Riyadh’s Look to Asia

King Abdullah’s historic visit to Beijing in 2006 marked the beginning of a new chapter in Sino–Saudi relations, building on the Kingdom’s purchase of 36 CSS-2 “East Wind” intermediate-range ballistic missiles and nine launchers from China in the 1980s. Yet since Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MbS) began his ascendancy, Riyadh’s look towards China, as well as Asia at large, has taken on significant new geopolitical importance.

This year, the Kingdom’s strategic partnerships with Asian powers will likely reach new heights. MbS’s three-nation Asia tour last month, which entailed high-profile stops in Pakistan, India, and China, highlighted Riyadh’s interest in conveying a message to both the West and Asia that the Kingdom’s foreign policy has an increasingly Eastward orientation.

While in Islamabad, New Delhi, and Beijing, MbS focused on Saudi investment in Pakistan, India, and China’s infrastructure and energy sector, with Riyadh pledging billions in investment. During MbS’s visit to the Pakistani capital, where he met with Pakistan’s Prime Minister Imran Khan and President Arif Alvi, he signed $20 billion worth of deals and received the highest civilian honor in Pakistan (the Nishan-e-Pakistan award).

The Crown Prince left India having announced an open-ended goal to invest $100 billion in the country, promising officials in New Delhi that Saudi Arabia would boost its trade and security cooperation with India. In China, meanwhile MbS signed 35 economic cooperation accords totaling $28 billion.

Such deepening relations with Pakistan, India, and China factor into Riyadh’s quest to diversify its global partnerships. Looking ahead, the odds are good that Saudi Arabia will continue investing in stronger partnerships with these three countries plus other Asian states against the backdrop of numerous issues fueling greater friction between Riyadh and its Western allies, from human rights abuses in the Kingdom to the civil war in Yemen and the Jamal Khashoggi affair.

Most recently, thirty-six countries (including every EU member-state) signed an open letter criticizing the Kingdom on human rights grounds at a meeting of the United Nations Human Rights Council, the first time a Western rebuke of Riyadh had ever been so collective, which underscored such friction.

In Islamabad, New Delhi, and Beijing, however, there is silence on sensitive issues pertaining to human rights in Saudi Arabia. By not making any official statements regarding the Jamal Khashoggi affair, these Asian countries’ leaders provided MbS with a great sense of comfort at a time when the murder case has severely damaged the Crown Prince’s reputation among government officials and civil societies in the West.

With the Democratic-controlled US House of Representatives and Senate expressing stronger opposition to Washington’s role in the Yemen campaign and members of Congress pressing the administration to hold MbS accountable for Khashoggi’s killing, U.S.-Saudi relations are facing unprecedented crises in bilateral affairs.

Simply put, MbS’s goodwill in Washington has suffered to the degree whereby it is difficult to imagine the Crown Prince visiting the American capital at any point in the foreseeable future. In stark contrast to the elite in Washington, authorities in Pakistan, India, and China gave MbS the red-carpet treatment last month. Such a welcome for the Saudi royal, who the CIA believes ordered Khashoggi’s murder, sent a message to Riyadh from these three countries’ governments that the fate of the Washington Post contributor will not hinder the Kingdom from deepening its strategic partnerships with Islamabad, New Delhi, and Beijing.

As MbS charts Saudi Arabia’s course on the international stage, he will certainly see the Kingdom’s ties with Asian states as salient to Riyadh’s interests, especially when considering the prospects of a Democrat becoming America’s 46th president in January 2021.

With such questions being raised about the future of Riyadh’s longtime alliance with the U.S., the Kingdom is set on devising strategies for moving forward with U.S.–Saudi strategic relations, but is also taking a position that takes stock of new dynamics harming Saudi Arabia’s relations with Washington and other Western capitals. Within this context, it is necessary for Riyadh’s long-term interests that it gains as many new allies as possible.

‘Vision 2030’ and the East 

Saudi Arabia’s economic challenges and goals also factor heavily into Riyadh’s “Look East” agenda. Dependent on oil for the government’s revenue, the Saudi leadership is in a race against time to achieve economic diversification in line with its ‘Vision 2030’ plan. Luring Asian investment and increasing trade with China, Japan, and other countries in the Far East is essential for Vision 2030’s chances of success.

If Saudi Arabia is to spark activity in its non-oil sectors and produce steady sources of revenue, co-operation with Asia is key. As China, the Kingdom’s top trading partner, seeks to establish itself as the center of the global economy of the 21st century through its ambitious Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), officials in Riyadh are determined to make Saudi Arabia more important in Chinese eyes.

Establishing Saudi Arabia as a global logistics hub offers the potential for the Kingdom to become a key hub for Chinese trade and investment in Africa and a key link between Beijing and Europe. Riyadh’s quest is to make Vision 2030 and BRI complement each other, paving the way for Sino-Saudi relations to reach new heights in the years ahead. The Kingdom’s recently-inaugurated National Industrial Development and Logistics Program aims to lure $450 billion worth of investment to boost four non-oil sectors: energy, industry, mining, and logistics.

Also, the Saudis have their eyes on the Asian market when it comes attracting tourists from around the world, as religious and non-religious tourism is a pillar of Vision 2030. The reform agenda’s goal is to increase the number of tourists visiting Saudi Arabia to 30 million a year in 11 years’ time. At the same time, the Saudi leadership also have a vision of their country becoming a major destination for medical tourists, and perhaps one day competing with Dubai in the field.

The Implications for Washington

How Saudi Arabia’s pivot to Asia will impact Riyadh–Washington relations is unclear. Unquestionably, the U.S. is concerned about Beijing’s efforts to capitalize on friction between Washington and the Kingdom to strengthen China’s economic and geopolitical interests in the Middle East.

That said, at this juncture, the leadership in Beijing has not signaled any interest in playing a role in the Middle East’s security architecture that could be considered serious competition to Washington’s role. Moreover, as Sino–Iranian relations strengthen, officials in Riyadh cannot expect China to support Saudi Arabia’s agenda against Iran. From this perspective, the U.S.–Saudi strategic relationship will remain the same despite vicious rhetoric.

Thus, as Beijing seeks to remain neutral in the Iranian–Saudi geo-sectarian rivalry of the region while China’s military has essentially no footprint in the Arabian Peninsula, China currently lacks the willingness and the capabilities to project hard power in the Middle East on the scale of the U.S. and other NATO members. Frankly, Saudi Arabia’s relationship with the U.S. is truly a ‘security alliance’ whereas the Kingdom’s ties with China, India, and other Asian countries are basically transactional in nature.

Saudi Arabia’s look to Asia, although not an effort to end Riyadh’s alliance with Washington, comes at a time in which the Kingdom faces major challenges on the international stage and economic difficulties at home which require establishing alternative partnerships. It is difficult to exaggerate the extent to which Saudi decision-makers worry about Washington’s willingness to maintain its commitment to the Kingdom’s security for the long-term and such concerns will inevitably inform Saudi foreign policy moves.

With Saudi officials unsettled by the potential for friction to heat up in Riyadh’s relations with Washington and Brussels, the leadership in China and other Asian states will remain keen to continue exploiting such tension between Saudi Arabia and the United States. In the process, the Saudi leadership hopes to keep Washington on alert.

Riyadh’s blunt message for the U.S. is that pressure from Washington on King Salman to replace MbS will fail because Saudi Arabia has other options to turn to if a total reorientation of the Kingdom’s foreign relations is required. Yet in reality it is difficult to imagine Riyadh being able to totally replace Western allies with newer Asian ones.