There can be no doubt that the signing of Sudan’s constitutional declaration played a key role in catalysing a transitional process that may yet lay the groundwork for Sudan’s democracy. The brokered agreement came into force on July 5, signed by the opposition coalition, ‘Declaration of Forces for Freedom and Change’ (DFFC) and the Transitional Military Council (TMC), in what could reshape Sudan’s future in its entirety.

As promising as the agreement seems however, what are the obstacles and challenges this bold beginning is set to encounter?

The agreement calls for a 39-month transition period, where the transitional body of the sovereignty council will consist of six civilians from the DFCF, and five military representatives from the TMC. The military contingent will be headed by Lt. General Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan for the first 21 months, followed by a civilian for the remaining 18 months.

It doesn’t end there. In a major reformation, the remaining transitional organs of the 20-strong council of ministers and the 300-strong legislative parliament will submit to 67 percent representation by the DFCF, with the remainder given over to parties who were not part of the former Omar Al-Bashir government.

Another significant development is the appointment of Sudan’s latest Prime Minister Abdella Hamdouk, a highly regarded economist who was rumoured to be the top prime minister candidate for months. He has held office since being sworn in on August 21, and is expected to deliver on a number of the top priorities defined by the DFCF.

These include ending civil war and strife, steering the economy towards recovery, revamping the judicial system and withdrawing Sudanese troops from Yemen; all of which are significant factors in mitigating instability, and promoting reform.

An Agenda for Peace?

With the DFCF’s failure to include the Addis Abba preamble for a just peace, as it agreed upon with the Sudanese Revolutionary Front  (SRF) on July 25, Hamdouk’s transitional government is largely expected to start peace talks with the SRF.

This may be challenging given that a significant cross-section of the DFCF who brought the government to power view the SRF with suspicion. The particular suspicion was manifested after the failure of a two-day inconclusive meeting held in Cairo between the DFCF and the SRF.

In the said meeting, both sides reached a compromise where the DFCF’s negotiators clarified that for a sustainable peace to find its way into the constitutional declaration, the compromise should be endorsed by the DFCF in Khartoum, followed by the TMC.

On the flip side, the SRF delegation presented a list of seven demands including allotted seats in the sovereignty council and transitional government, and postponing the government’s formation for a month to ensure their inclusion and participate in the process. In turn, the DFCF clarified it did not have a mandate to discuss the matters, effectively putting an end to the negotiations.

But this came from a previously established principle, chiefly that the DFCF rejected the principle of quotas within a government. This approach was perhaps all the more justified given that the newly formed government is geared to be technocratic, and furthermore tasked with establishing peace and implementing the DFCF agenda.

The overwhelming demands led the DFCF to suspect and question the SRF leadership’s intentions, for only seeking seats for themselves in the developing transitional organs, and not reflecting a commitment to end infighting within the country.

The SRF however, has a different view. From their stance, the DFCF disregard by not including the Addis Ababa preamble in the constitutional agreement is also a statement of disregard to their supporters living in refugee camps and the peripheral regions of Sudan whom they represent.

While the SRF remain open to talks with the government, major confidence building measures are required to settle the deadlock and resolve the SRF leaders’ frustrations born of previous interactions with the DFCF.

Furthermore, the transitional government will also be expected to open talks with Abdel Azziz Al-Hilu: leader of the SPLM/Al Hilu faction based in Nuba Mountain, as well as Abdel Wahid Al-Nour: leader of the Sudanese Liberation Movement based in Darfur.

While Al-Hilu himself expressed willingness to  begin talks with the transition government, many within the DFCF fear he will demand self-determination and autonomy of the Nuba mountains through a referendum vote.

This is primarily because many of those parties have disregarded or altogether forgotten that once development projects are set in place in that region, there is a higher possibility referendum votes will swing in favour of unity as opposed to secession.

For this reason, the fear of a self-determination movement taking root in the Nuba mountains are unwarranted.

On the other hand, Al-Nur, also known as ‘Dr. No’, has further hardened his position since the beginning of the uprising. He has consistently maintained that he views the DFCF parties who signed the agreement with the TMC as a soft landing group.

The soft-landing group are the ‘Sudan Call’ parties, composed of the Umma Party, the SRF, the Sudan Congress and others that agreed to take part in the national dialogue began by Al-Bashir in 2014.

