The Distribution of Oil Incomes and the Danger of the Partition of Libya

Although Libya’s armed rebellion was successful in toppling down the autocratic regime of Muammar Gaddafi, it failed to secure a peaceful transition of power or maintain stability and unity in the country. The emergence of two rival administrations in 2014, the UN-recognized Government of National Accord (GNA) in Tripoli and the Tobruk administration with the House of Representatives (HoR), paved the way for a multi-actor civil war across the country.

This piece examines the transition process after Gaddafi, analyzing the main reasons behind the civil war. Then, it discusses the idea of the equitable distribution of oil and gas revenues announced  in the July 6 statement released by the United Nations Support Mission in Libya.[1] The piece first argues that the beginning of the Libyan civil war was triggered by a lack of leadership, conflict among rival groups, and a struggle to control resources. Secondly, the country’s current situation with the presence of a rival government in Tobruk—controlling some territories and resources of the country–continues to extend the civil war. Thirdly, distributing oil revenues among the three different regions under the current circumstances threatens the country’s territorial integrity in the long run by making these regions grow more distant and autonomous from each other. Such a scenario under the current circumstances of the country might cause Libya’s partition in the future.

The Transition Process after Gaddafi and the Beginning of the Second Civil War

Peaceful protests against Muammar Gaddafi began in February 2011, but shortly turned into a large-scale armed rebellion that lasted until Gaddafi’s capture in October 2011. The Libyan National Transitional Council (NTC), established in the city of Bengazi, declared itself as the sole legitimate body representing the Libyan people in March. By the end of November 2011, more than a hundred members of the United Nations recognized the NTC.[2]

However, the NTC could not become a successful authority after Gaddafi’s demise and lost its function amidst both political and armed conflicts across the country. According to some sources, 1,600 armed groups were operating in Libya. Some of them had ties with different political parties while others were just tribal and regional based groups.[3] These factors complicated the situation and caused instability in different parts of the country. In 2014, a low-turnout parliamentary election of 18 percent resulted in two different rival governments in Tripoli and Tobruk in the east of the country.[4] Due to the nullification of elections by the Supreme Constitutional Court, the General National Congress based in Tripoli rejected the elections’ results. Therewith, the House of Representatives (HoR) was established in Tobruk and maintained its administration through its institutions and military forces. The HoR appointed Khalifa Haftar as commander in chief of the Libyan National Army and gave him full sovereignty across the country. The emergence of two rival governments after the 2014 elections instigated the beginning of the Libyan civil war.

The UN initiated attempts to form a new government to end the armed conflicts and maintain the country’s stability. In December 2015, the Libyan Political Agreement was signed after talks among Libyan groups in Skhirat, Morocco, to reach a solution. As a result of this agreement, the Government of National Accord (GNA), recognized by the UN, was established in Tripoli. The HoR refused to accept Tripoli’s new government, claiming that Tripoli was under the control of radical armed groups. 

Due to this torn status, armed clashes between forces loyal to GNA and forces loyal to Tobruk increased rapidly. Khalifa Haftar as the former chief of staff of the Gaddafi regime had spent two decades in exile in the USA. He then began to increase his influence as a military commander. Haftar received support from Gaddafi’s former military officers and some other tribal groups. He mobilized troops under his command and launched military operations in the eastern part of the country. In May 2014, forces loyal to Haftar attacked the parliament in Tripoli and attempted a failed coup. After this point, the civil war between the two rival governments intensified across the country and culminated in Haftar’s 14-months siege on Libya’s capital, Tripoli.

Why was Libya Dragged into the Civil War?

