Morocco is a Winner of the Al-Ula Summit

In addition to keeping strong relations with Western powers, one of the pillars of Moroccan foreign policy is the maintenance of its deep ties to all six Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) members. The extent of the close relations between Rabat and the Gulf monarchies was underscored a decade ago when there was a serious discussion on the North African kingdom joining the GCC amid the Arab uprisings’ unrest. Therefore, the Moroccan leadership welcomed last month’s GCC summit in al-Ula, which led to a partial resolution of the three-and-a-half-year Gulf crisis, given Rabat’s vested interests in fostering stronger partnerships with all of the Gulf sheikdoms, rather than being pressured to pick sides in intra-GCC disputes.

The North African country’s historic partnerships with all the Arabian sheikdoms drove Rabat to avoid taking sides in the GCC crisis. Instead, Morocco has been a strong advocate of diplomatic measures aimed at enhancing stability and decreasing polarization in the Gulf. For Rabat, a strong and unified GCC serves these interests. When explaining why Rabat stands to benefit from the al-Ula accord, Mohamed-Karim Boukhsass, a Moroccan journalist, explained that “the strategic depth of Morocco to the East is the GCC, so it is in its interest that the Gulf cooperation wheel returns to rotation.”[i]

Having adopted a strategy of neutrality to the GCC dispute, Morocco refused to join the anti-Qatar bandwagon. Rather than siding against Doha, Moroccan King Mohammed VI offered to mediate between the two sides. In November 2018, he visited both the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Qatar to urge reconciliation. The blockading Quartet, however, did not appreciate Morocco’s position. In this zero-sum crisis, the blockading states saw neutrality as, by default, a ‘pro-Qatar’ position. Rabat’s refusal to side against Doha irritated Abu Dhabi and Riyadh. Moreover, Morocco, like Tunisia, did help the Qataris weather the blockade, which Abu Dhabi and Riyadh saw as undermining their abilities to strongarm Doha into capitulating to their maximalist demands. “Thousands of Moroccans went to Qatar to develop their food production, agriculture, and other blockaded sectors that needed a massive injection of labor and know-how,” explained William Lawrence, a former US diplomat and political science professor at American University.[ii]

Rabat’s otherwise strong relations with the UAE and Saudi Arabia experienced some volatility from 2017 to 2020 due to the strong Morocco-Qatar relationship among other sensitive issues. Tensions between the Abu Dhabi-Riyadh alliance and Rabat were further contributed to by both Morocco’s departure from the Saudi-led Arab coalition in Yemen in February 2019 and the Emirati and Saudi media outlets reporting on the Western Sahara conflict in a manner that the Moroccan government found incendiary.

In 2018, Saudi Arabia lobbied against Morocco’s bid to host the 2026 FIFA World Cup, which outraged the Moroccans. Rabat, in turn, boycotted a meeting for the members of the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen and also did not receive the Saudi Crown Prince, Mohammed bin Salman (MBS), in Morocco during his North African tour in November 2018. Economically, Riyadh’s direct investments in Morocco saw a sharp decline, with a 69 percent decrease from 2017 to 2018 and an overall 78 percent decrease since 2015. In February 2019, Morocco recalled its ambassador to Saudi Arabia for consultations. The UAE also pulled its ambassador from Rabat in April 2019, with Morocco reciprocating 11 months later.

Rabat also grew uneasy with the UAE’s campaign against virtually all forms of political Islam in the Arab region due to its pluralistic political system, which allows the Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated Justice and Development (JDP) party to function. The same party is also the current head of the execute branch of Morocco’s government. Additionally, Morocco did not receive Abu Dhabi’s and Riyadh’s ambitious agendas in Mauritania well, viewing the Emirati designs for this Maghrebi country as threatening to Morocco’s interests. Specifically, in 2019, Morocco believed that Emirati and Saudi plans for boosting investments in port and military facilities in Nouadhibou (Mauritania’s commercial center and second largest city) were in competition against Morocco’s ports of Dakhla and Tangier Med, according to the European Council on Foreign Relations’ Cinzia Bianco.

Nonetheless, more recent events in Libya led to marked improvements in Morocco’s relations with both Gulf powerhouses which had resented Rabat for continuing its strong relations with Doha. In late 2019 and early 2020, when Turkey intensified its military intervention on behalf of the then-weak Government of National Accord (GNA) and its loosely allied militias, the UAE began having greater problems with Algeria for its refusal to take a firm stance against Ankara’s conduct in Libya. This led to a shift in Abu Dhabi’s approach to Morocco. Rather than taking a stance against Rabat for its refusal to join the boycott of Qatar, the Emirati leadership began to see Morocco as an ally against Algeria. Abu Dhabi and Manama’s decisions to open consulates in Laayoune (a sign of their recognition of Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara) and their support for Morocco in its clashes with the Polisario in Guerguerat in November 2020 underscored the extent to which the UAE had warmed to Rabat notwithstanding its strategic neutrality in the GCC crisis.

