The US-Israeli military operation against Iran did not catch Russia off guard. According to media sources, Russian intelligence learned in advance of the exact date the military campaign would begin and warned Russian diplomats and Iranian authorities. Specifically, the Russian Embassy in Tehran announced the urgent evacuation of its staff three days before the airstrikes began. Furthermore, in February 2026 alone, Russian military transport aircraft made at least six flights to Iran, delivering military cargo of unknown nature. On February 17, joint Russian-Iranian naval exercises took place in the waters of the Gulf of Oman, during which the forces informally practiced possible scenarios involving the blockade of sea lanes and attacks on a simulated enemy. 

Thus, unlike during the 12-day war in June, Moscow sought to provide Tehran with tangible, rather than merely diplomatic, support. Moscow likely began providing assistance to Tehran even after hostilities began, scoring political points with the increasingly powerful IRGC while simultaneously reaping economic benefits from trading in oil that had risen in price, although reports in Western media regarding the scale of such support should be treated with caution. 

Assessments of the War’s Progress

The trajectory of Russian-Iranian relations following the outbreak of military conflict in Ukraine is aptly described by the stock market term “short squeeze”: when, after explosive growth —which is often mistaken for a trend— the quotations of a security inevitably correct, and then rise again. Iran’s decision to allow the Russian military to purchase kamikaze drones and subsequently establish its own production under a franchise agreement, against the backdrop of the war in Ukraine, played a significant role in bringing the two countries closer together. Resistance to numerous sanctions has also left its mark on Russian-Iranian trade relations, as Moscow, following the imposition of sweeping restrictions in 2022, actively adopted Tehran’s accumulated experience in circumventing various restrictions. There is no doubt that the Kremlin viewed the US-Israeli operation against Iran through the lens of the fact that Washington’s pressure on Moscow—as Tehran’s partner on the anti-globalist front—will only intensify over time. 

If one analyzes the entire body of reports published by Russian media outlets loyal to the Kremlin, their main narrative is as follows: Israel and the US have made a catastrophic miscalculation and do not know how to end the war they have unleashed, the prolongation of which plays into Tehran’s hands. Iran, meanwhile, has not only demonstrated a high level of military competence in concentrating its forces and planning for war, but has also exposed US vulnerabilities in the Middle East and, according to numerous Russian analysts, is even poised to become a global player as a result of the campaign.

It is clear that Russia is waging this anti-Western propaganda campaign without taking into account the actual situation facing Iran’s political power centers, the IRGC, and the army. On the contrary, the scale and speed with which Israel and the US have eliminated the Iranian leadership, as acknowledged by independent Russian experts, point to glaring failures in their security measures and shortcomings in counterintelligence efforts to identify enemy agents. One can attribute the Iranian leadership’s willingness to risk their own lives—and their resulting disregard for safety protocols—to religious motives as much as one likes, but from the perspective of the state’s interests, this is a sign of an ineffective governance system. Furthermore, the decentralized system of military command—the so-called Iranian “mosaic defense” tactic—is not a result of “military competence,” but rather a measure of necessity that has always been employed primarily by paramilitary or quasi-state formations. One consequence of this, for example, was the spectacular destruction of three Alvand-class frigates and a number of other vessels at the Iranian Navy base in Konarak, which, for some reason, did not set sail after the war began—as military doctrine dictates—and were destroyed at their berths by a single missile salvo.

Controversial tactical advantage

Logistical disruptions in the narrow Strait of Hormuz benefit Moscow, which—amid fluctuating energy prices—is able to maintain oil supplies to India and replenish its budget, including to fund the continuation of military operations in Ukraine. In addition, disruptions to shipping through the Strait of Hormuz have already led to a sharp increase in prices for nitrogen and phosphorus fertilizers and a rise in import requests to Russia, which accounts for a significant share of global exports of ammonia, urea, and potash. 