The absence of a unified opposition army to fight the Gaddafi forces lead to the absence of a unified leadership after his removal from power. There was no national army, but many armed groups started operating in the country and pursuing their own agendas. Some of these armed groups were tribal forces while some others were local armed groups from different cities. These local armed groups formed a kind of city-state where each city was governed by its local councils and protected by its private armed groups. These councils made differing decisions on expected conduct during the civil war and fought each other by taking parts in various alignments. For example, the Darnah city council decided to join ISIS; Zintan city, close to Tripoli, chose to be loyal to the Haftar forces. On the other hand, Misrata has always been loyal to the government in Tripoli. Partition of Libya

The tribal nature of the Libyan society was also reflected in the institutions of the Libyan state where tribes have been part of the administration and held influence on the central authority in their areas. Whereas the Gaddafi regime cooperated with some tribes in order to govern the country,[5] tribes–such as Warfalla, Qadhadfa, Warshafana, Tarhouna, Asabia, and Mashashiya–felt threatened and excluded by revolutionary militias in post-Gaddafi Libya.[6] Similar to the local councils, tribes also pursued their own interests resulting in frequent clashes amongst them. The Sebha and Tebu tribes are an example of a conflict between different armed groups clashing over smuggling routes in the southeast of Libya.[7] Haftar benefitted from the void and successfully used the disputes among the tribes to gain their cooperation and support. By increasing his tribal allies, Haftar increased his military power and extended his territorial control. 

However, there were other factors that helped Haftar increase his support and influence. Firstly, the rise of ISIS in the country and its occupation of some towns and cities allowed Haftar to launch anti-terror operations and gain support from locals. However, after the end of ISIS’s territorial control in the country, Haftar forces continued their so-called anti-terror operations against other militia groups. This course of action did not support Haftar in taking control of different parts of the country. Due to the fact that Haftar did not have a remarkable army, he used armed militias and mercenaries during these operations. According to the UN reports, Haftar allowed mercenaries from Russia, Sudan, and Chad to enter the country, and he used them to take control of oil fields and protect them.[8] Although these mercenaries served Haftar to help control strategic positions and increase his influence, they also caused instabilities in those areas because of their irregular characteristics.

Resources within the country should be taken into account when analyzing the development of civil wars. The likelihood of civil wars increases “if rebels can extract and sell resources, or extort money from those who do.”[9] Similarly, resource wealth tends to increase or decrease the duration of a civil war: civil wars last longer when they involve land or natural resource conflicts.[10] If the weaker side gains additional resources, the conflict will continue.[11] In the Libyan case, Haftar forces saw a chance to seize oil fields and control them since the onset. This encouraged them to initiate a large-scale military confrontation against Tripoli-based GNA. Haftar forces continue to challenge the GNA as they gained control over additional land and natural resources, most significantly oil, ultimately prolonging the civil war. 

The Threat to the Territorial Integrity of Libya

As mentioned above, the lack of state authority allowed tribes and local groups in cities to act autonomously. It also allowed the emergence of two rival governments in the country, initiating the Libyan civil war. The external support Haftar forces receive from military equipment and foreign mercenaries makes it harder to end the civil war. However, as the length of the civil war increases, the possibility for the partition of the country also increases.

Nevertheless, after Turkey’s military support to GNA, foreign actors involved in the civil war began to seek a ceasefire and launched the political process for a solution.[12] The Berlin Conference on Libya was held in January in 2020 to initiate a ceasefire and to launch negotiations.[13] However, Haftar forces rejected the ceasefire and continued their attacks. As a result, the GNA forces launched a counter-offensive strike against Haftar forces[14] and succeeded in regaining full control of Tripoli[15] and advancing to the outskirts of Sirte city.[16] Following these advances, an actual ceasefire was reached on the field, and a new period of negotiations was launched under the mechanisms initiated by the Berlin Conference on Libya. However, during these international negotiations, some debates related to the distribution of oil revenues emerged. The outcome on the distribution of oil revenues might jeopardize the country’s territorial integrity. 

