The recent political movements in Hadhramaut, particularly the Hadhramaut Tribal Alliance‘s announcement of its intention to establish self-rule in Hadhramaut, represent a fundamental development in the Yemeni political arena. This is not only because these demands open the door to further partition projects in Yemen, parallel to the separatist demands led by the Southern Transitional Council (STC). Rather, these movements serve as the spark that ignited the dispute between the Hadhramaut Tribal Alliance and the STC, which could lead to increased rifts between the two principal backers of the conflict in Hadhramaut: Saudi Arabia and the UAE.

The Hadhramaut Tribal Alliance, which is demanding self-rule, has emphasized, through its leader, Amr bin Habrish, their close relationship with “our brothers in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.” Amr’s meeting with the Saudi Minister of Defense on March 22nd confirmed the close ties between Saudi Arabia and the tribal alliance.

On the other hand, Hadhramaut is the cherry on top of the secessionist project led by the Southern Transitional Council. It comprises more than half of the south and is a land of oil. According to official Yemeni figures, the oil sector in Hadhramaut accounted for 39% of Yemen’s total oil production in 2006. Therefore, practically speaking, the southern secessionist project cannot see the light without Hadhramaut.

Recently, there has been an increase in media tensions between the two sides, with each holding mass rallies to demonstrate their presence and underscore their strong popularity. The Hadhramaut Tribal Alliance staged a protest at what it called the “Historic Hadhramaut Meeting” on April 12, demanding self-rule. Meanwhile, the Southern Transitional Council organized a large public event on April 24 to commemorate the anniversary of al-Qaeda’s expulsion from Hadhramaut.

Both sides are also competing for military presence, especially with the increasing demands of the tribal alliance to allow for military enlistment, which could lead to armed violence in the future.

The growing possibility of the conflict in Hadhramaut escalating raises questions about its impact on Saudi-Emirati relations. Could it lead to indirect confrontations between Saudi Arabia and the UAE?

Diverging Saudi-Emirati Goals in Yemen

Although both sides intervened in Yemen under the pretext of fighting the Houthis and preventing Iran from expanding its influence inside Yemen, also, Saudi Arabia and the UAE feared that Tehran would launch attacks on shipping lanes vital to their strategic interests in the Red Sea and the Bab al-Mandab Strait, in addition to attacks on neighboring Gulf states. However, these goals soon shifted, with the UAE focusing primarily on Yemen’s southern and eastern coasts, particularly the Aden and Mukalla areas.

Perhaps the most striking evidence of the UAE’s shifting objectives regarding its military intervention in Yemen was the expulsion of the Hadi government from Aden by UAE-backed separatist forces in 2019, potentially the most significant challenge to Saudi influence in Yemen. This coincided with the UAE’s announcement of a reduction in its military forces, despite the ongoing Houthi coup. The UAE justified this by citing the presence of local forces it had trained, totaling 90,000 fighters. These UAE-trained local forces openly raised the slogan of secession, flying the flag and anthem of the former southern state. From these secessionist forces emerged a political entity called the Southern Transitional Council, which became part of the government thanks to the Riyadh Agreement. With direct support from the UAE, the STC established local military forces across the southern state and attempted to control even areas spared from the war, such as Socotra, Al Mahrah, and Hadhramaut.

As for Saudi Arabia, although the Kingdom primarily led the battles against the Houthis, it simultaneously had a broad interest in the eastern regions, particularly Al Mahrah. Since the era of Ali Abdullah Saleh, Saudi Arabia has sought to conclude an agreement under which it would obtain a land sector that would allow it to extend several pipelines to transport its oil to the Arabian Sea. These pipelines would be 300 km long and 5 km wide, starting from Saudi fields, passing through the Yemeni province of Al Mahrah, and reaching the port of Nishtun. This area and its logistical and security services would be subject to Saudi control. However, Ali Abdullah Saleh at the time categorically rejected this. Saudi efforts to establish a military presence in Al Mahrah, mainly to control the port of Nishtun, have also become public since 2019. This was also confirmed by a leaked document in 2018 regarding a Saudi plan to build a pipeline extending from the Najran region to the Yemeni coast of Al Mahrah.

Saudi Arabia and the UAE have diverged in their objectives regarding Yemen. While Saudi Arabia has sought to control the eastern regions of Wadi Hadhramaut to secure its borders, and Al Mahrah for the construction of the planned oil pipeline, the UAE has focused on controlling ports in southern and eastern Yemen, part of its strategy to control ports as an extension of Dubai Ports World’s operations.

Although the war against the Houthis was the primary reason that brought Saudi Arabia and the UAE together for military intervention in Yemen from the outset, the economic ambitions of both countries were the reason for adopting divergent policies.