Washington’s shift in focus from the European theater of operations to the Middle East, with all the ensuing consequences for Ukraine’s air defense, also serves Russian interests. Moreover, it is not only the US and Israel that need urgent replenishment of anti-missile interceptors for their Patriot systems through emergency deliveries, but also the Sunni monarchies of the Gulf, which used up about 800 interceptor missiles in just the first few days of the conflict.

In addition, the Kremlin will use the war in Iran to draw parallels between its military campaign in Ukraine and the US-Israeli “special military operation” in Iran, and will accuse the West of failing to establish a regional security architecture—both in the Middle East and in Europe.

Yet it would be unwise to overstate the number of opportunities currently available to the Kremlin. The shortage of anti-missile systems will be bad news for Kyiv, especially during the fall and winter (assuming the conflict continues), but it is unlikely to lead to a dramatic turnaround on the front lines. In addition, Elvira Nabiullina, head of the Russian Central Bank, noted that in the short term, rising oil prices are supporting the ruble; however, changes in global trade also pose risks to the Russian economy that are impossible to predict. In particular, disruptions to shipping through the Strait of Hormuz lead to higher prices for goods imported by Russia, and logistical restructuring could further reduce demand for Russian raw materials, which would fully or partially offset the effect of rising prices. The implementation of many Russian and Iranian economic projects is also in question. If the Iranian regime remains in power, the timelines for some of these projects will, at best, be significantly delayed, and some may be canceled altogether. For instance, Russia and Iran planned to begin construction of the Rasht–Astara railway line in late February 2026, which is part of the North–South International Transport Corridor. 

Behind the scenes, Russian diplomats openly admit that, first, they have no plan of action should the war take on a protracted nature, in which Israel would continuously carry out low-intensity strikes against Iranian leadership and targets—similar to the Lebanon scenario—which is possible given the suppression of Iran’s air defense systems. Second, there is no clarity regarding the balance of power within the Iranian leadership. The Kremlin states that Moscow is continuing its dialogue with representatives of the Iranian leadership, and in particular with President Masoud Pezeshkian. But the soft coup carried out by the IRGC in Iran, as Russian Iran expert Vladimir Sazhin put it, has led to a situation where it is unclear who actually makes decisions in Tehran. Military cooperation between Russia and Iran was primarily conducted through the General Staff of the Iranian Armed Forces, which involved contacts between the army and the IRGC, which dominates that institution. Yet the death in June 2025 of Mohammad Bagheri—who was a representative of the IRGC and frequently traveled to Moscow—and the current large-scale purge of the Iranian leadership could not help but affect Russian-Iranian communication. 

It is clear that cooperation through the General Staff, targeted collaboration between intelligence agencies—which has grown significantly stronger since 2022—and the exchange of views are continuing. However, the extent to which Moscow understands the actual and unified operational and strategic plans of the Iranian leadership is a question to which many Russian officials and representatives of security agencies do not know the exact answer. In the event of further polarization of Iran’s military and political establishment and the formation of rival centers of power within the country, Russia’s potential mediation mission regarding the Iranian issue could become extremely difficult. It is no secret that the trade in mediation is an important trump card for Moscow in Middle Eastern affairs. At the same time, Moscow has already taken a step that is quite damaging to Russian-Iranian relations by abstaining from voting “against” Bahrain’s anti-Iran resolution in the UN Security Council, a move clearly motivated by a desire not to sour relations with Arab states. 

Russian Support for Iran During the War

According to the WSJ, Moscow is providing Tehran with satellite imagery and sharing advanced drone technology during the ongoing war. In other words, according to this information, Russia is assisting with reconnaissance, target acquisition, and guidance for airstrikes, as well as supplying components for modified Shahed-type drones designed to improve communications and navigation. It is worth noting that since the start of the war in Ukraine in 2022, the Iranian regime, in addition to supplying 122 mm ammunition for multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) or anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs), helped Russia overcome a shortage of loitering munitions and establish a franchise-based UAV assembly operation in Tatarstan. Therefore, it seems logical that Moscow could indeed be providing assistance to Tehran in these fields.

