The Syrian opposition groups operating under the ‘‘Command of Military Operations (previously known as Al Fath al-Mubin Operation Room’’ have initiated their long-spoken major offensive entitled ‘Operation Deterrence of Aggression’ on the Syrian regime forces and its allies. The operation came in the aftermath of the recent accelerated severe Syrian regime and its allies’ attacks on southern Idlib and Western Aleppo that led to many civilian casualties, including children.

The Command of the Military Operations, led by Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham (HTS), the evolved version of Al Qaeda’s Syria branch Al Nusra Front, was also joined by the Türkiye-backed Syrian National Army groups in the major offensive. In a shocking pace of advance, the Syrian opposition forces have captured almost the whole Aleppo province, the economic heartland of Syria, and the second biggest city in the country.  The Aleppo province, which had fallen under the control of the Syrian regime and its allies at the end of 2016 after intense clashes with the Syrian rebels spanning several years, was captured by the opposition forces in several days. The return of the Syrian opposition forces to the province after eight years has proved that the opposition has been well-prepared for the major offensive over the past years in their control zones despite continued regime and Russian airstrikes as well as the Iranian-backed forces artillery fire. Following the fall of the majority of the Aleppo province, the Syrian rebels marched towards southern Idlib and took control of the entirety of the province. In later stages, the opposition marched towards the Hama province, where the regime later bounced back and repelled the rebels from the city center. This was followed up by the Syrian National Army’s ‘Operation Dawn of Freedom’, which forced the YPG Forces to evacuate the area without putting stiff resistance against the opposition forces after it failed to create a corridor linking Tal Rıf’at and Manbij. As of now, the situation on the ground is volatile at a time when the regime is dismayed by Russia’s inaction, and thus, it is turning its face to regional countries for backing.

The Timing of the Operation

Although the Syrian opposition groups’ attack was voiced for months, it was postponed due to Ankara’s objections. Following the Assad regime and Russia’s continuous and vicious air bombardment of the Idlib province, which claimed the lives of dozens of civilians along with the intransigence of the Assad regime to come to the negotiating table with Ankara for normalization talks, Ankara seems to have greenlighted the operation. Ankara, for an extended period of time, feared the shattering of the status quo in Idlib, possible ensuing chaos, and an influx of refugees toward Türkiye’s southern borders. Thus, it tried to convince the Syrian regime diplomatically.  

In line with this, for almost two years, Türkiye has continually called on the Assad regime to come to the negotiating table. Nevertheless, this fell on deaf ears in Damascus as the regime thought that it had won the war militarily against the Syrian opposition. Due to the Syrian regime’s perceived ‘phyric victory,’ the Syrian regime leader Bashar al-Assad has put many preconditions with regard to the projected normalization with Ankara, including the withdrawal of the Turkish troops from Northern Syria and Ankara ceasing support to the Syrian rebels, which were labeled as ‘terrorist’ in the regime lexicon. Although the top Turkish leadership voiced the normalization willingness, namely President Erdoğan, numerous times, Ankara deemed the regime’s preconditions unacceptable.  

As a result, and per Turkish sources, Ankara consented to a limited operation to restore the previous borders of the Idlib de-escalation zone agreed upon during the Astana process.  As the offensive was ongoing, the Turkish Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Öncü Keçeli released a statement in which he hinted at Ankara’s acquiescence by stating: ‘We have warned on various international platforms that the recent attacks on Idlib have reached a level that undermines the spirit and implementation of the Astana agreements and that there have been large civilian casualties. We have emphasized that these attacks must come to an end. In fact, the recent clashes have resulted in an undesirable escalation of tensions in the region.’

What was initially thought to be a limited offensive quickly morphed into a major ground offensive backed by the opposition forces’ improvised drones. The opposition forces captured large areas of Aleppo without real resistance from the Assad regime forces and Iranian-backed militias. In different parts of the province, the regime forces fled the city without putting up a fight against the rebels. In less than three days, the Syrian rebels reached the city center of Aleppo and shared photos from the Aleppo citadel. Russia largely remained silent while these events were unfolding in the province. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov hinted that the regime had to take care of itself this time around by articulating: ‘We call on the Syrian government to restore order at the front in Aleppo.’ Although Russia later conducted some airstrikes in Aleppo and Idlib, until now, it largely refrained from engaging in the transpiring developments with a heavy hand.

The timing of the operation is also significant. The offensive coincides with a time when Russia was very much preoccupied on the Ukraine front, and the primary Iranian proxy Hezbollah was inflicted heavy blows on by Israel following the war that transpired for almost 14 months before a permanent ceasefire was declared between Israel and the organization in late November 2024.

The End of the Status Quo in Syria and the Importance of the Offensive

The abovementioned groundbreaking major ground offensive heralds a new era in the Syrian crisis and puts an end to the status quo ante established in Syria in the wake of Ankara’s ‘Operation Spring Shield’ against the regime and Iran-backed militias in March 2020. This is so even if, in the upcoming period, the opposition loses some of the areas it controls in the Aleppo province, which means that the genie is out of the bottle.