Moroccan ties with Saudi Arabia also improved last year. In February 2020, the President of the Saudi Consultative Assembly Abdullah Ibn Muhammad Al-Sheikh visited Morocco to discuss means to improve the Moroccan-Saudi relations. That same month, Rabat’s chief diplomat Nasser Bourita flew to Saudi Arabia with King Mohammed VI’s adviser, Fouad Ali El Himma, for a two-day stay in Riyadh. Notably, Morocco’s improved ties with Abu Dhabi and Riyadh did not come at the expense of Rabat’s relationship with Doha. In fact, after their visit to Saudi Arabia, Bourita and El Himma were also received by Qatar’s Emir Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani in Doha.

By December 2020, Morocco became the fourth Arab state in 2020 to announce its plans to formalize diplomatic relations with Israel. This development boded well for a continuation of improvements in Rabat-Abu Dhabi relations with the UAE along with Washington having put pressure on the North African kingdom to join Abu Dhabi, Manama, and Khartoum in  making this move. With more Arab/Muslim countries opening full-fledged diplomatic relations with Tel Aviv, the UAE finds itself less isolated on this issue, one of the factors which contributes to Abu Dhabi’s interests in seeing more states in the region embrace normalization.

Ultimately, Morocco’s response to the Gulf crisis and the ways in which its response to the blockade of Qatar played out favorably for Rabat in the long-term says much about the Moroccan leadership’s success in shrewdly navigating the Gulf region’s polarization. Ultimately, in the period of time leading up to the al-Ula summit, Morocco managed to improve its relations with Abu Dhabi and Riyadh without having to burn its bridges with Doha. “Morocco is definitely a winner in this reconciliation,” said Riccardo Fabiani, the North Africa project director at the International Crisis Group.[iii] “The reconciliation simplifies Morocco’s foreign policy towards the Gulf and vindicates Rabat’s approach throughout the crisis.”[iv]

As a consequence of the GCC’s January 5, 2020 summit, Morocco’s ties with Abu Dhabi and Riyadh could further improve. Rabat is likely to receive even greater support from the Gulf vis-à-vis the Western Sahara issue. The al-Ula declaration stressed the importance of the “special strategic partnership between the Council of Cooperation and the Kingdom of Morocco.” It also pointed out that the council “recalls its positions and its unwavering decisions supporting the sovereignty of Morocco and its territorial integrity.”

On January 20, King Mohammed VI received the UAE’s Minister of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation Abdullah Bin Zayed Al Nahyan. Talks between King Mohammed VI and Abdullah bin Zayed reportedly focused on the evolution of bilateral relations in various fields. The top UAE diplomat also met his Moroccan counterpart, Bourita, and affirmed his country’s full support for Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara. Economically, the Moroccan-Saudi Business Council held a remote meeting, on January 12, to discuss boosting economic cooperation between the two countries.

The easing of the GCC crisis in early 2021 will “impact Morocco-GCC ties in a positive manner as it will reduce any tensions between the kingdom and the Saudi-Emirati bloc that were triggered by Morocco’s close ties with Qatar,” maintains Yasmina Abouzzohour, a visiting fellow at the Brookings Doha Center.[v] “There will also likely be a decrease in hostile Saudi and Emirati rhetoric on Morocco.”[vi]

At this juncture, Morocco can work to invest in its relations with all Gulf monarchies without having to navigate such a polarized sub-region. Like Algeria and Tunisia, Morocco believes that a strong GCC serves its interests. The Moroccan leadership saw the regionalization of the Gulf feud as highly destabilizing for North Africa and will most likely continue to welcome all efforts to build on the al-Ula summit in order to further repair the rift and bring both sides closer.

Endnotes:


[i] Mohamed-Karim Boukhsass, Interview with Authors, January 23, 2021.

[ii] William Lawrence, Interview with Authors, January 26, 2021.

[iii] Riccardo Fabiani, Interview with Authors, January 25, 2021.

[iv] Riccardo Fabiani, Interview with Authors, January 25, 2021.

[v] Yasmina Abouzzohour, Interview with Authors, January 25, 2021.

[vi] Yasmina Abouzzohour, Interview with Authors, January 25, 2021.

is Morocco a Winner of the Al-Ula Summit ?

In addition to keeping strong relations with Western powers, one of the pillars of Moroccan foreign policy is the maintenance of its deep ties to all six Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) members. The extent of the close relations between Rabat and the Gulf monarchies was underscored a decade ago when there was a serious discussion on the North African kingdom joining the GCC amid the Arab uprisings’ unrest.