The Economy: Hold the Vision

With inflation reaching nearly 70 percent, the value of the Sudanese pound has lost nearly 85 percent of its value in 2018. Sudan is also witness to a steady rise in commodity prices unemployment rates of 25 percent. With over 2 million unemployed youth and an external debt well over $60 billion, there are high expectations and stronger demands that the government will steer the economy to safe waters.

This may be an unfair expectation however, given that the government will have to  resolve decades of economic mismanagement and corruption in a considerable short time frame. Most of the challenges they face were created on the previous regime’s economic policies dependent on rents from oil (until South Sudan’s secession, which took with it more than 75  percent of the country’s oil revenue), followed by gold.

Although Hamdouk did not share his economic vision on August 24, he stated  that the country was in need of $10 billion USD in loans to rebuild the economy, and replenish the country’s foreign reserves.

Accordingly, he is set to approach the IMF and World Bank to restructure the country’s debt and ask for new loans. Nonetheless, he does not identify as a proponent of austerity measures which are conditional for World Bank and IMF assistance. In a widely circulated talk, he publicly spoke of his fascination with the Ethiopian economic development model, which was not dictated by the policies of World Bank and the IMF.

Cleaning the judiciary

There is no doubt that the government is set to focus on revamping the judiciary system, which the Al-Bashir’s regime had co-opted extensively to maintain its rule.

In January 2015, the parliament dominated by the National Congress Party [NCP] of Al-Bashir amended Article 151, effectively legalizing and expanding the mandate of the National Intelligence and Security Services [NISS] to gather information.

The NISS was given a sweeping mandate, using the prosecutor general’s office and the judiciary system to legally crack down on any individuals they deemed a threat to the NCP regime.

Though the Sudanese public anticipate a government revamp of the judiciary system, Lt. General Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan, chairman of the TMC has approved recent promotions of 46 judges largely believed to be loyal to the previous regime.

That will in effect create a challenge for the government, given that the popular expectation that a new judicial system will also be to open prosecution cases and try regime leaders who did have yet to appear before courts.

Notable amongst them are Ali Osman Taha, former vice president; Ali Karti, former foreign minister and the founding head of the Popular Defense Forces. These also include Bakri Hassan Saleh, another former vice president and close confidante of Al-Bashir who served as prime minister, as well as Salah Gosh, former head of the NISS; Qutbi Al-Mahdi, another security apparatus leader and Nafie Ali Nafie, former presidential advisor and former vice-chairman of the NCP.

Sudan’s involvement in Yemen?

Although the government reset is a significant step towards an independent and neutral Sudanese foreign policy, as clarified by Lt. General Shamsaldin Kabbashi, member of the sovereignty council; the Sudanese forces involvement in Yemen will surely result in the government taking a pragmatic foreign policy.

Amidst mounting calls by the Sudanese public demanding the withdrawal of Sudanese forces in Yemen, both civilian and military members of the sovereignty council are engaged in protracted debates over the matter, where Lt. General Burhan, Lt. General Kabbashi and Lt. General Hamdan Dagalo “Hemedti” strongly stand against the withdrawal.

The military members of the council disagree with the withdrawal of Sudanese forces because both Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have provided a $3 billion economic package that intends to keep Sudan’s forces in Yemen, and to also sway Sudan away from the perceived Qatar-Turkey alignment.

But the matter may simply be one of personal loss. If a Sudanese withdrawal takes place, the figure who stands to lose the most is Lt. General Hemedti, head of the infamous Rapid Support Forces [RSF] who has more than 30,000 troops stationed there, with salaries paid to him directly by his Gulf allies.

As Hamdouk and his government contend with these challenges, and others that have yet to manifest; Sudan has already shown signs of governance.  With the first civilian government in 30 years that is representative of their hopes, aspirations of freedom, and desire for peace and justice; Sudan’s population is hopeful.

However, given the high expectations of the government, Hamdouk will be required to deliver on popular demands, or will expect to face another revolution, as noted by Nazar Abdel Azziz, a leader within the DFCF.

If Sudan will prevent the deep state from undermining the transitional period, it is highly recommended that the DFCF opposition continues to provide a healthy opposition to the government.

To maximize the impact of this policy, they need to unite behind a nationalist consensus that supports it in governing this crucial transitional process.