As a result of the Berlin Conference on Libya last January, the Economic Working Group of the International Follow-up Committee on Libya was established along with three other technical working groups. The committee was working on economic conditions for a possible ceasefire in the country.[17] However, some media sources claimed that oil money could be split between three banks representing three regions to open the way for the ceasefire.[18] This claim was partially confirmed by the July 6 statement released by the United Nations Support Mission in Libya, stating that the discussions took place on an equitable distribution of oil and gas revenues.[19] It can be argued that the distribution of oil revenues among the three different regions would make these regions more distant and autonomous from each other.

In this regard, such a scenario under the current circumstances of the country might cause Libya’s partition in the future. If these three regions gain revenues, they may begin to act independently because of the lack of a central authority and functioning institutions. To exemplify, the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), an autonomous region in Iraq, has its own oil fields and revenues. The region’s rulers held a referendum for their independence in 2017 when Iraq was grappling with instability, and there was a lack of central authority in the country. If Libya’s oil revenues are distributed, the country might face similar situations in the long term.

Moreover, these three regions being referred to were products of colonial actions by the British in the East, the Italians in the West, and the French in the South. They even ceased to exist as administrative authorities since independence in 1951, and no longer have any validity.[20] However, Deputy Chairman of the Presidential Council in Tripoli, Ahmed Maiteeq, announced an agreement to resume oil production and revenue distribution on September 18.[21] Although Maiteeq stated that the process would continue until the formation of a national unity, it should be noted that this might deepen the regions’ economic sovereignty during this process as the torn-status of the country continues since the formation of the national unity seems unlikely to occur in the near future.

Conclusion

In the post-Gaddafi era, Libya witnessed a lack of a stable authority in the country. Even though there was a legitimate government in Tripoli with forces loyal to it, the Tobruk-based parliament and Haftar forces challenged the legitimate authority and contributed to the instability. Moreover, they gained additional power by taking control of some parts of the country and obtaining political and military assistance from external helpers such as the UAE, Egypt, Russia, and France. Hence, this situation has extended the duration of the civil war.

After the GNA forces reached Sirte, both sides noticed that any battle in Sirte might result in massive casualties and destruction. Also, foreign actors realized that the civil war might turn into a regional one. Due to deterrence, all sides seem to have agreed on a ceasefire for the time being. On the one hand, both sides and their external supporters do not seem to be willing to risk their gains for the time being.  On the other hand, each side perceives its rivals as terrorists threatening the stability and order in the country in the long run. Therefore, it seems that the armed conflict between both sides will be reignited, even after future political processes and elections.  

Meanwhile, some discussions on the distribution of oil revenues emerged in international decision-making bodies . The demilitarization of Sirte and the distribution of oil revenues bring about short-term solutions, however, the distribution of oil revenues might cause the country’s partition in the future.

References


[1] United Nations Support Mission in Libya, “Statement on The Meeting of Economic Working Group of the International Follow-Up Committee on Libya,” 2020, https://unsmil.unmissions.org/statement-meeting-economic-working-group-international-follow-committee-libya-06-july-2020

[2] Giuseppe Nesi, “Recognition Of The Libyan National Transitional Council: When, How And Why,” The Italian Yearbook of International Law Online, vol. 21,1(2011), 45-59, retrieved from  https://www.researchgate.net/publication/274358429

[3] Mattison Rowan, “Libya Timeline: Since Qaddafi’s Ouster,” United States Institute of Peace, 2019, retrieved from https://www.usip.org/publications/2019/07/libya-timeline-qaddafis-ouster

[4] Mattison Rowan, “Libya Timeline: Since Qaddafi’s Ouster,” United States Institute of Peace, 2019, retrieved from https://www.usip.org/publications/2019/07/libya-timeline-qaddafis-ouster

[5] George Joffé, “Where does Libya go now?” The Journal of North African Studies, vol. 25, 1(2020), 1-7, DOI: 10.1080/13629387.2020.1689806

[6] Artutor Varvelli, “The Role of Tribal Dynamics in the Libyan Future,” Italian Institute for International Political Studies, 2013, retrieved from https://www.ispionline.it/it/pubblicazione/role-tribal-dynamics-libyan-future-7944

[7] Viswas Viswanath, Megha Gupta, and Srivatasan Manivannan, “Conflict Resolution and Fragmentation in the Libyan Civil Wars. O. P,” Jindal Global University, 2018.

