IRGC-QF

Pakistan-Middle East Relations After Imran Khan’s Ouster

On April 11, Shahbaz Sharif took oath as Pakistan’s 23rd Prime Minister, following Imran Khan’s removal in the parliament’s vote of no-confidence. Shahbaz has inherited a multitude of internal and external challenges. One of the key external challenges confronting Shahbaz will be to repair ties with key Middle Eastern countries. During Khan’s four-year rule, the Pakistan-Middle East relations went through several ups and downs, creating uncertainties and avoidable strains.   Shahbaz’s rise to power will take the Pakistan-Middle East ties to pre-Imran status quo and away from his populism.              

Pakistan has longstanding strategic and economic relations with important Middle Eastern countries. The region employs the largest Pakistani diaspora in the world (over 4.7 million of the approximately 8.8 million Pakistani diaspora population) and is a key source of foreign remittances. Similarly, Pakistan has vital security pacts with Saudi Arabia ranging from military training, joint exercises to provision of weapons. Since the 1970s, Pakistan soldiers have been stationed in the Kingdom to protect the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Saudi Arabia. The Saudi and Emiratis have always helped Pakistan with economic bailouts.

Ties Under Khan

However, under Khan’s government, Pakistan’s ties with the Middle East underwent a major transformation for a host of geopolitical and strategic reasons, such as Middle East’s realignment towards India and the changing role of religion in statecraft. In recent years, Riyadh and Abu Dhabi have come closer to New Delhi in a bid to diversify their economic ties.

In a way, both the Saudis and Emiratis have de-hyphenated their dealings with India and Pakistan, creating discomfort in Islamabad. For instance, the United Arab Emirates (UAE)’s decision to confer Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi with its highest civil award in August 2019 award soon after Delhi revoked Kashmir’s semiautonomous status did not go down well with Pakistan.

In February 2020, signs of Riyadh-Islamabad tensions were visible when the Saudis snubbed the PIT government’s request to convene a meeting of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) on Kashmir. Riyadh’s growing economic ties with New Delhi necessitated a cautious approach, while Islamabad expected the former to issue a hard-hitting statement from OIC’s platform in favour of its stated position on Kashmir.

Following the Saudi refusal, Pakistan’s then foreign minister Shah Mehmood Qureshi threatened to form a new bloc of Muslim countries with the help of Turkey, Iran and  Malaysia. Subsequently, Riyadh demanded Islamabad to return $ 3 billion it parked in the State Bank of Pakistan to shore up Pakistan’s foreign reserves. Islamabad borrowed from Beijing to repay the Saudi debt.

Likewise, Khan’s tilt towards Turkey and Iran also irked the Saudi and Emirati leadership. In December 2019, Pakistan pulled out of the Kuala Lumpur Summit at the eleventh hour on the Saudi Pressure. Riyadh viewed the Kuala Lumpur Summit as an effort to undermine its leadership of the Muslim world.

In December 2021, Pakistan convened a special meeting of the OIC to help Afghanistan through economic and humanitarian assistance. In March, Pakistan hosted another summit of OIC’s Council of Foreign Ministers against Islamophobia. Khan’s success in getting the United Nations to adopt a Pakistan-tabled resolution against Islamophobia also rubbed the Saudi leadership the wrong way.

Arguably, Khan made the Saudi Crown Prince look a week leader of the Muslim World. During the OIC Summit in Islamabad, Khan’s remarks that the Muslim countries have failed the people of Kashmir and Palestine created a lot of unease in Riyadh and Abu Dhabi, which are trying to cultivate closer ties with Israel. 

Khan always had a soft corner towards Iran. The pro-Iran Shia lobby was quite strong in Khan’s inner circles. Historically, it is a tradition in Pakistan that all new elected leaders pay their first diplomatic visit to Saudi Arabia. However, Khan was reluctant to go to Riyadh after assuming office under the influence of his pro-Iran advisers.

Soon after Khan was elected to power in July 2018, the Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif landed in Islamabad to woo Khan to visit Tehran. In 2015, Khan was a very vocal supporter of the US-Iran nuclear deal or the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. Khan also severely criticized then US President Donald Trump for imposing a travel ban on Iranian nationals to the US.  

Ties Under Shahbaz

Against this backdrop, the Saudis and Emirati leaders view Khan’s removal and Shahbaz’s rise to power as an opportunity to reengage with Pakistan. It is interesting to note that Riyadh and Abu Dhabi were not only among the first countries that congratulated Shahbaz, but their respective envoys also called on him in the prime minister office. On the contrary, Iran is yet to send its message of felicitation to Shahbaz. This is in sharp contrast to 2018 when the former Iranian foreign minister wasted no time in reaching out to Khan.