The capabilities of Iran’s own constellation of communications and reconnaissance satellites are extremely limited.

Iranian-built Earth observation satellites—Kousar and Zafar-2, as well as the more advanced Payam—were launched into orbit by a Russian carrier rocket in December 2025 and form the core of the constellation along with two other satellites: the Russian-built Khayyam and the Iranian Fakhr-1. At the same time, Iran’s only geostationary communications satellite, Jam-e Jam-1, was launched into orbit by a Russian Proton-M carrier rocket just before the war—on February 12, 2026 (according to some reports, the satellite was built in Russia). It is obvious that Iran’s own capabilities are insufficient even to analyze the damage inflicted by its drones and missiles on American, Israeli, and European bases, as well as on civilian facilities in the Gulf states. However, it is hardly worth greatly exaggerating Russia’s capabilities. Compared to the United States, which operates approximately 2,000 satellites (excluding Starlink), the total number of satellites in Russia’s constellation is about 300. This figure is a record high in recent years, as the expansion of the constellation was carried out primarily for military purposes due to the war in Ukraine. 

In addition, the Iranian regime relied heavily on Russian Resonance-NE radars (Ghadir radars) to detect enemy ballistic missiles and aircraft. These state-of-the-art radars were supplied to Iran from 2014 through 2023 and featured enhanced, rather than export-grade, capabilities. Given that virtually all of these radars were, in one way or another, overseen by Russian intelligence but were destroyed practically on the first day of the war, the army and the IRGC were left virtually helpless in detecting airborne threats. It cannot be ruled out that Moscow is attempting to compensate for this “blindness” on the part of the Iranians by providing intelligence.

As for drones, the Russian-localized versions of the Shahed UAVs, which are manufactured in Tatarstan, in fact bear little resemblance to the Iranian originals. The upgraded loitering munitions feature design differences and are equipped with warheads, reinforced impact elements, and jam-resistant receivers to protect against electronic warfare. It stands to reason that Russia could return the favor to Iran by supplying limited batches of more advanced drones as a low-cost alternative to precision-guided munitions for striking stationary targets that do not require additional reconnaissance. But such support is insufficient to influence the military course of the conflict, and it is certainly not comparable to the support receives from NATO as a whole.

Political implications 

The evolving situation in the Middle East could yield certain political benefits for Russia—ranging from a noticeable shift in international attention away from the conflict with Ukraine to opportunities for mediation. However, there is also a range of risks: it cannot be ruled out that sooner or later Moscow will have to take one side or the other without the ability to maneuver between the Arab states and Iran, as well as in the confrontation between the emerging blocs (Israel-UAE-India-Greece-Cyprus on one side and Saudi Arabia-Türkiye-Pakistan, and Egypt on the other).

As pro-Kremlin political analyst Fyodor Lukyanov noted, the US-Israeli operation against Iran has put both the BRICS and the SCO—both of which Iran recently joined—in an awkward position. He described the dilemma as follows: ignoring aggression against a member signals that the organization is effectively non-existent, while showing solidarity and condemning violators of international law is risky, as no one wants a direct conflict with Washington. “In the end, the SCO did issue a vague statement (expressing deep concern and calling for peace), while BRICS remained silent, taking advantage of its informal status,” Lukyanov concluded. 

It is possible that the period of turmoil in international relations—which began with the outbreak of full-scale war in Ukraine and continued following the launch of the operation against Iran—may prove protracted and lead to unpredictable consequences. Russia has unequivocally interpreted the attack on Iran as confirmation that confrontation in Russian-American relations—in the spheres of diplomacy, military policy, and information warfare—will only intensify. The same applies to relations with Europe. Despite the contradictions that have emerged over the Iran issue—for example, between the US and France or the US and Spain—Moscow is unlikely to be able to capitalize on such signs of division. On the contrary, European states will seek to show solidarity with Washington while maintaining the appearance of independence on other issues, which can only harden their stance toward Moscow.