Mehmet Alaca
Bekir AydoganAfter Lebanese Elections: Another loss for Iran? what stands next for lebanon after key elections
Suffering a deep economic crisis with 80 percent of its population living below the poverty line, only 41 percent of the people went to the polls in the parliamentary elections held on 15 May in Lebanon.
While the supporters of the October 2019 protest movement achieved a surprise majority with 13 seats in the election, one of the most striking results was the decline of votes for the alliance of the Iran-backed Hezbollah, the Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) and the Shia Amal party. The alliance fell back to less than 62 seats after previously holding a majority with 71 seats in the 128-seat parliament in the 2018 elections.
In the general elections held in October 2021 in Iraq, the most obvious outcome was the decisive defeat of the pro-Iran Fatah Alliance, as well as the similar low turnout rate in the elections and the success of newcomers that emerged from the protest movement. The decline of votes for pro-Iranian parties in both countries might be interpreted as a defeat for Tehran. However, while Iran’s allies are facing challenges and seem to be politically weakening in these countries, it would be simplistic to interpret these developments as the fall of Iran’s regional power.
Pro-Iran actors’ losses: First Iraq then Lebanon
The Lebanese elections took place amid the ongoing discontent over the worst economic crisis of the last 150 years and the failure to investigate those responsible for the devastating explosion that caused 200 deaths in Beirut’s port in 2020. These were also the first elections to be held since the nationwide protests against the corrupt and ineffective political elite that resulted in the overthrow of former Prime Minister Saad Hariri’s government on 29 October 2019.
Unlike previous elections, Hezbollah and its allies did not reach the required 64+1 seats to form the government. While Hezbollah and Amal’s candidates held on to the 27 seats allocated to Shia Muslims, their allies experienced a meltdown in the election. The fact that the government established under Hezbollah leadership was held responsible for the present crises might have been one of the main motivations for losing the majority.
Iraq’s former Prime Minister Adil Abdul-Mahdi also had to resign just a month after the protests that started in opposition to the government in October 2019, in which more than 600 demonstrators were killed. Becoming the founding partner of the government with 47 seats in the 2018 elections, amid the country’s heavy economic conditions and military tension, the Iran-backed Fatah Alliance lost almost two-thirds of its seats in October 2021’s elections, falling to 17 in the 329-seat parliament.
Although the loss of votes for Hezbollah and its allies in Lebanon is remarkably smaller than the decline in votes for pro-Iran parties in Iraq, in both countries the loss of votes was largely a result of opposition to Iran and protest movements.
Stalemate in government formation process
Despite the many differences between them, governments in Iraq and Lebanon are built around a power-sharing system, namely consociationalism. Hezbollah and its ally Amal Movement filled the Shiite quota of 27 deputies that is allocated to the sectarian group since the 1992 elections held after the 1975-1989 civil war in Lebanon, which also reserves the parliamentary presidency for Shiites.
Established in 1974 under the leadership of Nabih Berri, Amal is the oldest Shiite political party in the country, while Hezbollah, founded in 1982 with Iranian support, has greater political and military influence.
Looking forward to the government formation process, there are several areas of conflict among the parties. For instance, independent parliamentarians and Samir Geagea, the leader of the Christian Lebanese Forces Party, oppose the continuation of Hezbollah-allied Nebih Berri’s 30 year-long position as Speaker of Parliament.
Although it remains unlikely, if Berri does not continue as speaker of parliament, it will be seen as a defeat for Hezbollah. Furthermore, it can be predicted that Hezbollah’s arms will remain an intense matter of discussion in the wake of the elections, similar to criticism in Iraq towards the pro-Iran Hashd al-Sha’abi militia group for holding military forces outside of state authority. As such, following the election, Christian leader Geagea again called for the Iran-allied group’s disarmament.
However, Hezbollah’s Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah comment that “It is a fact that attempts to disarm Hezbollah by force will lead to civil war,” made it clear that the group considers disarmament a red line.
While no groups in the country obtained the majority, Hezbollah and the Amal Movement gained the 27-seat quota reserved for Shiites and will likely remain an important partner of the government or play spoiler. Therefore, it would be hasty to say that Hezbollah has lost. Calling for cooperation between political parties, Nasrallah said that the alternative would be “chaos and vacuum.” His comments also implied a slight probability that Hezbollah may adopt an aggressive position after the elections.
Nevertheless, it would be farfetched to argue that we will see a level of violence in Lebanon similar to the violent pressure of pro-Iranian Shiite groups in Iraq, such as the attack on the Kurdish Democratic Party’s Baghdad Headquarter by pro-Sadr militias. In that regard, while the chance of a government excluding Hezbollah being formed remains remote, in that case, Hezbollah would likely exert pressure on the government with its political apparatus before resorting to force.
Moreover, unlike in Iraq, the fact that the Shiites are not fragmented in Lebanon is also an advantage for Iran’s allies. The most prominent pro-Iran structure in Iraq is the Fattah Alliance, which was formed before the 2018 elections. However, it is not as well-rooted as Hezbollah and Amal. Within the framework of Iraq’s informal power-sharing system, the prime minister is chosen from among the Shiites.
