(This text was translated from its original Arabic version.)

Introduction

At the time of writing these lines, the ongoing incidents in Jenin camp have resulted in 15 victims, which include six members of the Palestinian Authority’s (PA) National Security Forces of various ranks, three children, journalist Shaza Al-Sabbagh, and a member of the Jenin Battalion, Yazid Ja’ayseh, who was wanted by the occupation forces.

Following the announcement on 14 December 2024 of the launch of the penultimate stage of “Operation Protect the Homeland” by the PA’s National Security Forces spokesperson, Brigadier General Anwar Rajab, which he said aims to impose law and order and reclaim Jenin’s camp from “outlaws,” these incidents witnessed a significant upsurge and reached a critical stage.

Since then, the PA has officially dealt with this file from a security and military perspective. The only exception to this rhetoric was a statement made by Ziad Hab Al-Rih, the PA’s Minister of Interior, who highlighted the necessity to adhere to the Palestine Liberation Organization’s (PLO) program during this stage. This angered spokespersons of the “Jenin Battalion,” who considered there was a contradiction in the arguments and justifications provided by the PA to justify their security operations in Jenin Camp. One member of the Battalion stated on social media that the incidents were an attempt to impose a new political reality rather than pursue outlaws.

Never in the history of domestic Palestinian relations has there been such a crisis regarding the diversity of the parties involved, its relative length, and the accompanying political and regional circumstances.

In this article, we will shed light on the most critical factors and pillars that played and are playing a role in this crisis. In case it expands, there are grave concerns about its repercussions on the Palestinian people, especially in the West Bank. Israel is the sole beneficiary of this crisis and strife. It is spreading discord through its media, and the statements of some of its officials, and this is no secret to anyone.

Jenin Camp: A Stronghold of the Resistance and Complex Relations

Jenin camp holds great symbolism in the conscience of the Palestinian people and in that of the Arab and Muslim masses since its steadfastness and resistance in the face of the Israeli invasion in April 2002. Back then, the Israeli occupation forces, under the orders of then-Israeli Prime Minister Sharon, launched Operation Defensive Shield. They besieged President Arafat in his headquarters in Ramallah, destroying most affiliated buildings. For the first time since the signing of the Oslo Accords, they invaded all areas of the West Bank classified as (A). Resistance fighters in Jenin camp confronted the invasion and fought for about two weeks. The occupation forces were only able to subdue the camp by using bulldozers – which demolished hundreds of homes – helicopters, and many of its forces, including the elite. This led to the killing and wounding of dozens of Israeli soldiers and the death of dozens of citizens, something that had not happened at that time in any area invaded by Israeli forces. As a result, Jenin camp became an icon of steadfastness and resistance in the conscience of the Palestinians, including the residents of the Camp and its surroundings. It is worth noting that Jenin camp, which borders Jenin city, is only one square kilometer in area. It is characterized by its extensive social ties, which do not exist in any other area in the West Bank. For instance, individuals whose financial conditions improve tend to buy or build houses in surrounding neighborhoods or villages while maintaining their connection with the camp. All factions and components of the camp boast about their role in the battle of Jenin. For instance, the Palestinian National Security Forces are proud of the participation of their members and officers in that battle and of their leader, Yousef Rayhan-Abu Jandal. The Islamic Jihad movement lost Mahmoud Tawalbeh, and the Hamas movement lost Mahmoud Abu Halwa. During this battle, different factions lost their members, along with the members of the National Security Forces and civilians.

In addition to being an icon of struggle, the Jenin camp represents an unprecedented example of unity on the field in the West Bank. Despite the Palestinian discord in the Gaza Strip in 2007 and what ensued, the Jenin Camp maintained a minimum level of unity and cooperation on the domestic level. Any disagreements or tension were quickly addressed. Even though the camp witnessed a state of relative calm for a few years, its environment and social structure continued to be proud of the resistance. The stories of the fallen people and prisoners, as well as the memories of the invasion, were passed on to the new generation by their family and friends. In the summer of 2021, a group of young men, most notably Jamil Al-Amouri, announced the formation of an armed resistance body called the Jenin Battalion to confront the occupation forces when they storm the city and the camp and to attack the army and settler sites.