The Saudis and Emiratis believe that Shahbaz is their man in Pakistan. The Sharif family is very close to the Saudi Royal family. In October 1999, when General Pervez Musharraf mounted a military coup in Pakistan and incarcerated the former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and his family members, the Saudi Royal family brokered a deal between the Sharif family and Musharraf.

Likewise, it hosted the Sharif family in Jeddah during its 10-year exile. The Saudis were the co-guarantors of the Nawaz-Musharraf deal, along with Saad Hariri, son of the late Lebanese PM Rafiq Hariri. Furthermore, unlike Khan, who was very critical of the Indian prime minister, Shahbaz wants to maintain a working relationship. So, the Saudi and Emirati realignment towards India will not impact their ties with Pakistan. Shahbaz will (re)cultivate ties with Riyadh and Abu Dhabi free of the so-called India factor. 

As Pakistan will gravitate toward Saudi Rabia and the UAE, its ties with Iran will come under stress. Iran is already unhappy with Pakistan for not convincing the Taliban to accommodate the Tehran-backed Hazara Shia leaders in Afghanistan’s interim cabinet. The Taliban have incorporated only one Hazara Shia leader in their cabinet. After the Taliban announced their cabinet last September, there were anti-Pakistan protests in Tehran.

In recent years, Iran has recruited Shia volunteers from Afghanistan and Pakistan to fight its proxy war in Syria. These Shia volunteers were trained, funded and launched by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Quds Force (IRGC-QF) in Syria. Following Daesh’s defeat in Syria, Tehran used these Shia proxies as a strategic leverage in its dealings with Pakistan. Lately, Iran repurposed these Shia proxies to fight in Yemen alongside the Houthi rebels.

With Shahbaz’s return to power, Pakistan will pay more heed to the Saudi demand of stopping the Iran-backed Pakistani Shia proxies from fighting in Yemen.

Soon after consolidating his grip on power, Saudi Arabia is the first country that Shahbaz will visit in a hope to negotiate a new economic deal, including a cash handout to shore up foreign reserves and oil on deferred payments. In return for this economic assistance, the Saudis will expect Pakistan to move away from Iran and safeguard the former’s interest. Under Shahbaz, the Pakistan-Middle East relations will flourish and enter a new era of bilateral cooperation.   

Pakistan-Middle East Relations After Imran Khan’s Ouster
Pakistan-Middle East Relations After Imran Khan’s Ouster
Pakistan-Middle East Relations After Imran Khan’s Ouster

Pakistan-Middle East Relations After Imran Khan’s Ouster

On April 11, Shahbaz Sharif took oath as Pakistan’s 23rd Prime Minister, following Imran Khan’s removal in the parliament’s vote of no-confidence. Shahbaz has inherited a multitude of internal and external challenges. One of the key external challenges confronting Shahbaz will be to repair ties with key Middle Eastern countries. During Khan’s four-year rule, the Pakistan-Middle East relations went through several ups and downs, creating uncertainties and avoidable strains.   Shahbaz’s rise to power will take the Pakistan-Middle East ties to pre-Imran status quo and away from his populism.              

Pakistan has longstanding strategic and economic relations with important Middle Eastern countries. The region employs the largest Pakistani diaspora in the world (over 4.7 million of the approximately 8.8 million Pakistani diaspora population) and is a key source of foreign remittances. Similarly, Pakistan has vital security pacts with Saudi Arabia ranging from military training, joint exercises to provision of weapons. Since the 1970s, Pakistan soldiers have been stationed in the Kingdom to protect the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Saudi Arabia. The Saudi and Emiratis have always helped Pakistan with economic bailouts.

Ties Under Khan

However, under Khan’s government, Pakistan’s ties with the Middle East underwent a major transformation for a host of geopolitical and strategic reasons, such as Middle East’s realignment towards India and the changing role of religion in statecraft. In recent years, Riyadh and Abu Dhabi have come closer to New Delhi in a bid to diversify their economic ties.

In a way, both the Saudis and Emiratis have de-hyphenated their dealings with India and Pakistan, creating discomfort in Islamabad. For instance, the United Arab Emirates (UAE)’s decision to confer Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi with its highest civil award in August 2019 award soon after Delhi revoked Kashmir’s semiautonomous status did not go down well with Pakistan.

In February 2020, signs of Riyadh-Islamabad tensions were visible when the Saudis snubbed the PIT government’s request to convene a meeting of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) on Kashmir. Riyadh’s growing economic ties with New Delhi necessitated a cautious approach, while Islamabad expected the former to issue a hard-hitting statement from OIC’s platform in favour of its stated position on Kashmir.

