Sudan’s war, now entering its twentieth month, has evolved into one of the world’s most severe humanitarian crises after the eruption of the destructive confrontations between the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), a paramilitary group claiming to fight for the democratization of Sudan through neutralizing the power of the former regime, and the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), countering claims to fight for the sovereignty and existence of the Sudanese state. According to the UN International Organization for Migration (IOM), up to 11 million people have been displaced since the beginning of the war, marking it the largest displacement crisis in the world. The London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine reveals over 350,000 deaths linked to the ongoing conflict in Sudan from April to September 2024, including 100,000 from direct violence and 250,000 from indirect causes such as hunger and disease. The confrontation between the RSF and the SAF has devastated civilian infrastructure, with more than 70% of health facilities in conflict areas becoming non-operational, according to the World Health Organization WHO.

 

The Sudan war erupted on April 15, 2023, between the SAF and the RSF began in Khartoum, the capital city, and rapidly spread to regions like Darfur, Kordofan, and Gezira state. This violence followed months of escalating power struggle and tensions between the SAF and the RSF, a paramilitary group originally established by former President Omar al-Bashir over two decades ago to suppress rebellions in Darfur, where the RSF has been implicated in campaigns of ethnic violence, including atrocities against the Masalit ethnic group in Darfur.

 

After Bashir’s removal – in which the RSF played a considerable role – in 2019, Sudan underwent reforms during its political transition, further straining relations between the SAF and RSF. The current conflict has reignited past traumas, including ethnically motivated violence and war crimes. In Darfur, evidence links the RSF and allied militias to targeted attacks on non-Arab ethnic groups, echoing the atrocities of the 2003 Darfur conflict when government-backed militias engaged in, besides targeting specific regions in central Sudan, such as Gezira state, where Abu Aqla Kakil, a key RSF commander, defected from the paramilitary ranks, resulting in brutal revengeful attacks with mass killings, rapes, looting, and destruction of homes. The significant number of sexual violence resulted in mass suicides among women from Gezira states and other regions in Sudan, where violence against women is systematically used by the RSF as a weapon in their war against the Sudanese nation.

 

The brutal conflict, marked by persistent violence, suffering, and destruction, has torn the Sudanese civil community, killed thousands, displaced millions, and destroyed the state’s infrastructure. Compounding this tragedy, regional powers, particularly the United Arab Emirates, have been accused of intensifying the conflict through its support to the RSF militias, further complicating an already dire situation and taking away any hopes for peace and recovery for the Sudanese.

 

The war recently intensified in late September, with the SAF carrying multiple strategic operations on the capital, Khartoum, to retake the city after the RSF had seized it since the eruption of the war in April 2023. The escalation culminated in the alleged attack on the UAE’s ambassador’s residence, which drew widespread condemnations from the UAE and other Gulf states, emphasizing international law and protection of diplomatic posts. However, the Sudanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs has released a statement categorically denying the attack, calling the accusation a false claim designed to cover up the UAE’s deeper involvement in Sudan’s internal affairs. The ministry also highlighted the RSF’s criminal activities, the UAE’s support for the RSF, and its role in escalating the conflict.

 

On the other hand, the UAE condemned and labeled the act a grave violation of international diplomatic norms and called for the Sudanese Armed Forces to take full responsibility. It plans to address this breach with the League of Arab States, the African Union, and the United Nations, emphasizing the need for strict adherence to treaties safeguarding diplomatic missions. The UAE reiterated its rejection of violence that destabilizes security and violates international law. Besides, the UAE reports providing millions of dollars in humanitarian assistance since April 2023, including medical supplies, food aid, and support for displaced persons. 

 

The broader context

A pattern?

The UAE’s emergence as a significant regional power has been characterized by its involvement in regional conflicts, particularly through the support of non-state armed actors. A strategy that aims to advance the UAE’s geopolitical interests while countering political Islam influence in the region. In Libya, for example, the UAE supported the Libyan national army led by Khalifa Haftar, and in Yemen, it backed the Southern Transitional Council. These actions reflect its willingness to extend beyond diplomatic efforts and engage in military interventions to achieve its objectives.

 

The UAE’s support for the RSF in Sudan follows a similar pattern. Backing a militant group initially created by the former regime and legitimized as an official part of the state’s security apparatus, resisted attempts to integrate within the Sudanese armed structure and diverged from the formal state framework to oppose the national army for power. This support took different aid forms, securing interests without direct military involvement. This involvement drew attention from regional powers, notably the Egyptian government. For decades, Egyptian and Emirati policies in the region aligned until they diverged towards Sudan. Egypt, which has long viewed Sudan as vital for regional security, expressed concerns about the UAE’s involvement. While Egypt supports the SAF, the UAE’s backing of the RSF has driven a wedge between the two regimes, highlighting their increasingly divergent strategies.

