M. Tahir KilavuzThe Road to July 25: The Problems of Democratic Consolidation in Tunisia
Abstract: The Tunisian democratic experiment, once the last remaining hope of the Arab revolts, was put to an end on July 25, 2021, as President Kais Saied announced the dissolution of government and the freezing of parliament. This article goes beyond the immediate factors of Saied’s authoritarian take-over to discuss the background conditions that prepared the stage for July 25. It argues that there are two main conditions that led to this outcome. First, like many other countries that have experienced democratic transitions, Tunisia suffered from major obstacles in the way of democratic consolidation. Even with the post-revolutionary development of Tunisian civil society and the flourishing of a multitude of political parties and organizations, the institutional routinization necessary for democratic consolidation still could not take place. This institutional weakness led to an absence of horizontal accountability. Alongside these political problems, the democratic experiment failed to meet economic expectations. Second, as a result of these political and economic challenges, the Tunisian public grew disillusioned with democracy. The lack of democratic consolidation and the public’s subsequent frustration with the democratic experiment created conditions under which democracy could be undermined.
Introduction
As the hopes for genuine democratic change started to wane across the region following the first two years of the Arab revolts, Tunisia remained the only hope to continue its path to democratization. With the second free, fair, and competitive elections in late 2013 and the completion of the constitution in early 2014, Tunisia successfully completed its democratic transition. Yet, recent history has showed us once more that while democratic transition is an important milestone, it is not the endpoint, as the tumultuous years of political, economic, and security problems set the stage for Kais Saied’s takeover on July 2021.
Much has been written to successfully explain how and why Saied could take over and terminate (this stage of) the democratic experiment in Tunisia.[i] What then were the conditions that prepared the stage for Saied’s takeover? Why couldn’t Tunisia consolidate its democracy despite multiple governments taking power for over a decade after the transition?[ii] In other words, what brought Tunisian democracy to July 25?
Tunisia is not unique in experiencing problems in democratic consolidation after a successful transition. The literature produced on Latin America and Eastern Europe during the 1990s is quite illuminating to understand the Tunisian case. As these regions transitioned to democracy during what is called the Third Wave of democratization, over the following decade many realized that the results were far from what they had hoped for. Some even argued that there needed to be a second transition, this time into a consolidated democracy.[iii] Therefore, scholars turned their focus away from democratic transitions to democratic consolidation and even breakdown. Some attributed the lack of consolidation to the prior regimes or the modes of transition,[iv] while others focused on the post-transition developments.[v]
Following this literature, this article focuses on two aspects of the Tunisian experience after its democratic transition. First, Tunisian democracy, like many of its predecessors, was not successful in meeting the institutional and socioeconomic conditions necessary to consolidate a democratic system. Second, the Tunisian public consequently grew disillusioned with the democratic experiment, providing Saied and other actors an easy path to undermine democracy in the country.
Examining the problems of democratic consolidation and the public’s subsequent disillusionment can help us to understand the background of Tunisia’s current democratic breakdown. On the one hand, this shows us which aspects will be important to determine whether Saied will be perceived as successful in the eyes of the Tunisian public over the upcoming months. On the other hand, it can also aid us in understanding what the critical points will be if the democratic experiment restarts in Tunisia one day.
The Road to July 25: The Problems of Democratic Consolidation in Tunisia
Abstract: The Tunisian democratic experiment, once the last remaining hope of the Arab revolts, was put to an end on July 25, 2021, as President Kais Saied announced the dissolution of government and the freezing of parliament. This article goes beyond the immediate factors of Saied’s authoritarian take-over to discuss the background conditions that prepared the stage for July 25. It argues that there are two main conditions that led to this outcome. First, like many other countries that have experienced democratic transitions, Tunisia suffered from major obstacles in the way of democratic consolidation. Even with the post-revolutionary development of Tunisian civil society and the flourishing of a multitude of political parties and organizations, the institutional routinization necessary for democratic consolidation still could not take place. This institutional weakness led to an absence of horizontal accountability. Alongside these political problems, the democratic experiment failed to meet economic expectations. Second, as a result of these political and economic challenges, the Tunisian public grew disillusioned with democracy. The lack of democratic consolidation and the public’s subsequent frustration with the democratic experiment created conditions under which democracy could be undermined.
Introduction
As the hopes for genuine democratic change started to wane across the region following the first two years of the Arab revolts, Tunisia remained the only hope to continue its path to democratization. With the second free, fair, and competitive elections in late 2013 and the completion of the constitution in early 2014, Tunisia successfully completed its democratic transition. Yet, recent history has showed us once more that while democratic transition is an important milestone, it is not the endpoint, as the tumultuous years of political, economic, and security problems set the stage for Kais Saied’s takeover on July 2021.
Much has been written to successfully explain how and why Saied could take over and terminate (this stage of) the democratic experiment in Tunisia.[i] What then were the conditions that prepared the stage for Saied’s takeover? Why couldn’t Tunisia consolidate its democracy despite multiple governments taking power for over a decade after the transition?[ii] In other words, what brought Tunisian democracy to July 25?
Tunisia is not unique in experiencing problems in democratic consolidation after a successful transition. The literature produced on Latin America and Eastern Europe during the 1990s is quite illuminating to understand the Tunisian case. As these regions transitioned to democracy during what is called the Third Wave of democratization, over the following decade many realized that the results were far from what they had hoped for. Some even argued that there needed to be a second transition, this time into a consolidated democracy.[iii] Therefore, scholars turned their focus away from democratic transitions to democratic consolidation and even breakdown. Some attributed the lack of consolidation to the prior regimes or the modes of transition,[iv] while others focused on the post-transition developments.[v]
Following this literature, this article focuses on two aspects of the Tunisian experience after its democratic transition. First, Tunisian democracy, like many of its predecessors, was not successful in meeting the institutional and socioeconomic conditions necessary to consolidate a democratic system. Second, the Tunisian public consequently grew disillusioned with the democratic experiment, providing Saied and other actors an easy path to undermine democracy in the country.
Examining the problems of democratic consolidation and the public’s subsequent disillusionment can help us to understand the background of Tunisia’s current democratic breakdown. On the one hand, this shows us which aspects will be important to determine whether Saied will be perceived as successful in the eyes of the Tunisian public over the upcoming months. On the other hand, it can also aid us in understanding what the critical points will be if the democratic experiment restarts in Tunisia one day.