Wadah KhanfarThe Making Of The Post-Pandemic International Order
Moments in world history which establish or destroy international order are usually unleashed by the same events. Of them, war is the most consequential phenomenon. Next to which are arguably pandemics, plagues or diseases of global reach and consequence. From the Justinian plague (541-542 AD) to the ‘Black death’ (1346-1351AD), plagues and pandemics have played their roles in altering the history of international affairs. It is highly likely that future historians will count Covid 19 as such a watershed moment in the history of the international system and global order.
The Coronavirus isn’t simply a health crisis, neither is it singularly a political, economic, social, security or international crisis. It is in fact all of these combined. It is a meta crisis and as such will bring consequences to bear on all aspects of human life and the international system. This piece will specifically focus on the geopolitical ramifications of this crisis and its implications for the future of the international system or order.
Obviously, at this time we are writing the history of the future. Instead of archives, our imaginations will be our reference point. However, our imagination will be historically conscious, meaning we will take stock of similar historical processes whilst remaining future oriented. As exceptional phenomena, these global crises accelerate the course of history, accentuate already existing trends and produce exceptional outcomes. The Coronavirus pandemic will have similar ramifications on the international system
For those born after World War II, or whose formative life experiences have taken place in this period, the western centric liberal international order appeared to be the product of a natural course of history and historical processes. However, such a reading is the reflection of the intellectual hegemony of the west. If anything, the post-war period is a peculiar moment and an exceptional period in human history.
Covid 19 will further accentuate the peculiarity of what was seen to be the norm in the international system for decades. To be more precise, the Coronavirus pandemic and the responses to it have shone a spotlight on the crumbling nature of the western-centric international order. In particular, this crisis has demonstrated the lack of leadership, strategic planning and imagination in the USA and the decay of its hegemony. These features are not only illustrative of what is happening, but also harbingers of the post-pandemic international order to come.
Leadership – deficit and decay of the hegemon
The World needs a Marshall plan, not a Marshall fund:
In the face of economic hardship being felt around the world, but particularly in southern European and emerging markets, the call for a new Marshall Plan to weather this economic storm has been ubiquitous. As the Marshall Plan of 1948, which played a significant role in the economic-rebuilding of war-ravaged Europe through its $12 billion economic program, the so-called new Marshall plan is supposed to play a similar role. Despite these repeated calls for a new Marshall plan, the difference between the original and the one currently being proposed couldn’t be greater.
Firstly, in 1948 what was on offer wasn’t a mere Marshall fund (from the USA to western Europe), rather, as the name suggests, there was a plan based on the premise of a political vision, and aimed to generate collective action and collaboration amongst the western European states. This plan rested on the clear political leadership of the USA and collective action of the western European countries to reorganize their economic and political scene.
The Marshall plan being discussed today is devoid of all these features. There is no plan, no vision and no political leadership. Hence, at best, we are talking of a Marshall fund, which has little chance of solving a complicated meta crisis such as the one we are currently experiencing.
From war on terror to a war on a virus: the decline and decay of US leadership:
US political culture is attuned to declaring war on something. From Jimmy Carter’s war on energy, in reference to the long-lasting ramifications of the OPEC cuts in oil production in 1973, to Ronald Reagan’s war on the evil forces/empire (in reference to the Soviet Union), and from successive US president’s wars on terrorism, to Trump’s current war on the ‘Chinese’ virus, US foreign policy has been addicted to declaring war on something. Of these wars, the war on terror has been the most consequential, sapping US political energy and skewing its strategic orientation and geopolitical imagination.
This war on terror was, to a large extent, premised on a political and strategic reading which took the Islamic world as the constitutive ‘other’ of US foreign policy and of its declared value system. Though this war gained global prominence following the 9/11 attacks, the intellectual foundations for this war were laid much earlier.
Scholars such as Samuel Huntington and Bernard Lewis saw clashes between the west, the definition of which was nebulous and arbitrary, and the Islamic world, which was grounded in civilizational differences and aspirations, as inevitable. In these readings, Islam simply replaced the Soviet Union/Communism as the constitutive ‘other’ of the West in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War. This intellectual and political disposition has blurred the US strategic vision and squandered immense amounts of US resources.
At the same time, the process has created opportunities for China and Russia. In fact, while the USA was busy chasing ghosts in caves and deserts in the Middle East, China and Russia began laying the foundations for their international prominence and influence. Likewise, while the US wars in Afghanistan and Iraq were arguably strategic blunders of epic proportions, the same wars can be seen as strategic gifts from the USA to China.