 

A motive

The UAE’s support for the RSF raises questions about its strategic goals in Sudan. Several factors may explain this interest: One of the primary motivations in Sudan is likely access to the country’s resources, including gold and agricultural products. Sudan is home to vast gold reserves, which have attracted foreign investment and interest. Control over these resources would enable the UAE to further its economic ambitions and secure a foothold in Africa. Sudan’s geographical position along the Red Sea offers significant logistical advantages, particularly for trade routes. The UAE has shown interest in developing port facilities in Sudan to facilitate trade and strengthen its regional influence, particularly in light of the competition from Russia. By supporting a paramilitary group like the RSF, the UAE can exploit the instability in Sudan to increase its leverage over local factions, thereby enhancing its ability to intervene in Sudanese affairs. This influence allows the UAE to shape the political landscape according to its interests, contrasting with a more stable and cooperative government that may resist external influence.

 

However, Russia has adopted a dual approach to the conflict, seeking to hedge its bets by supporting the SAF and the RSF. This strategy enables Russia to counter UAE influence while positioning itself to gain control over Sudan’s mineral resources. By supporting the RSF, Russia aims to exert power and control over mining operations, which could challenge the UAE’s interests in the region. This complex interplay of support for competing factions reflects the broader geopolitical contest in Sudan. It underscores the intricate dynamics of foreign influence, where Russia and the UAE vie for control over resources and strategic advantages in the country.

 

Misinformation or tactical diversion 

As the conflict unfolds, the nature of the information surrounding key events becomes increasingly complex. The alleged attack on the UAE ambassador’s residence could set the ground for a strategic move by the SAF to signal its intent to take aggressive action in response to foreign interventions. It may also be a way to draw attention to the UAE’s persistent presence in Khartoum despite the ongoing military confrontations. At the same time, most other diplomatic missions have relocated to the new temporary capital. Although the UAE insists that its diplomatic mission was relocated to Port Sudan, and some claims suggest a complete evacuation, questions remain about why the army targeted the empty ambassador’s residence. This incident gains further significance in light of an earlier statement by SAF Military chief Yasir Alatta, who, in early 2024, called for the UAE ambassador to leave Sudan immediately. Alternatively, such an attack could underscore how the Sudanese military perceives the UAE’s involvement and serve as a warning of the potential consequences of further interference. On the other hand, the UAE’s claims may also be a tactic to justify deeper involvement in Sudan, potentially escalating the conflict and leading to further hostilities.

 

Strategy in Question

The UAE’s response to the alleged attack on its ambassador’s residence in Khartoum raises several critical questions. What’s going to be the breaking point for the international community to take action towards states funding and supporting the escalation of violence in Sudan? While the attack drew widespread international condemnations, the same voices were conspicuously silent when it was revealed that the UAE had been supporting the RSF, a paramilitary group responsible for destabilizing Sudan. The international community’s focus on the protection of diplomatic posts under international law contrasts starkly with its reluctance to condemn the UAE’s role in fostering instability through its backing of an armed group. Such selective outrage raises questions about the application of international law and the extent to which economic or geopolitical interests shape global responses to conflict.

 

Further complicating the regional dynamics is the UAE’s support for the RSF, which directly conflicts with Egypt’s backing of the SAF. Historically aligned in their regional policies, the divergence between Egypt and the UAE on Sudan has created tensions that may have broader implications for regional stability. Egypt views Sudan as critical to its national security, and its support for the SAF is grounded in maintaining a stable government. On the other hand, the UAE’s involvement with the RSF seems to be driven by economic interests, including control over gold reserves, which are the leading destination of Sudanese gold production, besides the desire to access Sudan’s Red Sea coasts and ports. This growing divide between the two powers could exacerbate instability in Sudan and the region, potentially straining the once-solid bilateral relationship between Cairo and Abu Dhabi. What’s in the future for countries in the region in light of the Sudanese crisis?

 

Lastly, one must ask: What does the UAE want from the Sudanese government that it could not secure through diplomatic or intergovernmental agreements, thus prompting its support for the RSF? This backing of a militia with significant control over Sudanese territory suggests a broader agenda, possibly rooted in long-term strategic goals related to resource extraction, economic expansion, or political influence. As the conflict in Sudan drags on, the involvement of regional powers highlights the broader geopolitical stakes at play. The conflict is no longer confined to local power struggles but has become a theater for competing interests, from resource extraction to regional influence.