The Jenin Battalion transcended factional affiliation and included the armed wings of many, such as the Al-Quds Brigades, the Al-Qassam Brigades, and the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades. Meanwhile, the Lions’ Den was formed in the city of Nablus. However, it was not sustained because Nablus’s social and political structure differs from that of the Jenin counterpart. Jenin camp became a relatively safe haven for resistance fighters from neighboring areas and other governorates, such as Nablus and Hebron. The camp residents opened their homes to resistance fighters from inside and outside the camp, hosted them, and shared food with them, just as they did in 2002. This contradicts the stance of the PA, which explicitly rejects armed resistance and views it as impossible given the significant power imbalance. The PA considers that the National Security Forces should be the exclusive and legitimate bearer of weapons, as it is haunted by the strife and inter-Palestinian fighting in Gaza. However, the friction between the PA and the Jenin Battalion was punctual and limited, especially since the Jenin Battalion repeatedly declared that its arms were solely directed towards the Israeli occupation.

Skirmishes and clashes have occurred between the PA and the Jenin Battalion ever since the latter’s founding because the PA arrested activists and prevented marches of armed young men in Jenin’s streets. Nonetheless, incidents never escalated as they have done today, thanks to the intervention of mediators, including influential leaders in the Fatah movement (who were later arrested by the occupation authorities) and because of the invasions and raids carried out by the occupation forces in the city and camp of Jenin, which always resulted in many casualties.

The death of citizens created a desire for revenge and brought back memories of former fallen people to the Camp. For instance, many young fallen persons carried the names of second-degree relatives who had also been killed (uncle, nephew, etc.). Consequently, the Camp became once again the pioneer of resistance in the West Bank, particularly with the decline and dismantling of the Lions’ Den. People started to believe that such a model of resistance could be transferred or copied to other regions, even though this has not happened yet.

October 7 Marks a New Phase

In the summer of 2023, the occupation forces launched a campaign on the city and camp of Jenin. The “House and Garden Operation” resulted in the death of ten citizens, including resistance fighters and civilians. The operation lasted two days and resulted in the destruction, vandalism, and demolition of dozens of homes in the Camp. Following that, President Abbas visited Jenin and the Camp, gave a short speech, and announced the reconstruction of what was destroyed by the occupation forces. Other parties, such as the UAE and Algeria, have announced their intent to provide financial support for the same purpose.

The occupation forces repeatedly stormed the Camp by relying on Musta’ribeen forces, which are an elite Israeli undercover unit that disguises themselves as Arabs or Palestinians and wears either civilian or military outfits. They use civilian vehicles to kill or arrest Palestinians and are usually followed by mechanized forces consisting of military jeeps and bulldozers. Since the Aqsa Flood operation on October 7, 2023, the West Bank, notably Jenin, entered a new phase. The occupation forces expanded their raids and airstrikes using drones or warplanes, resulting in the death of many resistance fighters and civilians.

Tensions between the PA and the Jenin Battalion increased. Several incidents and clashes occurred before the recent ones, the most violent of which took place on the night of the Baptist Hospital massacre in Gaza on October 17, 2023. The clashes resulted in the death of a citizen and a child, but the situation was contained after the victims chose forgiveness, given the situation in Gaza.

Tension remained dormant and reached its peak, which culminated in the recent events after the Palestinian National Security Forces arrested two young men from the Jenin camp, Imad Abu al-Haija, brother of a fallen person and son of a prisoner sentenced to life imprisonment, and Ibrahim al-Tubasi, brother of two fallen people and two prisoners, one of whom was also sentenced to life imprisonment, under the accusation that they had received money to support the resistance in early December 2024.

