What are the implications of the Russian-Turkish row on Turkey?

Turkey will do its utmost to de-escalate tensions with Russia but it is unlikely to remain silent where its national security is threatened in Syria.
Turkey will do its utmost to de-escalate tensions with Russia but it is unlikely to remain silent where its national security is threatened in Syria.
Turkey, with its massive military power and lucrative developing economy, and Qatar, with its large amount of natural gas resources and effective diplomatic prowess, are two emerging powers in the Middle East as vigorous countries in conflict resolution processes and claiming for the gradual regional transformation. They took similar positions towards the Arab Uprisings. Both countries have been supporting popular movements against the pro-status quo regimes. They have been backing the Syrian opposition against the Assad regime and have been searching for an Assad-free Syria.
But with Turkey and Russia more friend than foe, is it a battle royale or pissing match?
Local and regional developments since the outbreak of the crisis over the Kurdish presidency indicate that Masoud Barzani will remain in power.
After its electoral comeback, the AK Party has to deal with crises in Syria, Iraqi Kurdistan and negotiating with Europe over the refugee issue.
Iran and the Arab states of the counter-revolution have wreaked havoc, death and destruction - giving way to brutal groups like ISIS.
Beneath the euphoria and much vaunted hype of Kurdish unity as a result of the Kurdish fight against ISIS, the seeds of discord and dangerous rivalry have been planted. This rivalry, which is reminiscent of the old bloody and perilous rivalries in Kurdish politics, is taking place along two axes: on the regional setting between the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Kurdistan Worker Party (PKK), and within the context of the KRG between the KDP and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK).
The fight between Kurds and ISIS has engendered some new trends in Kurdish politics in Near East. These trends are likely to bear impact on the course of Kurdish politics in upcoming years. These trends can be grouped under the following headings: The emergence of a common Kurdish public sphere; the emergence of a fragile common Kurdish politics; the emergence of a non-state actor, ISIS, as Kurdish political identity’s constitutive other; the enhanced emphasis on the secular nature of Kurdish politics; the enhanced need for a security sector reform in KRG.
Turkey’s ideology and state identity is an amalgamation of secularism, Turkish nationalism and a Western orientation