The United States’ approach to foreign policy, both in the Middle East and globally, can be largely understood through a binary framework: states and actors are categorized as either integral to US global security interests or as threats to those interests. This fundamental dichotomy permeates US political discourse, evident in frequent references to the security of Israel, Europe, and the Gulf States. These concerns are consistently rationalized through the prism of US national security.

Conversely, entities perceived as challenges to US objectives are framed as “threats.” This designation has been applied to Iran, Russia, North Korea, and a diverse range of state and non-state actors whose agendas openly diverge from that of the United States. Driven by a selective and often expansive pursuit of “security,” US foreign policy has historically prioritized the identification and neutralization of these external “threats,” often at considerable cost. While distinct US administrations have adopted nuanced approaches to foreign policy over time, the underlying “security” versus “threat” doctrine has remained a consistent feature, particularly since the transformative period following the Second World War.

The Bill Clinton Administration (1993-2001) theoretically emphasized a containment foreign policy doctrine – one that was largely attributed to the Truman administration. However, his successor, George W. Bush (2001-2009), championed the doctrine of preemptive war – the emphasis on the Gulf region being introduced in the Carter Doctrine. Despite this divergence in approach, both administrations operated within the framework of dividing the geopolitical landscape into allies, whose security was to be guaranteed, and adversaries, who posed threats that required mitigation.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), established shortly after World War II, served as the cornerstone of European security. In contrast, security in the Middle East was primarily predicated on two main pillars: the security of Israel and the security of the Gulf region. Israel’s security was fundamentally intertwined with US political expansionism, with Tel Aviv acting as a strategic outpost for Washington, initially confronting communist influence and subsequently addressing what was termed “Islamic extremism.” Gulf security, on the other hand, was almost exclusively linked to the region’s substantial energy resources, notably crude oil and natural gas, which were directly relevant to the US economy.

While the Gulf’s strategic importance remained tied to its economic contribution, Israel’s perception of its role gradually evolved. Under the leadership of Benjamin Netanyahu, Israel increasingly viewed itself as an independent actor, less obligated to serve European interests in the Middle East. It solidified its alliance with the US to the point of perceiving itself as an equal partner, and arguably, during the Joe Biden Administration (2021-2024), even a dominant one.

The Biden Administration’s unwavering support and significant financial aid to Israel during the Gaza genocide, which began on October 7, 2023, will likely be a defining feature of its foreign policy. History may well record Biden as the US president who most completely aligned US foreign policy with the objectives of Tel Aviv, seemingly disregarding US geostrategic interests and its own “national security,” however defined.

Although past US administrations were often responsive to Israeli influence, particularly from the pro-Israel lobby, they generally preserved certain US regional interests. For example, while Clinton supported Israel’s ‘military edge,’ he also pursued politically biased settlements to stabilize the region for US benefit. Similarly, Obama, a significant provider of aid to Israel, occasionally demonstrated independence, such as abstaining from a vote on December 23, 2016, on a UN Security Council resolution condemning Israel’s settlement expansion.

Biden, however, readily supplied Israel with substantial weaponry amidst an active genocidal war in Gaza. Even his eventual calls for a ceasefire were not accompanied by concrete actions that would compel or even suggest to Israel a shift in US support.

This level of unreserved US support for Israel led some to anticipate, albeit with reservations, a potential shift in US policy with the advent of Donald Trump’s second term in the White House.

In contrast to the typically well-established policy stances of incoming US presidents, Trump’s Middle East policy, especially regarding Palestine, was characterized by its fluidity. Despite occasional criticism of Israel, his first term (2017-2021) witnessed significant deviations from longstanding US foreign policy, including the recognition of illegal Israeli settlements, the relocation of the US embassy to occupied East Jerusalem, and the recognition of Israeli sovereignty over the Golan Heights, all actions contravening international law.

Trump’s new administration, resembling his previous one, comprised a mix of hawkish elements, Christian fundamentalists, and isolationist voices. This composition generated considerable optimism in Israel, particularly among supporters of Netanyahu’s right-wing coalition, who understandably viewed Trump’s return as an endorsement of their policies.

Trump seemingly validated these expectations. On February 4, he initiated a series of statements regarding the need to “take ownership” of Gaza, while reiterating a transactional approach to foreign policy. These statements were interpreted by Israel as a tacit endorsement of a policy agenda centered on the displacement of Gaza’s population and the consolidation of Israeli dominance over the West Bank.

Despite his reputation for inconsistencies, Trump reportedly doubled down on the “proposal” of Gaza’s depopulation. His administration purportedly began formulating a new foreign policy strategy in Jordan and Egypt around this objective, while simultaneously discussing Israeli-Saudi normalization as if these issues were unrelated. Netanyahu, in turn, seemingly leveraged Trump’s perceived commitment to the displacement of Palestinians to contravene a ceasefire agreement with Palestinian resistance on March 18, escalate attacks in the West Bank, and carry out military attacks against Lebanon and Syria.

However, the alignment between Trump and Netanyahu eventually encountered limitations. This shift was likely not driven by a fundamental change in Trump’s principles but rather by his “America First” orientation, which prioritized perceived US interests over unwavering support for Israel. In his initial months back in office, Trump likely confronted the following realities:

First, Palestinian resistance proved too formidable for Israel to decisively defeat, with Netanyahu’s military failing to subdue a relatively small number of fighters in the Gaza Strip.

Second, Arab nations, driven by their own strategic considerations, were unlikely to countenance the mass displacement of Palestinians.

Third, confronting Iran and its allies would necessitate a significantly larger and riskier military undertaking than the 2003 Iraq War, with uncertain strategic outcomes.

Fourth, addressing the challenges posed by China and other global actors required a more stable Middle East, and such stability, crucial for securing trade routes, was incompatible with Netanyahu’s pursuit of perpetual conflict.

On April 7, Trump reportedly invited, or perhaps summoned, Netanyahu to the White House. In the Israeli leader’s presence, he declared that “direct” talks would commence between the US and Iran. Given Trump’s 2018 withdrawal from the Iran nuclear agreement, this announcement represented a potentially significant shift in US foreign policy.

The implications of such a move could be profound, potentially marking the first instance in decades where US policy in the Middle East is decoupled from Israel’s immediate interests. However, it remains uncertain whether Trump possesses the political capital to enact such a fundamental change, even if he genuinely intends to prioritize his “America First” agenda. 

The US relationship with Israel differs significantly from its relationship with Ukraine, for example, where a major policy shift was implemented. The pro-Israel lobby’s deep penetration into the American political system means that a substantial portion of the US Congress remains highly responsive to Israeli influence.

Furthermore, it is unclear whether the US will seek to recalibrate its alliances in the Middle East, fostering relationships with other nations independent of their alignment with Israeli interests.

An agreement between the US and Iran could also have far-reaching consequences for the broader region, as many regional conflicts are fueled by the tensions between Israel and Iran, as well as between Iran and the Arab Gulf states.

Numerous questions remain unanswered, requiring a consistent and coherent US foreign policy discourse to address them. Given Trump’s well-documented inconsistencies, this may prove to be a challenging endeavor. 

Nevertheless, it is pertinent to consider the potential transformation of the Middle East should the US move away from its selective application of “security” and “threat” as the primary determinants of its foreign policy. The ramifications could indeed be substantial, and potentially unfavorable for both Israel and other traditional US allies in the region.