Dimitar BechevAbstract: The Syria deal unveiled by U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry and his Russian counterpart, Sergey Lavrov, on September 10, is a diplomatic coup for Russia. Moscow has reconfirmed its status as a powerbroker on a par with Washington. Despite the inherent risks should the cease-fire fall apart, Russia is now in a position to tweak the terms of the agreement to bolster its protégé, President Bashar al-Assad. The Russians view the Kerry-Lavrov deal as a stepping stone to ensuring Assad remains in power with the implicit or explicit blessing of the U.S. and its ally Turkey. The paper looks at how the current diplomatic initiative fits Russia’s strategy of reinserting itself into the Middle East and its relations with key regional players, including Turkey, Iran and Saudi Arabia.[/box]
A year after the start of the Russian military operation in Syria, events seem to be stacking up exactly the way Putin and his team want them to. The U.S. accepts Russia as an interlocutor, though probably not as an equal, which is what Moscow would wish. Despite the sanctions on his country, Putin is no longer shunned by Western leaders. In September, he had a chance to talk to the German Chancellor Angela Merkel, President François Hollande of France, UK Prime Minister Theresa May and U.S. President Barack Obama on the sidelines of the G20 Summit in Hangzhou, China. Moscow is suspected of meddling with the forthcoming American presidential elections and blamed for hacking the Democratic National Committee (DNC) emails. The situation in Ukraine remains tense; low-intensity fighting in Donbas continues and Russian authorities allege that Kiev has fomented a terrorist plot in occupied Crimea. But, for all that, Russia and the West are in engagement mode.
The Russian presence in Syria goes a long way to explaining the dual strategy of containment and dialogue pursued by the U.S. and its European allies. It is not that the Obama administration is bullish about the prospects of a grand bargain with Moscow on ending the war. But at this stage, it is not realistic to expect any progress on the ground without a Russian buy-in. Months of negotiations between State Secretary John Kerry and the Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov are now bearing fruit. On September 10, the pair announced a deal to bring about “a cessation of hostilities”, effective as of the beginning of Eid al-Adha. In case the truce holds for at least a week, the U.S. has also agreed to set up a joint operations’ centre to exchange intelligence information and coordinate airstrikes against radical groups including the so-called Islamic State (IS) and Jabhat Fateh al-Sham (JFS, formerly known as Jabhat al-Nusra). To get there, however, the Syrian regime should discontinue its military push against rebel-held areas like eastern Aleppo, ground its aircraft and helicopters which are now showering civilians with barrel bombs and chlorine, and allow the delivery of humanitarian aid. In turn, the American promise to talk anti-Assad militias they support into severing ties with al-Nusra/JFS.
No doubt about it, the U.S.-Russian deal will be fiendishly difficult to implement, if it is possible at all. Can Russia be trusted to rein in Assad and his allies from the Iranian Revolutionary Guards, Hezbollah and motley pro-regime militias? How would the U.S. decouple JFS from other rebel factions, given the critical role the jihadi group played in breaking the regime siege of Aleppo in early August? All through the Geneva talks, scepticism prevailed in Washington D.C. The White House and Defence Secretary Ash Carter are yet to be convinced that Russia can deliver on a durable cease-fire. Even if it does, intelligence-sharing and joint military operations will prove a sticking point. U.S. experts are not brimming with excitement either.[1] The deal Lavrov and Kerry brokered in late February fell apart just weeks after the agreement was signed. Assad launched a new offensive on Aleppo in mid-April, backed by Russian heavy artillery and airstrikes. What the deal did in effect was to provide cover for Putin’s surprise announcement in March that Russia was winding down its operations (as “objectives have been generally accomplished”).
As in the spring, the Russians and/or Assad could use the run-up to the new truce as a smokescreen to capture more territory. (The Syrian leader has vowed to retake all land from “terrorists”.) That is exactly what happened during the Minsk II negotiations in early 2015. Less than a week after the so-called Normandy Four[2] endorsed a ceasefire in Eastern Ukraine on February 12, Moscow-backed separatists took control of the Debaltseve enclave located on a strategically important railway and road junction. As usual, Russia denied direct involvement but the U.S. government, amongst others, claimed that heavy fire from Russian artillery and multiple rocket launchers drove the Ukrainian troops out of the besieged village. Similarly, regime airstrikes went on unabated in the Aleppo and Idlib provinces before the September cease-fire entered into force.
To be sure, there are some cautiously positive assessments too. In some parts of Syria, the deal might empower more mainstream factions of the anti-Assad opposition. In the judgment of Syrian analysts, “in eastern Ghouta, where groups such as Jaish Al Islam have long sought to prevent what is now known as JFS from establishing a foothold for itself, the plan could critically tip the balance in their favor. The same goes for the Southern Front, the coalition of Free Syrian Army groups operating mainly in Deraa.” But again, there is one important caveat: “the plan can only have a lasting, transformative impact on Syria if the U.S. helps the opposition protect itself against the regime, exert political leverage and preserve any gains made against extremists.”