The Jenin Battalion said that the money was to support the families of the deceased and other affected families. It demanded the release of detainees and the return of the money. However, the PA categorically refused. Consequently, members of the Battalion seized two “Tundra” cars belonging to the PA and organized an armed march in the Camp square using the two mentioned vehicles. This provoked Hebrew media platforms, which called for bombing the militants. In tandem, the PA was mobilized and brought reinforcements from Ramallah and elsewhere.

The PA used an old rhetoric, claiming that it seeks to avoid a devastating Israeli war in the West Bank, particularly Jenin, similar to the one launched against Gaza. Therefore, it requested the surrendering of wanted militants, the withdrawal of their weapons, and the dismantling of explosive devices planted in the Camp and its surroundings, which are usually detonated when the vehicles of the occupation forces invade the Camp. The Battalion refused to abide by these conditions, but spokespersons said they were ready to compromise. Nonetheless, the PA maintained its position.

An Operation with Different Dimensions

No serious investigation has been conducted into incidents that resulted in deaths. The spokesperson of the National Security Forces announced that the latter was responsible for the killing of a boy after a video circulated documenting his unjustified killing while he was not posing any threat. In tandem with the security campaign, a media campaign was launched, attacking the Jenin Battalion. It used the term “outlaws” to designate its members and held them responsible for all the incidents that occurred (burning homes, killing citizens, or sabotaging electrical transformers).

As part of the mediatic war, the PA closed the Al Jazeera office and prevented it from operating in the West Bank. This step followed a campaign of incitement launched by PA leaders against the channel because of its coverage of the events in Jenin. For the first time since its establishment fifty years ago, the celebrations of the launch of the Fatah movement in all areas of the West Bank have turned into an occasion to express support for the military operation in the Jenin camp.

The Jenin Battalion was accused of contradictory charges – such as belonging to ISIS or of being Iranian mercenaries. The latter accusation was lately amplified, more intensely than ever, perhaps because of the hostile intentions of US President Trump towards Iran.

Spokespersons of the Jenin Battalion denied allegations that claimed they had adopted Shiism or the presence of Iranian flags or other similar manifestations. They added that if they received support from Iran or others, it was to resist the occupation rather than follow foreign agendas. Via their WhatsApp and Telegram channels, as well as on the media, the Jenin Battalion and its supporters emphasized that they have not used all their capacities yet and refuse to surrender. They stressed the fact that they could have killed members of the PA National Security Forces on several occasions but avoided doing so to avoid shedding Palestinian blood. They broadcasted videos of explosions happening next to PA vehicles, which they could have targeted but haven’t. Finally, the Jenin Battalion announced via social media that it was not responsible for the killing of any of the six members of the National Security Forces who fell during the incidents.

According to media outlets, several Arab countries – including Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, the Emirates, and Bahrain – support the operation. However, these countries have neither confirmed nor denied the allegations. On January 6, 2025, the Middle East Eye website cited sources in the U.S. and in the PA who claimed that the PA requested support worth $680 million from the American administration at the onset of its operation in Jenin. The fund would be used to train the PA’s National Security Forces and provide them with ammunition and equipment. However, the request was not answered. So far, no Arab or Western country has issued a statement or position regarding the operation in the Jenin camp.

Meanwhile, Israel is disseminating statements and news and claiming that it is waiting for the PA to achieve the declared goals of the operation and dismantle the resistance structure. Israel is also spreading contradictory rumors, such as claiming its satisfaction with the operation launched by the PA and then stating the opposite. Israel also expressed its concerns after the Jenin Battalion displayed an RPG launcher, which it claimed it had seized from members of the PA National Security Forces. However, the latter denied possessing this type of weapon and argued that what was displayed was a cartoon model.

Israel is closely monitoring the situation, and its drones are constantly flying over Jenin and the Camp. Since the beginning of the operation, it has avoided penetrating both the city and the Camp. What is certain is that the hundreds of PA National Security Forces who were able to enter Jenin in armored vehicles from Ramallah, Nablus, Jericho, and elsewhere, with weapons and equipment, were only able to do so after prior coordination with Israel.