It is of considerable importance as the control map in Syria is changing for the first time in more than 4 years. None of the major countries partaking in the Syrian crisis were able to militarily prevail over others and destroy the respective control zones of its rivals. Thus, the ceasefire announced in March 2020 led to the entrenchment of the boundaries of the conflict zones. This situation lasted for years. However, it is safe to say that the balance of power has shifted in favor of Türkiye over the past years, creating a conducive environment for the Syrian rebels’ offensive.

The current offensive showed the weakness of the regime, Iran-backed militias, and Russia and possibly created a new environment in which new calculations will be made and may result in different actors’ settling scores with each other in the coming period. This situation can become more visible in case US President Donald Trump decides to pull the US troops out of Syria, although some figures from his cabinet are likely to object to such a decision.

In the aftermath of destroying Hezbollah’s top brass, many thought that Hezbollah was weakened in Syria. Nonetheless, no one would have imagined the collapse of the Assad regime and Iran-backed militias’ defense lines in a very short period. The same goes for Russia; many have put forth that Russia was transferring its primary forces to Ukraine, which naturally rendered Moscow weaker in the Syrian theatre. Yet, once again, Russia has proven to be weaker in the Syrian Crisis as of now due to its preoccupation with Ukraine. As the Syrian rebels were quickly advancing toward the center of Aleppo, the Iranian Foreign Ministry released a statement in which Tehran claimed that the attack was constituting a blatant violation of the Astana agreement.

Having said that, Tehran seems to have forgotten that the Assad regime, Moscow, and Tehran were the ones that violated the Astana agreement by militarily capturing three of the four de-escalation zones specified in the Astana agreement before 2020 in the first place.

The weak reactions through statements and in the light of the lack of real resistance from the Assad regime, Russia and Iran have proven that their clout in Syria has shrunk than thought following the Russian invasion of Ukraine and repercussions on the Iranian proxies after the 7th of October.

Possible Reverberations

After the loss of Aleppo, the capture of the whole of Idlib, the march towards Hama province, and the seizing of Tal Rıf’at, the Syrian regime is likely to be forced to come to the negotiating table with Türkiye and indirectly Ankara-backed Syrian opposition forces. Moreover, the mentioned offensive increases Ankara’s appetite towards ending the presence of YPG/SDF in the West of the Euphrates River entirely. Manbij remains the last area of the SDF in the West of the Euphrates. This front may also become a heated area in the coming period, depending on the talks between Türkiye and the US.

Until now, the YPG/SDF also seems unwilling to lose its cadres in a fight it is unlikely to win. Thus, without putting stiff resistance, it agreed to leave Tal Rıf’at. Additionally, the Syrian regime left the Aleppo International Airport to the SDF once it retreated, only for the SDF to hand over the control of the airport to HTS without having a fight. Will a similar scenario take place in Manbij? This response to this question is up in the air at the moment.

Overall, it can be said that if the Syrian opposition succeeds in holding its ground in the face of projected Russian interference, this situation will also strengthen the hand of Türkiye in Syria and amplify its bargaining power vis-à-vis the US and Russia.

Furthermore, taking into consideration that a considerable chunk of the Syrian refugees in Türkiye is from Aleppo, the offensive can pave the way for at least a certain amount of the mentioned refugees to return to their homes. The internally displaced people of Aleppo currently residing in refugee camps of Idlib are likely to welcome the situation as a chance to return to their hometown.

Besides, it is plausible to suggest that the EU countries’ normalization attempts with the Assad regime may come to a standstill. For a long time, different European countries have claimed that Assad has taken control of the majority of the country and that, under the guise of a ‘safe Syria,’ the EU countries must engage with the Assad regime regarding the refugee issue. The rebels’ offensive will likely lead these countries to revisit their judgment on the issue. 

In a noteworthy development, the main driving force of the operation, namely HTS and its leader Abu Mohammad Al Jolani, is likely to garner popularity among the Syrian opposition groups in the aftermath of the organization. Jolani’s moderate calls on the rebels that entered Aleppo on the code of conduct towards locals and minorities and the HTS-backed Syrian Salvation government’s statement calling on Russia to abandon the Syrian regime, as well as its political messaging towards Iraq, show that they are willing to change the rules of the game dramatically. In the upcoming period, Jolani may come to the fore and become the primary leader of the rebel forces in Syria. Thus, some groups or fighters from the Türkiye-backed Syrian National Army may defect from the ranks and join HTS.

In a nutshell, the fall of Aleppo has given a rejuvenated glimmer of hope to the Syrian rebel factions. The offensive mentioned above encouraged Syrians in other parts of Syria, such as the Southern Druze-majority Sweida province, along with Daraa, the cradle of the Syrian Revolution, to show their discontentment with the regime. 

The current atmosphere among the Syrian opposition figures and groups is reminiscent of the early days of the Syrian revolution. Some even go as far as to label the current situation as the Syrian Revolution 2.0. Only time will tell to what extent this judgment is proper.

Over the past few years, Syria has largely slipped away from international attention. The so-called frozen conflicts have a bad habit of reminding themselves of the concerned parties at unexpected times. The Syrian rebels’ groundbreaking offensive in years is a stark reminder of this reality.