Fatih Şemsettin IşıkIsrael-Arab Normalization: Reverting Legacies and Shifting Realities
The process of publicizing the clandestine relations between Israel and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) together with Bahrain reached its climax at a White House ceremony last week. With all controversies around the nature of the normalization process and reactions from the Palestinians, the agreement between Israel and the two Arab states is undeniably a strong indicator of the dynamics shaping the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region in the upcoming years.
Following the UAE and Bahrain’s first steps to officialize relations with Israel, this trend is expected to continue with other Gulf Arab states, particularly Saudi Arabia and Oman. But these states also have to consider their positions among the Islamic nations, namely as the custodian of the two Holy Mosques and delicately-managed neutral stance respectively. Along with this attempt from the Gulf, some African states such as Sudan, Djibouti, and Mauritania can continue this trend.
Reverting the Legacy of Camp David and Oslo Accords
While this normalization agreement can be regarded as the third phase in the history of Arab-Israeli peace agreements after Egypt in 1979 and Jordan in 1994, a different pattern in regards to the foundations of this agreement can be seen. Unlike Egypt and Jordan, neither the UAE, Bahrain, nor the other prospective partners in the Gulf and North Africa (except Saudi Arabia) were hostile to Israel to the extent of entering an armed clash or military conflict; this resulted in having to pay a serious price for their stance in the defense of the Palestinian cause. Instead, it is the regional context in the post-Arab Uprising period that pushed these states to normalize their relations with Israel. For Israel, this changing regional context should have been responded with a shift in its foreign policy strategy from reliance upon international protection from regional threats with acting in collaboration with regional powers.
Moreover, regardless of what conditions were proposed to the signatory countries, Egypt and Jordan still considered Palestinian rights as a significant dimension in the negotiations that initiated the talks both in 1979 and 1994. However, in the case of the Abraham Accords, Israel 
succeeded in reaching an agreement with the signatory Arab states without having to give any concessions on the Palestinian issue. Hence, the Israeli violation of Palestinian rights is being legitimized as the Gulf countries are ready to trivialize the conflict by reducing it to “economic terms” to deal with and share the burden without effectively compromising Israel. It reached the point that annexation plans for some parts of the West Bank were not given up but rather just “postponed.”
Because this agreement disregards the reality on the ground for the Palestinians and hence has no solid ground to offer a solution to the Palestinians, signatories sought to legitimize the initiative in the eyes of the international community through resorting to sugar-coating actions which would better serve the promotion of the agreement in the international community. For this reason, it was not surprising for signatories of the deal to highlight the components that would promote the symbolic value of the agreement, such as writing “peace” in Hebrew and Arabic or naming the accords “Abraham” to emphasize the Abrahamic religious background. Ultimately, they came to a weird position in which “symbolism” was forced to swallow the reality on the ground through promoting Arab/Islamic cultural values but ignoring the Palestinians, representatives of one of the main elements of those values.
Statecraft vs. Diplomacy
This agreement can also be seen as an extension of how statecraft by the hands of charismatic leaders gradually outweighs the diplomacy through institutionalized means. Even though Henry Kissinger-type statesmen-led initiatives were crucial for materializing the Israel-Egypt and Israel-Jordan peace deals, this time the deals worked through strategies in which statesmen are the real focus and even set aside the diplomatic institutions. In this regard, Netanyahu’s choice to not involve his coalition partners (including foreign minister Gabi Ashkenazi) in the picture and Trump’s tweet diplomacy with an anti-establishment stance should be taken into consideration. In other words, this deal is deprived of motivation and grounds for establishing institutions and remains superficial to some extent.
However, this form of intra-elite dialogue and cooperation is actually where we should think twice about the future of such initiatives. If Mohammad Bin Zayed in the UAE or Mohammad Bin Salman in Saudi Arabia is no longer in power or Netanyahu leaves the prime ministry, it is very likely that these agreements can fail since a normalization process is mostly bound to charismatic leaders and their intra-personal relations. In such a situation, Israel would continue the previous discourse, complaining about the Arabs not wanting peace.
Where Local Implications Meet the Regional
It is without a doubt that the agreement is a personal victory for Netanyahu, amidst facing a trial on corruption charges, a surge of massive demonstrations against him, and challenging socio-economic conditions with the COVID-19 pandemic in his country. Not only has he distracted the dark clouds looming over his head, but he could also re-settle his popularity and prestige with his “statesman” image on the global stage in the eyes of Israeli voters. Besides, he could turn this process into his personal show since he only coordinated the talks with Mossad chief Yossi Kohen, who enjoys close relations with the Israeli prime minister, and even did not allow his coalition partners to steal the show, demonstrating how capable he is on the global stage.
Yet, his efforts for running the show alone were not warmly welcomed by all in Israel, particularly for security reasons. Among their discontent was the potential of an F-35 deal between the US and the UAE reportedly as a condition of the Israel-UAE normalization agreement. Although Netanyahu first denied the reports that he gave the US a green light in this matter and announced his opposition to the deal, which also caused the UAE to cancel a meeting with Israel, the purchase is still expected to take place especially since purchasing these jets has become top priority for the UAE and the Trump administration favors the idea.