[8] Yasin Şahin, “Hafter Güçlerinin Anatomisi,” iNSAMER, 2020, retrieved from https://insamer.com/tr/hafter-guclerinin-anatomisi_2620.html

[9] Michael L. Ross, “How Do Natural Resources Influence Civil War? Evidence from Thirteen Cases,” International Organization, vol. 58, 1(2004), 35-67, retrieved from https://www.jstor.org/stable/3877888

[10] James D. Fearon, “Why Do Some Civil Wars Last so Much Longer than Others?” Journal of Peace Research, vol. 41, 3(2004), 275-301, retrieved from https://www.jstor.org/stable/4149745

[11] Michael L. Ross, “How Do Natural Resources Influence Civil War? Evidence from Thirteen Cases,” International Organization, vol. 58, 1(2004), 35-67, retrieved from https://www.jstor.org/stable/3877888

[12] Safa Alharathy, “Putin calls on Egypt, UAE to push Haftar towards Political Solution,” The Libya Observer, 2020, retrieved from https://www.libyaobserver.ly/inbrief/putin-calls-egypt-uae-push-haftar-towards-political-solution

[13] The Gaurdian, “Libyan Warlord Haftar Leaves Moscow without SigningCceasefire Deal,” 2020, retreived from libyan-warlord-haftar-leaves-moscow-without-signing-ceasefire-deal

[14] Middle East Monitor, “Sarraj Announces Launch of Operation Peace Storm in Response to Haftar Attacks, 2020, retrieved from https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20200327-sarraj-announces-launch-of-operation-peace-storm-in-response-to-haftar-attacks/

[15] The Gaurdian, “UN-backed Libyan Forces Oust Renegade General from Tripoli,” 2020, retrieved from https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/jun/04/un-backed-libyan-forces-oust-renegade-general-from-tripoli

[16] Al Jazeera, “Libya: GNA Calls Egypt’s Military Threat ‘Declaration of War’,” 2020, retrieved from https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/06/22/libya-gna-calls-egypts-military-threat-declaration-of-war/

[17] https://unsmil.unmissions.org/berlin-international-conference-libya-19-january-2020

[18] The Gaurdian, “Talks May Lead to end of Blockade of Libyan Oilfields,” 2020, retreived from https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/jun/29/talks-may-lead-to-end-of-blockade-of-libyan-oilfields

[19] United Nations Support Mission in Libya, “Statement on The Meeting of Economic Working Group of the International Follow-Up Committee on Libya,” 2020, https://unsmil.unmissions.org/statement-meeting-economic-working-group-international-follow-committee-libya-06-july-2020

[20] Middle East Monitor, “Why is it Wrong to Share Libyan Oil Revenue Now?” 2020, retreived from https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20200710-why-is-it-wrong-to-share-libyan-oil-revenue-now/

[21] The Libya Observer, Maiteeq Announces Agreement to Resume Oil Production and Distribute Revenues,” 2020, retrieved from https://www.libyaobserver.ly/inbrief/maiteeq-announces-agreement-resume-oil-production-and-distribute-revenues

 

Why was Libya Dragged into the Civil War?

The absence of a unified opposition army to fight the Gaddafi forces lead to the absence of a unified leadership after his removal from power. There was no national army, but many armed groups started operating in the country and pursuing their own agendas. Some of these armed groups were tribal forces while some others were local armed groups from different cities. These local armed groups formed a kind of city-state where each city was governed by its local councils and protected by its private armed groups. These councils made differing decisions on expected conduct during the civil war and fought each other by taking parts in various alignments. For example, the Darnah city council decided to join ISIS; Zintan city, close to Tripoli, chose to be loyal to the Haftar forces. On the other hand, Misrata has always been loyal to the government in Tripoli.