Following the Saudi refusal, Pakistan’s then foreign minister Shah Mehmood Qureshi threatened to form a new bloc of Muslim countries with the help of Turkey, Iran and  Malaysia. Subsequently, Riyadh demanded Islamabad to return $ 3 billion it parked in the State Bank of Pakistan to shore up Pakistan’s foreign reserves. Islamabad borrowed from Beijing to repay the Saudi debt.

Likewise, Khan’s tilt towards Turkey and Iran also irked the Saudi and Emirati leadership. In December 2019, Pakistan pulled out of the Kuala Lumpur Summit at the eleventh hour on the Saudi Pressure. Riyadh viewed the Kuala Lumpur Summit as an effort to undermine its leadership of the Muslim world.

In December 2021, Pakistan convened a special meeting of the OIC to help Afghanistan through economic and humanitarian assistance. In March, Pakistan hosted another summit of OIC’s Council of Foreign Ministers against Islamophobia. Khan’s success in getting the United Nations to adopt a Pakistan-tabled resolution against Islamophobia also rubbed the Saudi leadership the wrong way.

Arguably, Khan made the Saudi Crown Prince look a week leader of the Muslim World. During the OIC Summit in Islamabad, Khan’s remarks that the Muslim countries have failed the people of Kashmir and Palestine created a lot of unease in Riyadh and Abu Dhabi, which are trying to cultivate closer ties with Israel. 

Khan always had a soft corner towards Iran. The pro-Iran Shia lobby was quite strong in Khan’s inner circles. Historically, it is a tradition in Pakistan that all new elected leaders pay their first diplomatic visit to Saudi Arabia. However, Khan was reluctant to go to Riyadh after assuming office under the influence of his pro-Iran advisers.

Soon after Khan was elected to power in July 2018, the Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif landed in Islamabad to woo Khan to visit Tehran. In 2015, Khan was a very vocal supporter of the US-Iran nuclear deal or the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. Khan also severely criticized then US President Donald Trump for imposing a travel ban on Iranian nationals to the US.  

Ties Under Shahbaz

Against this backdrop, the Saudis and Emirati leaders view Khan’s removal and Shahbaz’s rise to power as an opportunity to reengage with Pakistan. It is interesting to note that Riyadh and Abu Dhabi were not only among the first countries that congratulated Shahbaz, but their respective envoys also called on him in the prime minister office. On the contrary, Iran is yet to send its message of felicitation to Shahbaz. This is in sharp contrast to 2018 when the former Iranian foreign minister wasted no time in reaching out to Khan.

The Saudis and Emiratis believe that Shahbaz is their man in Pakistan. The Sharif family is very close to the Saudi Royal family. In October 1999, when General Pervez Musharraf mounted a military coup in Pakistan and incarcerated the former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and his family members, the Saudi Royal family brokered a deal between the Sharif family and Musharraf.

Likewise, it hosted the Sharif family in Jeddah during its 10-year exile. The Saudis were the co-guarantors of the Nawaz-Musharraf deal, along with Saad Hariri, son of the late Lebanese PM Rafiq Hariri. Furthermore, unlike Khan, who was very critical of the Indian prime minister, Shahbaz wants to maintain a working relationship. So, the Saudi and Emirati realignment towards India will not impact their ties with Pakistan. Shahbaz will (re)cultivate ties with Riyadh and Abu Dhabi free of the so-called India factor. 

As Pakistan will gravitate toward Saudi Rabia and the UAE, its ties with Iran will come under stress. Iran is already unhappy with Pakistan for not convincing the Taliban to accommodate the Tehran-backed Hazara Shia leaders in Afghanistan’s interim cabinet. The Taliban have incorporated only one Hazara Shia leader in their cabinet. After the Taliban announced their cabinet last September, there were anti-Pakistan protests in Tehran.

In recent years, Iran has recruited Shia volunteers from Afghanistan and Pakistan to fight its proxy war in Syria. These Shia volunteers were trained, funded and launched by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Quds Force (IRGC-QF) in Syria. Following Daesh’s defeat in Syria, Tehran used these Shia proxies as a strategic leverage in its dealings with Pakistan. Lately, Iran repurposed these Shia proxies to fight in Yemen alongside the Houthi rebels.

With Shahbaz’s return to power, Pakistan will pay more heed to the Saudi demand of stopping the Iran-backed Pakistani Shia proxies from fighting in Yemen.

Soon after consolidating his grip on power, Saudi Arabia is the first country that Shahbaz will visit in a hope to negotiate a new economic deal, including a cash handout to shore up foreign reserves and oil on deferred payments. In return for this economic assistance, the Saudis will expect Pakistan to move away from Iran and safeguard the former’s interest. Under Shahbaz, the Pakistan-Middle East relations will flourish and enter a new era of bilateral cooperation.