Saudi-Emirati Influence in Hadhramaut

Hadhramaut is considered an extension of Saudi national security, not only because of the long border between the two countries, but also for societal reasons. The Hadhrami community in the Kingdom is extensive, including prominent businessmen and families with significant investments in Saudi Arabia. Many are unaware of their Hadhrami origins, most notably the Bin Laden, Bin Mahfouz, Bugshan, and Al-Amoudi families, among others.

Militarily, Saudi Arabia has maintained a significant military presence in the First Military Region, which covers half the Yemeni border with the Kingdom. This region houses the Saudi Forces Command, which includes numerous Saudi officers and soldiers.

In addition to its military presence and direct and indirect influence in the Hadhramaut Valley and Desert, Saudi Arabia has supported several political forces, most notably the Hadhramaut National Council, whose establishment was announced in May 2023. Many analyses also suggest that Saudi Arabia was behind the Unified Council of the Eastern Governorates announcement in January 2024.

Both councils share a common emphasis on Yemen’s unity and the idea of​​federal regions, which was one of the most important outcomes of the National Dialogue Conference. This can be seen as a confirmation of Saudi political support for the federal regions. This is in addition to the recent support for the demands of the Hadhramaut Tribal Alliance. Saudi political support for these forces can be understood as an attempt by the kingdom to strengthen its political influence in Hadhramaut.

The UAE has maintained an apparent influence in the Hadhramaut coast since the expulsion of Al Qaeda in 2016, making the Hadhramaut coast a purely Emirati zone of influence. Despite the STC’s attempts to expand into the Hadhramaut Valley through popular demonstrations and the attraction of some tribal figures, Saudi influence has remained evident in the Hadhramaut Valley.

Thus, Saudi Arabia and the UAE divided their influence in Hadhramaut, with the former controlling the valley bordering its borders and the UAE controlling the coastline, which the latter considered important to its strategic economic interests.

Hadhramaut’s Self-rule Between Emirati and Saudi Interests

Since 2016, except for political movements primarily related to poor services in the governorate, such as the “Second Hadhrami Popular Uprising,” which focused mainly on demanding more economic rights and broader political representation for Hadhramaut, the governorate has remained calm. It has even been considered a model for the country as a whole.

However, the visit of Aidarous al-Zubaidi, head of the Southern Transitional Council, to Hadhramaut last March, accompanied by his harsh criticism of Hadrami political forces opposed to the separatist project, prompted the Hadhramaut Tribal Alliance to mobilize and demand self-rule. The alliance justifies its demands for self-rule by citing the government’s failure to provide basic services and the war’s transformation into an endless, pointless conflict. This means that the service crisis in Hadhramaut will continue, despite its wealth.

The future of the political conflict in Hadhramaut remains a subject of considerable speculation. There are real fears that Hadramawt could descend into armed confrontation. There are real fears that Hadhramaut could slide into a military conflict, particularly between the forces affiliated with the Hadhramaut Tribal Alliance, known as the “Hadhramaut Protection Forces,” and the Hadhrami Elite Forces, which were established with Emirati support.

Although tension has reached its peak, it would not be in the interest of any party for the political dispute to escalate into open warfare. For the Hadramawt Tribal Alliance, any bloody military conflict would portray it as a bloodthirsty armed militia seeking to declare self-rule by force of arms. This would significantly tarnish its image. As for the STC, any military conflict with the tribal alliance would present it as a party that is not reluctant to shed the blood of the southerners, to whom it promises to establish a modern state. This could also lead to an increase in its enemies in Hadramawt and the south in general.

Hadhramaut is its backyard for Saudi Arabia, and its primary concern is maintaining security there. Any political dispute with the Southern Transitional Council or any other force could negatively affect the kingdom. Since the start of the battles against the Houthis, Saudi Arabia’s desire to maintain calm in Hadhramaut has been clear. No military forces openly raising the slogan of liberating the south have appeared in Hadhramaut, and all critical positions in Hadhramaut remain in the hands of moderate figures.  For example, the current governor of Hadhramaut, Mabkhout bin Madi, was not affiliated with any political party when he was appointed governor. The commander of the Second Military Region in Hadhramaut, Faiz al-Tamimi, is a military commander who rose through the ranks of the Yemeni army and is not known to hold any strong political views. Furthermore, state institutions have generally maintained a degree of stability compared to other southern regions.

There is no doubt that Saudi-Emirati relations, notably regarding Yemen, may indicate a form of competition. However, this competition will not develop into an armed conflict in which either side might lose control, at least soon. This competition in Hadhramaut may affect other regions within Yemen, within the framework of the Saudi-Emirati competition over the Yemeni file as a whole, which first became public in 2019, such as each party trying to gain greater influence in senior positions in the government, or, for example, taking into account Emirati interests in peace negotiations with the Houthis.