Yemen: Unfinished Revolution

Executive Summary

1. One of the main problems in Yemeni society that was not resolved during the turbulent transformations of the 20th century was the correlation of the tribal and state systems, which inevitably entailed a conflict of sovereignties.
2. The conflict within the Hashid tribal confederation between the representatives of the Saleh and al-Ahmar families is the most important factor in the Yemeni crisis. It had two main tendencies: the increasing role of tribal elites, and the sharp increase in the number of conflicts.
3. In the early 1970s, President Abd al-Rahman al-Iryani launched a policy of “sunnization” of Yemen, which was subsequently implemented by Abdallah al-Ahmar. Its roots go back to the early 1960s, when the head of the strongest tribal confederation Hashid supported the Republicans, acting simultaneously against the Zaidi Sayyids formally occupying the supreme position in the tribal hierarchy of Northern Yemen.
4. The response to the implanting Wahhabism doctrine in Yemen was the creation of the “Faithful Youth” movement in 1995 in the Saada province, the main mission of which was the patriotic upbringing of the younger generation of Yemenis, where the study of Yemeni history and the foundations of the Zaidi dogma played a systemic role.
5. As a weak political figure, Hadi almost immediately allowed the al-Ahmar family to pull the blanket over to its side, which eventually knocked the political bottom out from under the influential family, and then the president himself.
6. Since the beginning of 2012, the situation in which the power in Yemen gradually began to be monopolized in the hands of al-Ahmars in the face of al-Islah, put almost all their opponents on one side and forced them to take extreme measures, predetermining the failure of the General People’s Congress, as well as the seizure of power in Sana’a in September 2014.
7. Within the framework of the National Dialogue Conference, its participants did not manage to reach consensus on three key points: “on the issue of Saada”, “on the issue of the South”, “on the transitional justice” and “on the state structure”.
8. The Kuwait talks failed largely due to the fact that both parties live in parallel worlds, and each world has a right to exist. Yet if authorities in Sana’a focused on the current status-quo, the government in exile, on the contrary, proceeded from retrospective views, insisting on the restoration of the status quo, which is relevant for the beginning of 2014.
9. At the talks in Kuwait, there occurred a situation in which the main demands of the parties, on the establishment of a transitional entity and on the disarmament of the Houthis, were by no means denied by the opponents. However, they, could not agree on what should be done first.
10. The change in all key parameters of the Yemen crisis over the past three years calls for a serious revision of the UN Security Council resolution 2216. The Yemeni crisis is considered by the Security Council exclusively as a confrontation of the “legitimate power” in the face of Mansur Hadi and “Houthi rebels” who committed a military coup in 2014-2015, which is absolutely irrelevant in the realities of 2018.
11. The current balance of powers (even after the murder of Ali Saleh) in Yemen, as well as the difficulties experienced by the Coalition in Yemen, is acting against Hadi. Time plays in favor of the Sana’a government, that is, Houthis and Saleh: the longer Mansur Hadi remains just a nominal president in exile who is not control the situation in the country, the less incentive the international community will have to recognize him as a legitimate president.
12. Yemen is a hostage to its periphery not only globally but also regionally, which leads to a serious lack of interest in this country from the international community.
13. Saudi Arabia has never been able to successfully implement the function of the main “moderator” of the Yemen crisis, which is largely due to the death of Prince Sultan in October 2011, and later Prince Nayef in June 2012, who for more than thirty years managed the Yemeni portfolio in the Kingdom.
14. The Yemeni campaign by no means became a zero-sum game for Riyadh: on the contrary, the Saudi army managed to carry out the minimum program, limiting the expansion of the Houthis.
15. The main problem for Yemen is the preservation of the state in its current borders. To date, a triple power has been established in the country: in addition to the world-recognized government of Mansur Hadi, Northern Yemen remains under the control of the Houthi-led Supreme Political Council, and in the south of the country the Southern Transitional Council that acts on the independence of South Yemen, took the power. This problem becomes even more urgent due to the split within the coalition, when the UAE is staking on the Southern Movement, and Saudi Arabia on Mansur Hadi.
16. A possible scenario is to end the military operation of the Coalition under a plausible pretext, while simultaneously adopting a plan for a comprehensive settlement of the Yemeni conflict under international control. That could, in turn, create the necessary conditions for the formation of a government of national unity, the distribution of power between the parties to the conflict, the withdrawal of troops from Sana’a and other key zones