Donald Trump’s return to the Oval Office resurrects an “America First” approach at odds with the more multilateral style of his predecessor. Biden emphasized alliances and multilateral solutions during his term, but Trump viewed the international system through a transactional lens, assessing each relationship by whether it benefits U.S. economic and security interests. Yet, when it comes to the Middle East, this difference is more in stylistic terms than substantial. Thus, Trump’s transactional lens for the region will favor short-term deals over comprehensive strategies, potentially overlooking the long-term dynamics that have historically shaped the region.

Washington has repeatedly attempted to pivot away from the Middle East, yet the region consistently reminds itself. Trump’s foreign policy hinges on transactional relationships—gauging allies and adversaries by cost, defense spending, and trade deficits. In practice, for the region, this likely means fewer open-ended commitments, more emphasis on direct payoffs, and a willingness to leverage U.S. security guarantees for financial or strategic gain.

At the heart of Trump’s calculations lie two metrics: defense spending and trade deficits. In his view, countries reliant on the US’s security umbrella must contribute more to their own defense, pay the insurance premiums, or risk losing U.S. backing. This mindset resonates well in the Gulf, for which the US remains the largest source of arms imports, security assistance, and training and exercises with significant force deployment to protect oil-rich partners. Saudi Arabia, with its vast oil reserves, stands out as a prime target. Trump’s statements about extracting “fair” financial returns—sometimes framed up to a trillion dollars—indicate he will push Riyadh to pay its share and limit any move toward China’s sphere of influence. Saudi Arabia’s own diversification agenda may give it options, but Trump seems convinced that U.S. security guarantees still hold decisive leverage.

Meanwhile, trade deficits also factor into Trump’s decision-making. He treats them as proof the U.S. is “losing” in bilateral relations. Though this metric often applies to US allies and partners in Europe, Asia, or the Americas, it is still a helpful heuristic to understand Trump’s transactional mindset toward Middle Eastern countries. As he pursues increased domestic oil production – aka “drill, baby, drill,” friction with oil producers in the Gulf could intensify. Trump may well play the “pressure card,” seeking lower oil prices by threatening tariffs or rethinking security guarantees.

Geopolitically, Trump’s regional policy is poised to emphasize maximum pressure on Iran and further Israel’s normalization in the Arab world—both viewed as pillars of stability and ways to limit broader US iinvolvement.

The Abraham Accords, which Trump considered a shortcut to resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, remain his blueprint for broadening Israel’s ties in the Middle East. While Biden endorsed this perspective, his efforts were disrupted by the war on Gaza. Trump, however, will likely push for visible results, especially given the recent Hamas-Israel ceasefire—brokered just before he assumed office—which served well to his “ultimate deal-maker” image. While Trump will push for maintaining the ceasefire and reconstruct the Gaza, there is little evidence of sustained peace within the region. For one thing, the Trump team does not provide a comprehensive pathway to a two-state solution and reconstructing Gaza. If anything, his idea of relocating Palestinians risks triggering more instability, as it ignores people’s deep ties to their land and likely pushback from neighboring states. In short, the administration’s main objective seems to be furthering Israel’s integration into the region, not necessarily delivering a comprehensive resolution to the conflict.

Under Trump’s presidency, US policy toward Iran will be driven by both push and pull factors. On the one hand, the administration’s official stance is to impose maximum pressure on Tehran, pointing to Iran’s potential nuclear capabilities and perceived regional threats—an agenda that Israel strongly supports. Complicating matters is Trump’s personal animus toward Iran, reportedly fueled by allegations that Iranian operatives sought to assassinate him. Given Trump’s personalistic approach, he will likely make this a personal case. One significant push factor, however, is the recent regional developments that may lessen the need for dramatic US interventions. Israel’s campaign against Hezbollah has reportedly diminished the group’s operational capacity, Assad’s downfall has undermined Iran’s regional ambitions, and Israeli strikes have allegedly compromised Iran’s air defenses. These setbacks might curtail Iranian influence enough to reassure US partners like Saudi Arabia and Israel—though they are unlikely to alter Trump’s readiness to ratchet up pressure on a regime he views as a direct threat to American interests and, potentially, himself.

 Turkey, straddling the Black Sea and the Middle East, looms large in Trump’s thinking. He values personal relationships, and his rapport with President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan could enable new cooperation in northern Syria. A US  troop withdrawal there aligns with Trump’s desire to limit foreign entanglements. This is why Turkey will look for ways to give assurances to the US to contain ISIS remnants and check Iran’s influence as a condition for that pullout. Trump may also seek Erdoğan’s support for a potential ceasefire in Ukraine, given Ankara’s pivotal role. Moreover, the United States does not run a trade deficit with Turkey, which has been significantly increasing its defense budget—factors that likely reduce pressures on the bilateral relationship.

Meanwhile, the fall of the Assad regime caught US policymakers off guard, leaving Washington’s Syria strategy in flux. Yet it dealt an even harsher blow to Russia and China. The collapse of the regime exposed the limits of Moscow’s regional influence and highlighted Beijing’s misreading of Middle Eastern dynamics, as Xi Xinping hosted Assad in Beijing for the first time just a year ago before his regime fell. Despite the ambiguity in the US policy towards Syria, Marco Rubio, secretary of state, hinted at the US involvement in the transition period in Syria, recognizing that stabilizing Syrian territory is crucial for curbing Tehran’s regional footprint and preventing Russia’s engagement.

Ultimately, Trump’s approach favors extracting short-term gains from bilateral deals rather than forging enduring alliances. If partners prove unwilling to bear costs or align with US goals, troop levels could diminish while trade pressures and sanctions rise—delivering headlines but leaving deeper structural issues unresolved. In contrast to the Biden Era, Trump’s approach to the Middle East will not be substantially different.

However, the Middle East’s interwoven security, economic, and societal challenges require more than a simple cost-benefit ledger. Whether this transactional lens leads to genuine stability—or simply reshuffles old conflicts—will define Trump’s second-term legacy, with high stakes and little room for error.