While Shiite leader Muqtada es-Sadr, who has taken an anti-Iran stance in the elections, won 75 deputies and acted together with the Kurds and Sunnis, the pro-Iranian Shiites also act in conjunction with some small groups. Although Sadr’s alliance has a sufficient majority to form a government, they could not reach the 220 seats required to elect a president who will appoint the prime minister.
However, Sadr still urges the Iran-allied parties to lay down their arms if they want to join a Sadr-led government. In this respect, forming a government cannot be reached without pro-Iranian actors’ participation in Iraq as well. Therefore, in summary, while pro-Iranian parties in Lebanon have a greater role in the government formation process, those in Iraq have a greater capability to block the government formation process.
Iran’s allies will seek to preserve the status quo
The push by the United States, Israel and Saudi Arabia to exert pressure against Hezbollah might be bolstered by the fact that the Christian Lebanese Forces party, which is opposed to Hezbollah and close to Saudi Arabia, increased its votes by 5 seats compared to the last election. Furthermore, if negotiations fail to revive a nuclear deal, Iran’s allies in both countries will be negatively affected, especially in economic and political terms.
Nonetheless, while Iran’s soft power has been damaged in both Iraq and Lebanon and pro-Iranian governments are tending towards losing votes, it would be an oversimplification to interpret these electoral defeats as a weakening of Iran’s regional position. While parliamentary candidates from anti-government protests are gaining in votes, the ethnic-sectarian division-based systems and long-standing fragility of the democratic processes in both countries are overwhelming.
Therefore, in both countries, Iran’s allies will undoubtedly utilize their armed forces and deep-integration into the present system to strive for the continuation of the status quo. In this regard, Iran and its allies still possess many legal and illegal means by which they can turn the balance in their favor.
Therefore, the degree to which Iran-backed parties can act outside of formal politics means that any international development in Iran’s favor, such as a revitalization of the nuclear deal, especially amid the rising oil prices, will also be a positive development for Iran-backed parties in Iraq and Lebanon. Therefore, it would be hasty to conclude that Iran lost in both countries since the Tehran-supported parties still have several options to block the government formation process.
Having said that, there is no doubt that the prolongation of the government establishment process in Lebanon, where the IMF stipulated the implementation of economic reforms for the 3 billion dollar-worth economic aid, will deepen economic despair and instability in the country. Nonetheless, despite the significance of electoral defeats, Iran and its allied parties will undoubtedly retain large influence in Lebanon, Iraq and the larger region.
After Lebanese Elections: Another loss for Iran?
Suffering a deep economic crisis with 80 percent of its population living below the poverty line, only 41 percent of the people went to the polls in the parliamentary elections held on 15 May in Lebanon.
While the supporters of the October 2019 protest movement achieved a surprise majority with 13 seats in the election, one of the most striking results was the decline of votes for the alliance of the Iran-backed Hezbollah, the Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) and the Shia Amal party. The alliance fell back to less than 62 seats after previously holding a majority with 71 seats in the 128-seat parliament in the 2018 elections.
In the general elections held in October 2021 in Iraq, the most obvious outcome was the decisive defeat of the pro-Iran Fatah Alliance, as well as the similar low turnout rate in the elections and the success of newcomers that emerged from the protest movement. The decline of votes for pro-Iranian parties in both countries might be interpreted as a defeat for Tehran. However, while Iran’s allies are facing challenges and seem to be politically weakening in these countries, it would be simplistic to interpret these developments as the fall of Iran’s regional power.
Pro-Iran actors’ losses: First Iraq then Lebanon
The Lebanese elections took place amid the ongoing discontent over the worst economic crisis of the last 150 years and the failure to investigate those responsible for the devastating explosion that caused 200 deaths in Beirut’s port in 2020. These were also the first elections to be held since the nationwide protests against the corrupt and ineffective political elite that resulted in the overthrow of former Prime Minister Saad Hariri’s government on 29 October 2019.
Unlike previous elections, Hezbollah and its allies did not reach the required 64+1 seats to form the government. While Hezbollah and Amal’s candidates held on to the 27 seats allocated to Shia Muslims, their allies experienced a meltdown in the election. The fact that the government established under Hezbollah leadership was held responsible for the present crises might have been one of the main motivations for losing the majority.
Iraq’s former Prime Minister Adil Abdul-Mahdi also had to resign just a month after the protests that started in opposition to the government in October 2019, in which more than 600 demonstrators were killed. Becoming the founding partner of the government with 47 seats in the 2018 elections, amid the country’s heavy economic conditions and military tension, the Iran-backed Fatah Alliance lost almost two-thirds of its seats in October 2021’s elections, falling to 17 in the 329-seat parliament.
Although the loss of votes for Hezbollah and its allies in Lebanon is remarkably smaller than the decline in votes for pro-Iran parties in Iraq, in both countries the loss of votes was largely a result of opposition to Iran and protest movements.
