The Provincial elections held in Kirkuk on December 18, 2023, after an 18-year hiatus, brought relative hope to the city’s conflict-ridden coexistence. However, the controversial governorship election held eight months later showed that Kirkuk would continue to be a contentious area between ethnic groups, political parties, and external powers.

The competition centered in Kirkuk will likely intensify further in the run-up to the Kurdistan Region of Iraq’s (KRI) parliamentary elections on October 20, with increasing tensions among the Iraqi Kurds. Türkiye’s fight against the PKK and Iran’s mounting influence through its proxies will likely be part of Kirkuk’s upcoming issues.

Kirkuk’s Conflictive Structure

The provincial council elections in Kirkuk were of critical importance for both local and regional actors, as they brought to the agenda the possibility of changing the order dominated by the Baghdad government and Hashd al-Shaabi, who took over the city after the KRI’s independence referendum promoted by the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) in 2017.

Although the Iraqi Kurds won a total of seven seats in the provincial elections in the city, with the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) winning five and the KDP getting two, the fact that the ruling Kurdish parties, which run separately for the elections, were also at opposite poles in the governorship elections precluded for the Iraqi Kurds to be the playmaker.

Türkiye, which accuses the PUK leader Bafel Talabani of supporting the PKK, has close political relations with the KDP, particularly in the fight against the PKK in the KRI, and makes efforts to establish influence over Iraqi Sunnis. Aiming to exclude the PUK, Ankara tried to challenge the Iranian dynamic in Kirkuk by attempting to forge an alliance among the Turkmen, KDP, and Sunni Arabs.

Nevertheless, the Ankara-backed Iraqi Turkmen Front (ITF) could not convince the KDP and Arabs of the “rotating governorship system” it advocated. Despite seeing Kirkuk as the capital of the Turkmens, ITF’s winning only two seats underlined the ethnic group’s minimal influence in the city.

In fact, the structure of Kirkuk’s Turkmens is split between Ankara and Tehran based on sectarian divisions, and the leadership race within the ITF has been another underlying cause that prevents the party from even providing the appearance of being united.

On the other hand, despite winning six seats in the elections, Arabs ran separately under the Arab Coalition, Qiade Coalition, and Arab Uruba Alliance lists. This disunity prevented them from retaining the governorship as they performed after 2017. Furthermore, the competition for the Iraqi Parliament Speaker position, which led to fragmentation among the Sunnis, paved the way for increasing Iranian influence in Kirkuk.

Consequently, in a meeting held in Baghdad on August 10, the Kirkuk governorship post went to the PUK’s Rebwar Taha with the support of five PUK, three Arab and one Christian quota from the pro-Iran Babylon Movement, and the presidency of the provincial council also was given to Mohammed Hafez from the Arab faction. This situation again displayed that the Iran-backed groups are the leading game changers in Kirkuk. They prevented the possibility of a pro-Ankara-KDP-Sunni alliance figure from getting the post by supporting the PUK candidate. Moreover, since the leader of the largest Sunni alliance, Taqaddum, and the ousted Parliament Speaker, Mohammed al-Halbousi, sided with the PUK, Ankara’s policy of acting together with the Sunnis also failed.

Reactions to the PUK Governor

Rakan Said Juburi, an Arab appointed as acting governor of Kirkuk by Baghdad in 2017, described the governorship election meeting in Baghdad as a “treason to the Arabs in Kirkuk.” The ITF applied to the Federal Supreme Court of Iraq to annul the governorship election and held a demonstration in the city against the election. The ITF also criticized Taha’s appointing five deputy governors before the court’s decision. Additionally, the spokesperson of Türkiye’s ruling AK Party, Ömer Çelik, accused the PUK of excluding the KDP-Turkmens and some Arabs.

The KDP criticized the meeting as illegal, but it is noteworthy that it did not apply to the court as the Turkmens did. Since the KDP and PUK had previously agreed on a Kurdish governor and the KDP’s insistence on a Kurdish governor was one of the reasons for the failure of the rotating governorship system of Turkmens-KDP-Arabs, it can be evaluated that KDP did not file a lawsuit against the current Kurdish governor because it would create discomfort in the Kurdish public before KRI’s elections.