Operational and Logistical Aspects

Since the announcement of the current phase of the operation, the PA National Security Forces have surrounded most of the entrances to Jenin camp. They have also transformed some buildings around the camp into military barracks, where snipers are stationed. Moreover, checkpoints have been set up near the Camp and arrests have been carried out in some of the neighboring villages and towns, such as Silat al-Harithiya, al-Yamoun, and the city of Jenin. Finally, the PA National Security Forces attempted to penetrate the Camp. However, they were faced with fierce resistance that forced them to return to their positions, which were set up in houses and buildings on the outskirts of the Camp.

Such incidents happen almost daily. The PA National Security Forces attempt to penetrate the Camp from the Mahib Street axis, at the south of the Camp, the nearby Al-Ghabs axis, or from the Jenin Hospital axis, which has almost been transformed into military barracks. Each day, the intensity of these clashes either increases or decreases. The number of injured members of the National Security Forces is unknown, as no official announcement has been made. There are only estimations and rumors.

The PA National Security Forces are arresting some of the wounded from hospitals and clinics and putting others under guard. For instance, Nour Hasees, from Jenin, was arrested while receiving treatment for his injuries in Balata camp near Nablus. Moreover, the mobile phones of young men, and sometimes women, are being searched at checkpoints to find materials or images related to the events unfolding in the Camp. Since the onset of the operation, several young men, and even a girl, have been arrested. They have not been released to this day. Among them are the head nurse at the emergency department of the government hospital, ambulance workers, and journalists. However, the real wanted men, for whom the operation was initially launched, are entrenched inside the Camp. They broadcast videos containing messages of defiance and sometimes jokes as a sign of indifference via internet platforms. All ventures to penetrate the Camp to eliminate or arrest them have failed.

The siege and clashes might have aimed to deplete the Jenin Battalion’s ammunition and pave the way for the Camp’s invasion by the PA’s National Security Forces. However, the Battalion confirmed that its ammunition would last a long period. Meanwhile, the PA National Security Forces boast a large quantity of various ammunition, including Energa shells, as evidenced by the intensity of the ongoing clashes. Several houses were burnt down in the Camp because of the fighting, forcing citizens to flee from danger and rent residences elsewhere. Moreover, water and electricity services have been cut off from most homes in the Camp, and UNRWA has suspended its services. This means that the medical clinic, which was damaged by countless bullets and is usually visited by people who suffer from chronic diseases or those who cannot afford treatment, and there are many of them, will not open its doors. Since the onset of the events, classes have been suspended at UNRWA and nearby government schools. Finally, garbage is not being collected. Had it not been winter, this would have led to the spread of epidemics. The Battalion’s fighters have been facing Israeli army incursions for a relatively long time and have gained significant experience in maneuvering and concealment. In contrast, the combat capabilities and potential of the PA National Security Forces are lesser than those of the Israeli army.

Critical Timing of the Operation and its Interpretation

The Jenin camp operation comes at a critical and sensitive time. On the one hand, the genocide that Israel has been waging against the Gaza Strip for about 15 months continues, resulting in an unprecedented number of casualties, wounded and displaced persons, and the destruction of all aspects of life there. It also unfolds in tandem with a right-wing Israeli government, which does not deal positively with the PA on the political level. On the contrary, it is adopting measures to annex large parts of the West Bank. Meanwhile, settler gangs are attacking various areas of the West Bank, burning homes and crops and beating and shooting at civilians. These issues were translated into anger and revolt in the Jenin camp. Camp inhabitants, regardless of their support for the Jenin Battalion or having reservations about it, say that members of the National Security Forces who are launching a campaign against the camp come from areas that are regularly raided by settlers. They believe it would have made more sense for them to respond to these attacks rather than target Jenin.