Stalemate in government formation process
Despite the many differences between them, governments in Iraq and Lebanon are built around a power-sharing system, namely consociationalism. Hezbollah and its ally Amal Movement filled the Shiite quota of 27 deputies that is allocated to the sectarian group since the 1992 elections held after the 1975-1989 civil war in Lebanon, which also reserves the parliamentary presidency for Shiites.
Established in 1974 under the leadership of Nabih Berri, Amal is the oldest Shiite political party in the country, while Hezbollah, founded in 1982 with Iranian support, has greater political and military influence.
Looking forward to the government formation process, there are several areas of conflict among the parties. For instance, independent parliamentarians and Samir Geagea, the leader of the Christian Lebanese Forces Party, oppose the continuation of Hezbollah-allied Nebih Berri’s 30 year-long position as Speaker of Parliament.
Although it remains unlikely, if Berri does not continue as speaker of parliament, it will be seen as a defeat for Hezbollah. Furthermore, it can be predicted that Hezbollah’s arms will remain an intense matter of discussion in the wake of the elections, similar to criticism in Iraq towards the pro-Iran Hashd al-Sha’abi militia group for holding military forces outside of state authority. As such, following the election, Christian leader Geagea again called for the Iran-allied group’s disarmament.
However, Hezbollah’s Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah comment that “It is a fact that attempts to disarm Hezbollah by force will lead to civil war,” made it clear that the group considers disarmament a red line.
While no groups in the country obtained the majority, Hezbollah and the Amal Movement gained the 27-seat quota reserved for Shiites and will likely remain an important partner of the government or play spoiler. Therefore, it would be hasty to say that Hezbollah has lost. Calling for cooperation between political parties, Nasrallah said that the alternative would be “chaos and vacuum.” His comments also implied a slight probability that Hezbollah may adopt an aggressive position after the elections.
Nevertheless, it would be farfetched to argue that we will see a level of violence in Lebanon similar to the violent pressure of pro-Iranian Shiite groups in Iraq, such as the attack on the Kurdish Democratic Party’s Baghdad Headquarter by pro-Sadr militias. In that regard, while the chance of a government excluding Hezbollah being formed remains remote, in that case, Hezbollah would likely exert pressure on the government with its political apparatus before resorting to force.
Moreover, unlike in Iraq, the fact that the Shiites are not fragmented in Lebanon is also an advantage for Iran’s allies. The most prominent pro-Iran structure in Iraq is the Fattah Alliance, which was formed before the 2018 elections. However, it is not as well-rooted as Hezbollah and Amal. Within the framework of Iraq’s informal power-sharing system, the prime minister is chosen from among the Shiites.
While Shiite leader Muqtada es-Sadr, who has taken an anti-Iran stance in the elections, won 75 deputies and acted together with the Kurds and Sunnis, the pro-Iranian Shiites also act in conjunction with some small groups. Although Sadr’s alliance has a sufficient majority to form a government, they could not reach the 220 seats required to elect a president who will appoint the prime minister.
However, Sadr still urges the Iran-allied parties to lay down their arms if they want to join a Sadr-led government. In this respect, forming a government cannot be reached without pro-Iranian actors’ participation in Iraq as well. Therefore, in summary, while pro-Iranian parties in Lebanon have a greater role in the government formation process, those in Iraq have a greater capability to block the government formation process.
Iran’s allies will seek to preserve the status quo
The push by the United States, Israel and Saudi Arabia to exert pressure against Hezbollah might be bolstered by the fact that the Christian Lebanese Forces party, which is opposed to Hezbollah and close to Saudi Arabia, increased its votes by 5 seats compared to the last election. Furthermore, if negotiations fail to revive a nuclear deal, Iran’s allies in both countries will be negatively affected, especially in economic and political terms.
Nonetheless, while Iran’s soft power has been damaged in both Iraq and Lebanon and pro-Iranian governments are tending towards losing votes, it would be an oversimplification to interpret these electoral defeats as a weakening of Iran’s regional position. While parliamentary candidates from anti-government protests are gaining in votes, the ethnic-sectarian division-based systems and long-standing fragility of the democratic processes in both countries are overwhelming.
Therefore, in both countries, Iran’s allies will undoubtedly utilize their armed forces and deep-integration into the present system to strive for the continuation of the status quo. In this regard, Iran and its allies still possess many legal and illegal means by which they can turn the balance in their favor.
Therefore, the degree to which Iran-backed parties can act outside of formal politics means that any international development in Iran’s favor, such as a revitalization of the nuclear deal, especially amid the rising oil prices, will also be a positive development for Iran-backed parties in Iraq and Lebanon. Therefore, it would be hasty to conclude that Iran lost in both countries since the Tehran-supported parties still have several options to block the government formation process.
Having said that, there is no doubt that the prolongation of the government establishment process in Lebanon, where the IMF stipulated the implementation of economic reforms for the 3 billion dollar-worth economic aid, will deepen economic despair and instability in the country. Nonetheless, despite the significance of electoral defeats, Iran and its allied parties will undoubtedly retain large influence in Lebanon, Iraq and the larger region.
