After months of deadlock, Turkey and the US have finally reached an agreement on the establishment of a safe zone in Northern Syria, an issue which has been on the agenda of the Turkish authorities ever since 2012. The deal was agreed upon following the consecutive meetings held between the two sides’ military delegations in Ankara between 5-7 August. The meetings were organized in the wake of Turkey’s enormous deployment of military equipment and personnel along its southern border. It seems that the likelihood of Turkey initiating a unilateral military operation compelled the American side to intensify its efforts in reaching a consensus with Turkey on the planned safe zone.

Following the subsequent meetings, the Turkish Defense Ministry and the US Embassy in Ankara both released the same statement, which consists of three major points on the creation of the safe zone. According to the statement, the two sides agreed on the followings:

-The rapid implementation of initial measures to address Turkey’s security concerns;

-To stand-up a joint operations center in Turkey as soon as possible in order to coordinate and manage the establishment of the safe zone together;

-That the safe zone shall become a peace corridor, and every effort shall be made so that displaced Syrians can return to their country.

The language used in the aforementioned points is quite vague while the need for a detailed roadmap for both sides is undeniable. Moreover, it has long been known that the Turkish and American perspectives on the safe zone do not overlap to a large extent. Turkey wants to create a safe zone, from which it can gradually undermine the administrative and security mechanisms of the PYD/YPG/SDF. However, from an American perspective, the projected zone should be a ‘buffer zone’ which can protect the PYD/SDF and its mechanisms.

That being said, the US seems to have made some concessions in the wake of Turkey’s rejection of the previous US proposal on the creation of the safe zone. In fact, the term  “peace corridor” was previously used in the Turkish National Security Council’s statement right before the meetings organized with the US side.  Additionally, both sides have been hesitant to provide any further details on the safe zone thus far. Nevertheless, some maps and news appeared on media channels concerning the planned zone. According to the news, the US has proposed to Turkey to establish the zone on three lines in three phases.

-In the first phase, a 5-kilometers deep zone is to be created along Turkey’s southern border, and the zone would be free of YPG/SDF elements. Turkey and the US are also planning to conduct joint patrols in this zone.

-In the second phase, the safe line would be extended in some parts to 9 kilometers. Additionally, the YPG/SDF would withdraw their heavy weapons, and joint patrols would be conducted by the US and the YPG/SDF.

-The third phase is the establishment of a line that has a depth of 14 kilometers. Turkey would not intervene in the area. The US and YPG would take part in the third zone.

In addition to the above-mentioned technicalities, the plan expects local military councils to oversee the protection of the three specified areas. Even though we do not know whether Ankara will show a willingness to accept such a deal, it can be expressed that the possible safe zone provides a multi-sided opportunity in Syria. Turkey, the US, and the SDF seem to all be satisfied by the outcome of the negotiations, as all sides articulated positive remarks after the release of the statement.

What Can the Agreement Achieve?

First, it is no secret that not a single issue has ever poisoned the Turkish-US bilateral relations as much as the USA backing of the YPG, the PKK’s Syrian branch, over the past five years. The relationship between the NATO allies recently further deteriorated with Turkey’s decision to purchase the Russian-made S-400s missile system. With the delivery of first package of the missile system to Turkey, some commentators went to the extent to advocate Turkey’s expulsion from the Western alliance and NATO due to the country’s “forced closeness” to Russia and Iran due to reasons stemming from realities on the ground in the Syrian conflict. However, Western circles interpret the situation differently, as they argue that Turkey drifts away from the NATO axis.

In such a tense atmosphere, the US has a chance to mend ties with its NATO ally to a certain extent by implementing a deal that addresses Turkey’s security concerns. Ankara has long thought the US to be stalling Turkey on the safe zone issue as well as on its relationship with the YPG. The Manbij agreement which was drafted in 2018 but was not implemented up until now has especially made Turkish authorities cautious with regards to US intentions in Syria.

As a result, Turkey has lately resorted to an intensified military rhetoric to get what it could not get on the negotiating table up until now. The current agreement shows that there is a general understanding of the needs of Turkey, but the details are yet to be discussed. Stalling the negotiations again will surely be detrimental to bilateral relations and might even further urge Turkey to carry out a unilateral military move. Therefore, a real intention to resolve the problem is needed, and the US has that chance. The joint operations center that has started operating is critical in this regard. Despite disagreements on the nature and management of the projected safe zone, the center can offer an opportunity to both sides to administer the divergences with regard to Northeastern Syria and help them to reach a consensus.

Secondly, the deal seems positive for Turkey under the current circumstances. The general understanding of Turkey’s security concerns will direct Turkey to halt its plan for an incursion into Northern Syria, for the time being at least. The US reaction to the agreement will be a determining factor in the short and mid-term trajectory for the two sides. Turkey is struggling with an economic recession and a military operation might put it in a tight spot. Moreover, refugees are also an important focus in the statement released by both sides. Turkey aims at utilizing the projected safe zone for the return of the Syrian refugees in an attempt to decrease the social tension that accumulated in the country over the past months. Furthermore, war is not only about economic losses, but also about military casualties. Turkey has prevented probable military casualties for the time being. However, this does not mean the end of the possibility of a third military operation into Syria. Turkey might resort to its military power if the US fails to implement a plausible deal that would address its security concerns.

Thirdly, with the agreement, the SDF has escaped from a bloody military confrontation. Moreover, the local military councils that are planned to be established can offer the group an opportunity to transform itself. The SDF has been operating under the constant threats of Turkey since the backbone of the organization is the Syrian branch of the PKK, namely the YPG. The local military councils can be a vital chance for the YPG/SDF to free itself from its dependency on the PKK. A “real transition” of power to the local military councils can mitigate Turkey’s security concerns to some extent.

However, a real transition of power entails that YPG elements should not take parts in the mentioned councils. As a matter of fact, the group is aware of the need for localization. It had already started its localization project to get popular support from the public with its capture of non-Kurdish areas in Syria as a need to rule the Arab population. The transition of power to the military councils can be helpful both for the group and for the people under its control. In the opposite scenario, the YPG/SDF will continue to be seen as the Syrian extension of the PKK that launched a decades-long insurgency which claimed thousands of lives in Turkey. If the YPG fails to cut its ties with the PKK, Ankara will always keep its military option on the table since it sees the organization as an existential threat to its national security and territorial integrity. Hence, localization will be beneficial for Turkey, the SDF, and the population under its control.

For the time being, the negotiations seem to have yielded a general understanding on the issue of Turkish border security. Nonetheless, the agreement remains unclear and its details will require some time to develop.