At a time when the USA was busy exhausting itself in the Middle East, China was smoothly accelerating its ‘peaceful’ (we should also add the word ‘comfortable’) rise on the international stage. Thus, the cumulative outcome of the USA’s strategic follies through the politics of war on terror is self-evident.
This pandemic now poses questions such as: Is the US war on the ‘Chinese’ virus going to gain cultural, economic, political and military dimensions? Is the USA about to replace its war on terror with a new war on ‘Chinese-born’ forms of pandemics?
The exact answers to these questions will of course be provided by future historians, however, all the early signs indicate that the USA is following this track. Moreover, China’s international aid diplomacy since the outbreak of the crisis – its ‘cooperative’ approach in stark contrast to the USA’s self-centered one – is adding a political and ideological flavor to the USA-China competition, which had previously been essentially economic in nature.
The politics of the US war on terror have clearly shown the decline and decay of US leadership in international affairs and this pandemic is set to accelerate this trend. Since the outbreak of Coronavirus, the message sent out to the world by the USA has been: We have no idea how to handle this crisis ourselves, let alone provide leadership to the international effort in this fight, and we will be selfish in facing this pandemic (as it clearly displayed in its drive to take over German-developed vaccines).
The outcome of this crisis and the nature of its handling at both national and global levels are signs of what can be expected in the post-pandemic international order.
The Post-Pandemic International Order
Downsizing of the world’s dependency on China or regionalization of manufacturing:
This pandemic revealed the world’s worrying dependency on China for manufacturing and production. A good example of this dependency is the irony of China being the birth place of the Coronavirus, yet also where the majority of masks and ventilators are produced which everyone now relies on to fight this pandemic. This has illustrated both the strengths and vulnerabilities of China.
Additionally, it has used its manufacturing capacity for PR, while possessing the capacity of weaponizing this prowess against its adversaries. Yet, this period has served as a wakeup call for the rest of the world. Economic globalization will now have to become politically and geopolitically conscious – with the cardinal goal being to reduce the world’s economic dependency on China for production and manufacturing.
Subsequently, we can expect multinational companies to undergo a process of partial re-nationalization in their economic activities, a process which will create losers, as well as winners. Emerging markets with better industrial bases, skilled work forces and proximity to major economic centers of the world will be well-positioned to reap the benefits of this process. In economic terms, one can argue that in the balance between globalization or regionalization of production chains, the change will favor the latter with regional units for production and supply chains gaining prominence.
More concretely, in relation to the European markets, Turkey, central and Eastern European countries such as Poland will be the beneficiaries of this process, whilst in the North American market, Mexico will enjoy similar advantages.
A leaderless G2 world:
The US-centric international order has been unraveling for a while now and this pandemic will only accelerate and deepen this process. In its place we are witnessing the emergence of an international order/status quo in which the USA and China will be the two most important superpowers. However, the emerging international order will not be exclusively or predominantly US-China centric.
Instead, the international order will be less structured and more fluid – where the relative regional powers of the G20 countries, will increase in international affairs. In a sense, we are entering a leaderless G2 world, where the regional units will become more important.
An uncoupling of geography and geopolitics:
The rise of China and Russia in international affairs has signified the upsurge of geopolitics in international politics – bringing an end to the self-righteous liberal victory, which supposedly terminated the era of geopolitical competitions in international affairs. Thus, geopolitics is back in international relations. However, it is accompanied by the diminishing significance of geography when it comes to dealing with global challenges.
The current pandemic is a clear demonstration that in the case of different types of viruses, as well as climate change, water scarcity, air pollution and cyber security, geography means less and less. These issues will require a global response to mitigate their global consequences. Therefore, while the rise of geopolitics represents the fragmentation of the world into different zones of influence, the diminishing significance of geography means that we need to treat the world as a single unit while dealing with the afore-mentioned crises.
This tension between geopolitics and geography throws up a plethora of questions, not least: Can an international order or framework be established without shared principles, value systems or even thinly concealed common interests? In the end, the previous architecture of the international system didn’t just reflect the value systems and principles of the hegemon, but also served its interests. There are intimate links between the hegemon’s declared values/principles and its concealed interests.
The League of Nations was essentially a structural representation of the British vision of the international order, whereas the UN and Bretton Woods system served the same purpose for a US-dominated global system, whilst Pax Britannica or Pax-Americana have had internationalist dispositions. Will there be a Pax-Sinica? The geopolitical tension between a declining Pax-Americana and a rising Pax-Sinica framework will debilitate the global capacity to deal with borderless challenges and threats.
As the Coronavirus pandemic accelerates the emergence of a new international order, the repercussions will be far greater and much more deeply felt than the health crisis caused by the same pandemic.