece sought to de-escalate tensions by inviting Libya’s Government of National Unity (GNU) to negotiate the demarcation of exclusive economic zones, signaling a shift from confrontation to cautious diplomacy. While Egypt adopted a more confrontational stance. Although Egypt has described it’s approximately 35 billion natural gas deal with Israel as purely commercial and non-political the scale and duration of the agreement give it clear geopolitical implications. Large-scale energy cooperation of this magnitude inevitably deepens strategic interdependence between Egypt and Israel and contributes to shaping regional energy alignments in ways that indirectly marginalize Türkiye. The insistence on its commercial nature appears aimed at managing domestic and regional sensitivities, even as it reinforces existing power and energy structures in the Eastern Mediterranean.  

Meanwhile, Türkiye’s relations with the eastern-based Libyan authorities, including those aligned with General Khalifa Haftar, have shown signs of cautious normalization. Although Haftar previously rejected the maritime deal, recent reports suggest he has adopted a more pragmatic stance, focusing on maintaining political relevance and economic benefit rather than outright opposition. This subtle shift reflects Ankara’s broader strategy of balancing relations across Libya’s divided factions to safeguard its long-term influence and energy access.

Türkiye’s involvement in Libya has shifted from a focus on military action to a broader political and economic partnership. By expanding its role in Libya’s energy sector and maintaining relations with both western and eastern groups, it’s clear that Türkiye aims to strengthen its control over Mediterranean trade routes and establish itself as an important power in the region.

Libya’s Strategic Interests

For Libya, the maritime agreement represented a major strategic gain, enabling the country to reclaim vast naval areas and granting it the right to explore and exploit natural resources, particularly oil and gas, in potentially resource-rich zones. He added that the maritime boundary agreement was concluded in accordance with international law and registered with the United Nations, emphasizing that it safeguards both nations’ sovereignty and mutual interests. These agreements, he noted, reflect the two countries’ determination to protect their strategic interests amid ongoing tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean over maritime rights and energy resources. Prime Minister Abdul Hamid Dbeibeh affirmed Libya’s right to the waters south of Crete, stating that the signed protocol would support the country’s major oil boom and boost related investments within its territorial waters. Libya’s maritime and energy strategy, backed by türkiye, serves both economic and geopolitical goals. It protects sovereignty over resources, increases foreign investment and regional influence, and strengthens national security and political legitimacy.

The maritime agreement has also bolstered Libya’s economy by increasing trade volume with Turkey by 43%, improving regional market access, attracting foreign investments, and supporting energy exploration, all contributing to economic recovery and stability.

In terms of security, the Turkish partnership provided Libya with a powerful external ally to strengthen stability and the authority of the western government. Turkey supplied training and advisory support to the Libyan security forces, deploying military trainers to help reorganize and professionalize the Libyan army. This support aimed to enhance the Government of National Union’s military capabilities and its capacity to maintain national stability.

This security dimension was underscored by the plane crash near Ankara involving Libya’s army chief of staff and several senior officers during an official visit to Türkiye. The aircraft lost contact shortly after takeoff and crashed after requesting an emergency landing, killing all on board. The incident represents a major loss for Libya’s military leadership and may complicate internal security coordination. General Mohammed Ali Ahmed al-Haddad was widely regarded as a key figure in ongoing efforts to unify Libya’s fractured military forces and strengthen institutional cohesion under the internationally recognized Government of National Unity.  His death removes a central leader at a moment when military coordination and institutional stability remain critical for Libya’s internal security and political reconciliation. Occurring during high-level engagement with Türkiye, it also highlights the depth and sensitivity of Turkish-Libyan military relations at a critical moment in regional geopolitics.

Libya’s maritime and energy strategy, backed by Türkiye, serves both economic and geopolitical goals. It protects sovereignty over resources, increases foreign investment and regional influence, and strengthens national security and political legitimacy. Economically, it boosts trade, attracts investment, and supports the oil sector, aiding recovery and stability. Militarily, Türkiye’s training and support enhance Libya’s security and reinforce the western government’s authority, showing a combined strategy of economic, political, and security consolidation.

Regionally, the dynamics of the Eastern Mediterranean have grown more complex. Although tensions between Türkiye, Greece, and Egypt have at times shifted toward cautious diplomacy, new sources of friction continue to emerge. In late 2024, Israel delivered the Barak MX air defense system to Cyprus, strengthening Nicosia’s defenses while raising concerns in Ankara. By 2025, these developments further intensified regional security calculations.

