Abstract: Since the July 15, 2016 coup, Turkey has been living in what might be termed ‘momentous times’. Since then the country has been struggling to deal with the aftershocks of the failed coup. People are still grieving for the loss(1) of 240 lives as well as caring for the more than 2,000 injured. Despite all of this, the country has emerged more cohesive, with shows of unity across almost the entire spectrum of political and social classes. In fact, the public’s sense of ownership of Turkey’s democratic gains and the political classes’ maturity were crucial in defeating the coup attempt. These are necessary but not sufficient conditions for permanently closing the door on the age of coups, and terminating the shady and illegal activities of ‘rogue’ elements within the state.  This article attempts to explain the structural foundation of the coup, highlighting the role played by the rogue groups ‘occupying’ some key state institutions. Three dimensions are vital in this respect. 1) Turkey’s over-centralised and identity-imposing state makes it easier for rogue elements to infiltrate and dominate the state for their own purposes, including would be coup-plotters. 2) The lack of proper problem-solving mechanisms between the government and opposition only aggravates this institutional flaw. 3) While formulating its policies to deal with the attempted coup, the government should not go for easy fixes. In-stead, it should deal with the conjectural, group-specific, and structural foundations of what it had experienced on the night of July 15.