About Omer Aslan

Ömer Aslan is an Associate Fellow at Al Sharq Forum and an assistant professor of International Relations at Yıldırım Beyazıt University. He received his Ph.D. from Bilkent University. His current research interests are military and politics in the Sharq region, radicalization, and foreign fighters.
27 May, 2022

Pakistan’s Turkey Relations and MENA Balancing Acts After Imran Khan’s Ouster

Omer Aslan | 27 May 2022 | TR

Pakistan is feeling the aftereffects of populist PM Imran Khan’s ouster. With rupee in freefall, dwindling foreign exchange reserves, and Imran Khan in opposition firing salvoes, the new interim government has turned to foreign relations to seek political and economic support from all corners

Pakistan’s Turkey Relations and MENA Balancing Acts After Imran Khan’s Ouster2022-06-22T12:13:03+03:00
7 Dec, 2020

The Dynamic of Syria’s Return to the Arab League

Omer Aslan | 07 December 2020 | TR

For the last two years, several members of the League of Arab States (LAS) have taken incremental steps to bring Syria back under the LAS tent. Oman never cut diplomatic ties with Syria, and the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain reopened their embassies in Damascus. Several other Arab states such as Algeria, Iraq, Tunisia, and Lebanon have been calling for Syria’s return to the League

The Dynamic of Syria’s Return to the Arab League2022-11-25T13:58:52+03:00
25 Sep, 2019

Pakistan: Balancing Between Iran and Saudi Arabia. The Shah, Ayatollahs, and Kings.

Omer Aslan | 25 September 2019 | TR | AR

Pakistan remains a key actor in the Middle East. ‘Islamic Alliance’ would arguably have already been admitted dead-born more easily if Pakistan had refused to join

Pakistan: Balancing Between Iran and Saudi Arabia. The Shah, Ayatollahs, and Kings.2020-08-15T11:24:47+03:00
7 Sep, 2016

Turkey’s ‘Fractured Military’ in Historical Perspective and Recommendations for a Military Reform Agenda

Omer Aslan | 07 September 2016

The AK Party government’s reaction to the failed July 15th coup attempt has been swift. Within a month, the government declared martial law for a three-month period, issued four decrees with the force of law,

Turkey’s ‘Fractured Military’ in Historical Perspective and Recommendations for a Military Reform Agenda2022-02-03T11:45:12+03:00
31 Jul, 2016

THE JULY 15TH FAILED COUP ATTEMPT IN TURKEY: Causes, Consequences, and Implications in Comparative Perspective

Omer Aslan | 31 July 2016 | TR

On July 15th a group of soldiers inside the Turkish military—ordinarily an expert executioner of military coups d’état - carried out the seventh coup attempt in Turkey’s checkered history.

THE JULY 15TH FAILED COUP ATTEMPT IN TURKEY: Causes, Consequences, and Implications in Comparative Perspective2022-09-22T16:25:58+03:00
17 Feb, 2016

The Syrian Conundrum and the Need for Regional Actors to Strategize

Omer Aslan | 17 February 2016

The Russians flocking to Syria, a ‘lame duck’ American President, and a more daring Iran after the implementation of the nuclear deal with the west all imply that the ‘Islamic Alliance’ proposed hastily and clumsily by Saudi Arabia deserves more serious thought than it has hitherto been granted.

The Syrian Conundrum and the Need for Regional Actors to Strategize2022-01-31T10:58:54+03:00
1 Nov, 2015

Aided and Obligated: The Egyptian Military, a Network Coup and its Aftermath

Omer Aslan | 01 November 2015

Political developments after the July 3rd coup in Egypt must be evaluated by taking into account the new character of coups d’état in the post-Cold War period. As a ‘network’ coup, carried out with the active participation of civilians from different sectors in the process, the coup annulled the possibility of the ‘engagement’ and ‘withdrawal’ of the Egyptian military from the system. Without the withdrawal of this entire network, which will be an utterly onerous task, the Egyptian system may only replicate what was once Turkey’s fate, a tutelary democracy, and that only in the long haul. In the meantime, Egyptian President Sisi will have to walk a tightrope to satisfy the demands of three parties: external pressures for economic liberalization and stability, the Egyptian military-as-institution, and his domestic constituency. The logic of the coup as a politicizing, destabilizing, and paranoia-breeding act, however, may defy all these purposes.

Aided and Obligated: The Egyptian Military, a Network Coup and its Aftermath2016-06-04T22:20:51+03:00
Go to Top