In the meantime, daily raids are happening in population centers in the West Bank, a few kilometers away from the operations unfolding against the Camp. They result in the killing and arrest of citizens, as well as destruction. The scene is tragic. The PA is suffering from a stifling financial crisis due to the Israeli government’s procrastination in handing over tax funds and the decline in Arab and international support to a minimum. This has resulted in its inability to pay its employees’ salaries, except partially, and with delays.

The operation came a few days after the fall of the Assad regime in Syria. The latter should have been an incentive to abandon security and military solutions, which were behind the fall of that regime. What prompted the PA to conduct this military operation under these conditions and circumstances?

Some claim that the PA seeks to regain control over the and wants to prove its ability by launching a large-scale operation in Jenin. Although this interpretation is widely accepted, including within circles of the Jenin Battalion, it seems unrealistic. Even if the PA succeeds in defeating the Jenin Battalion, Gaza represents a different case. Heavy, medium, and light weapons are widespread there, despite the destruction endured by the Strip and the death of many resistance fighters. Israel has explicitly declared that it is not interested in the PA ruling Gaza, and the Americans support that.

Some media outlets have mentioned that the UAE is calling for reforming the current PA system, including a radical change in its structure and framework. This aligns with Trump’s aspirations, which might have influenced the UAE. The UAE is one of the pillars of the Abraham Accords, which Trump sponsored and supervised the signing of. The PA was upset with the Emirati proposal and wanted to prove to Trump its ability to control and suppress pockets of resistance. It decided to start with the Jenin Camp, which is the most challenging one. Some believe that the matter revolves around conflicts between the poles and centers of power within the PA and the Fatah movement. A third opinion combines all the mentioned and considers the existence of secret Israeli threats to not spare either the PA or its headquarters and National Security Forces in the event of an Israeli attack if the PA does not eliminate the resistance in the northern West Bank, Jenin in particular, just like it did in 2002. Whatever the actual reason behind such an operation, its timing is bad, and the PA will not reap any political or financial reward from it.

The Positions of Different Players

Israel:

Israel is the biggest beneficiary of this operation. It considers that a good Palestinian is a dead one. As such, it prefers that Palestinians kill each other and take advantage of the strife. Through contradictory statements and positions regarding the operation, Israel has put the PA in a delicate position and made it lose an already weakened popular support. Moreover, Israel is rejecting in practice the PA’s approach to the Oslo Accords, according to which security cooperation is to be implemented in tandem with political negotiations. This has not been the case since the negotiations stopped after Olmert left the premiership in Israel. The Israeli army’s drones constantly fly over Jenin Camp and the city, collecting needed information for conducting a military operation targeting the resistance at any moment.

The United States, Europe, and Arab countries:

Washington did not publicly announce its position on the Jenin operation. However, the United States is omnipresent on the scene, considering its relations with the PA and Israel and its role in coordinating security between both parties. Arab countries do not want an upsurge in resistance. They are embarrassed by what is happening in Gaza after their incompetence or complicity has become apparent. They are certainly interested in the operation’s success, even if they have not publicly announced their position.

Fatah Movement and the PA

Fatah issued a statement attacking Hamas, saying it would not allow it to repeat its adventures in the West Bank. It reiterated its accusation to Hamas of being subservient to Iran. Remarkably, for the first time, the Fatah movement wholly identified with the position of the PA. Even though Fatah is part of the PA, it has always adopted a different discourse to preserve what remains of its popular support. Since the Al-Aqsa Flood Operation, most voices in the Fatah movement – with a few exceptions – and its media platforms have held Hamas responsible for the massacres and destruction that befell Gaza, claiming that the operation gave Israel a pretext to attack the Strip. Regarding the military operation in the Jenin camp, members hosted by the media, spokespersons, and media platforms affiliated with Fatah and the PA are adopting the same discourse. They claim that the operation targets outlaws or individuals who follow suspicious agencies and are subservient to Iran.