However, the Israeli military has a concern that the sale would undermine the country’s qualitative military edge (QME) according to a US commitment that dates back to the 1970s in which the United States is legally bound to uphold Israel’s military advantage over any individual Middle Eastern state. In this regard, both Israeli defense minister Gantz and Israel’s air force chief echoed their reservations about such a sale. Even though this sale was not officially a part of the deal, by making a peace deal with Israel, the UAE sought a shorter route to attaining F-35 jets through favoring a Trump administration-arbitrated solution in the Arab-Israeli relations. By opposing selling the F-35s to the UAE, Israel attempts to protect its privileged position in these bilateral relations with an upper hand in security capabilities, keeping the UAE in constant need of Israel’s security cooperation. That is why Netanyahu and Kohen offered the UAE to sell advanced weapons instead of F-35 jets. This showcases how Israel still regards the UAE as a junior security partner; although useful in disrupting Turkey and Qatar’s attempts at implementing assertive policies in the region, the UAE is not necessarily involved in the Western security camp.
Besides, the frustration of Palestinians with the Abraham Accords and their perception of the deal as the Gulf states abandoning the “Palestinian Cause” may curtail the UAE’s influence on the Palestinians. If the Gulf countries and their financial influence fail in reining back the Palestinian reaction, this may jeopardize the security cooperation between the Palestinian Administration (PA) and the Israel security officials in the West Bank. With the Trump administration-led “Deal of the Century” that almost destroys the conditions to materialize a two-state solution, the PA will not be motivated to maintain security cooperation with Israeli counterparts. Considering the expectations that Mohammad Dahlan’s influence will rise over the Palestinian issue after the UAE’s increasingly dominating role in the MENA region, it is crucial for the PA and Mahmoud Abbas, who is in a harsh rivalry with Dahlan, to mend the fences with Hamas for a unity government to survive its authority in the West Bank. In the event that Turkey-brokered talks between the two factions succeed, Israel’s security apparatus in the West Bank would face more challenges to control.
Fragmented Regional Threats Under the Same Banner
When it comes to regional consequences, one has to consider the shifts in regional security perception for Israel over the last decades. Along with the long-standing threat from Iran, since the beginning of the Arab Uprisings, Israel has also perceived Turkey and Qatar and their support for the pro-change political groups as hostile, given its reflexive pro-status quo stance. This concern has further been exacerbated with the latest developments and Turkish proactive foreign policy in the Eastern Mediterranean. Since the 2010s, Turkey has already supported the pro-Arab Uprising political factions and enjoyed good relations with Hamas. With the consecutive crises in Syria, Libya, and finally in the Eastern Mediterranean, Ankara has begun to transform its soft power into a political-security influence. Such influence of Turkey is found as a bigger threat than Iran for Israel, as Mossad chief Kohen admits. This became an indirect but important factor leading Israel to initiate normalization with the Arab states. The same shift can also be mentioned for normalizing Arab states, which shares the same concerns with Israel.
Having said that, the threat perceptions of the states, which have either been normalized or are expected to normalize, and their relations with Israel are fragmented rather than shared. While some states perceive a certain rival regional power like Turkey or Iran as a threat, others might not find that rival regional power threatening in the same manner. For instance, while Saudi Arabia and Bahrain consider Iran to be a threat, and, therefore, decided to cooperate with Israel on that basis, the UAE still prefers to maintain good economic relations with Tehran and does not perceive Tehran as threatening as Riyadh and Manama do. Similarly, countries such as Oman and Sudan do not regard Iran as a threat either. On the other hand, the Gulf countries and particularly the UAE have entered a fierce competition with Turkey in Libya, Syria, and other countries of the region with the Emiratis choosing to ally with the Israelis in Libya to support Khalifa Haftar. However, Oman and Sudan do not share the same position and prefer to maintain good relations with Turkey. This shows how Israel’s “peace” is established on a fragmented set of interests, threats, and perceptions.
Global Impacts
Regarding implications on the global level, the normalization agreement became the last nail driven in the coffin for the debate that the US has withdrawn from the MENA region. Both the “Deal of the Century” and the Abraham Accords proved that the Trump administration’s foreign policy in the MENA region was, in fact, a re-arrangement of influence through proxies and allies instead of a withdrawal. This strategy that is also managed through personal relations between President Trump and his counterparts can be seen as less costly compared to actions taken by previous US administrations. It is unclear yet whether Joe Biden, under the assumption that he wins the elections, will pursue the same diplomatic track.
Last but not least, Russia as an increasingly influential actor in the MENA region must be content with this achievement between Israel and the Gulf countries, whom both enjoy very good relations with Moscow. Even though the need for Russian involvement in mediating talks between Israelis and Palestinians is being warmed over whenever the Palestinians question the effectiveness of US mediation, Russia would not want to put all its eggs in one basket and give up its privileged position. This position includes being a partner for both signatories and supporters of the Abraham Accords and those who oppose it, particularly Turkey and Iran at the same time.
In the end, the following question should be asked: is it another indicator that the Palestinian cause is squeezed into a local matter after consecutive “betrayals” of the Arab states? Yes, the ruling Arab elites seem relentless and nonchalant to the Palestinians. Even though the public would not abandon its interest in the issue, it nevertheless lost precedence in the public sphere because information and the public debate are much more strongly shaped by the elite.
But no, because it is again Israel that is seeking regional support, which inevitably proves the “regionality” of the Palestinian issue. Leaving this issue unsolved and continually open for problems would first cause the normalization effort to be in vain. Moreover, the history of the conflict with two Intifadas and a recent Knife Intifada demonstrated that the Palestinians can change the reality on the ground.