Taha, who called for dialogue with the Turkmens, the KDP, and Arab members immediately after assuming office, forced former acting governor Juburi to retire due to his age, which can be interpreted as a revenge attempt. In addition, the fact that the Turkmen language, which should have been included in the first official letter signed by Taha regarding Juburi’s retirement, was not included alongside Arabic and Kurdish drew an adverse reaction from the Turkmen. Following that, Taha’s announcement that he had given the order for the Turkmen language to be used in official correspondence eased the tension.

Meanwhile, Türkiye’s increasing pressure on the PUK due to its ties with the PKK is an obstacle to the ITF working in harmony with the PUK in Kirkuk. Despite this, the new governor’s possible cooperation with the pro-Iran Shiite Turkmens in the city will not only be a loss for the ITF but may also lead to the pro-Iran Turkmens taking the positions reserved for the Turkmens in the city. The participation of the Shiite Turkmen MP Garib al-Asker, a close name to the Iranian-backed Badr Organization, in the governorship election meeting in Baghdad, which the ITF did not attend, also points to Iran’s ability to produce actors close to itself among all ethnic groups in the city. Therefore, the failure of the Iraqi Turkmen to engage in the current political arena will facilitate the already melting away Turkmen politics in Kirkuk.

KRI Elections and Ankara-PUK Tension

The fact that Iraqi President Abdullatif Rashid -also a PUK figure- handed over the governorship mandate to Rebwar Taha despite the objections of the Turkmens and Arabs and that he will soon pay his first visit to Kirkuk can be interpreted as the PUK choosing Kirkuk as one of the primary points of its election campaign. Interestingly, Rashid highlighting Article 140, which addresses the controversial status of Kirkuk, can be seen as the PUK’s move to make use of Kurdish nationalism against the KDP in the process leading up to the elections.

Despite this, when it is remembered that the PUK frequently brings up the issue of Sulaymaniyah seeking autonomy from Erbil and financially connecting it to Baghdad, it is not expected that the PUK can genuinely develop such a policy since it would damage its close ties with the pro-Iran Iraqi politicians who define Kirkuk as an Iraqi city.

On the other hand, Türkiye has concerns that the PUK may open up space for the PKK in Kirkuk. It would not be surprising that Ankara may also include Kirkuk in the area of its ​​anti-PKK operations. In that, shortly after the governorship election, a Turkish drone was shot down over Kirkuk. However, the Iraqi officials made contradictory statements, first stating that they shot down the Turkish drone but then saying that the cause of the crash would be investigated. This can also be interpreted as Ankara’s possible “PKK warning” against the PUK governor and countermoves by pro-Iran groups in the city. Moreover, the downing of the drone may mean that Baghdad would also respond harshly to Ankara’s possible military interventions in Kirkuk.

Iranian Influence

The PUK’s win over the governorship is an example of how Iran can instrumentalize the conflicts among the Iraqi Kurds, Arabs, and Turkmen. Furthermore, the PUK reaped the fruits of its close relations with Tehran and Iran-backed Iraqi political-militia groups and its politics of proximity towards Baghdad rather than Erbil. On the other hand, by signing a memorandum of understanding on cooperation in security, military, and counterterrorism with Türkiye, Iraq also banned the PKK, decided to dissolve the PKK-affiliated parties, and accused the group of setting fires to the markets in northern provinces in the country. However, the increasing momentum gained by Türkiye and Iraq in the fight against the PKK and Ankara’s military and political pressure on Sulaymaniyah have also revealed that the PUK’s influence in Baghdad has not been broken.

Ultimately, it would be a surprise if the Iraqi Federal Court decided against the PUK. The influence of pro-Iranian actors on the court is no secret. After all, the court’s previous decisions favoring the PUK regarding the minority quotas in the KRI undermined KDP’s hegemony on quotas and shed considerable light on the decision to be taken regarding Kirkuk.

Underestimating the influence of the PUK and pro-Iran forces in Kirkuk and leaving the KDP and Turkmen outside the administrative system will not only be a significant loss for both groups but also limit Türkiye’s impact in the city. Therefore, The Turkmens, KDP, and Sunnis working together with the PUK governor in Kirkuk could contribute to efforts to balance Iranian influence in the city, albeit quite limited.