Abstract: Since the invasion of Iraq in 2003, U.S. State Department officials have often observed that Arab Sunnis do not have arepresentative leadership in the way the Shia in Iraq do. Almost all Arab Shia in Iraq answer to Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, the highest Shia religious authority in Iraq, who has played a vital role in preventing a Shia militant insurgency against U.S.-led occupying forces. Furthermore, al-Sistani has been supportive of the new democratic political process in Iraq. Arab Sunnis, however, have been divided into two camps: those who have cooperated with the Coalition to help create a post-Saddam political structure in Iraq (Participants) and those who have opposed the new political process (Rejectionists). This article argues that these Arab Sunni divisions have had detrimental impact on the stability of Iraq. The analysis of this article is placed in the context of the recently announced political settlement called ‘the Historical Settlement’ proposed by the ruling political parties and endorsed by the United Nations Assistance Mission in Iraq (UNAMI). The analysis offered by this article recommends that intra-Sunni divisions should be taken into account by the drafters of the ‘the Historical Settlement’.