Geopolitically, the Türkiye–Libya maritime memorandum (2019) has continued to stir regional tensions in 2024–2025, especially between Türkiye and states such as Greece, Egypt, and Cyprus. Athens, for example, has renewed pressure on Tripoli to undo the deal as “invalid” under international law. Meanwhile, Egypt has formally rejected subsequent energy‑cooperation memoranda between Tripoli and Türkiye, arguing they infringe on Egyptian maritime zones. The deal’s contested status has contributed to real‑world security challenges: in June 2025, Greece announced it would deploy two frigates and a support vessel off Libya’s coast, citing rising migrant‑flows and linking the maritime boundary dispute to migration control.

Legal Challenges and Geopolitical Implications

Legally, the agreement has faced intensified scanning in recent years. Libyan House of Representatives Speaker Aguila Saleh declared the 2019 Libya–Turkey maritime border agreement legally invalid and nonbinding, arguing that it had not been reviewed or approved by the House, despite earlier expectations that the Tobruk-based parliament would ratify the deal. In July 2025, the European Parliament tabled a written question (P‑003013/2025) alleging that the Türkiye–Libya MoU “violates international law and undermines the territorial integrity” of a member‑state (Greece) by threatening the latter’s ability to extend territorial waters. In September 2025, the European Union’s High Representative reiterated that the MoU “is not consistent with customary law of the sea and cannot produce legal consequences for third states.” From Ankara’s side, the Turkish Ministry of Defense reaffirmed in July 2025 that the agreement was notified to the United Nations and drafted “in accordance with international maritime law” (including median‑line and non‑enclosure principles).

The ongoing legal and geopolitical disputes have turned the Türkiye–Libya maritime deal into a dynamic strategic tool rather than a mere boundary agreement. Türkiye continues to defend its legality, while Greece, Egypt, and the EU maintain that it violates international law. In 2025, Ankara and Tripoli expanded cooperation through new seismic and energy deals, transforming the memorandum into practical action. Each move by Türkiye and Libya has prompted counter-responses from Greece and Egypt, including diplomatic protests and naval measures. Overall, the deal continues to shift the balance of power in the Eastern Mediterranean, reinforcing Türkiye’s influence while deepening regional rivalries.

Conclusion:

Since 2022, Türkiye has redefined its regional posture through a series of normalization efforts aimed at rebuilding trust and strengthening economic and security ties across the Middle East. Relations with Egypt have notably improved after years of tension. In February 2024, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan paid his first official visit to Cairo since 2012, marking a major diplomatic breakthrough between the two nations. Later that year, Erdoğan reaffirmed Türkiye’s intention to deepen cooperation with Egypt in the fields of natural gas and nuclear energy, emphasizing mutual interests in regional stability and energy development.

Recent developments confirm that the Eastern Mediterranean is experiencing deepening geopolitical polarization. The $35 billion Israel–Egypt natural gas deal, despite being framed as commercial, reinforces regional energy alignments that increasingly exclude Türkiye. Similarly, the expanding cooperation between Israel, Greece, and Greek Cyprus has intensified Türkiye’s perception of strategic containment, contributing to a growing regional security dilemma.

The plane crash in Ankara that killed Libya’s chief of staff and senior officers further destabilized Libya’s security environment and underscored the sensitivity of Turkish-Libyan military ties.

Despite tentative diplomatic de-escalation between Türkiye, Greece, and Egypt, new security developments continue to reshape regional calculations. The late-2024 transfer of Israel’s Barak MX air defense system to Cyprus exemplifies this trend, reinforcing Cypriot defenses while deepening Ankara’s strategic concerns.By 2025, Türkiye warned that such deployments could destabilize the region and disrupt the fragile balance of power in the Eastern Mediterranean. These developments illustrate that the Eastern Mediterranean is shaped less by cooperation than by competing alliances, contested legal claims, and fragile partnerships, making regional stability increasingly difficult to achieve without inclusive dialogue.

Looking ahead, the region faces two possible trajectories: one marked by renewed competition driven by energy exploration and maritime claims, and another characterized by cautious rapprochement fostered by shifting alliances and mutual interdependence. These developments illustrate that the Eastern Mediterranean is shaped less by cooperation than by competing alliances, contested legal claims, and fragile partnerships, making regional stability increasingly difficult to achieve without inclusive dialogue. As Türkiye assumes a more central and stabilizing role, the future of the Eastern Mediterranean will depend on whether regional actors choose confrontation or cooperation in navigating this new geopolitical order.