Furthermore, they emphasize the necessity to prevent the Gaza scenario from being duplicated in the West Bank and present armed resistance as an evil that must be eliminated. The PA and Fatah perceive the operation as a zero-sum battle that cannot be resolved through compromise. Therefore, all suggested initiatives to settle the matter, which were sponsored by tribal gatherings or popular activities, have failed. The PA believes that failing to achieve the goal of the operation, which is to disarm the resistance and make fighters surrender, will lead to its loss of control over additional areas. Israel will use such failure as an excuse to implement unilateral measures. It will make the PA appear weak in the eyes of the Trump administration, which did not have friendly relationships with the PA in the past. On the contrary, achieving the operation’s goal would enable the PA to launch similar but less costly operations in other areas. Nonetheless, a military solution seems unattainable. The Jenin Battalion said it would accept any compromise that does not impose its disarmament. Therefore, the situation remains stuck in a vicious cycle.

The Palestinian Factions:

Apart from the Fatah movement, the Palestinian national, leftist, and Islamic factions announced their rejection of the operation. They called for sparing Palestinian blood, unifying of ranks, and not resorting to security solutions in internal disputes. Hamas and the Islamic Jihad movements strongly condemned the operation. They demanded that the PA lift the siege on the Jenin camp. Moreover, they appealed to the Palestinian masses to organize and break the siege on Jenin Camp, to no avail. Hamas supports the escalation of resistance and its expansion in the West Bank. This was clearly stated in its statements, declarations, and the speech of its leaders, especially Hamas’ chief in the West Bank, Saleh al-Arouri.

The Islamic Jihad agrees with Hamas on this point and believes that resistance in all its forms, especially armed resistance, is the best way to deter the occupation and defend the land and holy sites. They will not allow the defeat of the Resistance in Jenin or other regions.

Syndicates and Human Rights Organizations

Before the Gaza war, whenever the Security Forces in Gaza arrested a journalist or activist or committed any other violation, all syndicates and human rights organizations would mobilize and intensify demands for the release of the detainee, regardless of the charges that resulted in their arrest. Moreover, they would issue statements to condemn the arrests. Since the launch of the military operation against the Jenin camp, which resulted in the arrest of health workers and journalists, as well as harm against civilians and their deprivation of essential services, syndicates, and human rights organizations have remained primarily silent or have shyly addressed the matter. This double standard has angered various popular sectors, namely in Jenin.

Potential Scenarios and Outcomes of the Operation

A decisive military victory seems unlikely. The operation has been launched for a while, and the PA’s National Security Forces have been unable to penetrate the Camp’s neighborhoods. Moreover, their attempts to advance through the different axes have failed because they are exposed to gunfire and explosive devices, which force them to withdraw. Meanwhile, the Jenin Battalion fighters have adopted a defensive strategy and are not considering a counterattack now. What scenarios can be expected under these complex circumstances?

First Scenario

An agreement has been concluded to stop the war on Gaza and includes a prisoner exchange deal. Some prisoners who will not be deported but return to the West Bank are respected and influential figures. Their presence will impose a new reality that will end the crisis in one way or another because the cause of prisoners is of high importance and symbolism in Palestinian society. With the release of prisoners and popular celebrations, it is unlikely that the PA will maintain its siege on the Camp or a strong presence in the city.

Second Scenario

Following its failure to invade the Jenin camp, and with the ceasefire agreement in Gaza and its political and psychological repercussions on the Palestinian people, the PA may stop its operation to avoid embarrassment and accept one of the initiatives formerly proposed by the clans and prominent figures. It is worth noting that the Jenin Battalion had accepted all proposed initiatives. However, the PA insisted on a military solution, which it failed to achieve as it could not enter the Camp. Accepting a popular initiative would solve the dilemma.

This stage is challenging and complex. It has no precedent in Palestinian history, neither in terms of time, place, or political circumstances. The emphasis should be on dialogue, reconciliation, and unity to confront the Zionist settlement project. Palestinians should not rely on any promises or hopes from outside the Palestinian circle.